

Culture and Institutions: Studying Subnational Regimes, Immigrants and Moving Borders

Rasmus Fonnesbæk Andersen

Department of Political Science
Faculty of Social Sciences
University of Copenhagen

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Summary

This dissertation investigates the relationship between culture and political institutions. While policy-makers and the general public typically assign a high importance to culture and cultural differences in explaining political regime outcomes, political scientists have been more skeptical. In an age of increasing disillusion with liberal democracy across the world, it is appropriate to assess to what extent this also portends future setbacks for democracy around the globe.

The dissertation consists of seven articles that each seeks to answer questions about the relationship between national institutions, culture and local democracy. Four concern the relationship between political culture and political institutions and seek with different hypotheses, research designs and data to contribute to our knowledge of how political culture affects institutions and vice versa. Two of the articles instead concern how regime transitions happen at the subnational level, to what extent different transitions are similar to national-level transitions and the role of national actors in inducing and preventing subnational regime transitions. One final article is methodological and relates to geography and subnational analysis.

I revisit the theme of culture and institutions with a view to improving causal identification over existing cross-national studies of democratic demand and supply. By using particular situations in which we can separate ‘people’ with internal cultural beliefs from ‘places’ with geographically fixed institutions that are external to the individual, I am able to separate the effects of culture and institutions to some extent. I do this by first studying individuals exposed to new institutions due to moving borders or migration and second by studying subnational democracy.

The dissertation shows that extraordinarily high Scandinavian trust is mostly attributable to post-1920 institutional factors such as the welfare state rather than to deep cultural legacies by using historical and contemporary data from the area affected by the Danish-German border changes in 1864 and 1920. Next, it shows that while migrants’ political participation in Europe is shaped by their ancestral culture, it changes upon arrival and with time to increasingly resemble that in the destination country. Subnational and individual-level evidence suggest that national institutions are not responsible, but rather that natives pass on their norms for participation to their new migrant neighbors through bottom-up cultural diffusion and social interaction.

Next, we move to the study of subnational democracy and regime change. The dissertation first shows that in both democracies and autocracies, strong local coalitions can sometimes undertake subnational regime transitions that create or increase territorial unevenness in democracy. In both democracies and autocracies, equally, national institutions can also reverse these transitions after a while unless subnational leaders make themselves indispensable to national leaders. Focus then turns to the differences and similarities between subnational regime transitions and national regime transitions. Existing literature has emphasized marked differences, but this dissertation shows instead that some modes of subnational transition are very similar to national transitions, while others differ greatly. Specifically, subnational transitions with little outside interference and without violence are similar to many national transitions, while outside involvement and violent transition processes lead to the distinctive character of subnational regime transitions identified in the existing literature.

In the second-to-last chapter, I use this subnational approach to study the ‘democracy gap’ in Muslim majority countries. If the lower levels of democracy found in Muslim majority countries are due to political culture and a relative absence of local-level accountability pressures, then within-country analyses of religiously divided countries should show less democracy where more Muslims live. However, on the African continent territorial differences in perceived democracy do not line up with religious divisions, even when examining only the perceptions of local religious minorities to measure subnational democratic quality. A final chapter discusses how geographical information systems can help political scientists carry out subnational analysis.

Together, the dissertation shows the importance of moving beyond analysis of national institutions and engaging with local politics to better understand not just political culture, but also to bring about meaningful democracy.

Dansk resumé (summary in Danish)

Denne afhandling undersøger forholdet mellem kultur og politiske institutioner. Beslutningstagere og almindelige mennesker vurderer typisk, at kultur og kulturforskelle betyder meget for at forklare, hvilken regimetype et givent samfund har. Politologer er normalt mere skeptiske. I en tid med øget skepsis over for liberalt demokrati over hele verden er det passende at undersøge, i hvilken grad dette også varsler tilbageslag for demokratiske institutioner på verdensplan.

Afhandlingen består af syv artikler, der hver især søger at besvare spørgsmål om forholdet mellem nationale institutioner, kultur og lokalt demokrati. Tre handler om forholdet mellem politisk kultur og politiske institutioner og søger med forskellige hypoteser, forskningsdesign og datakilder at bidrage til vores viden om, hvordan politisk kultur påvirker institutioner og vice versa. To af artiklerne handler i stedet om, hvordan regime-transitioner foregår på subnationalt plan, og derunder i hvilken grad forskellige transitioner minder om nationale transitioner og om nationale aktørers rolle i at foranledige og forhindre subnationale regime-transitioner. En sidste artikel er metodologisk og omhandler geografi og subnational analyse.

Jeg vender tilbage til spørgsmålet om kultur og institutioner med sigte på at forbedre den kausale identifikation i forhold til eksisterende tværnationale studier af efterspørgsel efter demokrati og dets udbud. Ved at undersøge situationer, hvori vi kan skelne 'mennesker' med interne kulturelle overbevisninger fra 'steder' med geografisk udstrakte institutioner, som er eksternt givet for individer, kan jeg i nogen grad skille effekten af kultur og institutioner. Det gør jeg ved for det første at studere individer udsat for nye institutioner grundet grænseflytninger eller migration og for det andet ved at studere subnationalt demokrati.

Således viser denne afhandling, at ekstraordinært høj skandinavisk tillid mestendels skyldes faktorer efter 1920 (såsom velfærdsstaten) snarere end dyb, kulturel overlevering ved at bruge historiske og nutidige data fra det dansk-tyske grænseområde, hvor grænserne flyttedes i 1864 og 1920. Dernæst viser afhandlingen, at indvandreres politiske deltagelse i Europa formes af arv fra deres forfædres kultur, men også ændrer sig efter deres ankomst til i stigende grad at ligne den, som findes i destinationslandet. Data fra subnationalt hold og fra individer tyder på, at det ikke skyldes nationale institutioner, men i stedet at indfødte overleverer deres deltagelsesnormer til deres nyligt indvandrede naboer gennem social interaktion og kulturel diffusion nedefra.

Derefter flytter vi os til studiet af subnationalt demokrati og subnational regime-transitioner. Afhandlingen viser først, at det undertiden kan lykkes stærke, lokale koalitioner i både demokratier og ikke-demokratier at foretage subnationale regimetransitioner, der skaber eller øge territorial ujævnhed i demokrati. I både demokratier og ikke-demokratier, på samme vis, kan nationale institutioner omvende disse transitioner efter et stykke tid, medmindre subnationale ledere gør sig uundværlige for nationale autoriteter. Fokus bevæger sig derefter til forskelle og ligheder imellem subnationale regime-transitioner og nationale regime-transitioner. Den eksisterende litteratur har fremhævet udtalte forskelle, men denne afhandling viser i stedet, at nogle former for subnationale regimetransitioner er meget lig visse nationale transitioner, mens andre er vidt forskellige. Mere specifikt er subnationale transitioner med begrænset ekstern påvirkning og uden vold lig mange

nationale transitioner, mens kun ekstern påvirkning og vold i transitionsprocessen fører til de særlige træk ved subnationale regime-transitioner, som den eksisterende litteratur har identificeret.

I afhandlingens andetsidste kapitel bruger jeg denne subnationale tilgang til at studere 'demokratiunderskuddet' i lande med muslimsk befolkningsflertal. Hvis den lavere grad af demokrati, der findes i lande med muslimsk befolkningsflertal skyldes politisk kultur og et relativt fravær af pres for politisk ansvarlighed på lokalt niveau, så burde analyse af religiøst delte lande udvise mindre demokrati, hvor flere muslimer bor. Analysen viser dog, at territoriale forskelle i oplevet demokrati på det afrikanske kontinent ikke følger religiøse skillelinjer, selv når det kun gælder religiøse minoriteters opfattelse af graden af demokrati. Et afsluttende kapitel diskuterer, hvorledes geografiske informationssystemer kan hjælpe politologer med at udføre subnational analyse.

Som helhed viser afhandlingen vigtigheden af at analysere lokal politik for bedre at forstå politisk kultur, men også for at skabe velfungerende demokrati.

1. Introduction

“[...] as force is always on the side of the governed, the governors have nothing to support them but opinion. It is therefore, on opinion only that government is founded; and this maxim extends to the most despotic and most military governments, as well as to the most free and most popular.”

David Hume, *Of the First Principles of Government*, 1741

1.1 Motivation

People give their lives in the struggle for democracy. But who is willing to risk their life for the cause of free and fair elections, and who is not? And how much does it matter for democratization (or for preventing democratic breakdown) when some *do* risk their lives or otherwise fight for democracy?

Fatigue and disillusion with liberal democracy are on the rise in Western countries and the rest of the world. The most prominent accounts of democratization, democratic breakdown and regime change today give us little reason to believe that faltering mass support for democracy bodes ill for its survival and spread, or do not give an important place to questions of the perceived legitimacy of and demand for liberal democracy (Geddes 1999; Przeworski et al. 2000; Boix 2003; Acemoglu & Robinson 2006; Gandhi 2008; Levitsky & Way 2010; Svoboda 2012; Gibson 2013; Singh 2014; a partial exception is Magaloni 2006). In addition, many scholars are highly skeptical of the importance of political culture for political outcomes (Rustow 1970; Elkins & Simeon 1979; Jackman & Miller 1996; Bermeo 2003; Dahlum & Knutsen 2016).

Is this skeptical assessment of the importance of popular preferences correct or complacent? In emerging and consolidated democracies illiberal political forces can erode democracy or lead to its breakdown if they garner enough electoral support, as in Peru after 1990 and most spectacularly in Germany in 1933 (Linz 1978; Simpang forthcoming). Conversely, popular regimes – whether democratic or authoritarian – can wield support from their partisans as a form of coup-proofing when faced with coup attempts, as in Turkey’s failed coup of June 2016.¹ Post-electoral protests in competitive authoritarian regimes often provide focal points for regime change if dissatisfaction is sufficiently widespread, and opposition actors can successfully coordinate anti-regime coalitions as in Serbia in 2000 (Beaulieu 2014). Challenges by popular opposition candidates, dissidence and other acts reflecting a lack of public support for the regime are taken very seriously by authorities in all non-democracies (King et al. 2013; 2014; forthcoming). Even in closed one-party or non-electoral regimes,

¹ Singh discusses the hypothetical possibility of militaries socialized into voluntary compliance with civilian leaders and of differing military cultures (2014: 223), but he explicitly rejects either differences in elite culture or mass culture and regime support in explaining coup attempts and their success. However, his theory of coordination games, tipping points and self-fulfilling expectations appears fully reconcilable with legitimacy and public support factoring into elite expectations of coups’ long-term outcomes. One of his cases, that of the failed coup in the Soviet Union in 1991, explicitly appears to feature such consequential public opposition to the coup.

committed democrats can eventually subvert authoritarian regimes if they do not succeed in legitimating themselves with strong existential narratives and effective propaganda as in much of Eastern Europe after 1989 (Dimitrov 2014; forthcoming).

Looking over the set of fundamental strategies available to authoritarian regimes, mass support and political culture also appear to have strong implications for how regimes carry out (i) repression, (ii) cooptation, (iii) performance improvement, and (iv) legitimation.

Repression is hard to undertake because security forces or armies sometimes refuse to fire against co-nationals who may also be co-religionists, co-ethnics or even family members. Finding ways around this culturally conditioned distaste for exercising repression is one the main tasks of authoritarian coercive machinery. In the British Empire, minority ethnic groups (such as Sikhs in India, Tamils in Sri Lanka and the Karen in Burma) were disproportionately recruited to the armed forces due to the greater ease with which they could be persuaded to use violence against rebellious, larger groups by colonial officials (Ray 2012). Brett Carter finds that the security apparatus in the Republic of the Congo, appointed by President Denis Sassou Nguesso, is overwhelmingly populated by non-natives in regions that have historically been unfriendly to the regime (n.d.).² But even when regimes manage to create armed forces that use it, high-intensity coercion may also backfire and ignite yet more protest if it is broadly perceived as illegitimate (Martin 2007). On the other hand, law and order policies dispensing repression, especially against outgroups, are surprisingly popular in both democracies and non-democracies (Esberg 2016).

Cooptation of elites – whether sectorally in opposition parties, business, trade unions, religious organizations, etc., or regionally – is another core tool of authoritarian rule (Gandhi 2008; Malesky & Schuler 2010). Cooptation can pre-empt public criticism, opposition coordination, or social mobilization and thus keep authoritarian regimes in power. Yet, again, some actors or groups are harder to coopt than others, perhaps due to strong ideological commitments or to notions of cultural belonging and difference as with nationalist, secessionist or regionalist movements (Levitsky & Way 2013). Clientelism may be seen as a type of *citizen* cooptation by embedding them in long-term, transactional networks, whereby they are induced by the provision of gifts, access to public services or even public employment to support the regime (Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007; Svobik 2012). As at the elite level, however, “good democrats make bad targets” for cooptation or clientelism (Carlin & Moseley 2015), and conversely citizens often *demand* clientelist politics themselves (Nichter & Peress 2016).

Performance improvement is a ubiquitous survival strategy for authoritarian regimes. Authoritarian regimes with broad distributive coalitions such as institutionalized mass parties are likely to promote growth, public goods and other popular policies (Mesquita et al. 2003; Besley & Kudamatsu 2007), even if they often have a hard time getting credible information about citizens’ policy preferences given unfree media (Magaloni 2006; King et al. 2014). However, economic development and the provision of public goods may also undercut authoritarian regimes due to the changes in power balances it engenders (Acemoglu & Robinson 2006). Furthermore, optimizing policy performance

² Numerous examples of using armed forces from other regions or even from abroad exist also from Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain and Syria in the Arab Spring and from the Maidan Revolution in Ukraine in 2014.

often comes at the cost of reducing grand corruption that functions as a tool of elite cooptation to bind together ruling coalitions (Hollyer & Wantchekon 2015). While often highly effective, improving policy performance is not a panacea: in some societies, citizens care more about material outcomes than in others, where the processual aspects of decision-making sometimes take primacy regardless of the policy results produced by the regime (Inglehart 1997).

Finally, *legitimation* is the process of seeking legitimacy from the public by communicating and arguing for the worth and appropriateness of the government and regime more broadly (Gerschewski 2013). Unlike repression, cooptation, and performance, then, regime legitimation is entirely and not only partially about culture and popular support. On the one hand this includes propaganda, information distortion and media control, while on the other are various substantive types of non-democratic legitimation. Naturally, the latter vary from country to country and era to era and rely heavily on a highly context-specific repertoire of historical and culturally salient references. Thus, regimes seek firstly to manipulate information about its performance that might lead citizens to evaluate them unfavorably *given preexisting norms of legitimate government*, and secondly to *alter* these norms in a direction that is more manageable for the existing regime, and wherein it has a comparative advantage.

Non-democratic regimes seek to legitimate their rule on the basis of a number of non-exclusive pillars that are either procedural (oriented towards decision-making practices) or substantive (pertaining to political outcomes). Procedurally, they may claim legitimacy based on (i) personality cults of charismatic leaders, (ii) ideological precepts, (iii) traditionalist appeals to history in long-lived regimes, (iv) bureaucratic norms of technocracy and expert rule, or even (v) religious principles for leader selection. Substantively, a non-exhaustive list of the most commonly claimed legitimacy bases includes (i) law and order in post-conflict, high-crime or ethnically tense contexts, (ii) economic performance, (iii) economic populism in highly unequal settings, (iv) nationalism, often directed against foreign threats, or (v) ethnic or ethno-religious identity against internal threats (Weber 1922; Easton 1965; Beetham 1991; Gilley 2009; Soest & Grauvogel 2015).

Thus, the empirical record and the revealed priorities of non-democratic regimes suggest that popular support and political culture are not merely epiphenomenal or reducible to elite factional interests, economic performance, factor endowments and asset mobility, economic equality, military, western strategic leverage and commercial linkages, etc. Unlike political scientists, policy-makers typically also attribute great significance to culture and popular preferences in explaining large-scale political outcomes. This suggests that we should also study popular regime type support and legitimacy on their own terms, integrating them into the broader literature on authoritarianism and regime change (Gilley 2009).

For this reason, in this dissertation I study aspects of political culture and political regimes (or other types of institutions) with a view to improving causal identification over existing studies. I understand culture particularly as deep-seated values and practices with relevance for the demands, which citizens formulate in the political sphere, and which condition the *nature* and *intensity* of their political participation (Almond & Verba 1963; Inglehart 1988; Nannicini et al. 2013; Nunn 2012)

Citizens' willing deference and voluntary compliance with rules through legitimacy is a more cost-efficient form of rule than forced compliance upheld by monitoring under the threat of violence (Levi et al. 2009). I take as my point of departure models of institutional change and persistence that view institutions as social equilibria reflecting a given distribution of political power between political elites and non-elite populations (North 1981; Mahoney & Thelen 2009). I argue that these equilibria are fundamentally dependent on their normative status in the eyes of both elites and non-elites (Inglehart & Welzel 2005; Greif 2006). No polity may be ruled wholly without consent, and there are distinct limits to how great the divergence between preferences of rulers and the ruled may become. As Linz & Stepan emphasized, democratic consolidation entails the behavioral, attitudinal and constitutional recognition of democracy as "the only game in town" (Linz & Stepan 1996).

Much cross-national research has demonstrated strong correlations of certain cultural traits (such as individualism, egalitarianism and generalized trust) and democratic political institutions with low corruption (see for instance Inglehart & Welzel 2005; Licht et al. 2007, and Gorodnichenko & Roland 2013). However, these studies are based on static cross-country variation potentially due to omitted variables and underspecified theoretical frameworks linking individual-level attitudes and behavior to macro-level change. Most grievously, they are likely subject to endogeneity biases because democracy and low corruption themselves further trust in other people and pro-democracy attitudes.

In order to empirically address this problem of endogeneity, firstly, I use externally imposed changes in national borders and international migration to study individual-level cultural change as a result of changes in experienced institutions and social context. Secondly, I use subnational variation, i.e. differences between provinces, states or other first-level administrative units, to examine the relationship between culture and democracy in a new empirical and theoretical setting that holds a number of country-level features constant.

1.1.1 The research question

Each article in this dissertation has been written to stand alone as a separate contribution to various literatures in political science. The questions they pose are asked for their own sake and answered to the best of my ability using a number of different empirical, methodological and theoretical approaches. Nevertheless, they all ultimately contribute to answering the two overarching research question in this dissertation. The first, in its most abstract form, is:

RQ 1: How does culture affect political institutions and vice versa?

Thus, two articles and one book chapter concern the effects of institutions on individual-level cultural traits, and one article concerns the effect of region-level culture on subnational democracy.

The first set of articles investigate to what extent cultural traits and behaviors are persistent and could potentially shape political institutions, or are rather epiphenomenal and malleable. That is, could culture possess autonomous explanatory power in predicting political attitudes and behavior? By distinguishing between 'people' with internal cultural beliefs and 'places' with geographically fixed institutions that are external to the individual, we are able to separate the effects of ancestral culture

and institutions to some extent. This allows us some leverage in distinguishing the effects of culture and institutions on behavior. I do this first by studying immigrants that carry 'internal' culture, but move to places with new 'external' constraints, incentives and social influences. Further, I distinguish between formal institutions and new socializing contexts in destination countries. Secondly, I investigate the persistence and strength of cultural traits versus institutional influence by instead exploiting border changes to examine the effect of changing institutions on culture for individuals who stay in place. As such, in both articles I study cultural traits and behaviors in people exposed to new institutions, whether the exposure is due to migration or to institutional change. In the book chapter I undertake more conventional literature review of the explanations for high social capital in Scandinavia.

In the final article concerned with the relationship between culture and institutions, I again use the distinction between people and places in order to test whether such cultural differences can in turn further democracy. Because values and politically relevant cultural traits are likely to be endogenous to (national) regime types that seek to perpetuate and legitimate themselves, I examine subnational variation in culture and in democracy and regimes. Here, national regime legitimation strategies and other relevant country-level confounding factors apply relatively similarly to people in all parts of the country. But many countries still harbor large territorial variation in cultural traits and subnational regime practices that allow me to study the relationship between culture and democracy in a new empirical and theoretical setting.

Because this analysis has generally moved to local level for better causal identification and more precise measurement of culture and institutions, it also encounters a number of questions concerned with analyzing political culture and local governance. For this reason, the second research question addressed in the dissertation concerns the multilevel relationship between local politics, national politics and external actors.

RQ 2: How do processes of subnational regime change differ from those in national regimes, and how are they affected by national institutions?

The dissertation also contains two articles concerned with this question that assess and challenge the existing literature on subnational regime change and on how comparable subnational regime transitions are to national-level transitions. Finally, one is methodological in character and pertains to subnational analysis and the use of geographic information systems in political science.

A key question here is when local politics and governance primarily develop based on local dynamics and actors and thus allow for the type of analysis I undertake in the articles that seek to answer RQ 1, and when local politics are instead shaped by external actors and hierarchical dynamics of resource allocation and coercion.

The articles that answer RQ 1 and RQ 2 each make up a chapter of the dissertation. Figure 1 below provides an overview of how the individual articles relate to each other based around the three themes of national institutions, culture and subnational regimes.




Figure 1: Overview of the dissertation chapters

Thus, two chapters 2 and 3 concern the effects of institutions on individual-level cultural traits, while chapters 4 and 5 two concern subnational regime transitions and national institutions. Chapter 6 concerns the effect of region-level culture on subnational democracy, and finally chapter 7 is methodological in character.

1.1.2 Articles in the dissertation

In the remainder of chapter 1, I will go into the key concepts used in the dissertation and finally explore its contributions and conclusions to the research question and to the literature on subnational regimes. First, however, I will briefly introduce the individual articles of the dissertation.

Chapter 2: "Trust in Scandinavia: Findings from Moving Borders between Denmark and Germany."

This article shows that extraordinarily high Scandinavian trust is mostly attributable to post-1920 factors such as the welfare state rather than to deep cultural legacies. Historical border changes between Denmark and Germany in 1864 and 1920 have little to no impact on present-day trust in the affected areas relative to border samples that did not experience changes in territorial allegiance. Late 19th and early 20th century electoral turnout figures from North Germany and South Denmark show that benign effects of Danish rule were short-lived.

Chapter 3: "Social Capital in the Scandinavian Countries." (with Peter Thisted Dinesen). Forthcoming in P. Nedergaard & A. Wivel (eds.) Routledge Handbook on Scandinavian Politics.

This book chapter reviews data and existing literature on social trust and associational life, including the development of social capital in the Nordic countries over time, differences between the Nordic countries. Finally, it evaluates competing explanations for high levels of social trust and associational activity found in the Scandinavian countries today.

Chapter 4: "The (Re-)Socialization of Political Culture: Examining Immigrants' Political Participation in Europe." (with Peter Thisted Dinesen)

This article documents that the institutional and cultural shock of migration affects migrants' political participation through a bottom-up logic of cultural diffusion from residents in their European destination countries. Migrants become less like their ancestors and more like their neighbors the longer time has passed since they have migrated and the stronger are their social ties to natives.

Chapter 5: "Regime Change in Miniature: An Organizing Typology of Subnational Regime Transitions."

This article shows that subnational regime transitions take place in both national-level democracies and authoritarian regimes and both *to* and *from* democracy, not just back to democracy from subnational authoritarianism in national-level democracies as scholars have so far explored. I show that in the very different contexts of the Indian state of Bihar and the Russian oblast of Sverdlovsk, their transitions back to democracy in Bihar and authoritarian party rule in Sverdlovsk came at the behest of centralizing national actors as predicted by the existing literature. However, years earlier their regime transitions *away* from the national regime type came as a result of strong, local coalitions and against futile central efforts to stop them.

Chapter 6: "Transitions from Subnational Authoritarian Rule: Transitology in Short Pants."

This article introduces a novel way of conceptualizing subnational regime transitions that shows how some differ markedly from national regime transitions, yet others are strikingly similar to them. Those led by local incumbent or opposition actors without violence are similar to national pacted or incumbent-led transitions, while subnational regime transitions led by national or international external actors function very differently than any national transition. Subnational transitions featuring violence and intransigence between transition leaders and national political authorities also introduce features unknown in national transitions.

Chapter 7: "Christian and Muslim Regions Are Similar: Religion, Political Culture and Subnational Democracy in Africa."

A large literature has shown that Muslim majority countries are much less democratic than other countries. A prominent interpretation is that this result is due to political culture, such that Muslims are less likely to support democracy or to press for democratic political reform. This article provides evidence from the African continent that Muslim majority regions are perceived as no less democratic than other non-Muslim regions in the same country, however. The implications for the political culture interpretation of the Muslim democracy gap are drawn.

Chapter 8: "It's the Geography, Stupid! An Introduction to Geographical Information Systems in Political Science." Published in Statsvetenskaplig Tidsskrift, 118 (2): 249-265.

This article discusses how GIS, i.e. geographical information systems, can advance political science. I show three ways it can do so: (i) by integrating and visualizing diverse data sources based on shared

spatial referents, (ii) by facilitating new research designs and new units of analysis in political science that potentially mitigate spatial biases in existing research, and (iii) by aiding theory development concerned with political phenomena in-between individuals and countries, particularly relating to hierarchical and horizontal linkages between actors and organizations at different levels of government.

In the rest of the introductory chapter, I first conceptualize and reflect on institutions, regimes and culture and then briefly review recent approaches to the role of culture in institutional change. I then go beyond the individual articles' contributions to present more general conclusions and perspectives from the dissertation. As the last point before the individual articles comprising the dissertation, I give an insight into two subnational undemocratic regimes in India and one subnational democratic regime in Russia and their legitimation efforts and political cultures.

1.2 Key concepts and brief literature review

In this section I define the key concepts of institutions, regimes, and culture utilized throughout the dissertation. I also offer up a brief literature review of existing literatures that have sought to empirically assess cultural change as a cause of institutional change.

1.2.1 Institutions and regimes

In this dissertation, (formal) institutions are taken to mean "rules used by individuals for determining who and what are included in decision situations, [...] what actions can be taken and in what sequence, and how individual actions will be aggregated into collective decisions [...]" (Kiser & Ostrom 1982: 179). As such, constitutions, founding documents (that are followed by actors) and generally accepted, enforceable rules for how decisions are made in organizations represent typical examples of institutions. Such institutions reduce uncertainty over future processes (and thus also to a lesser extent outcomes) by regularizing actors' interactions. This also means that we can speak of more or less institutionalized organizations and polities depending on the degree to which such uncertainty over decision-making processes is present (Chehabi & Linz 1997; Bratton 2007; Levitsky & Murillo 2009).

Institutional change then is the abrupt or gradual change in such enforced decision-making rules in a given domain. The default position in the democratization literature is to regard such change, whether abrupt or gradual, as the result of shifts in power resources among actors and groups. The design and consolidation of institutions is regarded as strategic action by coalitions who change institutions to better suit their interests – unless the 'switching costs' exceed the benefits associated with a different set of institutions (North 1981; Mahoney & Thelen 2009).

The institutions in which I am most interested are regimes, by which I mean a set of rules that regulates the access to political power and the constraints on the scope of decisions (Geddes et al. 2014). As such, political regimes are typically distinguished as ranging from democratic to authoritarian, depending on the degree to which access to power is regulated by support in free and

fair elections and a guaranteed set of political liberties related to freedom of speech, association and organization. Increasingly, however, authoritarian regimes are also distinguished as for instance military, party-based, personalist, monarchic, etc. (Geddes 1999; Hadenius & Teorell 2007; Geddes et al. 2014).³ Juan Linz famously distinguished between authoritarian, totalitarian, post-totalitarian and sultanistic regimes based on their degree of institutionalization, popular mobilization, and repression (Linz 2000 [1975]). In different papers, I adopt different granularities of regime definitions; thus, in “Regime Change in Miniature,” I distinguish only between democratic and non-democratic regimes for simplicity’s sake, while in “Transitions from Subnational Authoritarian Rule” I also distinguish between different types of authoritarian regimes.

Political regimes also exist at the subnational level, either in decentralized electoral frameworks or via central appointment of officials. The literature on sub-national democracy and authoritarianism, at its most basic, is split into two views of this phenomenon. On the one hand are those (most often qualitative scholars) who see the regime juxtaposition between different levels of government as an outcome in and of itself to be explained (most notably Gibson 2005; 2013; Gilley 2010; Gervasoni 2010a and Mickey 2015), while on the other are those (usually quantitative researchers) who regard within-country differences in regime as fine-grained variation that exists in all polities and is amenable to explanation in a similar way to that *between* sovereign states (for instance Ziblatt 2009; Gerring et al. 2015; Asher & Novosad 2016 and Lankina & Getachew 2012).

The first literature sees sub-national regime variation as a phenomenon apart from national-level regimes. As Gibson succinctly puts it,

[T]he study of subnational democratization should not be seen as a theoretical derivative of national democratization, wherein the main challenge lies in identifying which theories developed for the study of countries can be transferred to the study of provinces. [...] Subnational democratization is not democratization in short pants.” (2013: 9)

On the other hand, another literature has approached sub-national variations in political contestation and substantive democracy as a general phenomenon holding everywhere that should be addressed for its own sake (Lankina & Getachew 2006; Ziblatt 2008; 2009; Gerring et al. 2013), and which may be caused by local, sub-national variation in potential causes that also vary at the national level (and not merely by center-periphery relations or multilevel politics). Using sub-national data, these studies have investigated the importance for democracy of factors such as land inequality (Ziblatt 2008; 2009), human capital (Lankina & Getachew 2012; 2013), natural resource endowments (Asher & Novosad 2013), economic structure (Jha 2012), population size (Gerring et al. 2013), and colonialism (Tudor & Ziegfeld 2010). However, with the partial exception of Lankina & Getachew’s (2012) study of the effect of missionaries and human capital on local democracy in India, studies have yet to investigate the relationship between cultural traits and democracy at the sub-national level.

³ Corruption, on the other hand, is related to the exercise of power: a common definition denotes the “abuse of public office for private gain” (Treisman 2000: 399), but a broader definition includes administrative decisions and behavior against rules not for personal gain in relation to nepotism or political favoritism (Gingerich 2013).

1.2.2 Culture

I regard culture as information, broadly construed, that individuals “acquire from other members of their species through teaching, imitation, and other forms of social transmission.” That includes both cognitive information (ideas, beliefs, knowledge) and affective information (values, attitudes, rituals, etc.). For this reason, culture is “capable of affecting individuals’ behavior.” (Boyd & Richerson 2006: 5). Cultural traits are then information transmitted from other people.

A long line of research in psychology has shown that individuals raised in East Asian cultures are on average much more likely to value in-group harmony, social hierarchies and societal conformity than are those of North American or European descent (Oyserman & Lee 2007). Such individuals quite literally *see* the world differently from Europeans, paying more attention to contexts and relations visually rather than to disconnected objects (Nisbett 2003). While East Asia, Europe and North America have been subject to the most systematic study, with high industrialization, economic development and generally strong bureaucratic states in common, the differences between European descendants and individuals hailing from African, Middle Eastern or various indigenous cultural backgrounds instead are probably equally consequential (Henrich et al. 2010).

How then does cultural change come about? While ‘new’ cultural traits can arise as the combination of existing traits in a new manner or in a manner akin to mutations, this is likely very rare, and it will almost always consist of a relative change in the frequency of cultural traits. If all cultural transmission took place faithfully from parents without copying errors, then culture would be relatively persistent, and all changes in culture would be due to natural selection if some cultural traits increase fertility or survival of offspring.⁴ However, cultural traits are also transmitted from non-parents in accordance with different biases: most important are likely conformity and prestige biases, wherein individuals copy cultural traits from the majority or from high-status individuals. As such, formal institutions may shape cultural change if they widely share information on the behavior of others or through the distribution of resources and status they engender by the policies they enact.

There has been a renaissance of studies examining the cultural foundations of human economic and political utilizing high quality data that is available over time and disaggregated to local levels (especially the World Values Survey, General Social Survey, European Social Survey, Life in Transition Survey and Afrobarometer surveys) and more sophisticated research designs such as various natural experiments, multi-country sub-national regression, and panel studies (Ichino & Maggi 2000; Madestam & Yanagizawa-Drott 2011; Kudo 2016; Feir 2013). Particularly relevant to this dissertation, Nathan Nunn and Leonard Wantchekon (2011) study the effects of the African slave trades on trust today and distinguish between the effect of slave trades through enslavement of one’s ancestors (people-based) and that of those who lived where one lives today (place-based). Here, they find a substantial negative effect of the slave trades on different types of trust, but also that the magnitude of the ‘cultural’ effect is about twice the size of the ‘institutional’ effect. Also examining trust, Dinesen

⁴ Our capacity for culture, then, is on the whole adaptive and has come about through evolution of genetic variants that allowed behavior to be epidemiologically transmitted rather than merely genetically evoked because it allowed humans to thrive in locally varying and shifting environments (Boyd & Richerson 2006: chapter 6).

(2013) has used immigration to Western Europe to estimate the causal effect of culture on generalized trust relative to the effect of just institutions and experienced trustworthiness, finding that the effect of each is significant.

Cultural change, however, may also be due to idiosyncratic or autonomously 'cultural' dynamics. Examples are a 'Zeitgeist', which may be seen as a 'cascading' cultural influence associated with conformity biases or interdependent preferences (see Kuran 1991; 1995), or the particular influence of one or several high-status individuals. Such cultural change may also *cause* institutional changes if it changes the relative strength of the coalitions behind an extant political or corruption regime, or if it directly or indirectly changes the preferences over institutions held by important actors.

1.2.3 Political culture and institutional change

A large body of scholarship disputes the arguments presented above asserting the causal importance for institutions of culture. Instead, it emphasizes the endogeneity of values and preferences to external conditions perceived as immutable (Festinger 1957; Lerner 1965), to expectations from social superiors (Milgram 1963; Arendt 1963; Zimbardo et al. 1973), or to elite-directed cultural propaganda (Gramsci 1971; Ryan 1971), and hence rejects the claims of the political culture approach (Elkins & Simeon 1979; Jackman & Miller 1996; Seligson 2002; Bermeo 2003; Teorell & Hadenius 2005; 2006; Dahlum & Knutsen 2016).

The most prominent recent explicitly cultural theory of democratization is Inglehart & Welzel's contention that so-called self-expression values of individualism, political tolerance and activism lead to democratic transition and deepening (2005). Self-expression values both increase the pool of potential activists and protesters who may participate in collective action directed against authoritarian government and increase the likelihood that elites also penetrated by self-expression values will lean towards liberal or democratic reform (Welzel 2007). Hence, self-expression values in the non-elite population raise the demand for democracy in terms of regime-critical protest and collective action, and self-expression values in the elite raise its supply as elites become more likely to initiate democratic transition or deepening because self-expression values lower the price that they will pay to stay in power.

Conversely, populations who do not prioritize self-expression values are less likely to protest government corruption or democratic backsliding. This allows elites to take back decision-making power and limit democracy. Furthermore, populations uninterested in self-expression might even demand repression of out-groups or other restrictions of political or civil liberties. Therefore, the human development framework expects higher levels of self-expression values to causally give rise to higher levels of more responsive democracy, as presented in a simplified fashion in figure 2.




Figure 2: The human development sequence of democratization (formalized and expanded from Inglehart & Welzel 2005).

Another way of thinking about the theory proposed by Inglehart & Welzel (2005) is in terms of political accountability and principal-agent theory. As such, politicians are agents, while the voters (or the broader population) are principals. Therefore, successful political accountability implicates monitoring and enforcement of agents by principals in the form of information-seeking and political participation (both formal and informal) that constrains agents by ultimately threatening to replace them. In that model, then, two factors determine the equilibrium level of democracy: the regime goals set by citizens as principals and the forcefulness with which these are pursued, i.e., the intensity of monitoring and enforcement (see figure 3). These two factors depend on culture: both substantive preferences for regime or democracy types and the importance attributed to responsive government relative to other goods vary between populations. The second factor also depends on social organization to solve the collective action problem of securing the public good of responsive government.




Figure 3: Political accountability as a principal-agent problem

Inglehart & Welzel (2005) find that self-expression values are correlated with democracy. However, self-expression values as a measure has been criticized for being over-empiricist, overlapping and difficult to distinguish (Schwartz 2006). Hadenius & Teorell (2005; 2006) criticize their results as being sensitive to model specification. In addition, their empirical investigation is unable to overcome the endogeneity problem that responsive institutions may also shape cultural values in the direction of liberal and participatory orientations. Reinvestigating the data over time, Dahlum & Knutsen (2016) find no support for the effect of self-expression values on democracy, but instead that “democracy breeds democrats in the long run.” (2016: 3).

A different, recent approach to studying cultural change and institutions examines the cross-sectional relationship between types of migrants and institutional outcomes to infer to the effect of non-migratory individuals. Thus, across countries Foa (2014) finds that the presence of Jewish and Indian diasporas are associated with greater rule of law and democracy, while Chinese population flows correlate with higher bureaucratic quality. Woodberry (2012) shows that the intensity of Protestant missions predicts more democracy across countries through investments in human capital, while Hariri (2012) connects the prevalence of spoken European languages outside of Europe to more democratic governance. All these results, however, are vulnerable to the concern that varying migrants did not just affect the societies to which they traveled through the culture they brought with them (Acemoglu et al. 2001; Glaeser et al. 2004) and to concerns of self-selection, both in terms of emigrants who may not be representative of their home societies and of destinations which may have been more conducive to democracy.

Addressing the latter concern somewhat in moving to the sub-national level, Pepinsky (2014) finds that Javanese districts that were settled more densely by Chinese traders have more well-functioning business-government relations today, while this is not the case for those settled by Arab traders. Echoing Woodberry’s study, Lankina & Getachew (2012) find that missionaries in India had a positive, early effect on schooling and that this accounts for better democratic outcomes in some Indian states than others. Still, however, self-selected foreigners likely had other effects than merely contributing to changing local cultures. Overcoming this concern, Chauvet & Mercier (2014) show that returning

Malian migrants transfer political norms picked up abroad to Mali when they return, increasing the electoral participation and closeness of elections in municipal elections over time. This, however, only goes for those who lived in France and were exposed to democratic institutions and not those who returned from other African countries.

Finally, a few studies use exogenous shocks to investigate the differential effect of these shocks depending on the prevalent culture. As such, studying local-level elections in China, Padro-i-Miguel et al. (2012) find that Chinese villages higher in voluntary organizations respond to the staggered introduction of elections by increasing expenditure on public goods. Nannicini et al. (2013) show that Italian parliamentarians who are criminally prosecuted are punished harder at the polls in constituencies marked by high levels of altruism as evidenced by voluntary blood donations than in those with lower levels of altruism, providing a plausible connection between altruism and democratic quality through political accountability.

After covering the main concepts and a short literature review, I move on to saying something about the areas of overlap between the different articles. Although they stand alone, because the articles address related issues they also hold broader lessons about culture, subnational governance and legitimacy.

1.3 Conclusions and further perspectives

In this section I reflect on the broader conclusions that can be drawn from this dissertation on the three questions of how culture and institutions are linked, how subnational regime transitions take place, and whether political culture and legitimation help explain subnational regime differences.

1.3.1 Culture and institutions

Despite arguments made here in favor of the importance of legitimacy, demand for democracy and culture on regimes, the studies detailed in this dissertation generally do not find a large importance of historical or ancestral culture on contemporary cultural and regime outcomes. I show (1) that extraordinarily high Scandinavian trust (i.e. relative to North Germany) does not appear directly grounded in pre-1920 factors, but at most indirectly so, (2) that immigrants to Europe undergo cultural change and adapt to their new social context and do not strongly hold on to ancestral culture, and (3) that specifically Islamic political culture is not to blame for the low levels of democracy in Muslim majority countries.

However, a number of reservations also apply to these conclusions such that (1) high historical levels of trust and social harmony may have facilitated the construction of a universalist welfare state or consensus-based politics system under a proportional representation electoral system, (2) socialization from natives rather than direct institutional effects on immigrants' political participation account for their increasing similarity in political participation over time, and (3) instead of religious individuals, what matters about religion for political regimes may be religious organizations taking explicitly political stands.

Does culture affect institutions, or the other way around? This may be the wrong question. Even if formal institutions generally shape culture, does that mean that the resulting culture is irrelevant to institutional change and reproduction? It is not clear that this is the case.

Thus, one implication of this dissertation is that we should study cultural *change* at the individual, group and region level in addition to cultural persistence. Migrants in Europe undergo a cultural transformation upon their migration. People are influenced by other people when they move to new social contexts in relatively small groups and interact socially. When they are unable to live in ethnically homogeneous migrant enclaves in the destination country, then migrants are shaped by their new fellow citizens.

Similarly, Danes in South Jutland appear to have converged to the levels of trust enjoyed by the rest of their countrymen after 56 years of isolation. Institutions changed, clearly, as the borders moved and South Denmark was reincorporated into the Danish administrative structure. However, cultural life prevailing in the rest of Denmark – for instance newspapers and civic organizations that had been barred from the area under German rule – also gradually penetrated the region and represented a new cultural influence.

The conclusions reached in this dissertation on the relationship between culture and institutions are more limited and particular than the grand question asked in RQ 1: related to political socialization and re-socialization and immigration, to border changes and political incorporation of new groups, and to subnational governance.

1.3.2 *Subnational regime transitions*

The dissertation also contributes to the expanding literature on subnational institutions and regimes firstly by expanding theoretical coverage to regime-juxtaposing subnational transitions, i.e. the emergence of juxtaposed subnational regimes, and to subnational regime transitions in national-level authoritarian regimes. By expanding this theory in “Regime Change in Miniature”, I show that some of Edward Gibson’s building blocks and insights for subnational authoritarianism in democratic federal states operate comparably in (electoral) non-democracies, but that they differ in regime-juxtaposing transitions in both democracies and non-democracies.

Secondly, I contribute a comprehensive and consistent way of conceptualizing modes of regime transition at the subnational level in “Transitions from Subnational Authoritarian Rule” (what the literature has hitherto referred to as “pathways” or “paths” to subnational democratization). This framework has a number of benefits: (i) It intuitively links the existing literature on subnational regime transitions to the extensive body of scholarship on national-level regime transitions, (ii) it avoids teleology by encompassing regime transitions that do not lead to democratization, and (iii) it includes a number of empirically pervasive modes of transition not present in the extant literature, such as incumbent-led and insurgent-led transitions.

In this section, I make clear the relationship between the two articles and these two contributions. “Regime Change in Miniature” concerns the empirical scope covered in thinking about subnational regime transitions (both in democratic and authoritarian national-level contexts and both *to* and *from*

the national regime type), while “Transitions from Subnational Authoritarian Rule” concerns the way in which subnational regime transitions take place (by incumbent or opposition actors, by local or non-local actors and with or without rupturing the relationship to the national state).

Thus, the eight modes of transition that I derive in “Transitions from Subnational Authoritarian Rule” could each theoretically take place in each of the four cells from “Regime Change in Miniature” (see table 1).

Table 1: Organizing subnational regime transitions and modes of transition

		Does the transition bring about regime juxtaposition or congruence between subnational and national regimes?	
		<i>Regime-juxtaposing</i>	<i>Regime-congruent</i>
What is the national-level regime type in country in which the subnational regime transition takes place?	<i>Democratic</i>	Democratic breakdown	Transition to democracy
		(mode of transition: elite identity X territorial position X insurgency)	(mode of transition: elite identity X territorial position X insurgency)
	<i>Authoritarian</i>	Authoritarian breakdown	Transition to authoritarian rule
		(mode of transition: elite identity X territorial position X insurgency)	(mode of transition: elite identity X territorial position X insurgency)

In order to simplify the task, in “Transitions from Subnational Authoritarian Rule” I only speak of transitions to democracy and authoritarian breakdown from table 1, two of the four cells. However, each of the eight modes of transition is equally a path that a democratic breakdown or a transition to authoritarian rule from table 1 could take.

Putting together the findings from these two articles, we can ask whether some modes of transition are more likely in regime-juxtaposing transitions relative to regime-congruent transitions? Rephrasing the conclusion from “Regime Change in Miniature” in terms of the framework developed in “Transitions from Subnational Authoritarian Rule,” we can say that regime-congruent transitions are *more* likely to be center-led and regime-juxtaposing transitions *less* likely to be center-led, whether in democracies or autocracies. In “Regime Change in Miniature”, I only describe center-led transitions and opposition-led transitions in India and Russia – the regime-juxtaposing transitions are opposition-led and largely local, and the regime-congruent transitions are center-led and largely non-local. However, both Russia and India also have examples of insurgent-led transitions (in Chechnya, Assam, etc.), India has had incumbent-led transitions (in Kerala and Tamil Nadu), and the end of the Soviet

Union saw incumbent-led insurgent transitions (as when the incumbent leader Niyazov pulled Turkmenistan into independence) as described in “Transitions from Subnational Authoritarian Rule.”

Tasks for future research include determining (i) the relative frequencies of the transition modes in regime-juxtaposing and regime-congruent transitions under democracy and authoritarianism, (ii) the (different?) causes of different transition modes, and (iii) their relationship to incumbent and opposition strategies such as those described by Edward Gibson, firstly when transitions are to a *different* regime type than the national regime type and secondly in an authoritarian national environment. Generally, more data collection on democracy, corruption, and human rights protection at the region-level will also be crucial in seeking to better understand

Utilizing within-country variation in explanatory variables when theoretically relevant and empirically possible is likely to move the regime and democratization literatures forward, also with regards to political culture. However, this dissertation shows that the multilevel context of subnational regimes presents a number of difficult-to-measure omitted variables, specifically at the level of the dyadic relationship between the subnational unit and national government, that should be factored into this type of analysis.

1.3.3 Political culture and legitimation in subnational regimes

Because political culture approaches to institutional change and reproduction focus on micro-level causes and macro-level consequences, they are well-placed to undertake multi-level analysis. Conversely, they are well-placed to benefit themselves from doing so as political culture approaches to institutional change have historically been criticized for their inadequacies in this effort and for ecological fallacies of mismatch between individual-level and macro-level analysis (Seligson 2002; Hadenius & Teorell 2006). What role do political culture and legitimation strategies then play for the emergence, survival and breakdown of regime-juxtaposed subnational regimes?

Only one article in this dissertation really addresses this question, namely “Christian and Muslim Regions are Similar.” In this section, however, I also look beyond the debate on Islam and subnational politics in Africa, drawing from the literature on decentralization, federalism and multilevel governance and from subnational politics in the world’s largest countries.

On the world stage today, particular forms of Islam are regarded as some of the most prominent sources of opposition to liberal democracy. In “Christian and Muslim Regions are Similar,” this dissertation shows that Muslim majority regions in Africa are not perceived as less democratic by their Muslim or non-Muslim citizens. Looking more closely, however, the article also shows that Muslims in the more politically knowledgeable and civic-minded than non-Muslims living under the same local institutions and equally democratically oriented. Thus, compared to others within the same country or same regions, they are not bearers of a relevantly different political culture. In this sense, the results from “Christian and Muslim Regions are Similar” are actually consistent with the type of political culture approach that I utilize in this dissertation, and which is previewed in section 1.3.3 in this introduction.

However, the results from Africa show a wide variation in within-country democratic quality. Data

from the Varieties of Democracy dataset also show that African regimes are very territorially varied. Do these differences correspond with differences in political culture?

Within the sovereign states that they belong to, regime-juxtaposed enclaves are often culturally or linguistically particular, have a history of independence or political autonomy, and are situated peripherally in terms of geography. All three conditions obtain for Tamil Nadu, although not for Bihar or Sverdlovsk. Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (2016) refer to such regions as 'Rokkan regions' following Stein Rokkan's pioneering work on center-periphery relations (Rokkan & Urwin 1983). Hooghe & Marks find that such regions, especially if they are populous, often set in motion processes of competitive decentralization, wherein their autonomy prompts demands for more autonomy for other regions as well (2016: 146). This in turn only increases their policy scope for erecting regime-juxtaposed regimes with their own, distinctive modes of operation.

Examples of this phenomenon abound. In Argentina and Mexico, provinces and states with large indigenous populations – such as La Rioja, Santiago del Estero and Jujuy in Argentina and Oaxaca and Yucatán in Mexico – have also seen less democratically responsive subnational regimes (Gervasoni 2010b), and in Mexico also legally communitarian political systems with non-secret votes and only partial suffrage (Benton 2012). In Russia, so-called titular ethnic republics populated by non-Russian ethnic groups are also generally less democratic (Saikkonen 2016), and some (like Tatarstan) have histories of independent statehood or separatist movements. In the Philippines, the Muslim majority southern region of Mindanao is host to both separatist rebellion, Islamist terrorism and regime-juxtaposed authoritarian regimes (Human Rights Watch 2010) – and after June 2016 it is also the home region and political base of the President of the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte.

Indonesia's Yogyakarta Special Region is a monarchy with the king serving as leader of the city state region after 200 years as an independent sultanate from 1745 to 1945. Ukraine's eastern Russian-speaking oblasts of Donetsk and Kharkiv were subnational fiefs of the Party of Regions from 2002 throughout the Orange Revolution of 2004 and until Viktor Yanukovich's fall in February 2014. Kurdistan is an enclave of democracy in Iraq (Voller 2015). Large swathes of Sri Lanka's Tamil North and East regions formed part of a quasi-totalitarian counter-state under Vellupilai Prabhakaran from 1983 to 2009 and remain militarized zones of civil rights violations after the massacre of LTTE leaders and cadres that ended the civil war in May 2009 (Mampilly 2011). In Northern Cameroon, pre-colonial Lamido rulers retain wide legislative, judicial and imprisonment powers and are considered major human rights abusers (Boone 2014: chap. 7).

Thus, in many culturally distinct regions of the world's most populous countries, subnational politics differ from the majority communities. The US South in the second half of the 19th and first half of the 20th century is yet another example of a culturally distinct community co-existing with radically different subnational political regimes (Mickey 2015). Interestingly, cultural change from in-migration of northern whites was argued as one cause of the fall of the one-party US South by Earl and Merle Black in *Politics and Society in the South* (1989: 16-20) and was also connected to it before the fact by V.O. Key in his classic *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (1949: 86-87).

Due to the lack of systematic data on subnational levels of democracy, we cannot use conventional regression methods to investigate the relationship between local cultural difference and subnational

regime type. Out of necessity, then, the cases mentioned here are selected on the dependent variable with the well-known problems associated with it (Geddes 1990). We must await the collection of more and better data before we can say something more conclusive about the relationship between political culture and the levels of democracy prevailing in the world's subnational regimes.

However, in the meantime we *can* study particular subnational regimes and their political culture qualitatively and see to which extent particularly democratic and authoritarian regimes also display differing political cultures. Before moving into the dissertation proper, I therefore present a brief detour where I present three cases of regime-juxtaposed subnational regimes in India and Russia and their legitimization efforts and political cultures.

This snapshot is intended to give a sense of texture to the mostly quantitative treatment of the question of political culture that this dissertation offers. Then, we move into the actual papers comprising the dissertation.

1.4 Political Culture and Legitimation in Bihar, Tamil Nadu and Sverdlovsk

Propaganda, cultural resonance and legitimization concerns were prominent in the three subnational regimes that I have studied the closest, especially in the two subnational authoritarian regimes. In this section, I will draw from these three regimes: Lalu Prasad Yadav's in Indian Bihar from 1990 to 2005, Jayalalithaa's in Indian Tamil Nadu from the early 1990s until today, and Eduard Rossel's in Russian Sverdlovsk Oblast from 1995 to 2004. One reason that concerns of legitimacy, 'branding' and propaganda loom so large for the regimes headed by the two Indian, undemocratic officeholders is that, like competitive authoritarian regimes at the national level, they are electoral authoritarian regimes. Although they can tilt the playing field in their favor, they also have to grapple with popular support even if it is in partially managed electoral processes. On the other hand, in Eduard Rossel's subnational democratic enclave, the popularity of the regime was anchored to a much larger degree in technocratic policy performance than in charismatic leadership.

To preview the patterns found, both internal dynamics and the multilevel aspect of subnational politics are evident in these subnational regimes' legitimization strategies. All three regime-juxtaposed enclaves displayed cultural particularities arrayed against outside elites: Lalu's *raison d'état* was protecting lower-caste Biharis against the traditional upper castes in the Congress party, Jayalalithaa's Tamils against a Hindi majority, and Rossel's a western-oriented reformist population against the post-communist nomenklatura. Rossel's democratic regime relied heavily on legitimization derived from its growth record, negotiation position vis-à-vis Moscow and liberal politics. Lalu's and Jayalalithaa's authoritarian (or hybrid) regimes, on the other hand, relied on charisma (and a personality cult in Jayalalithaa's case) and a strong caste and linguistic basis, respectively.

1.4.1 *Lalu Prasad Yadav in Bihar:*

Like a North Indian Hugo Chavez, Lalu was extremely charismatic and spoke directly to the lower castes and Dalits. Bihar has historically been marked by tremendous upper caste dominance, although upper castes make up only 15 percent of Bihar's population. In colonial times *zamindar* landowners

were empowered as local intermediaries by the British, and the post-independence Bihari Congress Party was equally dominated by upper caste politicians. Thus, Lalu became extremely popular for his brash, populist manners and perceived closeness to lower-caste voters. In 1991 he uttered the infamous and hugely popular refrain of “Bhurabal hatao” or “wipe out the upper castes” (Witsoe 2013: 63). He also received the unconditional support of Muslim Biharis for personally protecting Muslims against the Hindu nationalist agitation and violence that plagued other states in the period.⁵ By placing himself as a lower-caste politician in the Chief Minister’s mansion, Lalu upended the state’s sociopolitical hierarchies. He excelled in the politics of recognition, continually stressing lower-caste self-respect or ‘izzat’ (see Witsoe 2013 for an argument that Lalu substantially democratized Bihar for this reason despite degradation of procedural democracy).

For a long time, Lalu was able to disarm criticisms over lacking development, corruption, and repression in this way. When his detractors in the national media, upper castes and the National Democratic Alliance opposition coalition running against him in 2000 rightly called his regime the “Jungle Raj” for its rampant crime and corruption, Lalu extracted the casteism from the criticism to his advantage. If Bihar is the jungle, that is because the upper castes think you and I are animals, he would retort. When the upper castes say they want to finish “Jungle Raj”, they really want to end the rule of the poor people, Lalu thundered.

Perhaps because Lalu’s mass appeal depended greatly on his adroit image and media management, his media repression was never systematized. The upper caste-dominated Bihari media often vehemently opposed Lalu to the advantage of his ‘lower caste warrior’ image (Ninan 2003). Despite the lack of systematized media control, journalists were kidnapped and threatened on occasion by individuals close to the Lalu government, and most media were guardedly non-specific when discussing corruption or the issue of criminalization of politics in Bihar (Sengupta 2013; Singh 2015: 95-96; Kumar 2004). Thus, it took a Kolkata-based newspaper to break the scandal in early 1996. Ravi S. Jha, the journalist in question, received indirect death threats for his reporting on the Fodder Scam and took a job transfer out of Bihar after 20 months, before eventually leaving India for Canada (personal correspondence).

1.4.2 *Jayalalithaa in Tamil Nadu:*

2000 kilometers to the south of Bihar, Jayalalithaa’s personality cult in Tamil Nadu is astounding. A former movie star, she was the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu from 1991 to 1996 and from 2001 to 2006, and she has held the same post from 2011 until today.⁶ Both Jayalalithaa, the founder of her AIADMK party from whom she took over the party, and her long-time opposition party rival and ex-Chief Minister Karunanidhi hail from the Tamil-language film industry. It is a widely admired symbol of Tamil nationalism against perceived Hindi dominance, and both Jayalalithaa and Karunanidhi use dramatic political theatrics in their self-presentation. In January 2016, 4 months in advance of the

⁵ Massacres such as the Gujarat Riots in 2002 killed over one thousand Muslims and Hindus, and the Mumbai Riots and bombings in late 1992 and early 1993 killed about 1250 people

⁶ As with Lalu in Bihar, a number of lawsuits on corruption charges have meant that she has not always held the official post of Chief Minister over this period. In these occasions she reigned indirectly through loyal party lieutenants.

state assembly elections, her image was everywhere: On walls, scooters, police cars, flags, posters, billboards, trashcans – everywhere. Her supporters have drawn pictures of her using their own blood as paint and set themselves on fire during her many out-of-state corruption trials. She is referred to by them either as ‘Amma’ (Mother) or as the ‘Revolutionary Leader’. A large number of highly subsidized government schemes have been launched under the ‘Amma’ brand since 2011 (with Jayalalithaa’s face on most of them), including canteens, pharmacies, laptops, smartphones, fans, kitchen mixers and grinders, bottled voter, salt, seeds, and even cement. Most recently, Amma parks and outdoor gymnasiums have been added to the list.

Jayalalithaa’s image in the media is also carefully crafted. Jayalalithaa is the majority shareowner of her own TV station, Jaya TV, among the top five in news viewership. Sun TV, by far the largest media conglomerate in Tamil Nadu, is owned and operated by her rival Karunanidhi’s nephew (Forbes India 2012). The regime’s media control extends to the courtrooms: from March 2011 to July 2016, she and her government filed 213 criminal defamation cases against opposition politicians and media critical of her (The Hindu 2016). A prominent Tamil journalist’s biography of Jayalalithaa with Penguin Publishers was challenged in the Tamil Nadu courts in 2011 before its release and given a permanent injunction under the right to privacy. A new e-book version that cut one third of its material was released in May 2016 (personal correspondence). When Jayalalithaa was hospitalized in September 2016, two people were arrested over ‘spreading false rumors’ about her health on social media, and 40 other charged with defamation suits (BBC World 2016).

1.4.3 *Eduard Rossel in Sverdlovsk Oblast:*

Compared to Lalu and Jayalalithaa, Eduard Rossel is positively bland. Although a powerful politician in his day, his appeal was that of an effective representative more than a messiah. Although Sverdlovsk oblast under Soviet Russia was deprived of the type of limited Western influence known in St. Petersburg and Russia (Yekaterinburg being a closed city until 1991), it also fostered reformists such as Boris Yeltsin. Opposition groups appeared in January 1988, much earlier than in other parts of Russia. In the elections of March 1990 for the so-called *soviet* councils at the city and oblast levels, non-communist democratic forces did extremely well, capturing 60 of 200 seats in the Yekaterinburg city *soviet* (Gel’man & Golosov 1998: 33; Fish 1996: 149-150).

Somewhat paradoxically, one explanation for Sverdlovsk’s early political progressivism may be its highly educated and trained labor force stemming from its past as a closed city. Sverdlovsk had a scientific technical intelligentsia engaged in high-technology research in the industrial and defense sectors of the erstwhile closed city, some of whom became pro-reform candidates (Denezhkina & Campbell 2009: 207; Gel’man & Gosolov 1998: 33). After 1989, Rossel also helped attract foreign direct investment into Sverdlovsk, including a large number of EU-funded democracy-promoting aid projects through the TACIS programme (Lankina & Getachew 2006: 555). A number of diplomatic missions set up shop in Yekaterinburg in the 1990s (Carter 2015: 151-155). Rossel was the orphaned son of ethnically German peasants who were killed during Stalin’s purges in 1936-38, and accordingly his foreign links with Germany and German businesses were especially strong.

Thus, the three regimes each claimed legitimacy according to both procedural and substantive criteria and in accordance with the pre-existing political culture or with structural conditions in the regions that they ruled that let them create new, compelling political narratives.

Having shown more concretely how I think about political culture, legitimation and subnational regimes, we now move to the seven articles that make up the dissertation.

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2. Trust in Scandinavia: Findings from Moving Borders between Denmark and Germany

Rasmus Fonnesbaek Andersen¹
University of Copenhagen, Department of Political Science

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Abstract: Scandinavian societies express the world's highest levels of trust in surveys and display high levels of social capital more generally. Scholars and policy-makers disagree on whether this reflects high economic equality brought about by inclusive, universalist welfare states after WWII or historical legacies of political stability and relative social harmony. This paper utilizes a geographic regression discontinuity (GRD) natural experiment from history of moving borders between Denmark and Germany to examine the effect of belonging to a Scandinavian state on trust and cooperative behavior. Results from historical Danish rule prior to 1864 in North Germany and German rule in South Denmark from 1864 to 1920 suggest that institutional differences influenced early mass political behavior, but not social behavior. However, such early regime impacts petered out quickly. Today, there is little to no discernable difference in trust attributable to Danish state heritage in North Germany or South Denmark. This suggests that sizable differences in social trust between Germany and Denmark are instead attributable to post-1920 factors.

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2.1 Introduction

Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Iceland consistently show the highest levels of social trust in the world, leading some scholars to speak of a 'Nordic Exceptionalism' (Delhey & Newton 2005). Trust and the social bonds of community are widely regarded as facilitating collective action by lowering monitoring costs of informal social control and by increasing altruistic preferences. Social capital – i.e. strong social networks and associated norms of generalized reciprocity – is seen to promote economic growth (Helliwell & Putnam 1995; Knack & Keefer 1997; Tabellini 2010), lower corruption directly or indirectly (Rose-Ackerman 2001; Bjørnskov 2011), and increase the responsiveness of democracy (Putnam 1993; Boix & Posner 1998; Nannicini et al. 2013).

Scandinavian countries' social cohesion, low corruption and high equality are widely admired in the rest of the world and have attracted many policy efforts to learn from Scandinavia. The Scandinavian countries have been held up as a model to emulate across the political spectrum: by the classically liberal weekly *The Economist* (2013) and most recently in the 2016 US presidential campaign by the leftist Democratic primary candidate Bernie Sanders.

But how do you 'get to Denmark'? Rothstein & Stolle (2003), Torpe (2003), Rothstein & Uslaner (2005) and Delhey & Newton (2005) highlight low economic inequality and low corruption as the underlying explanation for high Nordic trust. They attribute these desirable attributes to the universalistic Social Democratic welfare states. Many center-left and leftist politicians and policy-makers in the Nordic countries and elsewhere share the same intuition. Supporting a policy-oriented perspective, extraordinarily high Danish trust is in some respects also a dynamic and more recent phenomenon; the proportion of Danes who answer in the affirmative that most people can be trusted has risen from 47 percent in 1979 to 79 percent in 2009 (Sønderskov & Dinesen 2014).

Why do Denmark and Germany differ in the design of their social policies, then? Esping-Andersen (1990: chap. 5) points to the strength of labor and left parties in Scandinavia, while Iversen & Soskice (2006) and Manow (2009) instead emphasize electoral systems of proportional representation and the absence of a state-church cleavage that divides the working class as in religiously divided societies.

Yet an alternative hypothesis concerning the historical genesis of highly redistributive universalist welfare states is that high pre-existing levels of trust, social capital and social solidarity protect against problems of moral hazard inherent in universalist-type welfare states and help spur strong labor movements capable of solving collective action problems. Thus, historical legacies of social harmony and high trust may thus themselves shape the design of social policy and patterns of inequality (Algan & Cahuc 2009).

Some evidence suggests that extraordinarily high Scandinavian trust also has deep roots in the past. Descendants of Scandinavian immigrants to the United States have also been found to be the most trusting and civically minded of American ethnic groups, having levels of trust close to those of native Scandinavians, despite their ancestors having emigrated in the late 19th or early twentieth centuries (Rice & Feldman 1997; Uslaner 2008). Also suggestive of high trust, industrialization in Denmark was atypical in being driven by the so-called cooperative movement composed of Danish peasants who banded together to buy and share capital equipment in the late 19th century (Fernandez 2014). Despite the increase in trust in Denmark, the Danish-German difference is large over the entire period from 1981 to today and even widens slightly in favor of Denmark (see appendix A1).

A number of other studies have found that social capital and trust have deep historical roots: Late medieval free cities in Italy and Germany (Putnam 1993; Jacob 2010; Guiso et al. forthcoming), the African slave trade (Nunn & Wantchekon 2011), Habsburg bureaucracy in Central and Eastern Europe (Peisakhin 2010; Becker et al. 2015; Grosfeld & Zhuravskaya 2015), the introduction of the Code Napoleon in Southwest Germany during the Napoleonic wars (Buggle 2016), and East German communism (Rainer & Siedler 2009; Jacob & Tyrell 2010) have all been associated with higher trust or mistrust today.

In contrast to previous research investigating the high levels of trust in Scandinavia, I alleviate the endogeneity concerns in examining the relationship between political institutions and social capital by exploiting a natural experiment from history: the border between Denmark and Germany first moved north in 1864, and it then receded some of the way back south in 1920. Thus, South Schleswig and Holstein in present-day Germany belonged to the Danish crown until the Second Schleswig War in 1864. On the other hand, North Schleswig (referred to today as South Jutland) belonged to Prussia and then the German Empire from 1864 to 1920 when it was returned to Denmark after a plebiscite.

This research design provides us with exogenous variation in terms of 'being a Nordic state': Schleswig and Holstein (henceforth, the duchies) have been part of one, but are no longer, while North Schleswig is part of Denmark now, but for a 56 year period less than a hundred years ago was not. Thus, this study analyzes the effect of two treatments on trust and social capital: the effect of differences between the Danish composite state and the German lands pre-1864 and the effect of differences between Denmark and the German Empire between 1864 and 1920.

The primary inference in this paper is made on the basis of within-country comparison over time, thereby holding constant various historical and contextual factors that are specific to either Germany in the post-1864 period or Denmark after 1920. The analysis therefore informs us on *when in time* we should look for causes of high Danish (and potentially Nordic) trust: if the duchies displays higher levels of social capital that are attributable to Danish rule, then we should in part locate the causes of high present-day trust in Denmark in early shared experiences in the Danish composite state before 1864. If North Schleswig displays lower social capital attributable to German rule, then we should expect that some of the causes of high present-day trust are to be found in dissimilar experiences from 1864 to 1920. If neither displays lower trust or social capital, then we would assume that the causes of high present-day trust should be located after 1920.

In order to undertake this investigation systematically, this paper utilizes electoral turnout over time at the district-level in Denmark and Germany, an original archival dataset of German gymnastics clubs at the historical county level, as well as survey data at the contemporary municipal and constituency level for Denmark and Germany.

The results presented show a positive association of pre-1864 Danish rule on electoral turnout in the duchies from the 1870s onwards and a negative association of German rule on electoral turnout in North Schleswig after 1920. In both cases, turnout then relatively quickly converges to the turnout levels in the geographically proximate non-treatment areas that did not change territorial allegiance. However, historical Danish rule is not associated with higher organizational membership (a measure of social capital) in the duchies when measured immediately following their incorporation into the Kingdom of Prussia in 1864. Examining different types of trust using contemporary survey data from two border samples of Germany and Denmark, the analysis also finds no consistent differences between the border treatment areas and non-treatment areas. The analysis then shows that any

effects of historical institutions have largely played themselves out today. The markedly higher levels of trust found in Denmark than in Germany today then do not appear directly related to pre-1920 historical institutions.

Summing up, the article provides a novel way to examine the question of Scandinavian exceptionalism in social trust based on within-country evidence that varies historical institutions, but holds culture in the form of language constant. I use both historical data concerning the time period in which effects are expected to be ‘freshest’ and strongest and contemporary data to test whether effects persist until today. The natural experiment is particularly fortunate because the border moves twice, and we therefore can utilize territorial variation both within Denmark and within Germany. Finally, compared to other articles utilizing geographic regression discontinuity designs to study trust, this one looks at variation between contexts with high and very high trust instead of low-trust contexts such as Eastern Europe, Italy or Sub-Saharan Africa.

The article first refines the research question, presents the research design employed in the study and then presents the history of the two border region cases. Next, I assess the Danish-German gap in trust and social capital. I then present OLS results supporting the argument using historical and present-day data. I then draw conclusions for the phenomenon of high trust in Scandinavian countries.

2.2 Research Design and Historical Background

As both Denmark and Germany are societies with high levels of trust and social capital in a global perspective, the analysis zooms in on a little examined question: How may we account for differences in trust and social capital in the most trusting societies, and do historical political institutions shape trust? In this section, I first spell out the logic of the research design and the two geographic regression discontinuities within present-day Denmark and Germany. I then specify what the two treatments of Danish relative to German rule consist of in the two relevant time periods of pre-1864 and 1864-1920. In the final two sections, I first give more historical, qualitative detail on how Schleswig and Holstein were governed under Danish rule until 1864 and then on how North Schleswig was governed under German rule from 1864 to 1920.

2.2.1 Research design: Geographic regression discontinuity

The research design employed is a geographical regression discontinuity (GRD) design, utilizing two geographical boundaries: first, that between the historically Danish-ruled territories in North Germany (the regions marked II and III in figure 1) and the closest German lands to the south. Second, the boundary separating Denmark’s Southern-most areas (I in figure 1), ruled by Germany from 1864 to 1920, and the territories immediately north thereof. The present-day boundary separating Denmark and Germany is that separating regions I and II in figure 1.

In line with a larger literature exploiting border shifts to isolate variation in political institutions (Diamond & Robinson 2010; Keele & Titiunik 2014), I regard the border shifts as natural experiments that exogenously change the institutions that some citizens live under based on location.² This study therefore analyzes the effect of two treatments on trust and social capital: the local effect in the border

² One may argue that treatment assignment for the populations of interest does not qualify as fully ‘as-if random’ (Dunning 2012), but following other comparable studies I regard the term as fully justified.

region of differences in governance between the Danish composite state and the German lands pre-1864 (in regions II and III) and the effect of differences in governance between the Kingdom of Denmark and the German Empire between 1864 and 1920 (in region I).




Figure 1: Denmark and Germany and historically changing borders. Region I is in present-day Denmark, regions II and III are in present-day Germany.

Spelling out the logic of the paper, I analyze two regions that shifted territorial allegiances and their differences vis-à-vis the regions bordering them, which did not change territorial allegiances. The first is *North Schleswig/South Jutland* (the region marked I in figure 1): It belonged to Denmark before 1864, then to Germany from 1864-1920, and to Denmark since 1920. Danish has historically been spoken in this region, although administratively it was ruled by German-speaking nobles under the house of Schleswig (regions I and II together in figure 1 made up the Duchy of Schleswig). After 56 years under German rule from 1864, it joined Denmark in 1920. In North Schleswig, I evaluate the immediate effects of German vs. Danish rule on voter turnout – one proxy for social capital – relative to the border sample directly north of it from 1920 onwards. I then use Danish survey data from 2002 to 2014 to evaluate whether social trust is lower in North Schleswig (present-day South Jutland) than immediately north of it, and whether this is particularly the case for older generations.

The other region is *South Schleswig* (region II) and *Holstein* (region III): they belonged to Denmark before 1864, then to Germany since 1864. German was traditionally spoken in South Schleswig, but it was administratively joined with Danish-speaking North Schleswig and in practice governed by German-speaking landholding elites. Holstein was German-speaking and its own administrative unit and also governed by various German-speaking landholding elites.³ In South Schleswig and Holstein, I evaluate the immediate effects of Danish rule on associational life in 1865 and on voter turnout from

³ The Duchy of Lauenburg was a third Duchy that belonged to the Danish Crown from 1815 and became part of the present-day Schleswig-Holstein. For simplicity's sake and because its post-1815 history and governance was very similar to that of Holstein, I do not further mention it in this article.

1871 onwards. I then use German survey data from 2002 to 2014 to evaluate whether social trust is higher in South Schleswig and Holstein than immediately south of them, and whether this is particularly the case for older generations.

Can we regard the differences in levels of trust and social capital between North Schleswig and the rest of Denmark or between the duchies and the rest of Germany as pure causal effects of historical Danish or German rule? In order to do so, we must make a highly demanding identifying assumption: that all relevant differences other than Danish/German rule (the treatment) vary smoothly at the two within-country boundaries or result solely from the assigned treatment (Keele & Titiunik 2014). In appendices A2 and A3 I use qualitative, historical information to assess the threats to inference from pre-treatment differences, endogeneity, selective sorting and post-treatment bias. I find that overall, North Schleswig and the duchies pose very plausible counterfactuals to the rest of Denmark and to Northwestern Germany, respectively. Selective migration out of North Schleswig (North to Denmark and West to the US) between 1864 and 1920 is the most apparent concern to the comparison. However, insofar as this is correlated with trust, I regard it as a mediator of the effect of German rule.

How was the treatment assigned, i.e. what determined the precise location of the boundary changes in 1864 and 1920? Already in the 11th century the Duchy of Schleswig had become a Danish fief, and from 1460 the royal Danish Oldenburg family also co-ruled Holstein with other royal houses until the Danish King Christian VII became sole Duke of Schleswig-Holstein in 1773. At this point, Denmark was a so-called 'composite state', a multinational empire whose composite parts were in some regards governed separately (Gustafson 1998).

In 1864, The Second Schleswig War led to Denmark's cession of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein to Prussia and then the united German Empire in 1871. In 1864, the border changes after the war followed existing, bounded political units as of 1864. The minor exception was Ribe Herred and eight parishes south of Kolding, which were taken from the Duchy of Schleswig and incorporated into Denmark proper. Denmark's population fell from around 2.5 million to 1.5 million as 520,000 German-speaking inhabitants in Holstein, around 200,000 German speakers in Schleswig, and 200,000 Danish speakers in Schleswig joined Prussia.

The partial reversal of the 1864 boundary came in the aftermath of WWI. A plebiscite in 1920 resolved for Northern Schleswig (population around 160,000) to rejoin Denmark after 56 years away, while Central and Southern Schleswig (as well as Holstein) remained part of Germany. The new post-1920 Danish-German border, however, was the result of a popular referendum on allegiance to Denmark or Germany. The voting zones in Schleswig had been gerrymandered by the Danish government and cut across existing German administrative divisions (Schultz Hansen & Becker Christensen 2008).

Thus, the two boundary changes were not random, but largely based on existing administrative units in 1864 and on linguistic divisions in 1920. Yet crucially they provide us with the opportunity to hold the most important confounder associated with Scandinavian countries in cross-national studies constant: the linguistic aspect of culture. We can compare German-speakers living in territories with the experience of Danish rule with other German-speakers without it from 1864 onwards up until today, and Danish-speakers with the experience of German rule to Danish-speakers without it from 1920 onwards and up until today.

2.2.2 *Specifying the treatment effect of 'Danish vs. German rule'*

What characterized the treatment of historical Danish rule relative to German rule? Due to the problem of compound treatment, in GRDs it is often very difficult to know exactly what the treatment is. Being on one side of a border rather than the other may mean exposure to numerous economic, policy, political, bureaucratic and other treatments, and information on local differences may be hard to come by (Dunning 2012: 300; Keele & Titiunik 2014). As emphasized in the previous section, I analyze the effect of Danish-German differences in local governance before 1864 in the duchies and of Danish-German differences in local governance between 1864 and 1920 in North Schleswig.

How did Danish and German rule differ over the period until 1920 in the border region? Asking this question faces the same difficulty due to limited information on local governance in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Here, I argue that the two political regimes differed in their degree of liberalism and the space for civil liberties and an independent public sphere, especially in the second period from 1864 to 1920. I also note the alternative possibility that German-speakers and Danish-speakers formed a minority in the duchies and North Schleswig in Denmark and the German empire, respectively. I then argue against two other potential differences, namely bureaucracy and land inequality.

Regime differences:

Differences in the degree to which political power is contested, checked by other holders of power and open to popular participation have long been held to account for differences in social capital due to the scope allowed independent organizations and citizen experience in local government (Putnam 1993; Guiso et al. forthcoming).

Denmark's political regime was absolutist until the introduction of constitutional, parliamentary rule in 1849 with some civic and political freedoms. However, prior liberalization took place since 1830: freedom of the press had increased, and representative assemblies with advisory legislative powers had been formed in 1835. The constitution restricted the franchise in 1866, but civic freedoms largely remained. Thus, Denmark was on a trajectory towards parliamentary sovereignty, which was finally established over royal primacy in 1901. In 1915, large enfranchisements made Denmark a full democracy (Knudsen 2006). The latter half of the 19th century in Denmark (often referred to as the 'age of associations') was characterized by a flurry of popular mass movements, voluntary organizations, free church congregations and more, as was the first part of 20th century.

The revolutions of 1848 and 1849 were quashed in German lands. Thus, Prussia and most of the smaller princely German states (with the partial exception of the Free Cities of Hamburg, Bremen, Lübeck and Frankfurt-am-Main) were absolutist until 1871, when German unification introduced parliamentary elections.⁴ Even after the introduction of elections in 1871 in the German Empire, there was no secret ballot, and in Prussia inegalitarian suffrage laws weighted votes cast in accordance with near universal male suffrage by thirds of tax contributions (the so-called 'three-class voting system') such that votes by the wealthy were vastly overrepresented. Furthermore, the Reichstag was counterbalanced by a very strong executive, first headed by the 'Iron Chancellor' Otto von Bismarck from 1871 to 1890 (Abrams 2006).

⁴ This was also the case for the Kingdom of Hanover, Holstein's nearest neighbor to the southwest, which had a liberal constitution only for four years between 1833 and 1837 before it was scrapped.

Minority political status:

Ethnic minorities that are territorially concentrated often find themselves controlled or even repressed by the majority ethnic group in a state. This could have negative consequences for trust and associational life if the minority's self-rule is constrained and its civil society organizations are repressed by the majority. On the other hand, it could also lead to community mobilization against the majority.

German-speakers had some autonomy in the duchies, but were ultimately ruled by a Danish king in a faraway capital city. As nationalism increased in the 19th century both in Denmark and in Schleswig and Holstein, German-speakers increasingly organized as a minority against the Danish state majority. Danish-speakers in the German Empire had no particular autonomy from 1864 to 1920 and also sought to organize to protect their language and culture against the German majority.

Similarities in bureaucracy and land inequality:

Bureaucracy: Competent, uncorrupt bureaucracies capable of formulating policy and delivering public goods have often been associated with higher trust than nepotistic and clientelistic political officials (Rothstein 2011; Peisakhin 2014; Becker et al. 2015; Grosfeld & Zhuravskaya 2014). However, the professionalization of the Danish bureaucracy after 1660 was undertaken by German-speaking and -trained jurists from Schleswig and Holstein along German lines (Ertman 1997: 311). The Prussian bureaucracy from the time of the 'Great Elector' Frederick William I in the early 18th century was therefore comparable to that of the Danish state, as appears to have been the case for the Kingdom of Hanover.

Land inequality: Land reforms undertaken from the late 18th century on led to large-scale sale of land from large landowners to peasants in Denmark. However, they were only incompletely implemented in Holstein and Eastern Schleswig due to the semi-autonomous status of the duchies and opposition from conservative political elites in Holstein (Porskrog Rasmussen n.d.). Thus, the land distribution in Holstein and parts of Schleswig remained highly unequal, and patterns of landholding were comparable to those in Prussia and East Elbian Germany. If anything, they were perhaps more unequal than in the nearest North German states such as the Kingdom of Hanover (iPEHD 2010).

The two 'treatments' that this article studies are the local effects of the Danish-German regime differences in the border region: between the Danish composite state and the German lands pre-1864 in the duchies and between the Kingdom of Denmark and the German Empire between 1864 and 1920 in North Schleswig. Because bureaucratic rectitude and land inequality were largely similar in North and South Schleswig until North Schleswig rejoined Denmark in 1920, we thus cannot evaluate the effects of these two features of history in this article. I argue instead that the 'treatment' of Danish rule consisted primarily of more liberal and democratic rule between 1830 and 1920 and potentially of experiences of minority political status of each region (see table 1).

	Pre-1864:		1864-1920:	
	<i>Denmark</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Denmark</i>	<i>Germany</i>
<i>Political regime</i>	Absolutist until 1830 (liberal constitution adopted in 1849)	Absolutist (outside of the Free Cities), 1848 revolutions quelled	Constitutional: franchise restricted in 1866, parl. sovereignty from 1901	Constitutional from 1871, but landlord-dominated elections
<i>Minority status</i>	German-speakers in duchies minority	No Danish-speakers	No German-speakers	Danish-speakers in North Schleswig minority

Table 1: Differences between Danish and German rule in the two treatment periods.

As such, the study of Schleswig and Holstein and of North Schleswig allows us to examine the role of liberal, representative or constitutional rule from 1830 to 1920. Because the border moves, and the study encompasses two GRDs, it also allows us to discern between general minority effects and specific effects of Danish rule. As in conventional, non-GRD regression discontinuity designs, we are very much estimating a local average treatment effect (LATE). One concern, then, is the degree to which Danish and German rule in the border areas was similar that in their territories as a whole, and whether the LATE estimate can be generalized to effects of Danish and German rule as a whole. In sections 2.3 and 2.4, I seek to evaluate this and formulate hypotheses for the article.

2.2.3 *Schleswig and Holstein in the Danish composite state*

The Danish Crown had inherited the title of Duke of Schleswig and Holstein, but the duchies were not fully incorporated into the Danish state. Thus, the Danish king ruled, but with considerable influence afforded to conservative nobility and landholders in Holstein. Administration was in the German language, and many aspects of rule, such as the liberal constitution of 1849 or thoroughgoing land reforms, were never extended to Schleswig and Holstein. The duchies each had representation in representative assemblies from 1835 as in Denmark proper, but the governance may have been somewhat less liberal and closer to that in the German lands to the south.

In Schleswig and Holstein, as in other German cities, an uprising took place in 1848. It turned into an attempted war of secession from Denmark in the First Schleswig War from 1848-1851 that killed 14,000 troops on both sides. Both fervent liberal German nationalists and conservative aristocrats in the German-speaking part of the duchies fought against the Danish forces seeking to keep the composite state together. Eventually, however, Russia's opposition to recognizing rebellious states and a British-brokered agreement ended the war. In some senses, the First Schleswig War may be considered political repression of an ethnic group's desire for self-government. It led to large-scale social mobilization for war in the duchies. In the aftermath, civil servants who had formed the core of the secessionist government were replaced, but the duchies maintained their representative assemblies. Certain newspapers were closed and symbols of Schleswig-Holstein sentiment repressed

(Glenthøj 2014: chapter 9). In 1864 Prussia attacked, and the Second Schleswig War finally led to Denmark's cession of the duchies.

Thus, post-1849 regime liberalization in Denmark was not representative of the duchies. This lessens the extent to which we can generalize conclusions to Danish rule as a whole. It also means that Danish rule only to a lesser extent constitutes a treatment relative to the control group of comparable North German states. However, I tentatively regard the 'treatment' of Danish rule for the duchies as exposure to more liberal rule, consisting of greater civil liberties and political participation than in Prussia and the Kingdom of Hanover.

If high contemporary levels of trust and social capital in Denmark are due in part to pre-1864 factors that varied between Schleswig-Holstein and the other North German states, then we would expect these to have facilitated the build-up of social capital in Schleswig and Holstein by 1864. That may have persisted up until today depending on the strength of the inter-generational transmission of trust. Thus my first hypothesis is that *Danish rule increased social capital and trust in the duchies until 1864*.

It is also possible that part of the treatment was German-speakers' status as an ethnic minority and the experience of self-organization in war. That part of the treatment, then, does not at all generalize to the rest of Denmark. The second hypothesis, then, is that *majority political repression increased social capital and trust in the duchies until 1864*.

2.2.4 North Schleswig/South Jutland in the German Empire from 1864-1920

In contrast to relatively liberal rule in Denmark culminating in the democratizations of 1901 and 1915, Danish-identifying residents of Schleswig lived under a more closed political system and faced additional political repression as an ethnic minority. Danish newspapers in Northern Schleswig were sought closed in addition to civil society organizations agitating for reunion with Denmark. Thus, the difference in regime is striking in Northern Schleswig in the period from 1864 to 1920, although the moderate repressive efforts directed at the national minority are not representative of the entire German Empire.

Danish-speakers fought back, mobilizing a flurry of petitions such as the 27,473 signatures in favor of a referendum shortly after 1866. After 1888, state schools eliminated the use of Danish except in religious instruction, leading to more petitions. The closure of state institutions, however, led to societal self-organization: 'free' congregations, 'free' schools and 50 community meeting houses were erected to preserve the use of the Danish language (Fuglsang 1920).

Thus, I regard the treatment of Danish rule (which North Schleswig did *not* experience) as greater civil liberties and more liberal rule in the period from 1864 to 1920. Is high present-day Danish trust and social capital influenced directly by Danes' ancestors' experiences of civic life in the 'Age of Associations' from 1864 to 1920 and the incentives that faced them? If so, then we would expect North Schleswig to display lower levels of trust and social capital by 1920 and today than the parts of Denmark that narrowly missed being included in the German Empire. Thus, my third hypothesis (parallel to H₁ in the previous section) is that *the absence of Danish rule decreased social capital and trust in North Schleswig from 1864 to 1920*.

Like German-speakers under Danish rule before 1864, Danish-speakers in North Schleswig also experienced political repression as an ethnic minority and organized as a community in response. Again, this part of the treatment does not generalize to most of the German empire. The fourth hypothesis (parallel to H_2) is that *majority political repression increased social capital and trust in North Schleswig until 1864*.

Note then, that H_1 on the presence of liberal Danish rule and H_3 on the absence of liberal Danish rule predict opposite effects on social capital and trust in the duchies (positive) and in North Schleswig (negative). H_2 and H_4 , instead, each predict higher social capital and trust in the duchies and in North Schleswig relative to the border samples in Germany and Denmark.

2.3 Historical Effects of Danish Rule on Trust and Social Capital

In this section, I use local historical data from the period right after the end of Danish rule in North Germany and of German rule in South Denmark, respectively, to test whether Danish rule had positive effects on historical proxies for trust. I first use district-level electoral turnout to see whether the Danish rule had positive impacts and German rule had negative impacts on turnout. I then move to an original measure of associational life and civil society, namely membership in gymnastics clubs in German-speaking regions in 1865.

2.3.1 Historical turnout: District-level evidence from Germany and Denmark


Reported trust predicts cooperative and altruistic behavior (Glaeser et al. 2000; Gächter et al. 2004) and has been argued to increase probability of voting (Putnam 2000). In the first six rounds of ESS data for Denmark and Germany from 2002 to 2012 the combined measures of generalized, political and institutional trust are correlated with reported voting in the last national election at $r = 0.20, 0.18$ and 0.22 , respectively. Finally, the measure is observational, reflecting real, consequential behavior undertaken by the entire population without sampling error.

Following Putnam (1993) and Jacob (2010), I therefore examine constituency-level turnout data to assess whether there are differences between the former duchies and North Schleswig and their respective border samples in the immediate aftermath of Danish and German rule, respectively. The time-varying nature of the turnout data also allows me to test whether there is convergence between the two treatment and comparison groups over time. This would be expected if there are historical effects of Danish rule that gradually fade out.

Using the CLEA database of constituency-level election results for parliamentary elections from 1871 to 2009 in Germany, I code constituencies as being in territory that was historically ruled by Denmark or in the border sample (see figure 3) – consisting of electoral constituencies in the three West German Länder closest to Schleswig-Holstein of Hamburg, Lower Saxony and Bremen – to approximate a geographical regression discontinuity design (see appendix A4 for coding details).⁵ In Denmark, I examine constituency-level turnout data from South Jutland's reunion with Denmark in 1920 to 2011

⁵ The number of constituencies in the sample is 32 from 1871 to 1912, between 3 and 6 from 1919 to 1933 and between 41 and 53 from 1949 to 2009.

and code constituencies as being in territory that was under German rule from 1864 to 1920 and in the border sample in figure 4 (see appendix A5 for details).⁶




Figures 2 and 3: Schleswig-Holstein and North Schleswig and the extent of the analyzed border sample with approximate location of electoral constituencies.

I then examine differences in turnout between these two groups (the proportion of valid and invalid votes cast to eligible voters), weighting constituencies by population.⁷ Figure 5 shows that areas ruled by Denmark until 1864 had higher turnout than neighboring districts that had not when elections were introduced from 1871 onwards. It excludes Danish-speaking constituencies from the analysis, so the result is not driven by cultural differences between ethnic Germans and Danes or between national majority and minority populations. Figure 6 shows that Danish-speaking areas formerly ruled by Germany saw lower turnout rates than neighboring districts from 1920, when South Jutland rejoined Denmark.

⁶ The number of constituencies in the border sample ranges from 3 to 10 over the period studied, and data for elections in 1964, 1966 and 1968 are unfortunately missing from the CLEA database.

⁷ Due to missing data on invalid votes cast for the period from 1918 to 1939 in Denmark, turnout is instead based on the proportion of valid votes cast to eligible voters. For the period when both measures are available, they are correlated at 0.9999 outside of South Jutland and at 0.997 in South Jutland.



Figures 4 and 5: Differences in turnout between the border sample and German-speaking constituencies ruled by Denmark until 1864 (left) and areas returned to Denmark in 1920 (right) with fitted lowess trend line.

This is consistent with Danish rule promoting the formation of social capital relative to German rule in both cases. The difference immediately after the end of Danish rule in North Germany was between four and six percentage points in turnout – or between a third and half of the standard deviation of turnout for the treatment and comparison group sample over the 37 elections studied in Germany. The effect appears to have depreciated fairly quickly, with a small effect remaining in the last competitive election before Nazi rule in March 1933 after about 70 years.

In Denmark, turnout was around ten percentage points lower than in the constituencies immediately to the North for the first two elections after the plebiscite to rejoin Denmark in 1920, or more than three times the standard deviation of turnout for the treatment and comparison group sample over the 30 elections studied. Yet it appears that the negative effect of German rule on turnout in North Schleswig has ‘depreciated’ more quickly than the positive effect of Danish rule in the duchies.

The results presented in figures 5 and 6 are simple comparisons and do not incorporate controls at the constituency-level that may be confounding the relationship. However, such confounding variables would have to change systematically over time for Schleswig-Holstein relative to the immediate border sample to overturn the relationship between experience to Danish rule and turnout over time. Thus, historical turnout data suggests that pre-1864 Danish rule did shape one indicator of social capital, namely turnout.

The two differences in opposite directions of comparable magnitudes in North Germany and Southern Denmark further bolster the finding that Danish rule increased turnout by testing the assertion in two different contexts. If minority status had increased community cohesion, it should have instead been higher in both the duchies and North Schleswig. It also suggests that the difference is not attributable to ‘dislocation effects’ of having to adjust to a new political system, as these were also present in the former duchies. Yet they displayed higher turnout than comparable districts on the other side of the old border.

2.3.2 Historical social capital: Evidence from Prussian gymnastics clubs

Another historical measure that we can use to assess whether Danish rule affected trust and cooperative behavior relates to civil society. The *Zweites Statistisches Jahrbuch Deutscher Turnvereine* contains membership data for all existing gymnastics clubs in 1865 in Germany in 1697 cities (32 of which are in Schleswig or Holstein). This provides a measure of associational life at the exact point when we would expect Danish rule to have shaped the propensity to engage in such voluntary social activity. Digitizing this data, Buggle (2016) and I construct an original dataset measuring historical social capital by way of membership of gymnastics clubs.⁸ The membership density of gymnastics clubs is likely to be a noisy proxy for social capital, but to the best of our knowledge, it is the best available data to assess historical levels of associational life in Germany.

I combine this dataset with Prussian census data at the Kreis or county-level such that the dependent variable is measured as gymnastics members per capita at the county level. Prussian census data via the ifö Prussian Economic History Database (iPEHD) also allow us to specify models with potentially confounding covariates using data on literacy, Protestantism, and land inequality (Becker & Woessman 2012). First, city data were geo-coded and plotted in ArcGIS and then merged to a shapefile of the German Union in 1867 created by the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research Population History GIS collection (MPIDR 2011). Then Prussian census data were made congruent with the 1867 shapefile, i.e. data from 453 counties from 1871 and from 463 counties in 1882 were merged to 438 counties from 1867 in accordance with the prescriptions outlined in the dataset (iPEHD 2012). As such, the dependent variable represents gymnastics membership standardized by the total county population for the Prussian counties for which this data is available, and counties with zero gymnastics clubs are included in the dataset (99 counties). Descriptive statistics for the dependent variable are displayed in figure 7, varying from 0 to 3.4 members per 100 county inhabitants.⁹




Figure 6: Gymnastics membership across Prussian counties, 1867.

⁸ The dataset also contains data on voluntary firefighting corps, but this is available for only five cities in Schleswig and Holstein. Thus, it does not allow me to precisely estimate the relationship between historical Danish rule and 1865 social capital.

⁹ At the city level it ranges from 0.04 members per 100 city inhabitants to 41 members per 100 city inhabitants (smaller villages of course may attract members from outside the village in which the club is located).

As table 2 shows, it appears that mid-1860s per capita membership of gymnastics clubs was *not* greater in Schleswig and Holstein than in the rest of Prussia. In every regression, I include a standard set of controls of average city population for cities with gymnastics clubs in the county, proportion county population aged under 10, proportion males (as gymnastics clubs were for grown men only), and proportion who speak only German at home (as this dataset pertains specifically to German-language gymnastics clubs). Each is related to gymnastics membership in the expected direction and significant.

Table 2: Membership of gymnastics clubs per 100 county inhabitants, 1865

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
S-H-L dummy	0.00 (0.04)	0.05 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.11* (0.05)	0.02 (0.04)	0.01 (0.06)
1878 income tax p.c.	-	-0.01 (0.03)	-	-	-	-	-	-0.02 (0.03)
1871 prop. born in county	-	-	-0.08 (0.13)	-	-	-	-	0.02 (0.17)
1882 land inequality	-	-	-	-0.07 (0.07)	-	-	-	-0.23** (0.08)
1871 prop. literacy	-	-	-	-	0.62*** (0.17)	-	-	-0.31* (0.16)
1871 prop. Protestants	-	-	-	-	-	0.27*** (0.03)	-	0.30*** (0.04)
Dist. Freyburg (in 100 km)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)
Standard controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
R ²	0.149	0.189	0.150	0.151	0.166	0.226	0.197	0.368
N	438	418	438	438	438	438	438	418

Notes. Unstandardized OLS beta coefficients, robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard controls: Average city population, 1871 county prop. aged under 10, 1871 county prop. men, 1886 county prop. who speak only German at home. Constant term not reported to save space. *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, + $p < .1$.

Column (1) including only standard controls finds an estimated effect on gymnastics club membership of exactly zero for counties in Schleswig and Holstein with a history of Danish rule. Neither controls for income, migratory patterns, landholding inequality, or literacy change this pattern. Controlling for Protestantism in column (6) even makes the duchy dummy variable negative and significant. In column (7) I include the distance to the South German city of Freyburg (from which the German gymnastics movement diffused) from the county centroid. The duchy dummy is again very close to zero and insignificant. In column (8) all of the above variables are included, and gymnastics memberships per capita in Schleswig and Holstein are estimated to be very close to that in comparable counties outside of the previously Danish-ruled regions conditional on controls.

Thus, despite precise estimates on other variables, it does not appear that there was an effect of Danish rule on associational membership in the historically Danish-ruled, German-speaking lands right after their incorporation into Prussia.

2.4 Contemporary Effects of Danish Rule on Trust and Social Capital

In this section I first gauge the extent of the Danish-German trust gap today in order to contextualize the magnitude of the estimated differences between each of the border regions and Denmark and Germany, respectively. I then proceed to test whether there are persisting traces of historical Danish

rule in North Germany and of the spell of German rule experienced by North Schleswig using survey data on trust.

2.4.1 The Danish-German trust gap

The Nordic societies lie uniformly at the top of the distributions for different types of trust with Denmark at the very top (Andersen & Dinesen forthcoming, see also appendix A6). When it comes to associational life, the Nordics also display the highest levels of organizational activity (and to a lesser extent for volunteering), but with Denmark at the bottom of the Nordic societies. While Germany lies in the upper half of the other surveyed European societies in terms of social, political and institutional trust, for associational life (work in organizations and volunteering) it lies in the very top with the Nordics and in fact above Denmark.

In table 3, the six trust measures found in the ESS are regressed on dummy variables for Denmark and East Germany in addition to a vector of individual-level controls for a sample of respondents in Denmark and Germany. It demonstrates that the differences are not a compositional artifact of observed individual-level differences, but rather appear to reflect institutional, cultural or otherwise contextual differences. Estimates of controlled differences in trust between Denmark and Germany – in global comparison both high-trust societies – range from 0.74 (trust in police) to 1.86 points (trust in parties) on a ten-point scale.¹⁰ For comparison, the differences between formerly communist East Germany and West Germany (likely at least in part a consequence of accumulated regime differences) range from statistically indistinguishable from zero for some aspects of interpersonal trust to 0.44 points for trust in police and 0.62 points for trust in the legal system (see Rainer & Siedler 2009 and Jacob & Tyrell 2010 on East Germany and social capital)

Table 3: Trust, various measures (ESS 2002-2012)

	(9) trust people	(10) fair people	(11) help people	(12) trust pol.	(13) trust parties	(14) trust parl.	(15) trust legal sys.	(16) trust police
Denmark	1.72*** (0.04)	1.13*** (0.04)	0.95*** (0.04)	1.74*** (0.04)	1.86*** (0.04)	1.40*** (0.04)	1.27*** (0.04)	0.74*** (0.04)
East Ger. ctr.	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
ESS round ctr.	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Ind.-level ctr.	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
R ²	0.244	0.157	0.099	0.234	0.257	0.220	0.191	0.121
N	25,809	25,779	25,797	25,616	21,243	25,432	25,513	25,761


Notes. Unstandardized OLS beta coefficients, robust standard errors in parentheses. Constant term not reported to save space. Individual controls: age, gender, education, income, religion dummies, ethnic minority, first generation immigrant, second generation immigrant, citizen, union member, perceived discrimination dummy, and perceived health. *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, + $p < .1$

2.4.2 Trust in the Danish-German border area

Next, I examine the Danish-German border area and their associated border samples to investigate whether historical differences in political institutions appear to have shaped present-day trust. Here, I rely on the large number of respondents in the six rounds of the European Social Survey to achieve

¹⁰ See appendix A7 for question wordings.

representativeness at the sub-national level (as respondents are instead sampled to be representative at the country-level). The six rounds of the ESS contains 850 respondents who live in areas of Germany that belonged to the Danish composite state in 1864, while the six rounds of the ESS contain 460 respondents living in South Jutland (i.e. North Schleswig).



Figures 7 and 8: German constituency boundaries and pre-1864 border region and North Schleswig and the 1864-1920 border region.

For the German ESS data, I spatially combine present-day constituency boundaries for the last four Bundestag elections (on which ESS sampling was predicated) with the 1864 German Confederation shapefile in ArcGIS shown in figure 7. I then compute the area of each border area constituency that was ruled by Denmark until 1864 (see appendix A8 for coding details). For instance, 1.1 percent for the 2009 Schwerin-Ludwigslust constituency was ruled by Denmark in 1864, while this is the case for 50.4 percent of the Lübeck constituency and for 100 percent of all eight Schleswig constituencies.¹¹ This creates the variable ‘proportion Danish in 1864’, which is then attributed to all respondents in a given constituency. The Danish ESS data is available at the municipal level (see figure 8).

To approximate a regression discontinuity design in holding constant unobserved factors correlated with spatial proximity, I estimate this potential effect of historical institutions on trust for border samples consisting of Schleswig-Holstein and the closest three West German Länder (Hamburg, Lower Saxony and Bremen) and for North Schleswig and the closest 13 municipalities. I include a set of standard controls. Most importantly, they include controls for whether respondents are first and second generation immigrants or ethnic minorities. As we would not expect these respondents to be affected through vertical cultural transmission within the family, we would not expect effects for this group of respondents, or we would expect them to be weaker.

¹¹ I am unable to weight these numbers by population as neither contemporary nor historical information on the spatial population distribution within constituencies is available.

Table 4: Trust in the Danish-German border region (ESS 2002-2012)

		(17) soc. trust	(18) pol. trust	(19) inst. trust	(20) soc. trust	(21) pol. trust	(22) inst. trust
	Border sample	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
	Individual controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Panel A1: Germany	Proportion Danish	-0.06	-0.05	0.10	0.081	0.16	0.73
	pre-1864	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.55)	(0.59)	(0.56)
	DK pre-1864 X yrs	-	-	-	-0.002	-0.003	-0.007
	born after 1864				(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
	R ²	0.111	0.128	0.089	0.110	0.127	0.091
	N	2,112	2,056	2,090	2,112	2,056	2,090
Panel A2: Denmark	Germany 1864-1920	-0.14	-0.14	0.03	-0.50*	-0.22	-0.31
	dummy	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.21)
	GER 1864-1920 X yrs	-	-	-	0.010*	0.003	0.009+
	born after 1920				(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
	R ²	0.102	0.119	0.082	0.103	0.110	0.080
	N	2,111	2,079	2,075	2,111	2,079	2,075

Notes. Unstandardized OLS beta coefficients, robust standard errors in parentheses. Constant term not reported to save space. Individual controls: age, gender, education, income, religion dummies, ethnic minority, first generation immigrant, second generation immigrant, citizen, union member, perceived discrimination dummy, perceived health, and ESS round dummies. *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, + $p < .1$

Table 4 shows no consistent effect of residency in the former duchies or North Schleswig on different types of trust. In columns (20) to (22), I investigate heterogeneity in the effect of living in duchies and North Schleswig, respectively, based on respondents' length in time from the treatment. Thus, for each respondent I calculate how many years after she was born the treatment ended. Thus, in North Schleswig someone born in 1935 is given a value of 15, while in Schleswig and Holstein someone born in 1964 is given a value of 100. I then include an interaction term between this variable and residence in one of the historical border areas to test the convergence hypothesis that inter-generationally transmitted trust differences diminish with time.

With one exception, the interaction terms all have the expected sign, but only one is significant at conventional levels – social trust in North Schleswig. As such, in North Schleswig those born closer to German rule ending in 1920 are *less* trusting than their age cohort counterparts in the border sample. Following the prescription by Brambor et al. (2006), I graph the predicted difference between respondents living in North Schleswig relative to the border sample for the full distribution of values for the interacted variables (years since 1920). This shows that respondents born between 1920 and 1950 in North Schleswig evince significantly less social trust than their contemporaries from the municipalities just to the north (see appendix A9 for similar plots for the other 5 models).




Figure 10: The effect of living in North Schleswig (relative to the border sample) on predicted social trust for varying distance in time to the end of German rule.

The positive signs on the interaction terms between North Schleswig and years since the end of German rule and the negative signs on the interaction terms between the duchies and years since the end of Danish rule are mostly insignificant. However, as point estimates they are consistent with the opposite trends found in turnout. Here, as well, it does not seem that there is a uniform positive effect of prior minority status. Instead, the results are consistent with a positive effect on past trust of Danish rule relative to German rule, present in the duchies and absent in North Schleswig.

A potential confounder of the results in Schleswig-Holstein is that it has experienced large population change after WWII. Does this affect the results? Because it was among the least populated parts of Germany and emerged relatively unscathed from World War II, it became the destination of Germans fleeing other and more war-torn parts of Germany. It also became home to some of the estimated 12 million so-called Heimatvertriebene ethnic Germans who were expelled from what is now Poland, the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, the Balkans and Baltics, Romania and Central and Eastern Europe in general (Connor 2007).

The native population of Schleswig-Holstein dropped by 9.6 pct. from 1939 to 1946, and in 1966 (the latest time point available) so-called Heimatvertriebene made up 24.9 pct. of the population. In the border sample of Lower Saxony, Hamburg and Bremen, the native population instead fell by 9, 25.3, and 24.2 pct., respectively, from 1939 to 1946, while Heimatvertriebene made up 23.9, 12.2 and 12.5 pct. of the population in 1966 (Steinberg 1991). Thus, the figures are broadly comparable between Schleswig-Holstein and Lower Saxony. The two cities are slightly different, with lower levels of Heimatvertriebene and a larger WWII drop in the native population. Dropping Hamburg and Bremen altogether and comparing only Schleswig-Holstein and Lower Saxony yields the same result as in table 3. However, the influx of new citizens should still attenuate any given effect of culturally transmitted effects originating in the pre-1864 period.

With these reservations, the contemporary analysis suggests that pre-1864 particularities of Danish rule do not continue to shape different types of trust in Schleswig and Holstein today. Furthermore, respondents separated more in time from the treatment are not particularly less trusting. In North Schleswig, German rule and repression seem to have lowered social trust significantly amongst respondents who were born in the immediate aftermath of the end of German rule, but there is no overall effect that has been transmitted to younger generations. This is consistent with a convergence pattern after an initial, negative shock similar to that found for turnout.

2.5 Discussion and Conclusion

This paper presents suggestive evidence that historical institutional differences between Danish and German rule affected past trust in the border areas which experienced both types of rule. However, there is little direct persistence to the present day of this historical influence.

The article has investigated the causes of Scandinavian exceptionalism in social trust in a new way that utilizes within-country evidence, a geographic regression discontinuity (GRD) design. The parts of northern Germany and southern Denmark that switched territorial allegiance between 1864 and 1920 thus saw higher and lower turnout, respectively, in the early years in their new state compared to their immediate neighbors. Gradually, they converged to the turnout rates seen by their neighbors and the rest of Denmark and Germany. The use of historical time series data on turnout allows us to trace the development of initial, opposite effects on North Germany and South Denmark of the presence or absence of Danish rule to convergence with the national average after 40 to 70 years.

On the other hand, there was no influence on the tendency to engage in associational life in the duchies right after their transfer to Prussia in the territories formerly ruled by the Danish composite state. This, however, is consistent with contemporary data showing higher associational activity in Germany than in Denmark. Today, trust is no higher or lower, respectively, in Schleswig and Holstein and North Schleswig than in their neighboring districts. Perhaps remnants of the negative influence of repression of Danish minorities under German rule until 1920 are reflected in lower trust among older generations in North Schleswig, but the estimates are small relative to the large difference in all types of trust between Denmark and Germany today. Because the border moves twice, the article is able to trace the potential effect of Danish rule in two separate contexts that are each broadly consistent with early positive effects petering out over time. This also allows us to reject the competing hypothesis of minority political status engendering social capital through mobilization against adversity.

Finally, the article has studied local-level historical persistence of trust in countries that are in the high-trust range as opposed to in low-trust contexts with weak institutions. If these local average treatment estimates from the border areas generalize to all of Denmark and Germany, a potential implication is that post-1920 developments bear the brunt share of the direct responsibility for extraordinarily high levels of trust in Denmark today. Based on this study, culture stemming from the pre-1920 era cannot account for the difference in trust between Denmark and Germany or other moderately high-trust countries such as some authors have suggested (Svendsen & Svendsen 2010; 2012; Sanandaji 2015)

Is this conclusion generalizable to the other Nordic countries who share its very high levels of trust? Norway, Sweden and Denmark have had similar histories of governance in many ways. Norway was ruled in a union with Denmark until 1814, then with Sweden until 1905. As in Denmark, Sweden's and

Norway's political regimes gradually liberalized throughout the 19th century. Finland's history is the most different from Denmark's: Sweden ruled Finland until it became an autonomous grand duchy under Russian rule from 1809 to 1917 after which it experienced a civil war that killed about 37,000 of a population of 3 million in 1918. Yet its levels of social trust today are similar to the other Scandinavian countries (Andersen & Dinesen forthcoming). Thus, conclusions may be generalizable to Norway and Sweden. Finland's high trust today also suggests more recent sources of trust rather than pre-1920 cultural factors, especially given its civil war.

A question suggested by this article, however, concerns the potential, *indirect* effects of historical political institutions on trust and social capital today. Did mass social and institutional trust shape institutional choices concerning the adoption of proportional representation in 1915 or crucial first steps towards the welfare in the early 1930s because of more consensual decision-making or a strong labor movement capable of self-organization? Lundström (1996), for instance, has shown that that the early Swedish welfare state to a great extent took over work already being done by bourgeois non-profit and voluntary charitable organizations and then built on it. This may be a fruitful way forward for the research on social capital in developed countries instead of contrasting present-day institutions and historical culture and institutions.

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2.7 Appendix

2.7.1 A1: Social Trust in Post-War Denmark and Germany

Much research assumes that attributes such as social trust are highly ‘sticky’ and historically persistent. In this section, I use the best available survey data to examine the historical development of trust in Germany and Denmark.

Figure A1a shows the percent of respondents in West Germany replying that “most people can be trusted” from the Allensbach Institut für Demographie (reported in Cusack 1997). A rising trend is clearly seen in West Germany since 1948, when only nine percent of respondents responded that most people could be trusted, to a high of 45 percent in 1994.




Figure A1a: Percent expressing social trust in Germany (Cusack 1997).

Exact comparison of these results to the data from the World Values Survey, the European Values Study and European Social Survey is hampered by differences in sampling frames and subtle question wording differences, however: The Allensbach IfD question asks only if “most people can be trusted” without adding the option that “one cannot be too careful”.

In Figure A1b, I plot the Allensbach data series and supplement it with the data for West Germany and Denmark from the European Values Study. It is overlapping in time coverage and shows that the Allensbach sampling and question wording likely increase the proportion of respondents who respond that most people can be trusted relative to the data from the EVS.




Figure A5b: Percent expressing social trust in Germany (Cusack 1997).

Here, we then see that social trust in West Germany has been on the increase since 1948 according to the Allensbach data and also since 1981 according to both the Allensbach and EVS data. In Denmark, it has been rising even faster and from a higher base in 1981, when 47 percent of the Danish population said they trusted others, while it was only 27 percent in West Germany according to EVS data. Thus, trust has been rising in both countries, but there was a vast gap between Denmark and Germany in 1981, and the difference has been widening: in 2007, 37 percent in West Germany and 75 percent in Denmark expressed trust in most people.

2.7.2 A2: Possible estimation bias in Schleswig-Holstein

In practice, our results may be biased in these four scenarios: Firstly, if the duchies differed from the areas now composing Germany in levels of social capital upon their subjugation to Danish rule (pre-treatment differences). Secondly, if the duchies' subjugation to Danish rule was correlated with their then levels of social capital and/or itself influenced social capital in other German lands (endogeneity). Thirdly, if migration to and from the duchies until 1864 was correlated with individual-level social capital (selective sorting). Finally, if the duchies or other parts of Germany have experienced subsequent exogenous shocks to social capital (post-treatment bias).

Pre-treatment differences: Schleswig first joined the Danish Crown with the rise of the first Danish state between 800 CE and 1000 CE, and it seems to have differed from the Germanic tribes then living in the current area of Western Germany linguistically, ethnically and culturally, being populated by Frisians and Danes. It is impossible to know, however, if cultural traits tracing this far back were already correlated with social capital. Holstein first came under Danish rule in 1460, although its

people were of thoroughly Germanic origin and do not seem to have differed in early culture from other Germanic tribes.

Endogeneity: Neither Schleswig nor Holstein became governed by Denmark because of particularly high levels of social capital but rather due to geographical contiguity. Instead, we may expect that areas which were particularly high in social capital would be better able to defend themselves against outsiders and keep self-determination. For instance, Lübeck's independence from Denmark was achieved in 1227 by a determined campaign on the part of a strong trading city. It subsequently came to champion the Hanseatic League of free cities (see Jacob 2010 on social capital and the Hanseatic League and Guiso et al. forthcoming on Italian free city states and social capital). As such, we may expect that a given positive effect of Danish rule on social capital in Schleswig-Holstein is underestimated due to endogenous determination of non-independence. It also does not appear that Danish rule of Schleswig-Holstein affected historical social capital in the lands of present-day Germany.

Selective sorting: Data on selective sorting into Schleswig-Holstein before 1864 due to Danish rule is lacking, but we know that while elite mobility was high, that of non-elites was very low outside of times of extreme crises of famine, war or disease. The historical literature on Schleswig-Holstein makes no particular mention of such migration dynamics, and it does not appear to have been important for the effect of Danish rule on social capital in the duchies.

Post-treatment bias: The imposition of communism on East Germany after WWII provided for a negative shock to social capital that was largely exogenous and due to the strategic interests of Soviet Russia (Alesina & Fuchs-Schündels 2007; Rainer & Siedler 2009; Jacob & Tyrell 2010). Therefore, we control for the experience of communism and also include a range of other controls. World War II likely differentially affected trust geographically depending on the severity of war and post-war migration patterns (see section 4.2).

2.7.3 A3: Possible estimation bias in North Schleswig

In practice, our results may be biased in these four scenarios: Firstly, if North Schleswig differed from the kingdom of Denmark in 1864 in terms of social capital (pre-treatment differences). Secondly, if the loss of North Schleswig and incorporation into Germany were correlated with its then level of social capital and/or affected social capital in Denmark (endogeneity). Thirdly, if migration to and from North Schleswig during German rule was correlated with individual-level social capital (selective sorting). Finally, if North Schleswig or other regions of Denmark have experienced subsequent exogenous shocks to social capital (post-treatment bias).

Pre-treatment differences: Schleswig was regarded as the “model region”, being the wealthiest part of Denmark from engaging in trade and ship-building especially from 1700 onwards. Universal schooling of 7 to 14 year olds was adopted in 1762, but had been preceded by parish schooling in Luther's Small Catechism, and almost the entire adult population is deemed to have been “roughly literate in reading and writing” around 1760 (Henningssen 2008: 379), a level of literacy reached in the rest of Denmark not until around 1812 (Markussen 1991). German-speaking Holstein was even wealthier: The first railroad tracks in the Danish monarchy were from Altona – Denmark's largest city in 1864 after Copenhagen – to Kiel, opening in 1844, just before the stretch from Copenhagen to Roskilde that opened in 1847. North Schleswig's (South Jutland's) first railroad opened in 1854, while the first

railroad in the rest of Jutland was Aarhus to Randers in 1862. As such, Schleswig (including South Jutland) educationally, economically and culturally seems to have been more advanced than Denmark proper in 1864. There seems no reason to believe that it had lower levels of social capital than the rest of Denmark, and they may indeed have been *higher*, possibly biasing our estimates downward.

Endogeneity: The loss of North Schleswig may be partly endogenous to lower social capital in the more socially stratified Holstein, which was hostile to liberal democratic reforms. However, North Schleswig's incorporation into the German Confederation and subsequent empire does not seem to have been endogenous to levels of social capital in North Schleswig itself. However, 19th century Denmark and North Schleswig are not statistically independent: the loss of Schleswig-Holstein seems to have influenced the dynamics of social capital formation and trust in the rest of Denmark as the culmination of Denmark's journey from multinational empire to homogeneous nation state. As such, the loss of Schleswig-Holstein spurred massive nation-building. It has often been summarized by poet H.P. Holst's 1872 slogan "for every loss replacement is found; what was lost outwards must be won inwards." ("*For hvert et tab igen erstatning findes; hvad udad tabtes, det må indad vindes.*"). Mass education took place in the cooperatively owned folk high schools that spread from the initial Rødding folk high school in North Schleswig, and enrollment rose from 505 in the school year of 1862-63 through 3091 in 1872-73 to 7361 in 1902-03, while the broader effects of bringing learning to the peasantry were also felt more generally in the rural districts where the folk high schools located. The cooperative movement beginning in the 1880s should potentially also be regarded in part as civic and economic build-up in response to the loss of North Schleswig. Thus, a given divergence in social capital may have been jointly determined and not solely attributable to the effects of German rule in North Schleswig (i.e. a violation of the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption or SUTVA).

Selective sorting: There were large post-1864 migration waves, affecting up to a third of the population of North Schleswig (Iversen 1933; Henningsen 2008). Both migration to Denmark and America from poor conditions under German rule may have been correlated with trusting attitudes or organizational propensity through resourcefulness. On this basis, we would expect our estimate of the effect of German rule to be overestimated. However, I view selective sorting as a mediator of the effect of German rule on trust in North Schleswig.

Post-treatment bias: There are no apparent exogenous regional shocks to social capital in Denmark since 1920, the closest perhaps being that the population share of immigrants and descendants has risen from 3.1 percent in 1980 to 11.6 percent in 2012, and immigrants and descendants have not been evenly located, likely depressing trust and social capital locally (Dinesen & Sønderskov 2015). However, immigrants are not concentrated in North Schleswig, but rather in the larger cities, potentially biasing my estimates towards zero insofar as this relatively depresses levels of trust outside of North Schleswig.

2.7.4 A4: Coding German Electoral Constituencies




Figure 3: Schleswig-Holstein and the extent of the analyzed border sample with approximate location of electoral constituencies.

First, the 1193 separate constituency names listed in the CLEA dataset for Germany were geocoded using the batch geocode function available at <http://www.findlatitudeandlongitude.com/batch-geocode/>, finding 1085 out of 1193 constituencies. The constituencies not geocoded are assumed to be random conditional on being located in present-day Germany, but formerly German territories in present-day Poland, Russia and Czech Republic are likely overrepresented in non-geocoded constituency names due to name changes.

The list was then manually searched for electoral constituencies in present-day Danish territory. The list was then plotted as x y coordinates in ArcGIS, and constituencies geocoded as located outside of the German Empire territory in 1871 (using the shapefile from MPIDR described in section 5.1) were manually investigated and recoded. Finally, the electoral constituencies were joined to their present-day Bundesland using a shapefile of the present-day German Länder and the 'join' function. The border sample consisting of Lower Saxony, Hamburg and Bremen was then created as well as the dummy variables for constituencies in territory belonging to the Danish composite state until 1864 and constituencies in territory returned to Denmark in 1920.

2.7.5 A5: Coding Danish Electoral Constituencies




Figure 9: North Schleswig and the extent of the analyzed border sample.

First, the 220 separate constituency names listed in the CLEA dataset for Denmark were geocoded using the batch geocode function available at <http://www.findlatitudeandlongitude.com/batch-geocode/>, finding 172 out of 220 constituencies. The missing constituencies were geocoded manually using Google Maps and using Table 141 from the Statistical Yearbook 1918 (Statistics Denmark 1918) concerning the elections to the Folketing in 1918.

The list was then plotted as x y coordinates in ArcGIS, and the electoral constituencies were joined to their present-day municipality using a shapefile of the Danish municipalities and the 'join' function. The border sample consisting of the 13 municipalities just north of North Schleswig was then created as well as the dummy variable for constituencies returned to Denmark in 1920.


2.7.6 A6: Trust and Social Capital in Scandinavia and the rest of Europe

In figures 1a to 1d, I employ the European Social Survey (ESS) to show the levels of trust and social capital in the Nordic countries and the rest of Europe to contextualize Denmark's and Germany's stocks of social capital.

In assessing levels of social trust, I use the questions "Can most people be trusted, or can you not be too careful?" and "Are most people are fair, or do most people try to take advantage of you?", each scored from 0-10, where 10 expresses most trustworthy and most fair. Following the literature on social trust, I construct a measure of combined trust scaled from 0-10 using the 'trust' and 'fair' questions. I also construct a measure of political trust in parliament and politicians as well as a measure of institutional trust in police and courts/legal institutions (both standardized to range from 0-10 as the combined measure of generalized trust for comparability) to test whether Danish rule might have specifically affected trust in political and legal institutions. For associational life, I use questions on whether respondents work have worked in another organization or association than a

political party or action group in the last 12 months (organizational work) or have done charitable or voluntary work over the past 12 months (volunteering), both dichotomous (see appendix A5 for exact question wordings).

Thus, Figures 1a-1d show differences between Nordic and non-Nordic societies in terms of social and institutional trust, organizational work and volunteering.



Figures 1a, 1b, 1c and 1d: social trust, political trust, institutional trust and associational life (European Social Survey, rounds 1-6, 2002- 2012).

2.7.7 A7: Coding of Variables in the ESS

Table A4: Coding of variables in the ESS

Variable	Measure	Source
Social trust, combined	Mean of two items based on the questions “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you can’t be too careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted.” and “Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means they would take advantage of you and 10 means they would try to be fair.”	European Social Survey
Political trust, combined	Mean of two items based on the questions “Please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust: Politicians?” and “Please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust: The German/Danish Parliament?”	European Social Survey
Institutional trust, combined	Mean of two items based on the questions “Please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust: The legal system?” and “Please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust: The police?”	European Social Survey
Most people can be trusted	“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you can’t be too careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted.”	European Social Survey
Most people try to be fair	“Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means they would take advantage of you and 10 means they would try to be fair.”	European Social Survey
Most people try to be helpful	“Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means they are mostly looking out for themselves and 10 means most people try to be helpful.”	European Social Survey
Trust in politicians	“Please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust: Politicians?”	European Social Survey
Trust in Parliament	“Please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust: The German/Danish Parliament?”	European Social Survey
Trust in political parties	“Please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust: Political parties?”	European Social Survey

Trust courts	in	“Please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust: the legal system?”	European Social Survey
Trust police	in	“Please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust: the police?”	European Social Survey
Organizational work		“There are different ways of trying to improve things in Germany/Denmark or help prevent things from going wrong. During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following: Worked in another organisation or association [than a political party or action group]?”	European Social Survey
Volunteering		“In the past 12 months, how often did you get involved in work for voluntary or charitable organisations?” At least once a week (5), at least once a month (4), at least once every three months (3), at least once every six months (2), less often (1) or never (0).	European Social Survey
Education		Indicator variable with four categories: Less than lower secondary education; Lower secondary education; Upper secondary education; Post-secondary or tertiary education. Due to changes in reported education categories between the fourth and fifth rounds of the ESS, the variable is combined of the variables edulv1a (1 = less than lower secondary; 2 = lower secondary; 3 = upper secondary; 4 and 5 = post-secondary and tertiary) and eisced (1 = less than lower secondary; 2 = lower secondary; 3 and 4 = upper secondary; 5 to 7 = post-secondary and tertiary).	European Social Survey
Feeling about present income		Indicator variable with four categories; Living comfortably on present income; Coping on present income; Living is difficult on present income; Living is very difficult on present income.	European Social Survey
Religion dummy variables		“Do you consider yourself as belonging to any particular religion or denomination?” Not religious (0), Catholic (1), Protestant (2), Eastern Orthodox (3), Muslim (4), Other religion (5).	European Social Survey
Ethnic minority		“Do you belong to a minority ethnic group in Germany/Denmark?” No (0), Yes (1).	European Social Survey
Citizen dummy		Are you a citizen of Germany/Denmark? No (0), Yes (1).	European Social Survey
Union member		“Are you or have you ever been a member of a trade union or similar organisation? IF YES, is that currently or previously?” No or previously a member (0), Yes, currently a member (1).	European Social Survey
Perceived discrimination		“Would you describe yourself as being a member of a group that is discriminated against in this country?” No (0), Yes (1)	European Social Survey
Perceived health		“How is your health in general?” Very bad (1), Bad (2), Fair (3), Good (4), Very good (5).	European Social Survey

First generation immigrant	Indicator variable with two categories: Born outside of country of residence (1); Born in country of residence (0).	European Social Survey
Second generation immigrant	Indicator variable with two categories: Born in country of residence <i>and</i> having one or two parents born outside country of residence (1); Born outside country of residence <i>or</i> having both parents born in country of residence (0).	European Social Survey
East Germany dummy	Indicator variable with two categories: the interview took place in former East Germany (1); the interview did not take place in former East Germany (0).	European Social Survey
Years born after 1989	The respondent's year of birth (calculated as age less year of interview) less 1989. Thus, this variable can take on both negative and positive values.	European Social Survey
Years born after 1864	The respondent's year of birth (calculated as age less year of interview) less 1864.	European Social Survey
Years born after 1920	The respondent's year of birth (calculated as age less year of interview) less 1920.	European Social Survey

2.7.8 A8: Coding Proportion Danish Territory in 1864 for Bundestag Constituencies

The ESS data for Germany is collected at the Bundesland constituency level, with constituencies changing over time. In order to assign respondents to historical political units, therefore I collected shapefiles for the Bundesland constituencies in the 16th, 17th and 18th elections in 2005, 2009 and 2013 (Bundeswahlleiter 2014). I then combined each with the historical shapefile for 1863 showing political boundaries, including those between Holstein, Lauenburg and their neighboring polities (MPIDR 2011). I then calculated the territorial percentage of each of the constituencies in the border area that was historically part of the Schleswig, Holstein and Lauenburg for the three elections by using the 'union' function. Finally, the percentage of the constituency belonging to the Danish composite state in 1864 was attributed to respondents based on constituencies and ESS round dummies.






Figure A9: close-ups of the Danish-German border area in 1863 with ESS 6 Bundesland constituencies superimposed.

2.7.9 A9: Age and Trust in the Danish-German Border Region



Germany: Social trust on left, political trust in middle, institutional trust on right (border sample)



Denmark: Social trust on left, political trust in middle, institutional trust on right

(border sample)

Figures 8a, 8b, 8c, 8d, 8e and 8f: The effect of living in the border region (relative to the border sample) on predicted trust for varying distance in time to the end of Danish/German rule.

3. Social Capital in the Scandinavian Countries

Forthcoming in *Routledge Handbook on Scandinavian Politics*
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Rasmus Fonnesbaek Andersen & Peter Thisted Dinesen¹
Dept. of Political Science, University of Copenhagen

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3.1 Introduction

The Nordic countries are admired worldwide for their social harmony. They are perhaps the prime example of Lijphart's "kinder, gentler" consensus democracies, displaying high economic and gender equality, extremely low corruption, generous foreign aid, and notable democratic satisfaction (Lijphart 1999). One of the most striking components of this 'societal gentleness' is the way citizens relate to and act towards each other, or what we may call the 'social capital' possessed by these societies. More specifically, they are 'cohesive' societies, wherein most citizens adopt cooperative attitudes towards others, refrain from crime and anti-social activities such as littering or other inconsiderate behaviours, uphold norms in the public sphere, and organise in voluntary associations to cultivate their common interests.

In this chapter, we conceptualise social capital as the strength of bonds between people who do not know each other.² This definition sees social capital as collective in nature, but also as a societal aggregate of individuals' relations, behaviour and attitudes. Two prominent components of social capital are citizens' engagement in associations or voluntary work (sometimes called the "structural" component), and their beliefs and expectations about cooperation and trustworthiness of others (often referred to as the "attitudinal" component) (Putnam 1993; Rothstein and Stolle 2003). Scholars typically study individuals to examine engagement in associations and/or social trust (i.e. trust in unknown others), and we will therefore primarily rely on this type of research. By aggregating these individual attributes for a given community, we can then also study social capital as a communal phenomenon.

While there is still great disagreement on the causes of social capital, its effects are somewhat less disputed. Trust and community connectedness are widely regarded as facilitating collective action by lowering monitoring costs of informal social control, and increasing cooperative tendencies and altruistic preferences (Putnam 1993). As a consequence, social capital has been shown to lower crime (Kennedy et al. 1998; Lederman et al. 2002; Buonnano et al. 2009), lead to better health outcomes (Islam et al. 2006), further economic growth (Helliwell and Putnam 1995; Knack and Keefer 1997; Tabellini 2010), and lower corruption (Bjørnskov 2011). The political effects of social capital are perhaps most controversial: Some authors have found that it increases the responsiveness of democracy (Putnam 1993; Boix and Posner 1998; Nannicini et al. 2013), while others have found that social capital under certain circumstances also stabilises authoritarian rule (Jamal 2008; Acemoglu et al. 2014) or has even led to the breakdown of democracy (Berman 1997; Satyanath et al. forthcoming).

The concept of social capital has also entered the political discourse in the Nordic countries (and elsewhere). In Denmark, Sweden and Norway, the question of social cohesion—a close relative of social capital—has given rise to legislation and public debate.³ Nordic politicians even justify policies based on arguments about how to best maintain and build up high levels of social trust. However, as we will discuss, scholars of trust and civic life still debate exactly how social capital can be strengthened and what are the roots of social capital, in the Nordic context and elsewhere.

² We do not review research on social capital in the Bourdieudian sense. In this vein of research, a primary concern is the effect of social networks and contacts with respect to social mobility (see Bourdieu 1986; Portes 1998).

³ In Norway, from 2000 to 2011, "social capital" was used in 11 different reports by panels appointed by the Norwegian government (Norges offentlige utredninger, NOUs) and 8 statements from the government to the Norwegian Parliament (stortingsmeldinger), see Wollebæk & Seegaard (2011).

3.2 Social Capital in the Nordic Countries

3.2.1 Stocks of social capital

In the following, we first review existing research on patterns of social capital in the Nordic countries, in general as well as in the specific countries. Then, to provide an up-to-date overview, we present figures mapping two of the most frequently used indicators of social capital—social trust and doing organisational work—for recent data for the Nordic countries, as well as large European countries in order to situate the Nordic level of social capital.

As indicated in the Introduction, the Nordic countries are generally considered high scorers on various measures of social capital. Illustrative of this, Delhey and Newton (2005), in their examination of cross-country differences in social trust, show that the Nordic countries display among the highest levels of trust in the world in the early to mid-1990's, and attribute this "exceptionalism" to the countries' high scores on a range of characteristics known to be conducive to trust (cf. below). Other cross-country studies show a similar pattern, which also seems to have persisted into the 21st century (Adam 2008; Bjørnskov 2008; Rothstein and Stolle 2003).

In Figure 1, we have plotted the level of social trust in the Nordic countries, as well as the largest European countries, in 2012 based on the European Social Survey (www.europeansocialsurvey.org). To measure trust, we have used the frequently employed question "Would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?", scaled from 0 to 10, where 10 reflects higher trust.⁴




Figure 1: Social trust in the Nordic countries and the largest European countries (source: European Social Survey 2012, design weight applied).

⁴ This more fine-grained, continuous measure of trust provides a more nuanced and valid measure of trust than the dichotomous variable used in much previous work (Lundmark et al. forthcoming; Zmerli & Newton 2008). It also accounts for the less pronounced differences in trust observed between countries (Adam 2008). The single-item trust measure is often combined with two other items, tapping helpfulness and fairness, respectively, to form a trust scale. Employing this measure we obtain an essentially identical pattern to that reported in Figure 1.

The figure confirms previous results: the five Nordic countries display higher levels of social trust than the seven other countries. Denmark leads, with Norway and Finland in the middle, and Sweden and Iceland at the bottom among the Nordic countries. The data also allow us to break down the Finnish figures separately for the Aaland islands (as the only Nordic dependency) for the years of 2010, 2012 and 2014 (to increase the sample size). In this period the Aaland island displayed an average trust score of about 6.5, thus conforming with the level in Finland and the other Nordic countries. Among the non-Nordic countries, Great Britain has the highest and Poland the lowest level of trust. There is also important variation between the Nordic countries: the difference between Denmark (6.98) and Sweden (6.00) is actually greater than that between Sweden and Spain (5.13).⁵ These figures do something to nuance the picture of Nordic exceptionalism in social trust. While the Nordic countries all have high levels of trust comparatively speaking, there seem to be relatively marked differences within the Nordic bloc. In that sense, the Nordic countries seem to be high scorers on a continuum from high to low trust in Europe, rather than a homogenous cluster of very high-trust societies that are qualitatively different from the other European countries.

Turning to participation in civic life, the Nordic countries again come out as ranking relatively high in international comparisons. However, they are less distinctive than for social trust, and there is some variation across specific indicators (Adam 2008; Gesthuizen et al. 2009; Morales and Geurts 2007; Schofer and Fourcade 2001; Sivesind and Selle 2010). Here, rather than Nordic exceptionalism, the pattern seems to be one of the Northern European countries more generally, as well as the US and Canada, standing out as being the most civic. Figure 2, which maps the share of the population indicating having worked "to improve things" in a non-political organisation or association within the last 12 months based on the 2012 European Social Survey, tells a similar story. Using this indicator, Iceland is in the lead with around 40 percent working in organisation and associations, followed by Finland, Sweden, and Norway, and then with Denmark lagging markedly behind the other four Nordic countries with only around 25 percent indicating having done this. In fact, based on this indicator, organisational involvement is more pronounced in Germany (around 32 percent indicate having done this within the last year) than in Denmark. Finally, it is worth noting that the Aaland islands show a very high rate of organisational work of around 57 percent of the population (from 2010-2014), thus markedly outcompeting the other Nordic countries as the most civic on this indicator.⁶

⁵ The relatively small differences between the Scandinavian countries have not been subject to much research. The largest difference is between Denmark and Sweden, which Torp & Lolle (2010) examine and find is accounted for primarily by differences in institutional trust and subjective well-being.

⁶ This accords with other findings showing that Aaland islanders work 30 percent more volunteer hours per capita than Sweden and Finland (Kinnunen & Rundberg 2013).




Figure 2: Work in organisations and associations in the Nordic countries and largest European countries (source: European Social Survey 2012, design weight applied).

However, one should perhaps not read too much into the observed variation in organisational work as this indicator is only one out of several frequently used indicators for engagement in civil society (others are, e.g., volunteering or sociability). Moreover, it is notoriously difficult to measure engagement in civil society because its organisation and form often varies considerably between countries.

A key to understanding Nordic civil society is the close relationship between the state and civil society (Klausen and Selle 1996; Selle 1999; Rothstein 2001; Alapuro 2005; Torpe 2011). Associational life—especially in youth, sports and humanitarian organisations—is highly subsidised by tax revenue. This has likely made organisational life in the Nordic countries more vibrant. Critics would claim that this may undermine their independence. In order to play the role envisaged by many proponents of social capital, associations have to be able to set limits against certain types of state action by mobilising the population. However, as Klausen and Selle put it, “The Scandinavian third sector is not working in opposition to the state; it is and has always worked together with and supplemented the state.” (1996: 118). In the Danish context, Ibsen (1996) and Torpe (2011) reach the conclusion that Danish civil society remains independent, and that associations are able to act critically towards the state and the politicians, who have fought for or protected their grants (see, however, Henriksen (1996) for a dissenting view).

Trägärdh (2013), based on the Swedish case, pinpoints another particularity concerning Nordic civil society. Unlike hierarchical civil society institutions such as churches, foundations, charities or even ethnic or clan-based organisations found in the US or developing countries, Nordic civil society usually has taken the form of membership-based voluntary associations with internally democratic procedures of decision-making and strong local branches (see Selle 1999 for a similar argument concerning Norwegian civil society). Hence, the Nordic countries largely share a qualitatively different, distinctive organisation of civil society that is intimately connected with the state and internally democratic with local representation.

In summary, the Nordic countries are generally high achievers in social capital as measured by social trust and civic engagement, although this is most pronounced for trust. While differences do exist between the Nordic countries, the overall picture is one of relatively high levels of homogeneity among the countries—especially when viewed through the lens of a worldwide or intra-European comparison.

3.2.2 *Intra-country variations in social capital*

While there may be limited variation in social capital *between* the Nordic countries, there may still be marked geographical variation *within* each country. Indeed, regional variation is observed in other countries—famously in Italy (Putnam, 1993), but also in the states in the United States (Fairbrother and Martin 2012).

Focusing on municipalities or very local contexts (neighbourhoods), previous studies have shown that social trust is not entirely equally distributed within Denmark, Norway and Sweden (Dinesen and Sønderskov 2012; 2015; Ivarsflaten and Strømsnes 2013; Wollebæk et al. 2012). Less research, however, have been devoted to more aggregate regional patterns within the countries, which was the focus of Putnam's (1993) path-breaking study on social capital and government performance in Italy. Figure 3 explores intra-country variation in more detail by mapping regional levels of social trust in Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland.⁷ Note that the geographical level of aggregation varies between the countries with the regions in Sweden and Finland being more disaggregated than in Norway and Denmark. While some variation exists within each country, the overall picture is one of geographic homogeneity, especially compared to the regional differences previously found in other countries. This is especially pronounced in Denmark and Norway, where the difference between the most and the least trusting regions is only 0.4 and 0.3 points on the scale from 0 to 10, respectively. However, the greater variation in Sweden and Finland also reflects, *ceteris paribus*, the nature of the more disaggregated regional units used here.⁸

⁷ The measure of social trust is the same as in figure 1, but we also include data from 2010 and 2014 to increase the number of respondents in each region. Iceland is omitted for clarity of presentation. However, it consists only of the two regions (Reykjavik and the rest of Iceland), which are very similar (trust scores of 6.1 and 5.9, respectively).

⁸ The lower level of aggregation allows for a greater level of detail, and it also implies that the average for each region is based on fewer individuals, which induces larger random variation.




Figure 3: Social trust in the Nordic countries at NUTS 2 (Denmark and Norway) and NUTS 3 (Sweden and Finland) regional levels (source: European Social Survey 2010-2014, design weight applied).

Focusing on organisational and associational involvement (based on the measure presented above; analysis not shown), there is less internal homogeneity within each of the Nordic countries with some regions having an average level of involvement around double that of other regions in the same country. Again, this may in part reflect specific measurement, but at the same time arguably also indicates higher intra-country variation in the organisational form of social capital.

The overall picture of intra-country variation in social capital in the Nordic countries thus varies for social trust and associational involvement. For the former, we observe variation in very local contexts, but considerably more homogeneity across aggregate regional contexts. For the latter, we see greater regional variation.

3.2.3 Social capital over time

Having noticed that the high levels of social capital is relatively uniform among and within the Nordic countries, one may ask whether the countries have also been homogeneous in social capital over time. That is, whether the levels of social capital have been stable for long periods of time or changed more recently?

The international literature again provides an interesting backdrop. Specifically, in terms of Robert Putnam's analyses showing a marked decrease in social capital on various accounts in the United States in the last decades of the 20th century (Putnam 1995; 2000; Robinson and Jackson 2001). Our ability to track social capital over time in the Nordic countries (and more generally) is limited by the availability of specific indicators. This is most pronounced for social trust, which is predicated on large-scale surveys. We are therefore effectively limited to focusing on the period after the introduction of questions on trust in public opinion surveys.

Mapping the development in the level of social trust in Denmark, Sweden and Norway from around 1980 and onwards, Sønderskov and Dinesen (2014) show that trust has increased markedly in the three countries. Bäck and Kestilä (2009) show a similar trend in Finland from 1981 to 2003, although the trust measures used are not strictly comparable over time. Again, some variation exists between the countries within this overall pattern. The increase in trust is most marked in Denmark, where the share of people indicating to trust others has gone up from 47 per cent in 1979 to 79 percent in 2009. This is an unparalleled increase in trust of 32 percentage points, or 68 per cent, and, remarkably, an increase that took place from an already high level of trust, comparatively speaking. The increases in the other Nordic countries have been less pronounced.⁹ Nevertheless, the increase in trust in the Nordic countries stands in contrast to the trend observed in many other countries, where trust has either stagnated or seen a decline (especially in the United States, cf. Sønderskov and Dinesen 2014).

Turning to associational involvement, we can both track the development in participation by means of survey data, but also through historical records of various indicators of the vibrancy of civil society.

The second half of the 19th century is often referred to as the 'age of associations' in the Nordic countries by historians because of the increase in and importance of civil society and voluntary organisations at the time (Balle-Petersen 1976; Klausen and Selle 1996). Political liberalisation ended repression of civic life in Sweden, Norway and Denmark with the consolidation of liberal constitutions around 1850, and in Russian-ruled Finland after the accession of Alexander II in 1855 (Nordstrom 2000). While this period in the Nordic countries also saw the formation of strong philanthropy movements rooted in the middle and upper classes as in the rest of Western Europe and North America (Rothstein 2001; Gade Jensen 2011), the most important and distinctive development was of popular mass movements: the peasant movement, the labour movement, the sports movement, the religious movement and the teetotal (or temperance) movement (Klausen and Selle 1996). The organisations formed around each of these mass movements were democratic and membership-based with local branches having a great deal of influence, founding the uniquely Nordic type of associational life described in the previous section (Selle 1999; Rothstein 2001).

The peasant movement (central in Sweden and Norway, but strongest in Denmark) spawned liberal political parties, cultural associations as well as the formation of cooperatively owned folk high schools, which brought learning and liberal political ideology to the peasantry (Klaudi and Selle 1996: 105-6). Starting in the 1880s in Denmark, the movement even gave rise to economic cooperatives composed of peasants, who banded together to buy capital equipment for the processing of agricultural goods. Agricultural cooperatives quickly spread to Norway, Sweden and Finland as well (Fernández 2014).

The labour movement, just as the peasant movement, reflected a distinct social group and organised around trade unions and, increasingly, the national social democratic parties. The labour movement also organised its own cooperatives, cultural associations and social welfare organisations. Unlike the peasant and labor movements, the sports, religious and teetotal movements to some extent spanned class divisions. The latter two were strongest in Norway and Sweden, where they had large influence and built wide-ranging welfare institutions (Rokkan 1970). The organisations surrounding these five mass movements remained important in Sweden, Norway and Denmark until at least the 1960s.

⁹ Over a much shorter period of time (1996-2002), Kumlin & Rothstein (2005) show that trust has been relative stable at high levels in Sweden .

Finland's associational life took a distinctly different trajectory from that of the Scandinavian countries. After 600 years of Swedish rule until 1809 and widespread autonomy under Russian rule for the first 90 years, the 'Russification' in 1899 curtailed Finnish self-rule, displaced the Finnish language from government, and instituted Russian censorship (Harju 2006). This led to large-scale mobilisation against Russification, including a petition gathering 523,000 signatures, one in three adult Finns, and the Great Strike in 1905. However, civil society also became radicalised and polarised: the labour movement withdrew from civic organisations, and workers were expelled from the sports movement. After independence from Russia was proclaimed in 1917, the Reds (social democrats, trade unionists and communists) and the Whites (peasants, conservatives and industrialists) clashed violently in the civil war of 1918, which killed more than one percent of Finland's population in less than five months before the Whites' victory. The civil war deepened political polarisation, and post-civil war associational life was divided along party lines to a degree unseen in Scandinavia (Harju 2006). Repression also continued: From 1930 onward, a great number of rightist military organisations were founded, while over 3000 leftist organisations were closed down, including the largest trade unions (Harju 2006). After World War II, on the contrary, almost 3,000 associations classified as rightist were closed. Not until much later in the 20th century did Finnish civil society again settle into the consensual form it took in the other Nordic countries.

From the 1960s onwards, organisations based around the peasant, labor, religious and teetotal movements lost ground against new types of organisations. However, the sports movement grew further. Based on studies of public registries of the total number of voluntary organisations in the Norwegian province of Hordaland, Selle and Øymyr (1992) found that from 1941 to 1988 the number of associations relative to population rose by about one third. At the same time, religious and tee-total/temperance organisations fell from more than 50 percent of associations in 1941 to only 16 percent of associations in 1988, while cultural, musical and sports clubs increased their share. Moving to the present day, Wollebæk and Seggaard (2011) find that this trend continues until today in Norway. Similarly for Denmark, Torpe (2011) found that associational involvement rose from 1981 to 2008, with the largest increases in membership and activity in associations concerned with education and culture as well as in sports clubs. Since the 1960s, membership in 'ideational' associations concerned with the environment, animals, human rights and development has also risen. Unlike the traditional, Nordic membership-based organisations, however, these organisations have mostly passive members, whose only organisational activity is paying dues, and are run by professionalised secretariats rather than local, elected branches (Tranvik and Selle 2007).

Summarizing the existing evidence on the development of social capital over time, we conclude that while the Nordic countries seem to have started off from relatively high levels of social capital judged from historical data, the reservoir of social capital seems to have grown even deeper over the years – especially with regard to social trust. This is all the more striking given the broader international patterns described above, which generally point to either stagnation or an erosion of social capital.

3.3 Why are the Nordic countries exceptional?

The Nordic exceptionalism in social capital demonstrated above naturally raises the questions of the causes of this phenomenon. Given the ostensible importance of social capital for democratic

government and the well-functioning of society more generally, this is obviously also a question of great importance from the view of policy-makers.

Mirroring disagreement in the wider literature on social capital and political culture, scholars disagree over whether high Nordic social capital should be attributed to recent social and political factors such as institutional quality, the universal welfare state or post-materialist values, or whether it instead reflects deep cultural or structural factors such as Protestantism, ethnic homogeneity, early state-building or the relative weakness of feudalism in Nordic societies.

Many scholars have pointed to historical evidence suggesting that the Nordic societies were marked by relative social harmony and cooperation already in the 19th century. In a comparative perspective, present-day trust predicts the success of agricultural cooperatives in the late 19th and early 20th century across the world (Fernández 2014), which is taken as an indication of the persistence of trust and cooperative tendencies more generally. Putting forward perhaps the most extreme account of how very long-run historical factors may have shaped Danish culture and social capital, Svendsen and Svendsen (2010) highlight early Viking state-building and trade networks, and the trust and trustworthiness it involved, as the cause of high present-day social capital. Other evidence for “historical” explanations of Nordic exceptionalism comes from Nordic immigrants in the United States, who were perceived and portrayed as almost naïvely trusting upon their arrival in the 19th century (Trägårdh 2009). Moreover, although their ancestors primarily emigrated in the late 19th or early 20th centuries, US citizens with Nordic roots are the most trusting and civically minded of all Americans, thus mirroring the relative contemporary placement of citizens in their ancestral countries in international comparisons (Rice and Feldman 1997; Uslaner 2008).

While this body of research has some merit, it may also be subject to confirmation bias. High levels of early trust may also have been present in other societies, and if this is the case, then observing high levels of cooperation and a vibrant civil society historically in the Nordic societies is a less convincing argument for high Nordic social capital today. It is also less attentive to discordant evidence such as Finland’s civil war. Lastly, on a theoretical level, the mechanisms allowing earlier levels of social capital to be transmitted to the present are underspecified.

In contrast to arguments about the deep roots of Nordic social capital exceptionalism, other scholars have focused on more recent causes of high social capital. More specifically, Sønderskov and Dinesen’s (2014) demonstration of the dramatic increase in trust in Denmark from 1979 to 2009 testifies to more recent drivers of social capital. They argue, and show empirically, that the increase in social trust can in part be attributed to increases in institutional trust. This ties in with the institutional account of social trust advanced by Rothstein and Stolle (2003). The argument is that high-quality institutions—especially those related to institutional fairness (e.g. low levels of corruption)—can engender trust by punishing untrustworthy behaviour and espousing values of honesty. In a related, but somewhat different, vein, others have argued that the universalistic design of the Nordic welfare state (as opposed to more selective welfare programs relying more on means testing), as well as the relatively high levels of economic equality that flows from it, are the causes of high levels of social trust (Rothstein and Stolle 2003; Delhey and Newton 2005; Kumlin and Rothstein 2005; Rothstein and Uslaner 2005). Relatedly, Larsen (2007; 2013) explains the increased levels of social capital (from an already high starting point) in the Nordic countries, vis-à-vis the drop in the US and the UK, with the relative absence of a distinct underclass, which stems from low levels of inequality and the absence of

mass media portrayals of character flaws of “the bottom” of society. Empirically, the remarkable similarity of Finnish levels of social capital to that of the other Nordic societies (despite its history of Russian rule, civil war and its non-Scandinavian language) provides support for the assertion that universal welfare states and low corruption increase trust.¹⁰

Finally, another institutional aspect of Nordic societies that has been highlighted as an explanation for the high levels of social capital is the predominance of ‘horizontal’ teaching practices in the educational system. Such teaching practices, focused on group work as opposed to teacher lectures, gained a foothold in the Nordic countries, especially after the student riots in 1968. Across and within countries, and even within the same schools, differences in such teaching practices predict differences in children’s trust and cooperativeness (Algan et al. 2013).

Like the cultural and historical explanations, the institutional accounts of trust are plausible. However, given their focus on more contemporary factors, these arguments rarely address the second order question of why low levels of corruption, universalist welfare states and low economic inequality arose in the first place, and why they did so first in the Nordic countries (at least for the latter two). However, prior research provides some suggestions in this regard. One of the dominant interpretations holds that consensual democracies with proportional representation electoral systems were more likely to form the kind of ‘red-green’ government coalitions between workers and small-scale farmers that then pushed through universalist welfare states (Esping-Andersen 1990; Manow 2009).

Less empirical research has focused on how historical and more contemporary factors, as identified in the literature so far, have interacted. One potential example is whether high initial levels of social capital, trust in particular, in the Nordic countries helped shaped institutional choices concerning the adoption of proportional representation in the early 20th century or crucial first steps towards the welfare state in the early or mid-20th century? The historical literature on associational life in Sweden has gone some way towards examining the latter question, showing that the early welfare state to a great extent took over work being done by bourgeois non-profit and voluntary charitable organisations (Lundstrøm 1996). The charitable organisations supported this ‘nationalisation’ of their work and sometimes themselves acted as instigators, and “Many of the leading persons in the charitable organisations quickly got leading positions in the governmental agencies that were established to handle the ‘social question.’” (Rothstein 2001: 215). This suggests that one type of social capital contributed very concretely to building the Swedish welfare state in the post-war years. More generally, high pre-existing levels of social capital, especially trust, may also have helped protect against problems of moral hazard inherent in welfare states without strict means-testing, or contributed to spurring strong labour movements capable of solving collective action problems. Thus, historically high social capital may have shaped the design of social policy and patterns of inequality in and of itself (Algan and Cahuc 2009), which then again feeds back positively on future social capital.

¹⁰ The Finnish welfare state developed slightly later than the Swedish, Danish and Norwegian welfare states in partial emulation of these existing welfare states (Kettunen 2001).

3.4 Conclusion and perspectives for future research

Are the Nordic countries exceptional in terms of social capital? The evidence reviewed in this chapter suggests that if not exceptional, they are at least high-rankers on the two dimensions of social capital—social trust and associational involvement—surveyed here. Especially for social trust, they stand out compared to other countries, while this is less pronounced for associational involvement. Moreover, while they are alike when compared to other countries, considerable variation in social capital also exists between the Nordic countries. Furthermore, the countries also vary internally, although much more in associational involvement than in trust. Finally, the nature of associational life has been, and to some extent still is, distinct in the Nordic countries as it is characterised by highly organised popular social movements with democratic internal workings.

Are the high levels of social capital long-standing features of the Nordic societies? On the one hand, there are indications that they, comparatively speaking, have had high stock of social capital back in time. That said, there is also evidence for a more recent increase in social capital over the last 30 years. Hence, from an already high starting point, Nordic social capital seems to have increased further in recent years. The question of the development of social capital over time ties in with the larger discussion of the roots of social capital and political culture more generally. At present, there is evidence suggesting both deep historical and more contemporary roots of the high levels of Nordic social capital, but none is definite, and future work integrating the two perspectives would be of great value.

Where should research on social capital in the Nordic countries look to next? In line with the broader political science literature, and ongoing research on data from the Nordic countries, we suggest three avenues for further research. First, given the exceptional quality of the public registries found in the Nordic countries, studies utilising these would further the literature on social capital not only in the Nordic countries, but more generally. Examples in recent work include precise local geographic data (Dinesen and Sønderskov 2015) and genetically informed data (Cesarini et al. 2014). Second, implementing more field experiments would be another advance in the literature because they allow for much stronger causal inference and evaluation of potential public or private interventions meant to increase social capital (see Bhatti et al. 2015 for an application in terms of turnout in Denmark). Third, and perhaps most pertinent in relation to the question of the causes of the high levels of Nordic social capital, more research utilising historical data and natural experiments to differentiate between “deep” and more contemporary causes would be very valuable. For instance, border changes have been used to estimate the effects of 19th century legal institutions (Bugge 2015) and pre-1864 Danish rule (Andersen 2015) on late 19th century associational life in Germany, as well as the effects of historically strong Habsburg bureaucracy (Becker et al. forthcoming), and of political instability (Jancec 2013) on local trust today in Eastern Europe. Because of the Nordic countries’ long histories of political stability and literacy, many historical data sources are available, yet remain underexploited.

Thus, we believe research on Nordic social capital can remain dynamic in the coming years, and that the Nordic countries are well-placed to continue to play an outsized role in new research on social capital with relevance for the rest of the world.

3.5 Literature

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4. The (Re-)Socialization of Political Culture: Immigrant Political Participation between the Political Culture of Their Contemporary Country and their Ancestral Country

Peter Thisted Dinesen* & Rasmus Fonnesbæk Andersen
University of Copenhagen, Department of Political Science

Abstract

In this paper we study how immigrants' political engagement is shaped in the cross-pressure between the political cultures of their ancestral country and their contemporary country of residence. In addition to contributing to understanding the dynamics of political integration of immigrants per se, our larger scholarly ambition lies in scrutinizing how political culture is (re)socialized. This can be studied due to the fact that many immigrants originate in countries with political cultures far removed from the culture of their present-day country. We make two contributions to political socialization research. First, we study the extent to which political culture is persistent or evolves over time by examining the connection between political participation in the ancestral and the contemporary country (proxied by political participation of natives in these contexts) and immigrants' present-day participation. Second, we suggest that one simple mechanism underlying the process of (re)socialization of political culture is social diffusion through *spatial and temporal proximity* to bearers of each culture (i.e. native residents of the ancestral/contemporary country). The empirical analysis is based on first and second generation immigrants in round 1-7 of the European Social Survey. The results show that immigrants to a considerable extent adapt to the political culture of their new country already in the first generation, and even more so for the second generation. Conversely, a stronger persistence of the political culture of the ancestral country is observed for first generation immigrants. Moreover, among first generation immigrants, those having stayed for longer have more strongly adapted the culture of their new country and loosened their connection with the culture of their ancestral country. Substantiating the suggested role of social diffusion in accounting for these patterns of adaptation and persistence, we show that immigrants tend to adapt more to political participation of natives living around them in regions *within* countries as well as that social ties with other immigrants play a role in preserving the culture of the ancestral country.

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* Corresponding author. This paper was previously presented under the title "Do democracies produce democratic citizens? On the portability of political culture".

4.1 Introduction

When and how do immigrants and descendants of immigrants become integrated into the political mainstream of their new country? Many immigrants² originate in countries with political cultures highly removed from the political culture of their present-day country, which in turn raises the key question of how immigrants' political behavior is formed in the cross-pressure between the political culture they were originally socialized into and the one they are currently exposed to. Does the political culture of the ancestral country persist for decades—even generations—in the new country? Or is there a more prompt adaptation to the political habitus of this country? Furthermore, how do we explain the patterns of political socialization we observe among immigrants?

This paper examines the dynamics of political (re)socialization by studying political participation—a key element of political culture (Almond & Verba 1963; Verba et al. 1995)—of immigrants in Europe. In so doing, we contribute to a number of literatures. First, we provide a broader picture of immigrants' ties to the political culture of their contemporary country and their ancestral country, respectively. This is key to understanding the political integration of immigrants in their new context—especially in light of this group constituting an increasing share of the population in their new countries. While others have studied immigrants' political participation in Europe from a broader perspective before us (e.g. de Rooij 2012), we believe we are the first to systematically contrast the influences of the contemporary and the ancestral country. Second, studying political participation of immigrants with ties to both the political culture of the ancestral country and the contemporary country allow us to examine processes of socialization and resocialization of political culture because immigrants are exposed to different political cultures at different points in time. This question of reproduction and change of political cultures is at the core of political socialization research. Third, and following directly from the second contribution, we wish to uncover the processes by which adaptation and persistence in political culture come about. More specifically, we suggest that one simple, yet important and hitherto largely unarticulated mechanism underlying the observed patterns of political (re)socialization is *spatial and temporal proximity* to bearers of this culture (i.e. native residents of the ancestral/contemporary country). In essence, natives' inclination to participate in politics rubs off on immigrants as a function of temporal and spatial exposure. In proposing this *bottom-up* perspective, we provide an important addition to the literature on immigrant political participation, which have overwhelmingly focused on *top-down* processes, especially the role of integration policy.

We examine the dynamics of political (re)socialization of immigrants in Europe by means of the first seven rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS), which holds a large number of first and second generation immigrants residing in more than 30 European destination countries and having ties with a high number of ancestral countries. Utilizing variation in political culture—proxied by the average political participation of natives—in ancestral and contemporary countries, this provides an ideal testbed for studying the extent to which immigrants' inclination to participate in politics is a function of the political culture of their

² For ease of presentation we use the term “immigrant” to refer to both immigrants (first generation immigrants) and descendants of immigrants (second generation immigrants) in the manuscript.

ancestral and their contemporary country, respectively. Furthermore, we probe the hypothesized social diffusion mechanism underlying the observed patterns in political (re)socialization by examining how immigrants' alignment with the political culture in both countries vary by spatial and temporal proximity to the native bearers.

Collectively, the empirical analyses indicate that while political cultures are somewhat inert, they are to an even larger extent formed by contemporary socialization processes, of which the diffusion of norms from individuals proximate in space and time—in line with our hypotheses—appear to be of great import. We find that immigrants come to adapt the political culture of their new country and lose the culture of their ancestral country through a symmetrical temporal process: having stayed longer in the destination country—either being a second generation immigrants or a first generation immigrant, who lived there longer—they adapt this political culture more strongly, while at the same time loosening their connection with the culture of the ancestral country. We also find evidence that spatial proximity to natives conditions immigrants' adaptation to the prevailing culture of the destination country: immigrants' participation tracks that of native participation in local regions *within* the country of residence. Finally, we find that the culture of the ancestral country is preserved more strongly, when immigrants have stronger ties (i.e. friendships and colleagues) with other immigrants.

The paper proceeds as follows. First we outline our theoretical point of departure and explain our contribution relating to the role of social diffusion of participatory inclinations from natives conditioned by social and temporal proximity. Second, we describe our research design—the analytical strategy, data, specifications and measurement. Third, we present the empirical analyses before, fourth, drawing a conclusion.

4.2 The (Re-)Socialization of Political Culture

The prevalent political culture of a given society is usually assumed transmitted *in toto* through the cumulative and mutually overlapping influence of various socialization agents in that society, perhaps most importantly the nuclear family and the school (e.g. Hyman 1959). Whereas this process of socialization is relatively straightforward for natives/members of the majority culture in a country, it is less obvious how it applies to immigrants and descendants of immigrants. The former grew up in a country with a different political culture than the present country, and the latter typically preserve ties with the ancestral country despite having grown up in a different country. This begs the question if these non-native groups are resocialized into the political culture of the contemporary country upon living—and thus meeting socialization agents transmitting the prevailing culture—in this context? Or, conversely, whether the political culture of the ancestral country persists through socialization within the immediate family or other contact with agents from this culture?

In theoretical terms, the two diverging conjectures regarding immigrants' political socialization reflect two prominent perspectives on the development of political culture (broadly understood as political behavior and attitudes) within political socialization research: the persistence and the lifelong openness perspective (Sears 1990; Sears & Levy

2003). The *persistence* perspective predicts a continued dominant influence of the political culture of the country of origin as a residue of early-life socialization into this culture. The *lifelong openness* perspective entails a continuous updating of political beliefs and inclinations throughout life, and hence predicts that exposure to the destination country (and the experiences this entails) brings immigrants' political inclinations into synch with the political culture of this country.

While rarely couched as a question of (re)socialization of political culture, a number of studies have examined how immigrants' attitudes and behaviors are shaped by features of their ancestral as well as their contemporary country. Illustrative of this line of studies is Rice & Feldman's (1997) demonstration that the "civicness" (i.e. the political culture) of European immigrants in the US reflects the culture in the ancestral country on a wide range of indicators, including political participation. Similarly, Giavazzi et al. (2014) also find marked persistence of political orientations and family values using data on several generations of European immigrants in the US. Relatedly, Alesina & Giuliano (2009) show long-run effects of culturally transmitted family ties from the ancestral country on political participation among first and second generation immigrants in the US and Europe. There is thus support for the political culture of the ancestral country persisting in the new country for generations. At the same time, a number of studies show that immigrants' level of political participation tracks that of the native population in the European destination countries, which suggests that a socialization into the prevailing political culture in this context also takes place, thus supporting the lifelong openness perspective (Just & Anderson 2014; De Rooij 2012; Helbling et al. 2013; Prokic-Breuer et al. 2012; Maxwell 2013). Finally, and most similar to our purpose, Aleksynska (2011), as the only study, examines the alignment of first generation immigrants with the level of participation of natives in *both* the ancestral and the contemporary country. She finds limited evidence for persistence of the ancestral culture, and a substantially stronger adaptation to the culture of the present country. Taking stock, previous studies thus suggest that the political habitus of immigrants and descendants is a concoction of the political culture of their ancestral country and their contemporary country.³

In this paper we study how political participation of immigrants and descendants of immigrants evolve in the cross-pressure between the political culture of the contemporary and the ancestral country. In so doing, we make a number of distinct contributions compared to the previous studies focusing on political participation with partially overlapping aims. First, our analysis is based on a substantially larger sample than previous studies, including both more destination and ancestral countries (cf. below). Our findings thus hold higher external validity than previous, more geographically restricted, analyses.

³ It deserves mentioning that a related literature has examined the influence of the ancestral and the contemporary country on social trust of immigrants in order to scrutinize whether this social value is mainly a persistent cultural trait or primarily altered by contemporary experience. Parallel to political participation, the results lend support to both the persistence and the lifelong openness perspective. Uslaner (2008) and Tabellini (2008) find a strong persistence of trust of the home country over generations in the US, but trust of the home country only persists for one generation in Canada (Soroka et al. 2007) and in Europe, immigrants' trust appears to be more in line with that of their new country than their ancestral country (although some persistence is observed) (Dinesen & Hooghe 2010; Dinesen 2012a; 2012b).

Second, compared to the study closest to ours—that by Aleksynska (2011)—we also focus on second generation immigrants, which allow us to study the wider dynamic of political (re)socialization and thus provide a stronger test of the persistence and lifelong openness perspective by studying those born and raised in the contemporary country. Third, we provide a novel theoretical account for the observed patterns of (re)socialization of political culture of immigrants emphasizing social diffusion, which we substantiate empirically in our data. We describe this account in the following.

4.3 Explaining the (Re-)Socialization of Political Culture: Proximity-Conditioned Social Diffusion

So how do immigrants come to be socialized into the political culture of their new country? And how do they uphold or lose the culture of their ancestral country? Two generic channels of cultural transmission can be distinguished in this regard: horizontal and vertical socialization. Vertical socialization refers to cultural transmission within the immediate family, whereas horizontal socialization consists of transmission of norms and behavior from others in the wider society (Bisin & Verdier 2011). Here, we focus on the latter. More specifically, how the extra-familial agents of political socialization in the destination country influence immigrants' and descendants' adoption of the political culture of their new country as well as their retention of the political culture of the ancestral country.

When considering societal agents of political socialization, one can further distinguish between *top-down* and *bottom-up* influences. The former focuses on the socializing effects of nationally instituted policies and practices, while the latter emphasize the diffusion of norms from interactions with others in various social settings. Previous research on immigrants has to an overwhelming extent focused on top-down influence, more specifically integration policy (Just & Anderson 2012; Helbling et al. 2016; Hainmueller, Hangartner, & Pietrantuono 2015). Illustrative of this line of research vis-à-vis political engagement, Andersson & Just (2008) show that being granted the right to vote further immigrants' political participation, and Helbling et al. (2016) similarly demonstrate that more immigrant-friendly integration policies reduce gaps in natives and immigrants' political engagement. As a more informal aspect of the destination country context, Just & Andersson (2014) show that a more positive public opinion climate in terms of natives' opinions toward immigrants furthers political participation of immigrants.⁴ The emphasis put on the top-down influences on immigrants' political resocialization is indeed reasonable given its direct link to public policies relating to integration of immigrants. As such, we do not take issues with this perspective and the empirical analyses supporting it. However, we do wish to suggest that the top-down perspective tells only part of the story of political (re)socialization of immigrants, and that it should be supplemented by the bottom-up perspective, which provides a theoretically well-founded additional explanation for these processes.

⁴ Depending on interpretation, the opinion climate of natives could also be seen as a bottom-up influence of socialization.

In essence, the bottom-up perspective posits that a given political culture is learned through diffusion of norms in social networks. Importantly vis-à-vis the political socialization of immigrants, this implies that proximity to native peers is expected to result in immigrants adopting the prevailing political culture of the destination country because these norms “rub off” from contact with natives. Likewise, more contact with (former) natives of the ancestral country should be expected to lead to a stronger preservation of the political culture of this country. We refer to this mechanism as “proximity-conditioned” social diffusion.

The social diffusion implied by the bottom-up perspective may operate in at least two ways. First, certain political conducts may come to be perceived as more or less desirable as the result of overt norm enforcement and exerted social pressure in social networks. Illustrative of this perspective, a recent literature finds that individuals vote not because of feelings of civic duty as often thought, but rather to avoid feelings of shame and informal means of social punishment for failure to comply with the norm of voting (Gerber et al. 2008). Similarly, Bond et al. (2012) find that social influence on voting decisions on the on-line social network Facebook occurred predominantly “between ‘close friends’ who were more likely to have a face-to-face relationship.” (2012: 295). Second, in addition to explicit prodding, norms of political (dis-)engagement may also diffuse in a more subtle—even subconscious—manner through casual observation and eventual imitation of others in various social contexts stemming from a conformist bias on the part of individuals. For example, Cho & Rudolph (2008) find that spatial diffusion of political participation operate in part through casual observation of “low-intensity environmental cues” embodied in weak social ties such as neighbors’ yard signs or even more subtle indications of a community’s political culture, which are eventually imitated (2008: 288). Baybeck & McClurg (2005: 498), in a similar interpretation of the importance of (impersonal) context, describe such mundane experiences as the “slow drip of everyday life” that shapes political participation. So in short, being more exposed to natives from the destination country in various social settings is expected to lead to a stronger adaptation of the political culture of this country among immigrants—either through explicit social pressure or norm enforcement or via more subtle diffusion of these norms by means of causal observation and imitation.

While not directly related to our purposes regarding the (re-)socialization of political culture of immigrants, two studies provide indirect evidence on bottom-up processes shaping immigrants’ political ways. Examining the social context of political trust and satisfaction among immigrants, Maxwell (2013: 118) shows that immigrants “are closer to native-born individuals living in the same subnational region than to migrants living elsewhere in Europe.” That is, immigrants’ political trust and satisfaction appear to diffuse from geographically more proximate natives, which support the bottom-up perspective. Relatedly, Luttmer and Singhal (2011), find a differential influence of the political culture of the ancestral country on immigrants’ attitudes towards redistribution based on the concentration of immigrants with a similar background in the destination country. The culture of the country of origin persists more strongly for immigrants living among more immigrants (and therefore fewer natives), which suggests that exposure to natives is a driver of the desocialization of the political culture of the ancestral country.

So far we have emphasized the importance of *spatial proximity* to natives of the destination country for the processes of socialization of political culture. However, the socialization process is also likely to be conditioned by *temporal proximity* of natives in the new country (and, conversely, natives in the ancestral country). More specifically, as an implication of the theory of social diffusion of political culture, we would expect a dose-response relationship between immigrants' accumulated temporal exposure to natives in the destination country in terms of time spent there, and their adaptation to the political culture of this context. Conversely, the further temporally removed immigrants are from their home country, the less they should be expected to retain this culture. In other words, in the cross-pressure between divergent political cultures, we expect immigrants to be more strongly influenced by political norms held by bearers of the political culture with whom they have interacted more recently and over an extended period of time.

In summary, we propose that the predominant top-down perspective on immigrants' political (re-)socialization should be supplemented by a bottom-up perspective, which emphasizes social diffusion of political culture conditioned by proximity in time and space of socializing agents carrying this culture. This perspective implies a number of observable implications for the political culture of immigrants and descendants, which we outline in the following section and subsequently test empirically.

4.4 Hypotheses

Based on the conjecture that social diffusion of a political culture is stronger under temporally extended exposure to carriers of this culture, our first hypothesis is that second generation immigrants are more strongly influenced by natives in their present country, where they were born, than first generation immigrants, who were born in the ancestral country and therefore have experienced less cumulative exposure to natives in the destination country. Conversely, based on the same pattern of exposure, our second hypothesis states that first generation immigrants more strongly retain the political culture of the ancestral country than do second generation immigrants. Further, focusing exclusively on first generation immigrants, our third hypothesis states that those having spent more time in the destination country, and who have therefore been exposed more to natives from this context, should be more strongly socialized into this political culture. Conversely, our fourth hypothesis states that the political culture of the ancestral country will be preserved less strongly the longer time an immigrant has spent in the destination country.

The hypotheses outlined so far are consistent with patterns predicted by the social diffusion perspective presented above. However, the conjecture that political culture is transmitted and upheld through interactions with bearers of this culture closer in time and space can be substantiated more rigorously by examining how immigrants' alignment in participatory inclinations with natives in their contemporary countries vary subnationally by exposure to subsets of natives in those countries. More specifically, in Hypothesis 5, we propose that immigrants resemble natives they live among in a given region *within* a country more than natives in the country as a whole. That would be strong evidence that norms of political

engagement diffuse socially from those more proximate (residentially) to us. Based on a similar rationale, we expect immigrants (due to reasons related to availability of data we focus only on first generation), who interact more extensively with other immigrants—that is, agents from their ancestral country—to adapt less to the political culture of the contemporary country (Hypothesis 6), and retain the political culture of the ancestral country to a higher extent (Hypothesis 7). Table 1 summarizes our hypotheses.

Table 1: Overview of hypotheses

H ₁ : Second generation immigrants adapt more strongly to the political culture of the contemporary country than first generation immigrants.
H ₂ : First generation immigrants retain more strongly the political culture of their ancestral country than second generation immigrants.
H ₃ : First generation immigrants having lived in the contemporary country for a longer period of time adapt more strongly to the political culture of the contemporary country than immigrants having lived there for a shorter period of time.
H ₄ : First generation immigrants, who have lived in the contemporary country for a longer period of time, retain the political culture of the ancestral country less strongly than immigrants, who have lived there for a shorter period of time.
H ₅ : First and second generation immigrants adapt more strongly to the political culture of natives they live among in regions within the contemporary country.
H ₆ : Immigrants who interact less with other immigrants adapt more strongly to the political culture of the contemporary country.
H ₇ : Immigrants who interact less with other immigrants less strongly retain the political culture of their ancestral country.

4.5 Research Design

4.5.1 Analytical strategy

The key thrust of our strategy for examining the socialization of political culture of immigrants is to examine the extent to which the political participation of individual first and second generation immigrants is correlated with the mean level of participation of natives in their contemporary country as well as in their ancestral country (see Dinesen & Hooghe [2010] for a parallel strategy regarding the acculturation of social trust). A stronger (partial) correlation between political participation of immigrants' and natives in the destination country is taken as an indication of stronger immigrant adoption of the political

culture in this context as this implies a stronger tendency for immigrants to track natives' level of participation across destination countries. Conversely, a stronger correlation between immigrants' present-day participation and participation of natives in the ancestral country implies that immigrants to a greater extent retain the political culture of the country of origin. One point of clarification is in order in this regard: our approach looks at the *relative* correspondence in participation between immigrants and natives across contemporary and ancestral countries, *not* the correspondence in absolute levels of participation. Hence, immigrants may generally have lower (or higher) levels of participation than natives due to various individual-level differences (although this is likely to be explained to some extent by some of the control variables, cf. below). The key aspect for our purposes is the extent of a systematic component in immigrants' political participation—over and above various individual-level differences—that can be attributed to variation in natives'—in either the contemporary or the ancestral country—propensity to participate (i.e. what might be referred to as political culture).

A second core feature of our strategy is to examine how immigrants' alignment with the political culture in the contemporary and the ancestral country varies with immigrants' social ties to the destination and the ancestral country. As hypothesized, we expect adaptation to the political culture in the contemporary country to be stronger for immigrants who have been more exposed (temporally and socially) to natives and therefore more subject to diffusion of prevailing political norms. This implies that we expect a stronger correlation between natives' average participation and immigrants' present-day participation for immigrants who have been more exposed to natives (i.e. second generation immigrants and first generation having stayed for a longer period of time), as well as have weaker social ties with other immigrants in the contemporary country. Conversely, we expect the correlation between natives' participation in the ancestral country and immigrants' present-day participation to be weaker for immigrants with more pronounced exposure to natives in the contemporary country and weaker social ties with other immigrants in this setting.

4.5.2 *Specifications and issues of unobserved heterogeneity*

The primary aim of our analysis is to determine the degree to which immigrants retain the political culture of their ancestral country or adapt the culture of their new country by means of the correlation between immigrants' present-day political participation (at the individual level) and the average level of participation among natives in the contemporary and the ancestral country. As a consequence, we do not control for any other aspects of neither the contemporary nor ancestral country context as this would obfuscate our aim of studying the (re-)socialization of political culture *in toto* in these contexts. We do, however, include socio-demographic (gender, age, and age squared) and socioeconomic (education, income and unemployment) control variables at the individual level. Systematic differences in these variables between immigrants coming from and residing in different countries could potentially confound the relationship with natives' mean participation in the contemporary and the ancestral country (to the extent that these factors are also correlated with political participation). We do include citizenship as a control variable as we wish to

rule out differences in citizenship practices (i.e. which immigrants are granted citizenship)—one of the key explanation in the top-down approach to immigrants' political engagement (Hainmueller, Hangartner, & Pietrantuono 2015)—as a confounding explanation for observed differences in participation between immigrants coming from and residing in different countries. While various attitudinal measures such as political interest or political efficacy are sometimes included in models of political participation (Verba, Brady & Schlozmann 1995), we prefer not including such measures in our models as these constructs arguably form part of a political culture themselves (Almond & Verba 1963), which in turn would introduce post-treatment bias in the models.

As a further means for addressing concerns stemming from unobserved heterogeneity among immigrants, we employ—along with the standard survey-round fixed effects—ancestral country and/or destination country fixed effects in many of our specifications. The former implies that we obtain the association between native participation in the contemporary country and immigrants' present-day participation for immigrants stemming from the *same* ancestral country. Conversely, using the destination-country fixed effect we obtain the association between native participation in the ancestral country and immigrants' participation for immigrants residing in the same destination country. Using fixed effects at the ancestral or destination country level is a marked strength of our study compared to most previous studies of related questions, which have typically not applied a similarly rigorous control strategy. Employing fixed effects of the contemporary country is particularly powerful in our test of immigrant adaptation to the political culture of the subnational region in which they reside (*within* that country) as this removes all national-level influences that could otherwise confound this relationship.

4.6 Data

Our primary data source is the first seven rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS) collected from 2002 to 2014. The survey is based on random samples in the participating countries and presently covers more than 30 European countries surveyed in one or more rounds. It is thoroughly validated and widely considered among the best surveys for studying attitudes cross-nationally (Norris 2004). Essential for our purposes is the fact that the survey, unlike a number of other cross-national surveys, asks not only about whether the respondent is an immigrant or not, but also which country he or she comes from, and, from the second round onwards, in which country the parents of second generation immigrants were born. As a consequence, we can link each first and second generation immigrant to an ancestral country, which, together with data on the destination country, allow us to study the dynamics of (re-)socialization of political culture.

While the ESS is not designed specifically for studying immigrants, the random sampling employed in principle ensures that sub-populations should be adequately represented in the survey. That said, there is arguably an issue of potential non-response among immigrants, which renders the survey non-representative of this population. Specifically, the fact that the survey is most often only conducted in the language of the destination country makes it likely that more recent immigrant groups, and those less integrated in the

destination country more generally, are underrepresented in the survey. However, despite the problem of representativeness of immigrants in general, the ESS arguably constitutes the best survey available for studying political participation among immigrants on a broader scale cross-nationally in Europe.⁵

In the analyses, our data set consists of first and second generation immigrants in the European countries in the survey (see Table A2 in the Appendix).⁶ To avoid conflating migration with redrawn borders, we remove individuals, who claim to have migrated (themselves or their parents) from a previously existing country (e.g. Czechoslovakia) of which their present-day country (e.g. the Czech Republic) used to constitute a part. Relatedly, we construct ancestral country participation means for former union states based on data from presently existing countries (e.g. participation means for Czechoslovakia are based on data from the Czech Republic and Slovakia). This also implies that our sample consists of more ancestral countries than exist in the ESS.⁷ The largest ancestral country in our main sample (used in Table 1) is Russia, followed by Germany, Italy, Poland, the UK and France. In the extended sample (not restricted to ancestral countries in the ESS), there is also large numbers of immigrants from non-European origin countries well-represented in (Western) Europe, e.g. Morocco or the US.

We use the ESS for calculating natives' mean participation in the ancestral and the destination country (cf. the next section). However, given that the ESS is limited to Europe and its surrounds, this severely limits the number of ancestral countries. Therefore, we supplement our main analysis with analyses based on data on political participation in the ancestral countries from the World Values Survey (WVS) rounds 3, 4 and 5 (collected from 1996 to 2008), which hold data on a substantially larger number of countries, and hence ancestral contexts to be included in the analysis (see Table A1 in the Appendix regarding the specific participation items included in this analysis). In addition to testing our hypotheses with an independent data source, this yields more variation in political participation in the ancestral country and greater external validity (geographical representativeness) of our analysis.

4.7 Measures

Our dependent variable, *political participation*, is measured by an additive scale (rescaled to range between 0 and 1) based on survey items probing the following seven forms of participation (yes/no) during the last 12 months: contacted a politician/(local) government official, worked in political party or action group, worked in another

⁵ The issue of representativeness of the ESS also has implications for the potential weighting of the data. Although ESS recommends using survey-weights in the analyses (ESS 2013), this is likely to be problematic in the case of immigrants as the survey weights are not constructed to reflect immigrant non-response, which would most likely differ from that of the general population. Therefore we do not apply survey weights in our analyses, which is also in line with previous studies of political engagement of first generation immigrants (Just & Anderson 2012; 2014; Prokic-Breuer et. al. 2012).

⁶ Israel is included in the ESS, but in seeking a more homogeneous and comparable European destination context we do not include this as a *destination* country in the sample.

⁷ More specifically, this adds the following former countries: Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, GDR.

organization/association, worn/displayed campaign badge/sticker, signed a petition, taken part in a lawful demonstration, boycotted certain products.⁸ Cronbach's alpha of the participation scale is 0.67/0.66 for both first and second generation immigrants (calculated individually). The scale was calculated based on at least four valid answers to minimize non-response. We exclude voting from the scale as immigrants' eligibility to vote differs substantially between European countries (see Just & Andersson [2014] for a similar strategy). To maximize comparability of the participation measure in the analyses using the WVS ancestral country data (cf. the next paragraph), we only use the five items (worked in political party, worked in another organization, signed a petition, taken part in a lawful demonstration, boycotted certain products) paralleling those in the WVS in a subset of the analyses. Table A in the Appendix provides details on the measurement of this and all other variables.

Our main independent variables of interest are natives' mean political participation in the contemporary country (nationally or regionally) and the ancestral country, respectively. *Mean political participation of natives in the contemporary country* is calculated as the ESS country-wave mean of the dependent variable (the political participation scale) for respondents who are neither first nor second generation immigrants (i.e. natives) in the contemporary country.⁹ *Mean political participation of natives in the region of residence in the contemporary country* used in some analyses is calculated in the same manner, but as the regional mean of the dependent variable (cf. Table A3 in the Appendix for coding of regions). For the replication analysis, using the larger WVS sample of ancestral countries, mean political participation of natives in the destination country in the ESS is measured with an analogous measure based on five items (cf. above) comparable to those in the WVS.

Mean political participation of natives in immigrants' ancestral countries is calculated as the mean of the dependent variable over all available rounds in ESS for ancestral country respondents, who are neither first nor second generation immigrants (cf. operationalization below). First generation immigrants are assigned the level of participation in their ancestral country and second generation immigrants that of their parents' country. Second generation immigrants with parents born in two different countries (other than the respondent's country of residence) are given the average value for mean political participation of the two countries of parental descent.¹⁰ This variable is measured similarly in the WVS data based on the 1996-2008 rounds of the survey in the ancestral country. Ideally, we would measure political participation in the ancestral country at the time of departure of individual immigrants to reflect pre-departure political culture of this country, but such measurements do often not exist (particularly for second generation immigrants). While suboptimal, this is unlikely to constitute a problem as national political cultures are rather sticky: political

⁸ The delimitation of political activity to the last year is imperfect, especially for older respondents, but it is the best measure available.

⁹ We calculated weighted native means using the "pspwght"-variable in order to maximize representativeness. This weight is lacking for a few country-years resulting in missing values for these observations.

¹⁰ For immigrants indicating coming from presently dissolved countries (e.g. the USSR), we calculate ancestral means based on available present-day countries that were a part of these. In the case of missing data (due to non-existent data for the ancestral country or non-response) for one parent, second generation immigrants are given the participation value of the other parent.

participation among natives in the first and the seventh round of ESS (over a 12-year period) correlates at $r = .89$.

A number of the moderating variables are implied by the hypotheses specifying how the (re-)socialization of political culture is expected to vary by length and intensity of exposure to natives in the destination country. First, immigrant generation is operationalized by the information on respondents' country of birth and, from the second round onward, those of the respondent's parents. *First generation immigrants* are identified by being born in a different country than that of current residence. *Second generation immigrants* are defined as individuals being born in their country of residence, but who have at least one parent born in another country. Natives—who are used for calculating the mean level of participation in the destination and the ancestral country—are those born in the destination country with two parents also born in this country. *Length of residence* in the destination country of first generation immigrants is measured by a dummy indicating whether a respondent has stayed more than 20 years in the contemporary country.¹¹ *Social ties with natives/immigrants* in the destination country are measured by three variables: having *friends*, *colleagues*, and *neighbors* with immigrant or—as a proxy—racial/ethnic minority background. These measures are only available in the first and the seventh wave of the survey, thus resulting in a reduced sample in these analyses. Finally, the measurement of the control variables along with more information on the abovementioned variables can be found in the Appendix.

4.8 Analysis

In the following we present the empirical assessment of our hypotheses in a series of analyses. To take into account that immigrants and descendants are nested within ancestral countries and destination countries, we employ two types of statistical models: crossed random effects (multilevel) models, which estimate variance components at both the level of the ancestral and the destination country, and fixed effects models, which include fixed effects for the ancestral country and/or the destination country.¹² The random effects model enables us to simultaneously examine the association between mean native participation in the ancestral and the destination country with immigrants' present-day participation. The fixed effect model allows us to hold constant all factors pertaining to either the destination or the ancestral country, while examining the association between native participation in the other context and immigrants' present-day participation.¹³

¹¹ There is only data on the exact length of residence (in years) in the destination country for first generation immigrants for the last three rounds of the ESS, while they are available in less fine-grained bins for all rounds. We therefore opted to distinguish between respondents with more than 20 years of residence and respondents with less (each category contains roughly half of first generation immigrants). Reassuringly, reanalyzing the models using the more fine-grained measure in the last three rounds yields results roughly similar to those reported.

¹² Keep in mind, as noted in the "Data" section, that the number of ancestral countries is larger than the number of countries in the ESS dataset because they also include formerly existing countries.

¹³ An added benefit of using fixed effects for destination and/or ancestral country is that it enables a larger sample of immigrants because it does not require valid values on the participation measure for the context modeled as fixed effect. There are few missing values on native mean participation in the

4.8.1 *Political (re-)socialization of immigrants*

Table 1 examines the extent to which immigrants retain the political culture of their ancestral country and adopt the culture of their contemporary country by regressing individual immigrants' level of participation on the mean level of participation of native in their contemporary and ancestral countries in a series of models. Model 1a is the baseline specification, which includes control variables and a dummy for being second generation immigrant. Subsequent specifications are extensions of this model, which include interactions between being second generation immigrant (descendant) and participation of natives in the ancestral and/or the contemporary country to examine if political (re-)socialization varies by cumulative exposure to natives in the destination country. Further, a number of robustness checks are conducted in terms of introducing ancestral and destination country fixed effects. The key coefficients of interest are those involving natives' participation in the ancestral or the contemporary country (main effect of interacted with other variables). The interpretation of the main effects is straightforward: how much does immigrants' predicted level of participation increase with natives' mean level increasing one unit on the participation scale. Higher values thus indicate that immigrants' level of participation tracks that of natives more closely.

contemporary country, but many at the ancestral country level, which explains why more observations are added when using ancestral country fixed effects. To rule out differences in samples as explanation for differences in models with and without fixed effects, we apply fixed effects both to the sample on which the baseline model (the second column in Table 1-4) is based as well as the full available sample.

Table 1: Adaptation and persistence in political participation of 1st and 2nd generation immigrants in Europe

	Model 1a	Model 1b	Model 1c	Model 1d	Model 1e	Model 1f
Second generation immigrant	0.022*** (0.002)	0.007 (0.005)	-0.008 (0.005)	0.034*** (0.004)	-0.009* (0.004)	0.034*** (0.004)
Destination country participation	0.721*** (0.038)	0.549*** (0.042)	0.591*** (0.043)	-	0.577*** (0.036)	-
Second gen. imm. * Dest. country part.	-	0.391*** (0.039)	0.247*** (0.035)	-	0.264*** (0.030)	-
Ancestral country participation	0.347*** (0.046)	0.471*** (0.047)	-	0.408*** (0.048)	-	0.403*** (0.048)
Second gen. imm. * Anc. country part.	-	-0.338*** (0.042)	-	-0.135*** (0.038)	-	-0.134*** (0.037)
Female	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.008** (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)
Age	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)
Age ²	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)
<i>Education (ref: <secondary)</i>						
Lower secondary	0.019*** (0.004)	0.018*** (0.004)	0.019*** (0.004)	0.019*** (0.004)	0.016** (0.003)	0.020** (0.004)
Upper secondary	0.040*** (0.004)	0.037*** (0.004)	0.039*** (0.004)	0.039*** (0.004)	0.038*** (0.003)	0.039*** (0.004)
Post-secondary, non-tertiary	0.058*** (0.006)	0.057*** (0.006)	0.058*** (0.006)	0.058*** (0.006)	0.053*** (0.005)	0.058*** (0.006)
Tertiary	0.098*** (0.004)	0.096*** (0.004)	0.097*** (0.004)	0.097*** (0.004)	0.096*** (0.003)	0.097*** (0.004)
Currently unemployed	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.007 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.007 (0.004)	-0.009** (0.003)	-0.007 (0.004)
Ever unemployed for period > 3 months	0.004 (0.002)	0.005* (0.002)	0.005* (0.002)	0.005* (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)	0.004 (0.002)
<i>Feeling about income (ref = very difficult)</i>						
Difficult	-0.007 (0.004)	-0.007 (0.004)	-0.007 (0.004)	-0.007 (0.004)	-0.008* (0.003)	-0.008* (0.004)
Coping	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.007 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.007 (0.004)
Comfortable	0.004 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)	0.004 (0.003)	0.003 (0.004)
Citizenship (Yes)	0.036*** (0.003)	0.034*** (0.003)	0.034*** (0.003)	0.036*** (0.003)	0.037*** (0.002)	0.035*** (0.003)
Origin countries	ESS	ESS	ESS	ESS	All	All
Country fixed effects	NONE	NONE	ORIGIN	DEST.	ORIGIN	DEST.
Std. dev. dest. country intercept	0.012** (0.002)	0.012** (0.002)	0.013** (0.003)	-	0.011** (0.002)	-
Std. dev. origin country intercept	0.013*** (0.002)	0.012*** (0.002)	-	0.013*** (0.002)	-	0.013*** (0.002)
Std. dev. of residuals	0.166*** (0.001)	0.166*** (0.001)	0.166*** (0.001)	0.166*** (0.001)	0.166*** (0.001)	0.165*** (0.001)
N (destination countries)	33	33	33	33	33	33
N (countries of origin)	40	40	40	40	214	40
N (individuals)	29,774	29,774	29,774	29,774	42,832	30,267
Wald χ^2 (df)	2381.11*** (22)	2521.75*** (24)	3142.75*** (61)	3510.29*** (54)	4771.80*** (235)	3539.23*** (54)

Note: Estimated coefficients from a maximum likelihood multilevel model with standard errors in parentheses. Constant and ESS round fixed effects coefficients not shown to save space. Models 1a-1d are based on the same observations. See note 13 regarding the differences in observations between models.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Model 1a demonstrates that immigrants' political participation correlates strongly positively with natives' participation in both the ancestral and the contemporary country. In other words, immigrants seem to a considerable extent to be socialized into the political culture of their new country, while at the same time retaining some of the political culture of the ancestral country. The alignment with the political culture of the present-day country is, however, around twice as strong as that of the ancestral country. More specifically, a one-unit change in natives' participation in the contemporary country translates into a change in immigrants' participation of 0.72 units on the participation scale, while a corresponding change in ancestral country participation changes immigrants' participation by 0.35 unit. There is thus considerable evidence for a strong adoption to the prevailing political culture in a given country. This is further underlined by the finding that none of the control variables come close to having effects similar to that of average participation of natives in the contemporary country (nor of that of the ancestral country for that matter).

Model 1a does not address how the political socialization of immigrants varies by immigrant generation, and thus does not test hypothesis 1 and 2. This is done in Models 1b-1f in which we add interaction terms between immigrant generation (second versus first generation) and natives' participation in the ancestral and the destination country. Model 1b shows patterns in line with our predictions in hypothesis 1 and 2. As indicated by the significant positive interaction term between natives' mean participation in the contemporary country and immigrant generation, second generation immigrants more strongly adopt the political culture of the destination country than first generation immigrants. While both participation of first and second generation immigrants is significantly associated with destination country participation (i.e. the marginal effect is significant for both groups), second generation immigrants' adoption of the political culture of this country is around 70 percent stronger than that for first generation immigrants as indicated by the ratio of the coefficients of the two groups (a one-unit change in natives participation for natives in this context translates into a striking 0.94 unit change for second generation immigrants and a 0.55 unit change for first generation immigrants). Hence, our analysis overwhelmingly supports hypothesis 1 stating that second generation immigrants, who have been more extensively exposed to the political culture of the destination country, are also more strongly socialized into this context. There is also strong support for hypothesis 2. Second generation immigrants less strongly retain the political culture of the ancestral country as indicated by the negative significant interaction term between origin-country participation and immigrant generation. In fact, the association with natives' participation in the ancestral country is reduced by around 70 percent for second generation immigrants compared to the first generation. A one-unit change in natives' participation in the ancestral country corresponds to a 0.47 unit change for first generation immigrants and a 0.13 unit change for second generation immigrants. In other words, this analysis suggests that the political culture of the ancestral country is to a considerable extent desocialized with the second generation in the contemporary country.

Model 1c through 1f include fixed effects for the ancestral and the contemporary country, respectively (Model 1e and 1f are based on the full sample—i.e. not only data with non-missing values on ancestral country participation, cf. note 13). This is a very rigorous control strategy as it removes all confounding from either the ancestral or the contemporary country. While inclusion of fixed effects changes the results somewhat—most notably, the differential (de)socialization patterns for first and second generation immigrants are reduced—the overall results are generally reproduced. This suggests that even when comparing people from the same ancestral country or those living in the same destination country, we observe the same differential pattern of adaptation and retention of political culture for first and second generation immigrants. Having survived this demanding test further bolsters our faith in the results.

On the whole, based on various specifications and samples, our results thus far tell a story that is consistent with our proposed account of proximity-conditioned political socialization of immigrants. Second generation immigrants, who have been more cumulatively exposed to natives in the destination country, more strongly adapt to the political culture of the destination country than first generation immigrants, who have been less exposed to carriers of this culture. Conversely, first generation immigrants more strongly uphold the political culture of the ancestral country than second generation immigrants as expected based on the same pattern of exposure to natives in the destination country.

4.8.2 Replicating the results in larger sample of ancestral countries

The analyses reported above are based on a selected sample of ancestral countries as they only include ancestral country data from European countries and a few other countries bordering the region for which ancestral participation is available in the ESS. While the ancestral countries in the ESS sample vary substantially in political culture (in casu, the level of political participation), this sample naturally restricts variation in ancestral country culture as well as the geographical scope of generalization. To probe the robustness of our results in this regard, we instead used levels of political participation in ancestral countries based on the World Values Survey (WVS), which covers a substantially larger and more diverse group of ancestral countries. As noted above, the participation measures included in the WVS and ESS overlaps regarding five activities and we therefore created a scale based on the items covering the five common activities (see Table A1 in the Appendix) both for the dependent variable at the individual level as well as the independent variable at the destination country (ESS) and the ancestral country (WVS) level. The two data sources differ somewhat in the specific question used to tap each activity, which should be kept in mind when assessing the relative importance of destination country and ancestral country participation. That said, the comparison between first and second generation immigrants within each measure should not be affected by these differences. Table 2 below reports a number of models parallel to those reported in Table 1 (except the models using ancestral country fixed effects) using the WVS ancestral country data and the alternative participation measure.

Table 2: Adaptation and persistence in immigrants' political participation (larger sample of ancestral countries)

	Model 2a	Model 2b	Model 2c	Model 2d
Second generation immigrant	0.022*** (0.002)	0.001 (0.005)	0.036*** (0.004)	0.035*** (0.004)
Destination country participation	0.717*** (0.035)	0.557*** (0.037)	-	-
Second gen. imm. * Destination country participation	-	0.384*** (0.031)	-	-
Ancestral country participation	0.189*** (0.028)	0.246*** (0.028)	0.218** (0.029)	0.218** (0.029)
Second gen. imm. * Ancestral country participation	-	-0.177*** (0.028)	-0.076*** (0.020)	-0.072*** (0.019)
Individual-level controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country fixed effects	NONE	NONE	DEST.	DEST.
<i>Std. dev. dest. country intercept</i>	0.013*** (0.002)	0.013*** (0.002)	-	-
<i>Std. dev. origin country intercept</i>	0.020*** (0.002)	0.019*** (0.003)	0.028*** (0.004)	0.020*** (0.003)
<i>Std. dev. of residuals</i>	0.181*** (0.001)	0.181*** (0.001)	0.193*** (0.001)	0.181*** (0.001)
<i>N (destination countries)</i>	33	33	33	33
<i>N (countries of origin)</i>	111	111	111	111
<i>N (individuals)</i>	38,662	38,662	38,662	39,266
<i>Wald χ^2 (df)</i>	2909.56* ** (22)	3097.13* ** (24)	4501.72* ** (54)	4544.04* ** (54)

Note: Estimated coefficients from a maximum likelihood multilevel model with standard errors in parentheses. Individual-level controls are gender, age, age squared, education (dummies), feelings about income (dummies), currently unemployed, previous unemployment, and citizenship. Constant and ESS round fixed effects coefficients not shown to save space. Models 2a-2c are based on the same observations. See note 13 regarding the differences in observations between models.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The results based on the broader sample confirm the patterns observed in the previous analysis. Model 2a and 2b show that immigrants strongly adapt to the political culture of their new country, but second generation immigrants significantly more so than first generation immigrants. The culture of the ancestral country also appears to linger into the new country for both first and second generation immigrants (cf. Model 2a-2d), although to a significantly higher extent for first than second generation immigrants (the participation in the ancestral country significantly predicts present-day participation for both groups). Quantitatively, the results for destination country adaptation parallel those of the main analysis in terms of strength of the adaptation, which testifies to the robustness of this result. Conversely, the comparable estimate for ancestral country persistence is substantially weaker. However, this is most likely due to changes in measurement (the instrument or the specific activities in question) rather than the geographical scope of the analysis as limiting the sample to countries used in the main analysis based on the ESS only changes this estimate slightly. In conclusion, the analyses based on the extended WVS ancestral country sample suggest that results regarding dynamics of political resocialization extend to a more diverse set of countries, but with the exact strength of the persistence of the political culture of the ancestral country culture being unclear.

4.8.3 *Political socialization of first generation immigrants and length of residence*

Having focused on the dynamics of (re-)socialization of political culture among both first and second generation immigrants, we now zoom in on the former in order to further test our theory of proximity-conditioned socialization. Specifically, we examine whether length of residence in the destination country (i.e. extended proximity to this political culture) conditions adaption to this culture as well as retention of the culture of the ancestral country. As noted, the measurement of length of residence differs across rounds in the ESS and we therefore chose to use a simple dichotomous measure—more than 20 years versus less—as a rough, albeit meaningful indicator. By interacting length of residence with destination and ancestral country participation we can assess whether the time-conditioned dynamics of (re-)socialization of political culture also takes place *within* first generation immigrants. Table 3 reports the results from this analysis in a series of models.

Table 3: Gradual adaptation and persistence in political participation of 1st generation immigrants in Europe

	Model 3a	Model 3b	Model 3c	Model 3d	Model 3e
Lived in country more than 20 years	0.024** (0.003)	0.014 (0.009)	0.001 (0.006)	0.036** (0.007)	0.013* (0.006)
Destination country participation	0.617** (0.049)	0.506** (0.059)	0.514** (0.060)	-	0.521** (0.046)
More than 20 years. * Destination country participation	-	0.215** (0.056)	0.156** (0.054)	-	0.156** (0.042)
Ancestral country participation	0.444** (0.060)	0.534** (0.065)	-	0.506** (0.066)	-
More than 20 years * Ancestral country participation	-	-0.190** (0.055)	-	-0.120* (0.053)	-
Individual-level controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country fixed effects	NONE	NONE	ORIGIN	DEST.	ORIGIN
Std. dev. dest. country intercept	0.015** (0.003)	0.015** (0.003)	0.013** (0.003)	-	0.013** (0.003)
Std. dev. origin country intercept	0.017** (0.003)	0.016** (0.003)	-	0.017** (0.003)	-
Std. dev. of residuals	0.158** (0.001)	0.157** (0.001)	0.159** (0.001)	0.157** (0.001)	0.159** (0.001)
N (destination countries)	33	33	33	33	33
N (countries of origin)	40	40	40	40	206
N (individuals)	15,477	15,477	15,477	15,477	24,530
Wald χ^2 (df)	1153.88** (22)	1183.58** (24)	1883.19** (61)	1614.46** (54)	3137.70** (227)

Note: Estimated coefficients from a maximum likelihood multilevel model with standard errors in parentheses. Individual-level controls are gender, age, age squared, education dummies, income feeling dummies and indicator variables for respondents currently unemployed and having ever experienced unemployment for longer than three months. Constant and ESS round fixed effects coefficients not shown to save space. Models 3a-3d are based on the same observations. See note 13 regarding the differences in observations between models.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The results in Table 3 support our conjecture in Hypothesis 3 about the socializing influences in the destination country context accumulating over time and thus that political resocialization is conditioned by length of residence in this context. First generation immigrants' participation not only positively tracks that of natives in the contemporary country, they do so to a significantly higher extent for immigrants who have stayed for more than 20 years as evidenced from Model 3b. More specifically, the association with participation of destination country natives' is around 40% stronger for those who have stayed for more than 20 years compared to those arrived more recently (a unit-change in natives' participation corresponds to a change of 0.51 on the participation scale for those having arrived more recently and 0.72 for those having stayed for more than 20 years). Including ancestral country fixed effects in Model 3c and Model 3e reduces this ratio slightly, but generally tells a similar story. The fact that this result also holds up when applying ancestral country fixed effects means that the differential adaptation over time *cannot* be explained by any compositional differences in ancestral countries between those who have stayed longer or shorter in the destination countries. This is strong evidence in favor of (temporal) proximity-conditioned adaption to the prevailing political culture of the destination country; the longer you stay, the more strongly you adopt this culture.

The hypothesized pattern of desocialization of the political culture of the ancestral country (Hypothesis 4) is also supported. First generation immigrants' participation is positively associated with ancestral country participation, and significantly less so for immigrants having lived in the destination country (hence not in the ancestral country) for more than 20 years as Model 3b and 3d both indicate. The persistence for those having stayed longer is around 40% weaker than for those having left the ancestral country more recently. Again, the fact the result holds up when including fixed effects—this time for the destination country—strongly supports the hypothesis. In other words, staying longer in the contemporary country increasingly decouples immigrants' from the political culture of their ancestral country. Interestingly, comparing the coefficients for destination country adaptation and ancestral country persistence, we see that these are roughly of an equal magnitude for those having resided in the destination country for 20 years or less—a one-unit change for natives in either the contemporary or the ancestral country corresponds to roughly a 0.5-unit change in immigrants' participation. After that, the adaption to the political culture in the contemporary country becomes dominant and the persistence of the culture of the ancestral country wanes.

In summary, our results show that among first generation immigrants, our theory of proximity-conditioned socialization also holds merits. Both Hypothesis 3 and 4 are supported as first generation immigrants having stayed in the destination country longer adapt more strongly to this political culture and are more loosely tied to the culture of their ancestral country.

4.8.4 *Probing the mechanism of proximity-based diffusion further: regional adaptation*

Evidence of immigrants' gradual adaptation to the political culture of the destination country and, conversely, decoupling from the political culture of the ancestral country, is consistent with the suggested bottom-up account of immigrants' political socialization stressing proximity-based social diffusion. However, it is not definitive evidence of this process. It is also consistent with a top-down account emphasizing the role of nationally instigated laws and policies in influencing participatory inclinations. Perhaps the influence of such national-level institutions are strengthened over time and are therefore the drivers of the gradual (de)socialization of political culture.

However, our data offer some leverage for adjudicating between the bottom-up and the top-down perspective, namely by disaggregating our analysis to regions within countries. More specifically, following from the bottom-up perspective emphasizing proximity-conditioned diffusion of political participation, we would expect immigrants' participation to resemble that of natives living closer to them (with whom they are more likely to interact) as stated in Hypothesis 5. In other words, to the extent that political cultures vary within countries (which is generally the case; cf., e.g., Elazar 1966; Putnam 1993), this perspective predicts immigrants to adapt to the *regional* political culture carried by individuals in closer proximity to them. Conversely, intra-country variation in immigrants' participation does not follow from the national-level socialization processes implied by the top-down perspective. Hence, this perspective cannot straightforwardly explain why immigrants in a given region tend to resemble natives in that region more than natives in the destination country at large.

In order to test immigrants' socialization into a regional political culture, we regress individual-level participation on natives' average participation at the regional level in a host of models in Table 4. Clearly regional-level political participation overlaps substantially with national-level participation, and it is therefore necessary to control for the latter to parse out regional adaptation more specifically (Model 4a). An even stronger test of regional adaptation is presented in the models that include ancestral and destination country fixed effects (Model 4b-e). Perhaps most importantly, the fixed effect specification in these models removes all cross-national destination country variation. Using only within-destination country variation in political culture, this model thus examines whether immigrants adapt to natives' regional level of participation *net of* all destination country influences at the national level.

Table 4: Regional adaptation in political participation of 1st and 2nd generation immigrants in Western Europe

	Model 4a	Model 4b	Model 4c	Model 4d	Model 4e
Destination country participation	0.444*** (0.057)	-	-	-	-
Ancestral country participation	0.332*** (0.049)	-	-	-	-
Regional destination participation	0.388*** (0.055)	0.552*** (0.062)	0.496*** (0.052)	0.387*** (0.054)	0.367*** (0.064)
Second generation immigrant	0.022*** (0.002)	0.021*** (0.002)	0.023*** (0.002)	-0.011** (0.004)	-
Second gen. imm. * Regional destination participation	-	-	-	0.278*** (0.028)	-
More than 20 yrs.	-	-	-	-	0.010 (0.006)
More than 20 yrs. * Regional destination participation	-	-	-	--	0.174*** (0.040)
Individual-level controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country fixed effects	NONE	BOTH	BOTH	BOTH	BOTH
Std. dev. dest. country intercept	0.012** (0.003)	-	-	-	-
Std. dev. origin country intercept	0.011*** (0.002)	-	-	-	-
Std. dev. dest. region intercept	0.015*** (0.002)	0.011*** (0.001)	0.010*** (0.001)	0.010*** (0.001)	0.010*** (0.002)
Std. dev. of residuals	0.165*** (0.001)	0.165*** (0.001)	0.165*** (0.001)	0.165*** (0.001)	0.158*** (0.001)
N (destination countries)	33	33	33	33	33
N (countries of origin)	40	40	214	214	206
N (destination regions)	492	492	497	497	482
N (individuals)	29,773	29,773	43,435	43,435	24,788
Wald χ^2 (df)	2444.94*** (23)	4485.17*** (92)	6409.62*** (266)	6490.57*** (267)	4064.07*** (259)

Note: Estimated coefficients from a maximum likelihood multilevel model with standard errors in parentheses. Individual-level controls are gender, age, age squared, education dummies, income feeling dummies and indicator variables for respondents currently unemployed and having ever experienced unemployment for longer than three months. Constant and ESS round fixed effects coefficients not shown. Model 4a and 4b are based on the same observations. Model 4c and 4d are based on the same observations. See note 13 regarding the differences in observations between models.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The results reported provide very strong support for regional diffusion of political participation among immigrants and thus the bottom-up perspective stated in Hypothesis 5. In Model 4a, we observe that beyond adapting to the political culture of the destination country (the positive and significant coefficient on the “destination country participation”-variable), immigrants adopt the political culture of the region in which they reside within that country (the positive and highly significant coefficient on the “regional destination participation”-variable). Quantitatively, the adaptation to the regional-level culture in the destination country is pronounced—a one-unit change in natives’ regional participation is predicted to lead to a 0.39-unit change in immigrants’ participation—falling just short of that of the national level (0.44-unit change) and being stronger than the persistence of the culture of the ancestral country (a 0.33-unit change). Model 4b and Model 4c confirm the finding of strong destination region adaptation in the rigorous ancestral and destination country fixed effect specification (in different samples). In fact, the regional level adaptation appears to be even stronger (a one-unit change in natives regional participation is associated with a 0.55-unit change in immigrants’ participation) in this model that weeds out all variation at the ancestral and destination country-level. Because immigrants’ adaptation to a regional political culture cannot readily be explained by national institutions or nationally instigated policies, this is strong evidence in favor of a bottom-up process of social diffusion of participatory inclinations to immigrants from natives living in closer geographical proximity. In Model 4d and 4e we show that the gradual adaptation to the political culture of the destination country observed earlier also holds up for adaptation to

the regional-level culture (the adaptation is significantly stronger for second generation immigrants, and for first generation immigrants having resided in the destination country for longer), again using the rigorous control strategy of including both ancestral and destination country fixed effects. This further corroborates our theory as those having lived longer in the destination country (and thus plausibly also in the specific region of that country), more strongly adapt the political culture of surrounding natives. In summary, utilizing within-destination country variation in the political participation of natives that immigrants are exposed to, we find evidence strongly supporting the contention that immigrant socialization into the prevailing political culture of their present-day country (also) works through a bottom-up process.⁴¹

4.8.5 Further evidence on the role of social networks in driving immigrants political (de-)socialization

Observing that political culture diffuses from geographically proximate natives is important evidence of the role of weak social ties in socializing immigrants into the (regional) political culture of the destination country. Regional cohabitation most likely captures a process of superficial casual observation of natives' political practices. Yet, more intimate social ties may likely matter for this (de)socialization process as well as specified in Hypothesis 6 and 7. After all, it is through friends, co-workers or neighbors that immigrants—as individuals more generally—are likely to get clearer directions on what constitutes acceptable political practices (Beck et al. 2002).

The ESS allows us to address the role of more intimate social ties through questions concerning having immigrant friends and colleagues, and living in a neighborhood with fewer or more immigrants. Because these questions were only asked in round 1 and 7 of the survey (the “colleagues” question only in round 1), and since round 1 did not record the specific ancestral country of parents of second generation immigrants, we limit these analyses to first generation immigrants. Moreover, the “friendship” question varies in formulation between rounds (see Table A1 in the Appendix). As a consequence, the results of these analyses are more tentative. If our conjecture regarding proximity-based conditioning is true, we would expect a stronger adaptation to the destination country culture for immigrants having weaker ties with other immigrants and, conversely, that they maintain a weaker connection to the ancestral culture. Table 5 presents the results of an analysis in which each measure of social ties are dichotomized (subset by the prevalence of such ties) and interacted with the measures of participation of natives in the destination country and the ancestral country.⁴² Specifically, the table reports marginal effects of natives' participation in the contemporary and the ancestral country for those exposed

⁴¹ These results are also consistent with those obtained by Maxwell (2013), who finds very strong correlations between regional native mean political attitudes and the attitudes of individual immigrants in these regions, and by Just & Anderson (2014), who test the robustness of their results on the relationship between native immigration attitudes and immigrants' participation by investigating this relationship at the sub-national level.

⁴² We also tried substituting the aggregate destination country measure with the regional-level measure and destination country fixed effects. This yielded results parallel to those reported in Table 5.

more versus less to other immigrants, as well as the p-value of the associated interaction term indicating whether there is a significant difference in the two or not (for a parallel reporting strategy, see Luttmer & Singhal 2011).

	Coef. on destination participation	(SE) p value	Coef. on ancestral participation	(SE) p value	N
1. by neighborhood					
<i>Almost nobody minority race/ethnicity</i>	0.676***	(0.119)	0.408***	(0.116)	3,892
<i>Some or many/all minority race/ethnicity</i>	0.721***	(0.105)	0.499***	(0.102)	
p value on test of equal coefficients		0.718		0.410	
2. by immigrant friends					
<i>No friends immigrants</i>	0.633***	(0.120)	0.298**	(0.123)	3,938
<i>Some or all friends immigrants</i>	0.705***	(0.105)	0.570***	(0.102)	
p value on test of equal coefficients		0.563		0.017	
3. by immigrant colleagues					
<i>No colleagues immigrants</i>	0.861***	(0.243)	-0.011	(0.200)	1,372
<i>Some or all colleagues immigrants</i>	0.917***	(0.233)	0.437**	(0.149)	
p value on test of equal coefficients		0.827		0.036	

Notes: Entries are marginal effects from a maximum likelihood multilevel model with standard errors in parentheses and significant test of difference in coefficients. Individual-level controls are gender, age, age squared, education dummies, income feeling dummies and indicator variables for respondents currently unemployed and having ever experienced unemployment for longer than three months. Constant and ESS round fixed effects coefficients not shown.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 5: Adaptation and persistence in participation by social interactions with other immigrants

The reported results indicate an interesting asymmetrical role of personal social ties with other immigrants in shaping the political (re-)socialization of immigrants. Whereas no significant differences exist in destination country adaptation depending on the strength of ties with other immigrants (a rejection of Hypothesis 6), the persistence of the ancestral country culture is significantly stronger for those maintaining stronger ties with other immigrants in terms of friendships and having colleagues (a (partial) confirmation of Hypothesis 7). For those without immigrant friends, the marginal effect of natives' participation in the ancestral country is 0.30, whereas it is 0.57 for those who have immigrant friends (both effects are significant). The marginal effect for those without immigrant colleagues is essentially zero (-0.01) and insignificant, while the corresponding effect for those with immigrant colleagues is a substantial 0.44 and highly significant. A similar pattern of persistence of the political culture of the ancestral country is observed for those living in a neighborhood with many immigrants, but it is not statistically significant (the marginal effect of persistence is significant in both conditions, but slightly weaker than for those with immigrant friendships and colleagues). More intimate social ties—such as friends and colleagues—thus matter more for immigrants relative retention of the culture of the ancestral country than more superficial ties such as those in the neighborhood.

Conversely, none of these more intimate ties matter for adoption of the destination country political culture, which instead seems to diffuse from more subtle cues from surrounding natives. This differential process makes sense intuitively. Immigrants will almost automatically be exposed to natives in the destination country and from those encounters learn about the “appropriate” level of political engagement in this context. Conversely, a connection to the ancestral country—and thus the political culture of this context—is only likely to be upheld when undergirded by close social ties to this culture. We take the latter finding—primarily supporting Hypothesis 7—as further evidence for the bottom-up perspective on political socialization. Even if political institutions or policies (i.e. top-down factors) vary at the regional level, this could not explain why immigrants who socialize more intimately with other immigrants within destination countries also more strongly retain the political culture of the destination country.

4.9 Conclusion

In this paper we have asked whether immigrants adapt to the political culture of their contemporary countries or cling to the political culture of their ancestral countries. In so doing, we have utilized the variation in the political culture of immigrants’ ancestral and present-day countries to address a key question within the political socialization literature, namely how reproduction and change of political culture come about. In the empirical analyses we found no categorical answers, but instead discovered an intuitive pattern of symmetrical adaptation and persistence. Over time and generations, immigrants come to adopt the political culture of their contemporary country and soften their connection with the political culture of their ancestral country.

While the question of cultural adaptation and persistence has not been examined in a systematic way previously, our finding resonates with the broader finding in the literature that factors in the ancestral country and—in particular—the contemporary country correlate with immigrants’ political participation. However, whereas these studies emphasize the role of top-down influences—first and foremost integration policy—as drivers of political integration of immigrants, we have argued that this perspective should be supplemented—not replaced—with a bottom-up perspective. More specifically, we have argued that participatory inclinations (also) diffuse socially from those we are in more proximate spatial and temporal contact with through a process of “proximity-conditioning”. This explains why second generation immigrants, who grew up in the contemporary country, have taken in this political culture more, as well as let go of the culture of their parents’ country to a larger extent (and similarly for first generation immigrants having stayed longer in the contemporary country). While this finding can also be taken to be consistent with top-down processes, such processes cannot explain the social contingencies also observed in our data—most convincingly that immigrants tend to adopt the participatory inclinations of those living around them within the country of residence. In short, our findings indicate that the political culture of the contemporary country is to a considerable extent shaped by diffusion through weak social ties, whereas the culture of the ancestral is preserved more strongly through more personal ties with other immigrants.

Other than the important—but perhaps somewhat trivial—finding that political culture evolves dynamically over time, the most important theoretical implication of our findings is arguably that the role of social diffusion—especially in a more subtle form through the low-intensity “slow drip of everyday life” (Braybeck & McClurg, 2005)—is somewhat undervalued in understanding how individuals become socialized politically. As such, we would like to reiterate Cho & Rudolph’s (2008) call for more research on the role played by casual observation in shaping the political habitus of individuals. Further integration with the reinvigorated literature on residential context (e.g. Hopkins, 2010)—an obvious place for casual observation to occur—seems like a fruitful path to explore further in this regard.

Lastly, what are the implications of our findings for political integration of immigrants? Plainly, our results show that immigrants with time—for better or worse—come to resemble natives’ political inclinations and as such integrate into the political mainstream. Given that the flow of immigrants is mainly from low-participation countries to high(er)-participation countries, our finding leaves some room for optimism for politically integrating migrants into their new polity.

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4.11 Appendix

4.11.1 A1: Coding of variables

Table A1: Coding of variables

Variable	Measure	Source
Political participation (full)	<p>Scale based on seven items tapping participation in the following activities within the 12 months:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Contacted a politician, government or local government official - Worked in a political party or action group - Worked in another organization or association - Worn or displayed a campaign badge/sticker - Signed a petition - Taken part in a lawful public demonstration - Boycotted certain products <p>For each activity, respondents were asked to indicate whether they took part (1) or not (0). The final scale is calculated as the mean of the seven items, thus running between 0 and 1. It includes respondents who have valid answered at least four of the seven questions. Alpha of the scale for first generation immigrants/second generation immigrants (separately, based on all valid responses): 0.668/ 0.662.</p> <p>Mean/Std. Dev.: 0.097/0.170 (first generation immigrants); 0.128/0.190 (second generation immigrants) (separately, based on all valid responses).</p>	European Social Survey, rounds 1-7
Political participation (WVS equivalent)	<p>Mean of 5-item scale based on participation in the following activities within the last 12 months:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Worked in a political party or action group - Worked in another organization or association - Signed a petition - Taken part in a lawful public demonstration - Boycotted certain products <p>For each activity, respondents were asked to indicate whether they took part within the last year (1) or not (0). The final scale is calculated as the mean of the five items, thus running between 0 and 1. It includes respondents who have valid answered at least four of the seven questions.</p> <p>Alpha of the scale for first generation immigrants/second generation immigrants: 0.600/ 0.586.</p> <p>Mean/Std. Dev.: 0.103/0.186 (first generation immigrants); 0.134/0.206 (second generation immigrants) (separately, based on all valid responses).</p>	European Social Survey, rounds 1-7
National mean of native political participation in the destination country	<p>National mean of “political participation (full/WVS equivalent)”, calculated similarly to the dependent variable (cf. above), but based on natives’ (cf. below) responses in a given survey round using the post-stratification weight “pspwght” to obtain nationally representative means. Each respondent is attributed the mean level of participation in their country of residence in a given survey round. In a few instances the survey weight is not available and the means are thus not calculated for that given country-survey round, resulting in immigrants included herein dropping out of the sample. Note that these individuals can be included despite no valid destination country participation mean when</p>	European Social Survey, rounds 1-7

using destination country fixed effects.

Regional mean of native political participation in the destination country	National mean of “political participation (full)”, calculated similarly to the dependent variable (cf. above), but based on natives’ (cf. below) responses in a given region using the post-stratification weight “pspwght” to obtain nationally representative means. The mean is not calculated per survey round to maximize the number of observations. Each respondent is attributed the mean level of participation in their region of residence in a given survey year. Country-survey rounds without a valid post-stratification weight are dropped from the calculation. For the construction of regions see Table A2 in the Appendix (below).	European Social Survey, rounds 1-7
National mean of native political participation in the ancestral country	National mean of “political participation (full/WVS equivalent)”, calculated based on natives (cf. below). For <i>first generation immigrants</i> , the country mean of the political participation scale from their stated country of birth is attributed. <i>Second generation immigrants</i> are attributed the participation value of their parents country of origin. If the parents were born in two different countries other than the respondent’s country of residence, the average value of mean political participation of the two parental ancestral countries are attributed. If only one parent was born outside the country of residence, the mean value of participation for this country is attributed.	European Social Survey, rounds 1-7
National mean of native political participation in the ancestral country (WVS)	National mean of 5-item scale of political participation from the WVS based on having done the following items: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Taken part in a lawful demonstration - Collected signatures for a petition - Boycotted certain products - Worked in a political party or organization - Worked in another organization The scale is constructed in a manner similarly to the dependent variable from the ESS, but with the difference that respondents need at least three valid answers to be included. To the extent possible, responses are only taken from natives/respondents born in the country, but this information is not always available.	World Values Survey, rounds 3-5
First generation immigrant	Dummy variable with two categories: Born outside of the country of residence (1); Born in country of residence (0).	European Social Survey, rounds 1-7
Second generation immigrant	Dummy variable with two categories: Born in country of residence <i>and</i> having one or two parents born outside the country of residence (1); Born outside the country of residence <i>or</i> having both parents born in the country of residence (0).	European Social Survey, rounds 2-7
Native	Dummy variable with two categories: Born in country of residence with parents also born in this country (1); All others (0). If parents’ country of residence could not be determined, the respondent is set to missing.	European Social Survey, rounds 2-7
Length of residence (dummy)	Variable dichotomized into two categories: Respondent was not born in country of residence and first came to the country within the last 20 years (0); Respondent was not born in country of residence and first came to the country more than 20 years ago.	European Social Survey, rounds 1-7
Education	Ordinal variable with five categories: Less than lower secondary	European

	<p>education; Lower secondary education completed; Upper secondary education completed; Post-secondary, non-tertiary education completed; Tertiary education completed. Due to changes in reported education categories between the fourth and fifth rounds of the ESS, the values are extracted from variables “edulvla” and “edulvlb”.</p> <p>Included as dummy variables with reference = less than lower secondary education.</p>	Social Survey, rounds 1-7
Feeling about present income	<p>Ordinal variable with four categories; Living comfortably on present income; Coping on present income; Living is difficult on present income; Living is very difficult on present income.</p> <p>Included as dummy variables with reference = living is very difficult on present income.</p>	European Social Survey, rounds 1-7
Current unemployment	<p>Indicator variable with two categories: Unemployed and actively looking for work <i>or</i> unemployed and not actively looking for work (1); All other valid responses (0).</p>	European Social Survey, rounds 1-7
Ever unemployed more than three months	<p>Indicator variable with two categories: Previously unemployed for more than three months (1); Never unemployed more than three months (0).</p>	European Social Survey, rounds 1-7
Citizenship	<p>Dummy variable with two categories: Respondent has citizenship of country in which he or she resides (1); Respondent does not have citizenship of country in which he or she resides (0).</p>	European Social Survey, rounds 1-7
Neighborhood ethnic composition	<p>Variable dichotomized into two categories: No one or almost nobody in respondent’s neighborhood belongs to a minority race/ethnic group (0); Some or everyone in respondent’s neighborhood belongs to a minority race/ethnic group (1).</p>	European Social Survey, rounds 1 and 7
Friendship group ethnic composition	<p>Question is asked slightly differently in rounds 1 and 7. Variable dichotomized into two categories:</p> <p><i>Round 1:</i> None of respondent’s friends have come to live in resident’s country from other countries (0); A few or some of respondent’s friends have come to live in resident’s country from other countries (1).</p> <p><i>Round 7:</i> None of respondent’s close friends belongs to a minority race/ethnic group (0); A few or some of respondent’s close friends belongs to a minority race/ethnic group (1).</p>	European Social Survey, rounds 1 and 7
Workplace/colleagues ethnic composition	<p>Variable dichotomized into two categories: Variable dichotomized into two categories: None of respondent’s colleagues have come to live in resident’s country from other countries (1); Some or all of respondent’s colleagues have come to live in resident’s country from other countries (0). Respondents not in the workforce are coded as missing.</p>	European Social Survey, rounds 1

4.11.2 A2: ESS round participation

Table A2: ESS round participation by country, alphabetical

Country	ESS rounds	Country	ESS rounds
Albania	1	Latvia	3, 4
Austria	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7	Lithuania	4, 5, 6, 7
Belgium	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7	Luxembourg	1, 2
Bulgaria	3, 4, 5, 6	Netherlands	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
Croatia	4, 5	Norway	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
Cyprus	3, 4, 5, 6	Poland	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
Czech Republic	1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7	Portugal	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
Denmark	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7	Romania	3, 4,
Estonia	2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7	Russia	3, 4, 5, 6
Finland	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7	Slovakia	2, 3, 4, 5, 6
France	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7	Slovenia	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
Germany	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7	Spain	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Greece	1, 2, 4, 5	Sweden	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
Hungary	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7	Switzerland	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Iceland	2, 6	Turkey	2, 4
Ireland	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7	Ukraine	2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Italy	1, 2, 6	United Kingdom	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Kosovo	6		

4.11.3 A3: NUTS level of subnational administrative units

Table A3: NUTS level of subnational administrative units by country and year, alphabetical

Country	Round 1	Round 2	Round 3	Round 4	Round 5	Round 6	Round 7	Exceptions
Albania	NUTS 3							
Austria	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	
Belgium	NUTS 1	NUTS 1	NUTS 1	NUTS 1	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	Brussels (BE100) is NUTS 3 in rounds 1-7
Bulgaria			NUTS 3	NUTS 3	NUTS 3	NUTS 3		
Croatia				NUTS 2	NUTS 2			
Cyprus			NUTS 3	NUTS 3	NUTS 1	NUTS 1		
Czech Republic	NUTS 3	NUTS 3	NUTS 3	NUTS 2	NUTS 3	NUTS 3	NUTS 3	In round 4, three regions are NUTS 3 (CZ010, CZ020, CZ080)
Denmark	NUTS 3	NUTS 3	NUTS 3	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	
Estonia		NUTS 3	NUTS 3	NUTS 3	NUTS 3	NUTS 3	NUTS 3	
Finland	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	NUTS 3	NUTS 3	NUTS 3	
France	NUTS 1	NUTS 1	NUTS 1	NUTS 1	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	Rounds 1-4 are slightly more disaggregated than NUTS 1 (due to split on

								bassin parisien est/ouest)
Germany	NUTS 1	NUTS 1	NUTS 1	NUTS 1	NUTS 1	NUTS 1	NUTS 1	
Greece	NUTS 2	NUTS 2		NUTS 2	NUTS 2			
Hungary	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	NUTS 3	NUTS 3	NUTS 3	
Iceland		NUTS 3				NUTS 3		
Ireland	NUTS 3	NUTS 3	NUTS2	NUTS 2	NUTS 3	NUTS 3	NUTS 3	In rounds 3-4, Dublin is NUTS 3 (IE021)
Italy	NUTS 2	NUTS 2				NUTS 2		
Kosovo						NUTS 3		
Latvia			NUTS 3	NUTS 3				
Lithuania				NUTS 3	NUTS 3	NUTS 3	NUTS 3	
Luxembourg	NUTS 3	NUTS 3						
Netherlands	NUTS 3	NUTS 3	NUTS 3	NUTS 3	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	
Norway	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	
Poland	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	
Portugal	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	
Romania			NUTS 2	NUTS 2				
Russia			NUTS 1	NUTS 1	NUTS 1	NUTS 1		
Slovakia		NUTS 3	NUTS 3	NUTS 3	NUTS 3	NUTS 3		
Slovenia	NUTS 3	NUTS 3	NUTS 3	NUTS 3	NUTS 3	NUTS 3	NUTS 3	
Spain	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	NUTS 2		
Sweden	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	NUTS 3	NUTS 3	NUTS 3	Stockholm is both NUTS 2 and 3 (SE11 & SE110)
Switzerland	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	NUTS 2		
Turkey		NUTS 1		NUTS 1				
Ukraine		NUTS 2	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	NUTS 2	NUTS 2		
United Kingdom	NUTS 1	NUTS 1	NUTS 1	NUTS 1	NUTS 1	NUTS 1		

5. Regime Change in Miniature: An Organizing Typology of Subnational Regime Transitions

Rasmus Fonnesbaek Andersen¹

Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen

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Abstract: There are four distinct types of subnational regime transitions, of which only one has been identified and described in the extant literature: transitions of subnational authoritarian enclaves to subnational democratic rule. In this paper, I present an organizing typology for the study of subnational regime transitions that maps out all of the four types. Its two dimensions are, firstly, whether the subnational transition is to a regime type that is at odds with the national-level regime type (a regime-juxtaposing transition) or to one that is similar to the national-level regime type (a regime-congruent transition), and secondly whether the subnational transition takes place in a context of national-level democracy or authoritarianism. Abbreviated case studies of regime-juxtaposing and regime-congruent transitions under democracy in the Indian state of Bihar (1990–2005) and under authoritarianism in the Russian oblast of Sverdlovsk (1995–2004) show that regime-congruent transitions under authoritarianism have strong similarities with democratization of subnational authoritarian regimes in democracies and are directed by national actors. On the contrary, regime-juxtaposing subnational transitions in both democracies and autocracies are a result of strong local coalitions prevailing against national actors.

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5.1 Regime Change in Miniature

Countries differ in their protection of free elections and political liberties, but democracy is also unequally distributed within many countries. Robert Dahl self-consciously addressed the absence of analysis of subnational regimes in his classic *Polyarchy*, pronouncing his exclusive focus on national regimes “a grave omission in a book about democratization.” (1971: 12).

Recent research has confirmed Dahl’s concerns. A growing literature has demonstrated striking within-country differences in the openness and contestation characterizing subnational regimes in some of the world’s most populous states like India, the US, Brazil, Mexico, the Philippines, Argentina and more (see Lankina & Getachew 2012; Gibson 2005; 2013; Mickey 2015; Hagopian 1996; Sidel 1999; Gervasoni 2010). From 1900 to 2012 between 50 and 60 percent of countries have had “some or significant unevenness” in government officials’ respect for civil liberties, while almost 60 percent of countries – both democratic and non-democratic – experience such unevenness in the freeness and fairness of subnational elections today (McMann 2016).

In these countries some provinces and municipalities are governed more or less democratically than their neighbors. We still know little about such pockets of atypical subnational regimes, especially why subnational polities experience regime transitions and how transitions unfold over time.

In this article, I develop a typological framework for mapping types of subnational regime transitions based on whether (1) they take place in democratic or authoritarian states and (2) whether they are *regime-juxtaposing* transitions that bring about a ‘mismatch’ between the rules that govern the selection of leaders at different levels of government or *regime-congruent* transitions that bring such regime juxtaposition to an end. The typology thus yields four types of subnational regime transitions based on well-established concepts in the study of national and subnational political regimes: in democracies, democratic breakdown and transitions to democracy at the subnational level, and in authoritarian regimes, authoritarian breakdown and transitions to authoritarian rule.

Of the four types of subnational regime transitions in the typology, only *one* has been systematically studied, namely subnational transitions of miniature dictatorships to subnational democratic rule (Gibson 2005; 2013; Borges 2011; Mickey 2015). The main conclusion from these studies of subnational transitions to democracy has been that subnational regime transition takes place when initiated by powerful national-level political actors such as national political parties, the executive branch or the national courts: as Edward Gibson puts it, provincial democratization is a “a result of the nationalization of subnational conflict.” (2013: 149).

The novel conceptualization of four types of subnational regime transitions is important because this result holds *only* for regime-congruent transitions and *not* for regime-juxtaposing transitions. By conducting abbreviated case studies of all four types of transitions in the Indian state of Bihar (to and from subnational authoritarianism) and the Russian oblast of Sverdlovsk (to and from subnational democratic rule), I show that national actors are not preeminent in subnational democratic and authoritarian breakdowns. Not only that, subnational actors carry out regime-juxtaposing transitions precisely *against* the objections and efforts of politicians and institutional actors at the central level.

In Bihar subnational democracy broke down when chief minister Lalu Prasad Yadav centralized power around himself quickly after gaining power in 1990, although the Election Commission and national party leaders – including the prime minister from his own party – sought to have him removed from his post. In Sverdlovsk subnational *authoritarian* rule broke down in 1995 when a coalition of local actors led by future governor Eduard Rossel succeeded in forcing President Boris Yeltsin to allow the oblast to hold competitive gubernatorial elections. By leveraging subnational political resources and coalitions that are organizationally or institutionally innovative, I find, subnational actors can prevail against national attempts at imposing regime uniformity – at least for a while.

On the other hand, regime-congruent transitions that return subnational enclaves to the national-level regime type appear to be initiated or greatly influenced by national-level political actors not only in democracies, as the existing literature has found, but also in authoritarian regimes. In Bihar, the Indian Election Commission and an opposition party alliance with a national party were key in the transition to democracy that dislodged the incumbent chief minister after 15 years of authoritarian rule in 2005. In Sverdlovsk, the transition to authoritarianism was accomplished by Russian president Vladimir Putin's campaign of authoritarian centralization that coopted leaders of rival Sverdlovsk parties into the United Russia party in 2003 and 2004.

Thus, this article advances a novel conceptual distinction, extends and modifies theory on national-local relations in subnational regime change and provides new empirics to the literature on regime juxtaposition and subnational regimes from the important cases of Russia and India.

The remainder of this article is structured as follows. I start by defining subnational regimes and then present an organizing typology of subnational regime transitions. On the basis of existing literature and this typology, I derive theoretical expectations concerning the role of national actors in the four types of subnational regime transitions. Next, I undertake my case studies focused on the role of national political actors in the four types of subnational transitions in Bihar and Sverdlovsk. Based on the case studies, I evaluate the theory and probe the external validity of the findings. Finally, I conclude and draw implications for the study of democracy in a world of increasing decentralization.

5.2 Regime-Juxtaposing and Regime-Congruent Transitions under Democracy and Authoritarianism

In this section, I first define the operative concepts in my typology and argue in favor of why its dimensions together delineate theoretically interesting and substantially different subnational transitions. I then briefly examine each of the four types of subnational transitions yielded by the typology, giving examples of subnational regimes and their transitions.

5.2.1 Constructing the typology

Countries are often governed quite differently across regions, with even central components of democratic rule varying along a fairly wide continuum between regions. Election fraud, vote buying and the degree of incumbent control of both private and public media are often highly concentrated in some parts of the country. Obstacles to opposition or even harassment as well as cooptation of elites

by the use of administrative resources are also among the features of democracy that vary widely within countries.

Behrendt & Whitehead (2016) have argued that few subnational governments in national democracies are full-blown authoritarian regimes, and that we should instead study subnational regime heterogeneity in democracies as illiberal political practices in hybrid subnational regimes. Yet another phenomenon, exemplified by Kerala in India or Tatarstan in Russia, is subnational polities that are enclaves of 'deepened' democracy or authoritarianism (Heller 2000; Farukshin 2002). Variation in the subcomponents of democracy can naturally delineate more or less democratic empirical instantiations of both authoritarian and democratic subnational rule.

However, in order to construct a simple typology at an early stage of the development of the research program of subnational regime variation, in this article I employ dichotomous distinctions between democratic and non-democratic rule at both the national and subnational level. I conceptualize a subnational democratic regime procedurally: democratic rule is constituted by reasonably free and fair subnational elections with multiple parties, factions or independent candidates running for subnational offices with some decision-making power. Subnational democracy also provides for a reasonable measure of de facto freedom of assembly, speech and association and some extension of suffrage in the subnational polity's territory.² A subnational authoritarian regime, conversely, is constituted by the absence of *any one of these* features.

Correspondingly, in this article I only qualify as a *transition* a change in the rules that govern how subnational leaders come to power that is drastic enough that the regime changes from being governed democratically to being governed by authoritarian rule (or vice versa). It limits the empirical scope of the article to fairly dramatic political changes that are easier to identify, but also more puzzling.³ I also limit myself to examining subnational regime changes in which the *national* regime is held fairly constant and does not undergo liberalization to an extent that it democratizes or, conversely, de-liberalization to the extent that becomes non-democratic.

The first dimension of the typology, then, is whether a subnational regime transition (as just defined) is what I call *regime-juxtaposing* or *regime-congruent*. Regime-juxtaposing transitions take place when a subnational political unit changes regime type from one that is the *same* as or similar to the national regime to a subnational regime that is *at odds* with the regime type of the national-level government. On the other hand, regime-congruent subnational transitions are transitions from existing regime juxtaposition to a regime that *mirrors* the national-level regime. As such, regime-juxtaposing transitions bring about subnational authoritarian enclaves in democracies and subnational democratic enclaves in authoritarian regimes, while regime-congruent transitions do away with such enclaves. This is the fundamental distinction that I make. It also does most of the theoretical work in the article.

The other dimension of the typology is whether such subnational transitions take place in a national-level context of *democracy* or *authoritarian rule*. The *type* and *degree* of control that authoritarian and

² If there are no subnational elections and officials are instead selected by appointment, then the national elections held in the territory must live up to the same criteria for subnational democratic rule to obtain.

³ Another implication of this conceptual choice, again to reduce complexity, is that I do not consider transitions between different subnational authoritarian regimes.

democratic national regimes have over subnational politics vary: Authoritarian regimes are less constrained in the use of power than democratic regimes. However, they are not all-powerful and must dose their use of repression and concentrate it, where the greatest challenges to their rule exist. They also face information shortages on subnational politics relative to democratic regimes due to lower transparency and media restricts. They have only fragile legitimacy. Democratic regimes are constrained in how they can control individual regions, but they can obtain greater knowledge of local contexts. Furthermore, they have a greater reservoir of legitimacy that they can draw on in seeking to submit regions to centrally determined standards of policy and governance.

For these reasons, both authoritarian and democratic regimes face the issue of delegating power and managing subordinate levels of government. Unlike what has been assumed or explicitly claimed by existing research on subnational regime heterogeneity (Gilley 2010), then, territorial variation in civil liberties protection, election quality and other components of democracy also vary in authoritarian regimes.

Together, then, the subnational transition type – regime-juxtaposing or regime-congruent – and the national regime yield the following typology of subnational regime transitions:

Table 1: Organizing subnational regime transitions

		Does the transition bring about regime juxtaposition or congruence between subnational and national regimes?	
		<i>Regime- juxtaposing</i>	<i>Regime- congruent</i>
What is the national- level regime type in country in which the subnational regime transition takes place?	<i>Democratic</i>	Democratic breakdown	Transition to democracy
	<i>Authoritarian</i>	Authoritarian breakdown	Transition to authoritarian rule

Democratization of authoritarian enclaves as studied by Edward Gibson, Robert Mickey and others in this typology thus occupies the top-right quadrant as regime-congruent transitions in national democracies. I refer to regime-congruent transitions as transitions to democracy and authoritarian rule, while for terminological distinction I refer to regime-juxtaposing subnational transitions as democratic and authoritarian breakdown because they can also each be seen to form part of a national process of deconsolidation of the prevailing national regime.⁴

Next, I describe each of the types of transitions.

⁴ I thus use a conceptual typology to bring together previously established concepts in the study of national political regimes and democracy and in subnational authoritarianism to make a conceptual distinction that allows us to see similarities and differences across different types of subnational regime transitions (Collier et al. 2012)

5.2.2 *The four types of subnational transitions*

Subnational *democratic breakdown* is the transition to authoritarianism of a previously democratic subnational regime in the context of a nationally democratic regime. Many authoritarian enclaves have been unreconstructed remnants from previous periods of national authoritarian rule (for instance in Brazil and Mexico). However, other authoritarian enclaves are a result of regime-juxtaposing transitions, i.e. subnational democratic breakdown. Subnational democratic breakdown has only received a limited amount of less comparatively oriented academic attention (Gibson 2013: 57-63; Mickey 2015: chap 2). Examples of previously democratic provinces experiencing a breakdown of democratic rule and subsequent subnational authoritarianism include the post-Reconstruction US South (1877-1965), Bihar (1990-2005) in India or Áncash (2007-2014) in Peru (Mickey 2015; Thakur 2015; Comisión Áncash 2015).

A subnational *transition to democracy* is when a pocket of authoritarianism embedded in a national democracy transitions to democratic rule, and it thus generates congruence between the subnational and national regime type, which after a subnational transition to democracy are both democratic. The example of the Southern US states in the middle of the 20th century is the most well-known. The transition to democracy from hegemonic one-party rule by the Southern Democratic parties and suffrage informally limited to white voters by violence, property restrictions and administrative discrimination enfranchised almost 10 million African Americans and made them full citizens. In addition a total of around 43 million US citizens living in the South came to experience competitive party politics, which the rest of the country had known for much longer. Other examples of pockets of authoritarianism in democracies that experienced recent transitions to democracy are Oaxaca in Mexico in the period from 2000 until its democratization in 2010 (Gibson 2013), Maranhão (1985-2014) and Bahía (1985-2006) in Brazil (Borges 2011; Herrmann 2014) and Maguindanao in the Philippines from 2001 to 2010 (Human Rights Watch 2010).

Subnational *authoritarian breakdown* is when a subnational regime democratizes in a context of national-level authoritarian rule. While some pockets of democracy are institutional leftovers from earlier democratic rule, other enclaves under authoritarianism spring forth anew. Two recent examples of subnational democratic enclaves that result from regime-juxtaposing transitions are the state of Baja California from 1989 to 2000 in PRI-era Mexico (Rodriguez & Ward 1994) and Iraqi Kurdistan from 2009 to 2015 (Voller 2015). Regime-juxtaposing transitions in authoritarian regimes have received attention mostly as precursors to national-level transitions to democracy (see Magaloni 2006 on Mexico and Levitsky & Way 2010 on competitive authoritarian regimes).⁵ Indeed, subnational opposition victories do often give access to institutional resources that can allow opposition forces to launch effective campaigns against the national authoritarian regime (Cornelius et al. 1999; Riedl & Dickovick 2014; Lucardí 2016). However, a forthcoming national transition to democracy is not given after regime-juxtaposing subnational transitions in authoritarian states, and in many cases the enclaves experience transitions back to authoritarianism.

A subnational *transition to authoritarianism* is when a democratically governed enclave in a nationally authoritarian regime adopts authoritarian rule as prevailing at the national level or in other

⁵ Gilley (2010) is a partial exception, but concerns primarily institutional and sectoral enclaves such as a free press, courts, etc., rather than territorial enclaves.

subnational regimes in the country. Like transitions to subnational democratic rule in democracies, these transitions are regime-congruent because they bring about congruence between subnational and national regimes. Transitions to authoritarian rule may take place during processes of attempted authoritarian consolidation, when subnational democratic strongholds are stamped out and replaced by authoritarian governments staffed by regime loyalists, local notables or newly coopted politicians (Eaton 2013; Riedl & Dickovick 2014). In Russia a crucial part of national authoritarian consolidation was abolishing governors' elections in 2004, which subjugated democratic enclaves in St. Petersburg and elsewhere (Saikkonen 2016). Such regime-congruent transitions also took place in Brazil two years into military rule in 1966 with the Third Institutional Act aimed at opposition governors in Minas Gerais and Guanabara states and mayors in state capital cities (Falleti 2011: 148-9).

Table 2: Empirical instances of subnational regime transitions

	<i>Regime-juxtaposing</i>	<i>Regime-congruent</i>
<i>Democratic</i>	US South (1877-1900), Free State of Prussia (1932-1933), Áncash in Peru (2007-08), Bihar in India (1990-95)	US South (1960s), Bahía in Brazil (2006-07), Oaxaca in Mexico (2010), Maguindanao in the Philippines (2009-10), Bihar in India (2005-06)
<i>Authoritarian</i>	Baja California in Mexico (1989-1990), Iraqi Kurdistan (2009-2015), Sverdlovsk Oblast in Russia (1993-96)	Saint Petersburg in Russia (2004), Minas Gerais in Brazil (1966-71), Sverdlovsk Oblast in Russia (2004-05),

Table 2 shows the transitions mentioned in the text assigned to the typology. Going into more detail, in section 6 I study regime-juxtaposing democratic breakdown in Bihar in India from around 1990 and its subsequent regime-congruent transition to democracy beginning in 2005. In section 7, I study the regime-juxtaposing authoritarian breakdown in Sverdlovsk oblast in Russia from 1993 to 1996 and also the regime-congruent transition to authoritarian rule from 2004 to 2005. These transitions are marked in bold.

In the next section, I first lay out findings and arguments in the existing literature on subnational transitions to democracy in federal democracies, where national actors and their strategic support for subnational regimes is emphasized as the most important factor for the timing and occurrence of provincial democratization. I then consider to what extent these arguments can be generalized to the *three other* types of subnational regime transitions described in this section.

5.3 National Regime Standardizers and Subnational Regime Contesters

Political actors at the national-level such as the president, cabinet ministers, Supreme Court or national party leaders have been highlighted as the key actors that determine when subnational transitions to democracy take place (Gibson 2005; 2013; Mickey 2015; Montero 2011) – as well as

when they do not and subnational autocrats instead maintain their power against potential challenges (Gibson 2005; Giraudy 2015; Gervasoni 2010).

Do the conclusions from the study of subnational transitions to democracy concerning the primacy of national actors and national dynamics rather than local actors and dynamics travel to the three other types of regime transitions? In order to probe whether the theoretical logic underpinning this conclusion is more general, I first go through the arguments found in the literature on subnational democratization. I then argue that regime-juxtaposing and regime-congruent transitions exhibit differential patterns in the importance of national-level actors for subnational regime change.

5.3.1 National political actors in subnational transitions to democracy

Edward Gibson's pioneering account of subnational democratization is sophisticated and influential (2005; 2013). Research building off Gibson's groundbreaking work has investigated the ways in which national governments, courts and parties indulge local autocrats in order to use their political support to prop up their legislative majorities and how local autocrats are supported or undermined by national policies and resources (Mickey 2008; 2015; Gervasoni 2010; Fenwick 2010; Gel'man & Ryzhenkov 2011; Hidalgo 2010; Rebolledo 2012; Giraudy 2010; 2015; Bohlken 2016; Behrendt & Whitehead 2016).

This research argues that sub-national pockets of authoritarianism are maintained by national-level parties' need for electoral or other support from local hegemonic party incumbents "regardless of endogenous socioeconomic or cultural characteristics that propitiate local hegemony" (Gibson 2013: 33). This leads scholars to focus predominantly on the strategies pursued by local authoritarian rulers that confine conflicts over repression to the region and keep oppositions from nationalizing issues and creating linkages to national-level actors. Gibson refers to such strategies as exercising 'boundary control'.

According to Gibson, subnational authoritarian incumbents avoid transitions to democracy by employing three strategies centered on different arenas: firstly, they parochialize power in the subnational arena, entrenching hegemonic party rule by means of formal (state constitutions and electoral rules) or informal (repression and cooptation) arrangements. Secondly, they nationalize influence in the national arena by controlling national legislators whose votes they can bargain with to shield themselves from national legal challenges or national policies that threaten the local authoritarian regime coalition. Thirdly, they monopolize national-subnational linkages to disempower local opposition parties, controlling resource flows into the province, colonizing unions, courts, administration, national and international organizations and even churches (Gibson 2013: 26-29).

On the other hand, Gibson identifies one strategy that local opposition parties can employ to bring about a subnational regime transition: they can nationalize local conflicts by allying with extra-provincial actors who "invest resources in the jurisdiction, and become participants in the local struggle for power." This is because national actors embedded in a democratic system always have interests in the authoritarian enclave: it contains potential voters that can help national actors create a winning coalition in nationwide elections, and it contains potential legislative support in the form of voting blocs of MPs controlled by the authoritarian incumbent (ibid. 30-31). When a local conflict in an

authoritarian enclave has been nationalized, national actors may bring about democratic transition in one of two ways. National actors can strengthen local opposition party capabilities by support in the form of resources, endorsements, etc. such that the local autocrat loses within the existing institutional arrangements in the province in a *party-led transition*. Alternatively, national actors – usually the Supreme Court, Election Commission or national executive – can intervene directly in the province and reshape the electoral system or another aspect of the subnational regime in a *center-led transition*.

5.3.2 *National political actors under authoritarian rule and in regime-juxtaposing transitions*

So what about the other three types of transitions revealed by the typology; subnational transitions to authoritarianism, democratic breakdown and authoritarian breakdown?

Regime-congruent transitions – both transitions to democracy and to authoritarianism – can be seen as part of processes of national regime standardization insofar as they make the subnational regimes within the national territory more uniform. Regime uniformity makes a political system more integrated and easier to manage, at least outside of extraordinary circumstances such as secessionist movements or disputed borders. For this reason, I assume that national actors hold a preference for regime standardization all else equal. This would appear to be a reasonable assumption in both democracies and authoritarian regimes.

Regime-juxtaposing transitions are different from the regime-consistent transitions studied by Gibson and others. Subnational authoritarian breakdowns are puzzling because they look like a direct threat to the national authoritarian government that is in power. Subnational democratic breakdowns are perhaps even more unexpected, in part because the citizens in the provinces in which they take place have in fact experienced political competition and democracy, and in part because they happen against the backdrop of a national government that is itself democratic. Regime-juxtaposing transitions in both democracies and authoritarian regimes share the condition of reshaping local legislative, executive and judicial institutions while having to navigate pressures for subnational ‘regime congruence’ from the national political system. Thus, it is hard to see why national-level actors in the executive, legislature or judiciary would want to promote regime juxtaposition in both democracies and autocracies. Fundamental conditions underpinning the logic of Gibson’s and others’ arguments on the primacy of national actors in subnational regime transitions do not obtain in these cases.

On the other hand, subnational executives or party machines in democracies have obvious incentives to contest the regime type required from above. Lessening the competitiveness of elections can allow them to stay in power longer and enjoy the spoils of office in terms of rent-seeking and policy control. If they are able to so due to economic structures unfavorable to democracy, weak civil societies or other reasons, they may indeed seize that opportunity to curb democracy. In authoritarian regimes certain subnational polities may have strong civil societies, autonomous business groups or for other reasons be especially vulnerable to elite splits or bottom-up challenges to their power. In such contexts, institutionalized power-sharing in the form of subnational democratic rule may appeal to incumbents – or be forced upon them. Thus, both in democracies and autocracies, subnational leaders may become regime contesters engaged in a struggle against centrally mandated electoral or governance practices in order to gain or retain political power. *For this reason, my first hypothesis is*

that local actors and local dynamics drive regime-juxtaposing transitions and that, in addition, national-level actors usually also oppose them.

Deriving observable implications from H_1 , we would then expect to see local actors undertake reforms that lessen political competition when they can in democracies and sharing power when forced to do so in authoritarian regimes. In addition, we would expect to see national actors opposing their reforms and seeking to subject the newly formed local regime to regime standardization. If we were instead to see national actors themselves imposing such political changes or even supporting them, this would count against H_1 .

Why are national actors not successful when they oppose regime-juxtaposing transitions and regime contesters? Firstly, it is sometimes hard to determine with certainty the nature of an emerging regime before it is too late for national political elites to intervene, especially when the province or city is of secondary importance. Secondly, national political actors often have competing concerns and may worry about antagonizing subnational leaders unnecessarily in the face of uncertainty and poor information over subnational regime developments. Thirdly and most importantly, subnational regime contesters are often creative, pioneering organizational, coalitional or institutional innovation. As such, they can overwhelm national political actors' efforts at regime standardization for a period of time.⁶

However, due to their preference for regime standardization, national actors in both democracies and autocracies are likely to press for regime-congruent transitions once it becomes clear to them that a subnational government operates under a distinct and separate regime logic. The new, innovative coalitions put together by regime contesters also are likely to lose their comparative advantage over challengers supported by national actors as time passes. Thus, when national actors do not depend crucially on political support furnished by regime-juxtaposed enclaves, they are likely to eventually find ways to bring regime-juxtaposed regimes back under their control. *Thus, the second hypothesis I derive is that national actors and national dynamics drive regime-congruent transitions both in democracies (as the existing literature suggests) and in autocracies.*

Observable implications of H_2 are that national actors use either discretionary privileges, fiscal powers, legislation or partisan networks to precipitate regime change in regime-juxtaposed enclaves. Another important implication is that it is these actions by national actors, and not just opposition by local actors, that bring about the regime-congruent transition. If we were to see regime-congruent transitions undertaken by local incumbents without pressure from national actors or primarily local developments leading to regime-congruent transitions, this would count against H_2 .

⁶ Examples of such innovations are for instance the 'ley de lemas' that lessened the risk of elite splits in Santiago del Estero and other provinces in Argentina or the Jim Crow laws in the US South.

Table 3: Theoretical expectations concerning subnational regime transitions and role of national actors

	<i>Regime-juxtaposing transition</i>	<i>Regime-congruent transition</i>
<i>Democratic national regime</i>	H ₁ : Importance of national actors: <i>low</i> Case: <i>Bihar, India (1990-95)</i>	H ₂ : Importance of national actors: <i>high</i> Case: <i>Bihar, India (2005-6)</i>
<i>Authoritarian national regime</i>	H ₁ : Importance of national actors: <i>low</i> Case: <i>Sverdlovsk, Russia (1991-96)</i>	H ₂ : Importance of national actors: <i>high</i> Case: <i>Sverdlovsk, Russia (2004-05)</i>

In table 3, I have plotted an overview of the two hypotheses concerning the importance of national actors into the typology developed in section 3. Importantly, both hypotheses are the same in autocracies and democracies, pointing to broader features of national regime standardization and multilevel politics that *cut across* the democracy-authoritarianism divide.

5.4 Research Design and Case Selection

In order to test these hypotheses concerning the role of national actors in subnational regime transitions and to provide exemplifying accounts of regime-juxtaposing and regime-congruent transitions under democracy and authoritarianism, I zoom into the Indian state of Bihar and the Russian oblast of Sverdlovsk. Both states are first-level administrative units in large, populous countries that experienced regime-juxtaposing transitions and then formed enclaves for a substantial period of time.⁷ For each case, I will examine the transition to a regime-juxtaposed enclave and the transition back to a regime type congruent with the national regime and the most important actors in these transitions.

Systematic, time-varying, quantitative data is not available on the characteristics of a large number of subnational regimes. Therefore, we cannot identify a larger number of regime-juxtaposing and regime-consistent transitions (and non-transitions) in democracies and authoritarian regimes. Accurate and reliable classification of subnational regimes requires both country and regional expertise, and identifying the most important actors at the national and local levels in each of these transitions adds yet another layer of complexity to that type of data collection effort (see Haggard & Kaufmann 2012 for an example of such a dataset at the country-transition level). For this reason, thus far it is not possible to test the hypotheses using quantitative data. However, studying subnational polities that experience both types of transitions carries with it a large advantage: it holds constant a number of

⁷ Because the ambition here is to describe *how* different regime transitions take place *conditional* on their occurrence, this does not constitute selecting cases on the dependent variable with its attendant issues of bias.

conditions in the two cases, focusing our attention on the *changes* in the subnational regions, national-level politics and their bilateral relationship over time that are responsible for the transitions.

I choose India and Russia first because they represent democracy and authoritarian rule, respectively. Secondly, they are both territorially heterogeneous countries displaying substantial subnational regime variation. Thirdly, because the countries are populous and well-studied cases, information about subnational regimes is available for the present and recent past both in English and in Russian from newspapers, the popular press, and government agencies. There are also large secondary academic literatures on subnational politics in both countries as well as multiple existing comparative attempts to evaluate the regimes and levels of democracy in the states and territories of India and the so-called federal subjects of Russia (see Appendix B for information on selection of sources for the case studies). Fourth, they are important cases in and of themselves because they are large, populous countries with high geopolitical importance.

India is a democracy with free and largely fair elections and protection of freedom of speech, association and organization, including for opposition parties. Yet, the range of democratic outcomes in India is staggering. While the southwestern sliver state known as Kerala is an oasis of advanced and highly participatory democracy, Jammu and Kashmir in northwestern India has witnessed long periods of rule from Delhi in abject contradiction of the demonstrated electoral choices of the state's citizens, massive electoral fraud and finally civil war partly brought on by the exclusion of institutionalized outlets for their grievances (Heller 2000; Tudor & Ziegfield 2016; Widmalm 1997; Singh 2002).

In contrast to India, post-Soviet Russia under Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin has not experienced free and fair multi-party elections and reasonable guarantees of freedom of assembly, speech and association (Cheibub et al. 2010; Geddes et al. 2014; Levitsky & Way 2010; Wahman et al. 2013). For that reason, I do not consider it a democratic national regime, especially after the constitutional crisis in 1993 when Yeltsin bombed the Russian Parliament (or Duma). Furthermore, since the election of Vladimir Putin as president in 2000, Russia has become an increasingly consolidated and closed authoritarian regime. As in India, territorially uneven governance also marked the early post-Soviet Russian Federation, and center-region relations in this period were "shaped by informal practices and by presidential decrees" (Saikkonen 2015: 5). Broadly, ethnically based titular republics like Tatarstan were and are run as personal fiefdoms reminiscent of neo-patrimonial regimes like Turkmenistan under Saparmurat 'Turkmenbashi' Niyazov (Farukshin 2002; Mikhailov 2010). A large group of other oblasts saw run-of-the-mill authoritarian rule, while a handful of federal subjects containing Russia's largest cities experienced truly competitive politics, independent media and political activism until the authoritarian centralization campaign embarked upon by Vladimir Putin in the early 2000s (Lankina 2005; McMann 2006; Lankina & Getachew 2006; Petrov & Titkov 2013; Saikkonen 2015).

Both Bihar and Sverdlovsk in the period studied were extreme cases of regime juxtaposition, with subnational regimes that were highly different from their respective national regimes. I selected them to be sure that they were indeed regime-juxtaposed and because they experienced both types of transitions (Petrov & Titkov 2013; Bartman & Glasius 2016). If national-level political actors have a preference for regime standardization over regime juxtaposition, as I posit, then national-level actors should be most involved and most motivated to influence subnational regimes in extreme cases such as Bihar and Sverdlovsk. This suggests that these case studies may *overestimate* the role of national actors in both regime-juxtaposing and regime-congruent transitions relative to other states and

oblasts. However, I hold the subnational regions constant and hypothesize that national actors play a *small* role in regime-juxtaposing transitions and a *large* one in regime-congruent transitions. For this reason, this case selection should not pose any problems. Both are also populous states in their respective federations, which makes information on their politics more easily accessible. However, socioeconomically and administratively they are polar opposites.

5.4.1 Bihar from 1990 to 2005: an overview

From 1990 to 2005 the state of Bihar constituted a pocket of subnational authoritarianism in democratic India. A populous and important state of the Hindi Belt crisscrossed by the Ganges and other large rivers, it is exceedingly poor and rural with a GDP per capita comparable to that of Eritrea. In 1991 Bihar was the second-most populous of the then-existing 32 Indian territories, with more than 64 million inhabitants.

The charismatic Lalu Prasad Yadav ruled the state for 15 years: First as leader of the Bihar branch of the national Janata Party and as Chief Minister. Election practices quickly grew less democratic, the bureaucracy lost autonomy, and Lalu's allies committed violence and engaged in corruption with impunity. Lalu continued rule indirectly after 1997, when he had his barely literate wife Rabri Devi installed as Chief Minister by his splinter group from the Janata Dal, the Rashtriya Janata Dal. For parts of the latter period, he governed the state using his cellphone from the deluxe jail in which he was serving time due to his involvement in the large-scale corruption ring known as the Fodder Scandal. However, an opposition alliance with a national party, poor elite coalition management by Lalu and a strong effort from the national Election Commission produced an indecisive election in 2005 and imposition of president's rule by the central government (see figure 1 for a timeline of the events).




Figure 1: Timeline of Bihar case study

5.4.2 Sverdlovsk Oblast from 1995 to 2004: an overview

From 1995 to 2004 Sverdlovsk Oblast was a subnational democratic regime nested in an increasingly authoritarian Russia (Petrov & McMann 2000; Petrov & Titkov 2013; Saikkonen 2016). Located at the heart of Russia in the Ural Mountains, Sverdlovsk oblast's total population of 4.7 million inhabitants in 1989 made it the fourth-most populous federal subject. Industrial, urban and with an economy based on the mining and export of metals such as gold, platinum and iron and a large-scale steel industry, Sverdlovsk was and is also one of Russia's wealthier regions.

Eduard Rossel led the oblast as governor from 1995 to 2010 after a concerted effort to introduce direct gubernatorial elections once he had fallen out with Boris Yeltsin. Due to elite splits and high-level defections, Sverdlovsk experienced sustained electoral competition across oblast and municipal levels of government between elite factions representing separate parties capable of mobilizing voters until they were definitively coopted into the ruling United Russia Party from 2004 onwards (see figure 2).




Figure 2: Timeline of Sverdlovsk Oblast case study

I now go on to first describe regime-juxtaposing transitions in Bihar and Sverdlovsk in the early 1990s and the roles played by local and national actors in them. Then I move on to their respective regime-congruent transitions in the mid-2000s before concluding on the theoretical framework presented in section 4.

5.5 Regime-Juxtaposing Transitions: Innovative Local Coalitions Outsmarting the Center

In the following, I examine how democracy broke down in Bihar and how authoritarian rule was overcome in Sverdlovsk oblast with a particular focus on the role played by national political actors within the context of federal democracy in India and Russia's authoritarian (quasi-)federation.

5.5.1 Bihar: gradual breakdown of democracy, 1990-1995

Lalu (always known by his first name) became leader of the Bihar Janata Dal party after the sudden death of the former state party leader in 1988. Janata Dal had an overwhelming result in the 1990 state assembly elections, riding the coattails of a nation-wide surge for the founder of the JD party, Prime Minister V.P. Singh. In Bihar, the 1990 elections were free, contested by many different parties and candidates (including new outfits) and resulted in a loss for the Congress party incumbent state government. The state assembly elections were covered by national and local media, and parties and candidates campaigned and were able to hold rallies unhindered by the incumbent government (India Today 1989; India Today 1990a; 1990b).

However, the elections also took place in the shadow of violence and manipulation. 125 people were killed in election violence. The elections also were marked by 'booth capturing' (wherein polling booths are taken over by candidate or party representatives using violence) and other irregularities that prompted reruns of the election in more than 1200 polling places (Bharti 1990a). After the elections Lalu got himself elected Chief Minister of Bihar as leader of the largest party in the state's Legislative Assembly through deft and brutal political maneuvering (Thakur 2015: 71-74).⁸

The regime-juxtaposing transition to subnational authoritarianism in Bihar was gradual and 'endogenous' in the sense that it was undertaken from within the government by a democratically elected leader (Maeda 2010). Lalu quickly centralized power around himself and undermined the constitutional checks and balances of bureaucracy, courts and in part opposition in Bihar (Witsoe 2013: 68-70). He also brought with him into office a coterie of hardened criminals as members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs), who had won their seats in part through thuggery and violent intimidation of both voters and competing candidates (Bharti 1990b; Vaishnav 2012: 120-22).

Thus, the following elections were fought in an unfair contest due to election violence, occasional electoral fraud and misuse of administrative resources, first at the state-level and later both from the state of Bihar and the federal government of India (Ghosh 2000; Ramakrishnan 2005). The process had already begun before the 1990 State Assembly elections with the fielding of convicted criminals as candidates due to their ability to win seats using intimidation and violence. It intensified for the 1991 elections to the National Assembly, in which a number of opposition candidates were killed, and the 1995 State Assembly elections, which Lalu and his coalition partners swept with almost two thirds of the seats against the Election Commission of India's vocal disapproval of the polling process (Ghosh 2000: 49-50).

⁸ He was already at this point a beneficiary of the Fodder Scam corruption ring that would later send him to jail, and it has been alleged that he paid off some MLAs to elect him leader of the Janata Dal party in the legislature using such tainted funds (Thakur 2015: 126-27).

I therefore argue that Lalu's ascent to power constituted a regime-juxtaposing transition to non-democratic rule in the setting of national-level democracy in India.

5.5.2 *Sverdlovsk: two-stage authoritarian breakdown, 1991-1996*

In Sverdlovsk, the regime-juxtaposing transition entailed a two-step process of first achieving political decentralization that would allow for subnational democratic elections in an authoritarian national-level political system (instead of centrally appointed officials). The second step then consisted in building a political system that guaranteed political contestation in relatively free and fair elections and the protection of political rights of association, speech and organization. In the following, I thus divide Sverdlovsk's authoritarian breakdown into two sections.

5.5.2.1 Sverdlovsk's fight for direct gubernatorial elections

Eduard Rossel was appointed head of Sverdlovsk oblast by presidential decree from Boris Yeltsin in October 1991, in part based on their relationship from Yeltsin's time in Sverdlovsk and in part due to Rossel's strong backing of his Soviet reform stance during the coup attempt in August 1991 (Carter 2016: 9-10). However, Rossel and other oblast elite groups were highly unsatisfied with the federal arrangements governing Sverdlovsk's relationship to the Russian state and especially the revenue flows from Sverdlovsk to Moscow (Easter 1997: 622). Alongside Yeltsin's referendum on his rule in April of 1993, Rossel and his deputies in the oblast soviet therefore added a question on increased autonomy for Sverdlovsk to the ballot, and 83 percent of voters supported the proposal in what was generally considered a clean election (Gel'man & Golosov 1998: 34; OSCE 1993).

In the aftermath of the Russian constitutional crisis in October 1993, the Sverdlovsk oblast soviet proclaimed the Urals Republic with expanded autonomy on October 27th (Dukes 2015: 186). Rossel was confident of voter support and thus sought to legitimate Sverdlovsk's autonomy further by also announcing a referendum on the matter, gubernatorial elections (instead of presidential appointment) and new oblast legislative elections, pitting Sverdlovsk voters against the federal center (Easter 1997: 623). However, after ten days, Yeltsin dismissed Rossel as head of the oblast administration and replaced him with Aleksei Strakhov, who was loyal, but unknown.

Rossel, after his demotion in November 1993, founded the party Transformation of the Urals (TotU) with a group of Sverdlovsk notables to mount a comeback. In April 1994 he was elected to the oblast дума with five supporters from Transformation of the Urals and managed to get himself elected chairman of the council as well with the support of many of the independent candidates elected.⁹ He, the oblast дума and TotU immediately set about organizing gubernatorial elections for Sverdlovsk. They met broad resistance from the federal center as Yeltsin forbade elections for regional heads of administration in October 1994 by presidential decree, but lodged an appeal with the Constitutional Court over Yeltsin's decree (Easter 1997: 625). In May 1995, Yeltsin and Rossel went tête-à-tête, and Rossel promised to retract the appeal from Russia's Constitutional Court and support Yeltsin in the upcoming presidential election in exchange for Yeltsin's grant of the 'exceptional right' to hold Russia's

⁹ Before this, he was also elected to the Federation Council (the upper house of the Russian Parliament) as one of Sverdlovsk's two senators in the Russian Parliamentary elections in December 1993 (Gel'man & Gosolov 1998: 35).

first gubernatorial elections in August of 1995 for Sverdlovsk (Zlotnik 1997: 184-85; Carter 2015: 134-35).

I argue that this electoral concession as a result of center-local negotiations and brinkmanship was the first stage of a regime-juxtaposing transition in Sverdlovsk. The next step then concerned the development of pluralism in elections, media and civil society.

5.5.3 The development of political pluralism in Sverdlovsk

The gubernatorial election campaign went ahead with Strakhov, Yeltsin's appointee, against Rossel in the summer of 1995. However, Strakhov was quickly weakened by the high-level defection of Valerii Trushnikov, his deputy head of the Sverdlovsk administration. Trushnikov was supported in turn by liberal Moscow politicians. Thus, the election became a three-way race between Rossel's TotU, Strakhov and Yeltsin's competing national-level party machine and Trushnikov's more personalistic and clientelistic campaign (Gel'man & Golosov 1998: 35-37). The first round of the election was extremely competitive and dispersed: Rossel received almost 29 percent of the votes, Strakhov received 25.6 percent and Trushnikov secured almost 22 percent.¹⁰ Rossel won handsomely in the second round with the support of Trushnikov, taking almost 60 percent of the votes against Strakhov's 32 percent, even though his link to the party in power allowed Strakhov to ultimately spend almost five times the amount that Rossel was able to raise (NYT 1995).

Thus, the election was clearly free with a plethora of candidates to choose from and resulted in a loss for the incumbent. Freedom of assembly, speech and association also appear to have been reasonably protected in the elections: both state and private media covered the elections vigorously, and many candidates organized political movements without hinder (Campbell & Denezhkina 2007: 58).¹¹ The gubernatorial elections in 1995 thus inaugurated the democratic enclave of Sverdlovsk oblast.

Rossel took power of the oblast administration after Strakhov, installing the newly defected Trushnikov in Rossel's own previous position as chairman of the oblast дума. Trushnikov still commanded the support of mining interests in the north of the oblast, and the oblast дума elected in April 1994 remained composed only of a few loyal Rossel supporters, while more than two thirds remained independents (Startsev 1999: 352-53). Thus, there was a fair degree of pluralism in the seat of the oblast government. However, Rossel would primarily be challenged from outside the oblast government. The man who would become Rossel's most formidable opponent instead was Arkady Chernetsky, the mayor of Yekaterinburg since his appointment by Rossel in 1992.

Yekaterinburg was the jewel of Sverdlovsk oblast, representing most of the oblast's economy and especially its advanced service sector (Denezhkina & Campbell 2009: 208). After his election as governor, Rossel sought to have his lieutenant Anton Bakov elected as mayor in the December 1995 mayoral elections. However, Chernetsky enjoyed a reputation as a capable mayor due to his performance in his almost four years as mayor, and furthermore he overtook Strakhov's center-

¹⁰ Other candidates including the communists, ultranationalists and local businessmen received the remaining votes.

¹¹ Whether the election should also be qualified as fair is more debatable. 2,337 domestic and international observers reported some vote-buying, but likely from several candidates (Moscow News 1995). Incumbent weakness in organizational power likely blunted the advantageous effect of control over the local administrative structure, which in any case was split between Trushnikov, Strakhov and partly also Rossel.

backed party, rechristening it Our Home Our City. Despite hard campaigning from Rossel and Bakov, Chernetsky defeated Rossel's candidate heavily in the second round for the Yekaterinburg mayorship, gaining 70 percent of votes against Bakov's 16 percent.¹²

This 'multilevel political cohabitation' guaranteed two strong actors in Sverdlovsk politics with independent sources of power. Chernetsky also orchestrated a challenge from Our Home Our City for the oblast дума elections in April 1996, which provided for strong party-building at the local level for both Chernetsky's, Rossel's and Trushnikov's party machines (Gel'man & Golosov 1998: 38-40). The same election led both Rossel and Chernetsky to found competing media conglomerates and institutionalize media pluralism and competition, albeit within the confines of the influence of their respective patrons (Koltsova 2006: 180-83). However, despite an institutionalized bipartisanship, the political system even remained open to new political players and to civil society activism.¹³

Hence, the second step of the regime-juxtaposing transition – the installation of competition and pluralism in elections, media and civil society – had clearly taken place by the April 1996 oblast дума elections.

5.6 Regime-juxtaposing transitions: national and local actors

In this section, I evaluate H₁ that I derived in the typology and literature review in section 4, i.e. that local actors and local dynamics drive regime-juxtaposing transitions. So, which actors were the most influential in Bihar's democratic breakdown from 1990-1995 and Sverdlovsk's transition to democracy from 1994-1996? And should the causes of these transitions be located at the local or national level?

5.6.1 The role of national actors:

Political actors at the national-level do not appear to have been crucial in Bihar's democratic breakdown or only to have been so in very general ways that set the stage for the regime transition: Firstly, the Congress Party did poorly everywhere in the 1989 elections for the Lok Sabha lower house and in 1990 state assembly elections, yielding the favorable Janata Dal party result that allowed Lalu to become Chief Minister. Secondly, Lalu's machinations to become Chief Minister against rivals involved links to influential national politicians in his Janata Dal party (Singh 2015: 53-54).

However, a number of other 'process observations' (Brady & Collier 2004: 227-8) point to the impotence of national actors in the face of Lalu's power grab. First, for a long time both Congress and BJP were trying to unseat Lalu without success, and for a while even Chandra Shekhar, the prime minister from his own party, sought his exit from the Chief Ministership (Witsoe 2013: 70-77). Second, the Election Commission tried extremely hard to clean up elections in Bihar, yet still failed to do so

¹² The limits of Rossel's power in the oblast also showed in the federal legislative elections held on the same date, wherein Transformation of the Urals only secured 12 percent of the votes and a few deputies to the Russian Duma (Carter 2016: 14-15).

¹³ In the 1999 gubernatorial election, a populist third-party candidate bested Chernetsky in the first round, but was resoundingly defeated by Rossel in the second round (Moscow Times 1999). Popular political activism was also widespread: in 1997, most of the 300 mass protests in the Urals took place in Sverdlovsk oblast (Dukes 2015).

(Ghosh 2000: chapter 8). Third, even when Lalu was imprisoned in 1997 on orders of the Central Bureau of Investigation, this did not break his hold on power.

As in Bihar, in Sverdlovsk oblast the regime-juxtaposing transition was not led by national actors. Neither the fight over direct gubernatorial elections nor the development of pluralism in elections, media and civil society were directly initiated or supported by national-level political actors who sought to move Sverdlovsk towards greater democratic rule.

Rossel's negotiation with Yeltsin and the federal center over gubernatorial elections was based on 'raw' political resources like his voter popularity, influence with Sverdlovsk elites (who controlled industrial and mining assets) and Sverdlovsk's status as a high-taxpaying 'fiscal donor' region rather than on institutionally delimited resources bestowed by his leadership of the Sverdlovsk oblast дума. President Yeltsin was in an insecure position. By threatening him with an appeal to the Constitutional Court as well as a potential, humiliating defeat in his home region in the upcoming elections, Rossel weaponized his genuine popularity and elite backing in Sverdlovsk oblast and in the broader Urals region. The first stage of the regime-juxtaposing transition was aimed quite literally against the federal center.

As in India's regime-juxtaposing transition, however, national political institutions had in some sense laid the foundation for the conflict: Rossel originally gained prominence due to his appointment as head of the Sverdlovsk oblast administration after organizing support for Yeltsin during the 1991 coup attempt. His ability to do so resulted in part from his extraordinary political and social skills, but also from his position as director of a large construction enterprise in Sverdlovsk gained from his long career in the Sverdlovsk Communist Party (Carter 2015: 44, 77).¹⁴

In the second stage of the regime-juxtaposing transition, national political actors also played only an indirect role. Because Rossel's strength against the center depended on his genuine popularity and because he had explicitly used the trappings of democracy to legitimize his rule, Rossel both opened the stage to competitors and allowed his own power to depend on credibly demonstrating his popularity with voters. This proved fateful for subsequent political practices in the oblast.

5.6.2 *The primacy of local actors:*

The democratic breakdown in Bihar instead happened for local and internal reasons: Lalu constructed a personality cult around himself through charisma and populism, based electorally around his own Yadav caste, Muslims and Dalits (also known as untouchables occupying the lowest rung of the caste system) and against upper castes.¹⁵ He was able to maintain this 'vote-bank' by controlling defection and ensuring regime cohesiveness using the threat of violence from his goons and the carrot of spoils of power and corruption (Chakrabarti 2013: 67-82). Furthermore, this regime cohesiveness allowed

¹⁴ The one exception concerning the support of national political actors for democratic rule in Sverdlovsk is the presumed support of the Constitutional Court against Yeltsin's presidential decree against direct gubernatorial elections.

¹⁵ Of MLAs elected in 1985, 36 percent had upper caste backgrounds and 28 percent had "other backwards caste" (OBC) backgrounds. In 1995, only 17 percent had upper caste backgrounds and almost 50 percent in total had OBC backgrounds: 27 percent Yadavs like Lalu and 23 percent non-Yadav OBCs (Chaudhary 2001 cited in Witsoe 2013: 59, 65).

him to manipulate election processes and results that further solidified his grasp on power in the face of opposition from national-level institutions and local rivals.

Thus, the years of subnational authoritarianism in Bihar were marked by Lalu's populist and personalist non-governance, by large-scale corruption by Lalu, his brothers-in-law and members of his inner circle and – most noticeably for the outside world – by the rise of crime and lawlessness in Bihar. Bihar under Lalu was part authoritarian regime and part failed state.

In Sverdlovsk, Rossel's need for legitimacy and voter support combined with the oblast's economic structure to let pluralism emerge. Its economy had a relatively low ownership concentration, lending a basis for financing multiple parties to represent the interests of different industries and individual business owners. As Carter puts it, "the city elites maintained competition that forced both patrons to act according to their interests." (2016: 18). While not initiating or wishing to support Sverdlovsk's democracy, the existence of national actors willing to ally with local parties and politicians also contributed to the reasonably even balance of power between Rossel and Chernetsky because the weaker party in any conflict could ally with federal actors in power (who by themselves were unable to dictate to the oblast). For these reasons, no local actor was able to or found it advantageous to excessively manipulate elections or restrict freedom of expression, association and organization, including that of new opposition parties.

As such, in the following years Sverdlovsk oblast saw vigorous political competition between Rossel, Chernetsky as well as less organized political forces, and both Rossel and Chernetsky maintained prominent national profiles and networks (Startsev 1999: 346-50).

5.6.3 *Summing up:*

In Bihar, Lalu's coalition of Yadavs, Muslims and Dalits became a "new hegemonic alliance" that national actors were unable to defeat (Witsoe 2013: 57-60). Lalu's regime was opposed by the BJP, Congress and even by his own Janata Dal party's Prime Minister Chandra Shekhar when it first was established. National actors including the Election Commission tried unsuccessfully to remove the government or change its electoral and governance practices in 1990, 1995, 1998 and 1999 (Witsoe 2013: 75; Thakur 2015: 108). In Sverdlovsk, Rossel represented a coalition of local business leaders and engaged in prolonged negotiation and political conflict with the ruling party and Kremlin before he finally secured direct elections for the post of governor in Sverdlovsk oblast. Table 5 categorizes national actors in the two cases as either supporting or opposing the regime-juxtaposing transitions.

Table 5: National actors in regime-juxtaposing transitions

		Which national actors initiated or supported the subnational regime transition, and which did not?	
		<i>For</i>	<i>Against</i>
What is the national-level regime type in country in which the subnational regime transition takes place?	<i>Democratic: Bihar, 1990-95</i>	(None) (Ruling party faction: Janata Dal)	Election Commission Opp. parties: Congress, BJP (Ruling party: Janata Dal)
	<i>Authoritarian: Sverdlovsk, 1993-96</i>	(Constitutional Court) (Liberal Moscow elites)	Kremlin: Yeltsin & Prime Ministers Ruling party: Our Home is Russia

Thus, local leaders clearly drove the regime-juxtaposing transitions with varying degrees of opposition from and engagement with national leaders, and my first hypothesis on the local provenance of regime-juxtaposing transitions finds strong support. Furthermore, the strategies that leaders of regime-juxtaposed subnational enclaves employed to protect their independence are telling: In Bihar Lalu's primary approach to threats and challenges from the central level in the early 1990s was not to seek further national influence, but rather to emphasize charisma, electoral strategy and alliances with local strongmen. From 1991 onwards, Lalu began to control the large Bihari delegation of 31 JD MPs in the Lok Sabha, but the parliamentary situation was such that they were not pivotal. However, the attempts to unseat Lalu did subside with greater national influence and with time and the increasing consolidation of his regime coalition. In Sverdlovsk, on the other hand, Rossel had to change national policy in order for gubernatorial elections to be held and utilized his supporting coalition and local political resources to gain national influence under the provisions for shared rule allocated to the provinces in Russia's intergovernmental structure.

Still, however, analysis of these transitions is incomplete without attention to the national level. In Sverdlovsk, the potential for alliances with national actors allowed for relative parity of power between Rossel and Chernetsky in the establishment of political competition in late 1995 and early 1996, and the constitutional framers and Constitutional Court may have helped Rossel's case for gubernatorial elections. In Bihar, a faction of the national Janata Dal party supported Lalu's candidacy for Chief Minister of Bihar, while the prime minister and other factions were opposed to it.

5.7 Regime-Congruent Transitions: Regime Standardization by National Actors

I now turn to Bihar's and Sverdlovsk's regime-congruent transitions in the mid-2000s. First I present each transition, and then the role played by national actors in them is explored. Finally, I sum up the implications for the second hypothesis concerning regime-congruent transitions set out in section 4.

5.7.1 *Bihar's transition back to democracy: 2005-2006*

In the February 2005 state assembly elections, the Lalu regime finally suffered a grievous electoral setback: the opposition united and coordinated their campaign, the Election Commission took a hard line against Lalu's musclemen and loyalists installed to administration state elections, and finally Lalu drastically underestimated the threat from a party mobilizing the votes of 'untouchables' (i.e. those lowest in the caste system) and failed to include it in his coalition (Ananth 2005).

Neither coalition had a clear majority immediately after the election. However, when the main opposition candidate Nitish Kumar – who defected from Lalu's own party in 1994 – began to gather a majority, Lalu convinced the governing coalition at the center to dissolve the State Assembly and call for new elections. The Supreme Court later declared this discretionary intervention unconstitutional (The Hindu 2005). However, the backlash against the openly desperate moves by Lalu contributed to his dwindling popularity. Furthermore, the caretaker government by the state governor under President's Rule shut out Lalu from control of the state apparatus (Mukherjee 2010).

Accordingly, the Election Commission was better able to conduct a free and fair election over four rounds in October and November 2005. Political violence and misuse of administrative resources were less pronounced than in the February contest. Around 60,000 out-of-state military and police personnel were dispatched for a month and a half to prevent violence, intimidation, booth capturing, and fraud (India Today 2005a).¹⁶ Approximately 50,000 out-of-state military and police personnel were deployed to Bihar in the February 2005 election, but only by the third round of the election, while the first two rounds of polling saw much fewer security personnel and, correspondingly, more violence (India Today 2005b).

Nitish Kumar and his National Democratic Alliance overwhelmingly won the new round of elections administered by the caretaker government rather than the Lalu clique. The new government went on to drastically curb the role of violence in elections, restore independence to bureaucracy and courts (including election administration), and pursue pro-development policies (Chakrabarti 2013).

I thus consider the unraveling of the Lalu regime and the change in government occasioned by the October-November 2005 election to constitute a regime-congruent transition to subnational democracy in Bihar.

5.7.2 *Sverdlovsk: authoritarian centralization, 2004-5*

The beginning of the end of the democratic enclave of Sverdlovsk came about by a change in the power of the federal center relative to Sverdlovsk oblast and, for that reason, in the rivalry between Rossel and Chernetsky.

The election of Vladimir Putin as president of Russia in March 2000 meant a very different approach to the regions whose powers were drastically curtailed (Saikkonen 2015: 7-8; Levitsky & Way 2010: 189-90). Allying with the federal center against Rossel, Chernetsky had headed the Sverdlovsk branch of the nationwide Fatherland party from 1999-2001, and he stayed when it became United Russia,

¹⁶ This was equal to more than one third of the number of security personnel involved in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and on top of this number comes police and other security personnel from the state of Bihar itself.

Putin's new party, in 2001. In the face of the expected abolition of gubernatorial elections and to counter Chernetsky's influence, Rossel also finally abandoned TotU and preemptively joined forces with United Russia in 2003. The party gave him priority over Chernetsky, and the mayoral election of December 2003 was the last election of importance in Sverdlovsk that was not dominated and determined by Putin's United Russia party: Chernetsky spectacularly won the election in the second round with 15 percentage points against a Rossel- and United Russia-backed candidate (Campbell & Denezhkina 2007: 75-79). In 2004, Putin abolished gubernatorial elections, and Rossel was reappointed governor.

However, once Rossel and Chernetsky were in the same fold, their continual struggle to check each other's power in Sverdlovsk oblast's media, electoral, business and civil society arenas came to a close. Pressure from the Kremlin succeeded in coopting the previously rivalrous elites of Sverdlovsk and their respective parties, putting an end to competitive politics and bringing about United Russia dominance in both the Sverdlovsk oblast дума and Yekaterinburg city дума. United Russia was a top-down political force bent on securing the 'power vertical' from the Kremlin and throughout Russia (Gel'man & Ryzhenkov 2011). From 2004 to 2006 it began to dismantle the system of power sharing, which Rossel and Chernetsky had constructed: elections were abolished and manipulated, local parties lost prominence in favor of United Russia, the media continued to be streamlined, and civil society lost influence (Carter 2015: 251).¹⁷

5.7.3 *Regime-congruent transitions: national and local actors*

In this section, I evaluate H₂, that national actors and national dynamics drive regime-congruent transitions in both democracies and autocracies. Which actors were then the most influential in Bihar's transition to democracy in 2005-06 and in Sverdlovsk's transition to authoritarianism in 2004-05?

5.7.3.1 The primacy of national actors:

National political actors were divided concerning the transition back to democracy for Bihar in late 2005. The national government – in which Lalu's RJD was the second-biggest party with 22 MPs – actively fought the end of 'Lalu Raj'. Against the view of national actors ultimately clinching the transition, one might also object that Lalu and the RJD lost the Dalit vote to the LJD party, denting his support in many constituencies. Lalu's misappraisal of the popularity of the LJD and unwillingness to share power were local developments that were not primarily controlled by national actors. Yet they were strongly affected by Lalu's rivalry with the LJD leader in the national UPA government cabinet.

Most importantly, the Election Commission of India – which has been called the fourth estate of power in India (Katju 2006) – and the Supreme Court were instrumental in dislodging Lalu's increasingly brittle authoritarian regime. The strengthening of the efforts of the Election Commission – as in 1995 under T.N. Seshan, but unlike in 2000 under M.S. Gill – was important in reducing election violence

¹⁷ While Putin initially tolerated Rossel and Chernetsky due to their ability to mobilize votes for him in nation-wide elections, each was replaced in 2009 and 2010 by appointed Putin loyalists.

and incumbent control of district administrators and other parts of the election administration.¹⁸ As regards the Supreme Court, its verdict against Lalu and the national government further delegitimized the desperate means by which the Lalu regime had tried to maintain power. Thus, although this was clearly not the intention, the round of fresh elections called due to Lalu's influence with the national government ended up benefiting the transition process. Under President's Rule, the misuse of administrative resources prevalent in the February elections was muted, and the Election Commission had more room to help bring about a free and fair election (India Today 2005b).

A unified local-national party alliance in the opposition also provided for a strong, coordinated push against the incumbent. Although Nitish Kumar and his JDU party dominated the NDA coalition, national-level BJP leaders had helped broker the strong JDU/BJP coalition before the 1999 National Assembly elections and again in late 2004 (Chakrabarti 2013: 191-92). Furthermore, although his party was a Bihar-based outfit, Kumar's popularity was in large part predicated on his BJP-approved leadership of the National Democratic Alliance, and he had received wide acclaim and recognition as national Railway minister.

In Sverdlovsk oblast, national actors even more clearly initiated and led the transition to subnational authoritarian rule. Subnational democratic rule unraveled when the federal center's organizational capacity became strong enough to subjugate the indigenous political machines of Eduard Rossel and Arkady Chernetsky. Especially the introduction of presidential representatives in the regions in 2002 provided a direct link to the president for regional elites that both bypassed Rossel and Chernetsky and allowed for close monitoring of and maneuvering in Sverdlovsk politics from the Kremlin (Carter 2015: chapter 8). At the same time, Rossel and other governors lost their automatic seats in the Federal Council in 2001, and Rossel could no longer use this platform to his advantage to coordinate with other regional leaders against the federal center (Nelson & Kuzes 2002: 8). In this way, Rossel's and Chernetsky's local political organizations lost power even before the abolition of direct elections for governor and mayor in 2004 and 2010, respectively.

The dispersion of political power in the oblast inherent in democratic rule early on made it possible for both Rossel and his opposition to ally with authoritarian-minded Putin loyalists at the federal center to gain an advantage over the other and promote pluralism. By using political and financial support channeled from the Kremlin through national party networks both were following their narrow self-interest. However, in the end it jeopardized and ultimately doomed the democratic independence of Sverdlovsk oblast.

5.7.3.2 Summing up:

In both the national democratic context of India and the national authoritarian context of Russia, national political actors played important roles in the two regime-congruent transitions studied in Bihar and Sverdlovsk oblast. In Bihar, the Election Commission of India, the Supreme Court and the BJP, the foremost national opposition party, were key in first bringing about a free and fair election in November 2005 and then in reforming the state's electoral practices after the NDA opposition win. In

¹⁸ The explanation for this appears to be found in dynamics internal to the Election Commission and not in national party politics, as Lalu was allied with the Congress government in 2005 and had a strongly antagonistic relationship with the BJP-led government during the previous state elections in 2000 that he won.

Sverdlovsk, the national government intervened to change the oblast's political regime, most notably the manner of selecting leaders, with the abolition of gubernatorial elections and the colonization of the indigenous party system by the ruling party United Russia.

In table 4, national actors in the two cases are categorized as either supporting or opposing the regime-congruent transitions.

Table 4: National actors in regime-congruent transitions

		Which national actors initiated or supported the subnational regime transition, and which did not?	
		<i>For</i>	<i>Against</i>
What is the national-level regime type in country in which the subnational regime transition takes place?	<i>Democratic: Bihar, 2005-06</i>	Election Commission Supreme Court Opp. party: BJP	National government Ruling party: Congress
	<i>Authoritarian: Sverdlovsk, 2004-05</i>	Kremlin: Putin Ruling party: UR	(None)

Thus, I find support for hypothesis 2 in both democratic India and authoritarian Russia. Additionally, national regime type may also influence the means by which national actors seek to impose regime uniformity upon subnational jurisdictions. In India regime standardization from the center is institutionalized and strongly driven by the highly independent Election Commission of India that regulates national and subnational elections, by the Supreme Court, by national parties' competition for votes and by the considerations of popular legitimacy in a context of relatively free national media. Due to laxer constitutional and parliamentary oversight, regime standardization in the Russian context is instead discretionary and undertaken by presidential decrees and through favoring the ruling party locally by allocation of federal funds.

I also find that although national actors were of preeminent importance for both regime-congruent transitions, in India national actors were split over the Bihar's democratization, while in Russia national actors were unanimously in favor of subjugating the independent Sverdlovsk party system. This split was very clearly linked to the pluralism and political competition characterizing Indian national politics. On the other hand, no significant national actors publicly opposed the transition in Sverdlovsk in authoritarian Russia.

As such, overall the theoretical framework for thinking about national actors' roles in different types of subnational regime transitions is supported by the findings in the four transitions studied here. It is important to distinguish between regime-juxtaposing and regime-congruent subnational transitions taking place in democratic and authoritarian national contexts because their dynamics are mirrors of each other. The conclusions from existing studies of provincial democratization not only do not travel to regime-juxtaposing transitions in democracies, but are indeed also inverted in authoritarian national contexts.

Before concluding, I briefly examine subnational regime variation in the rest of the world and the external validity of the conclusions from Bihar and Sverdlovsk.


5.8 Subnational Regime Variation outside India and Russia

I have shown that we may distinguish between four different types of subnational regime transitions. In two cases from India and Russia only regime-congruent transitions conform to the existing literature's focus on national actors as driving these subnational regime transitions, while regime-juxtaposing transitions are instead led by subnational actors against the disapproval of national actors.

How applicable are the conclusions from Russia and India to the rest of the world? In addition to regime type, the two countries differ on questions of economic development, historical and colonial legacies, centralization, parliamentarianism, and more. While both regions are populous and examples of marked regime juxtaposition, they are also polar opposites in terms of economic development and bureaucratic capacity. That a unified theoretical framework can account equally for transitions in both cases suggests high external validity.

However, a question concerns which level of subnational jurisdictions has the possibility to erect differing political regimes. Although the analysis on Sverdlovsk oblast focused on the first administrative level, the second administrative level of cities and municipalities also played a key role, whereas this was not the case in Bihar. Whether local or provincial politics are most important venues for subnational regime differences depends on the particular constitution of intergovernmental relationships and the factors that shape them. This could very well be consequential for the role of national actors in shaping local regimes. The smaller political units are, the less bargaining power they have relative to the national government (Grossman & Lewis 2014). Thus, these case studies may also *underestimate* the role of national actors in regime-juxtaposing and regime-congruent transitions relative to transitions in countries, where municipalities rather than provinces are the most important subnational level of government.

Also, both Russia and India are territorially large, very populous and diverse states. Are intra-country differences in election practices or the protection of civil and political liberties also found in countries with high centralization, ethnic and social homogeneity and with medium-sized or small populations? The Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset has recently collected data on subnational unevenness in civil liberties and election practices in the 20th and early 21st centuries from a large-scale expert survey with multiple coders for each country (see appendix for details on measurement). These data allows us to situate India and Russia in the larger universe of country cases, including in terms of the period studied (late 1980s until late 2000s).



Figures 3 & 4: Territorial evenness in freeness and fairness of subnational elections (left) and in protection of civil liberties (right) from 1980 to 2009.

Examining the two countries relative to the rest of the world, figure 3 shows that for the period studied (roughly 1985 to 2010), evenness in election practices across the territory is markedly lower for Russia than for the average country, while India's score is relatively close to that of the average non-democratic country, and lower than the average democratic country.¹⁹ Figure 4 shows that evenness in the subnational protection of civil liberties is similar in Russia to that prevailing in the average non-democratic country, while India's is much lower than both the average democracy and non-democracy.

Thus, while the two country cases on average display higher subnational regime type variation than the average, it should not be considered a fringe phenomenon. The differences in governance between the subnational regimes analyzed in this article and the national regimes within which they are embedded are comparable to those obtaining in many other country cases, both democratic and non-democratic.

Thus, subnational regime variation (mostly stemming from regime-juxtaposing transitions) is widespread also outside India and Russia. Where such regime unevenness obtains, national actors likely fight it, while it is defended by the subnational actors that it empowers.

5.9 Conclusion

Shallow democratization in the parliament and national executive in many new democracies conceal local politics that are dominated by party machines or local elites, just as many electoral authoritarian regimes have pockets of unconsolidated democratic rule, where political agents lack either the incentive or the ability to manipulate the political system into the territory of authoritarianism. Why do these regime-juxtaposed enclaves sometimes arise and sometimes disappear?

This article has demonstrated that there are four unique types of subnational regime transitions, while only one of these has been subjected to systematic academic scrutiny. Furthermore, in only two of the four transition types – what I call regime-congruent transitions – do national actors initiate or support

¹⁹ I use the binary democracy-dictatorship indicator variable from Cheibub et al. (2010).

them, as the existing research on provincial democratization has highlighted. In the two remaining types of transitions, regime-juxtaposing transitions in both democracies and under authoritarian rule, this paper finds the *inverse* result of existing research: These transitions are opposed and actively fought by national actors who face strong coalitions by subnational politicians seeking regime change to gain power or prolong their tenure.

The concept and analysis of regime-juxtaposing transitions introduced in this article help make sense of how subnational regime variation arises. Instead of regarding subnational authoritarianism and democracy as *sui generis* phenomena arising from strategic interaction between different levels of government in the existing literature, the finding that regime-juxtaposing transitions are driven by local, internal factors and actors draws a clear parallel to the literature on national-level regime transitions, democratization and democratic breakdown.

To understand all types of subnational regime transitions we should study subnational regimes in their particular multi-level context with a focus on national actors, the intergovernmental framework, and the strength of the national state and the national stature of subnational politicians. But perhaps certain internal political dynamics, structural conditions and shocks also drive regime change in both national and subnational governments. Some democracy-promoting or -obstructing factors identified in the broader democratization literature are not specific to uniquely national-level institutions. They may affect the risk of subnational regime transitions by limiting the resources available to opposition forces or by allowing incumbents more easily to put up barriers to opposition. Changes in natural resource dependency, social modernization, popular contestation and social movements, international influences, political culture and economic inequality are prime candidates for local developments that may bring about subnational regime transitions (Ross 2001; Przeworski & Limongi 1997; McAdams, Tarrow & Tilly 2001; Levitsky & Way 2010; Inglehart & Welzel 2005; Acemoglu & Robinson 2006; Ansell & Samuels 2014).

The typological framework in this article has focused on whether the transitions took place against the national regime type and in a national context of democracy or authoritarian rule. A more common dimension in studies of national-level regime change is between democratic transitions and authoritarian transitions. Are transitions to democracy (i.e. Sverdlovsk in 1995 and Bihar in 2005) and transitions to authoritarianism (i.e. Bihar in 1990 and Sverdlovsk in 2004) similar? Not a lot, but there are a few parallels.

In both transitions to democracy, Rossel in 1995 and Kumar in 2005 were genuinely popular candidates. Combined with the poor performance of preceding subnational governments, their popularity did contribute to the transitions to subnational democracy, through Rossel's brinkmanship in negotiations with Yeltsin and Kumar's performance at the polls despite manipulation. Structural conditions such as growth, the level of development, and administrative capacity were very different, however. Sverdlovsk's high levels of education, industrialization and its economic complexity provided the impetus for a democratizing ruling elite, while this was not the case in Bihar.

In the transitions to authoritarian rule, we find fewer similarities: The heads of the national parties whose local branches took power and extinguished democracy – Putin in 2004 and V.P. Singh in 1990 – were both popular. That helped insert Lalu's party (if not himself directly) into the seat of power and made defection to Putin's United Russia party more attractive for Rossel. Structural conditions were

again extremely different: Bihar's status as the poorest, most corrupt and least administratively capable state in India likely holds part of the explanation for why its democracy broke down and it subsequently sustained a non-democratic subnational regime for 15 years. Sverdlovsk, by comparison, had a thriving economy and capable bureaucracy, but still lost its democracy.

Yet the structural factors that separate Bihar and Sverdlovsk were fairly constant and do not explain why each experienced regime-juxtaposing transitions *when they did so* and why they experienced regime-congruent transitions *at all*. That has to do instead with features of the national regime, with local coalition formation and with the particular relationship between the region and the national government, as emphasized in this article.

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5.11 Appendix

5.11.1 V-DEM data on subnational regime heterogeneity

Variable	Measure	Source
Subnational election quality unevenness	<p><i>Question:</i> Does the freeness and fairness of subnational elections vary across different areas of the country? 0=No, Subnational elections in most or all areas of the country are equally free and fair (or, alternatively, equally not free and not fair), 1=Somewhat. Subnational elections in some areas of the country are somewhat more free and fair (or, alternatively, somewhat less free and fair) than subnational elections in other areas of the country. 2=Yes. Subnational elections in some areas of the country are significantly more free and fair (or, alternatively, significantly less free and fair) than subnational elections in other areas of the country.</p> <p>The measure uses a particular measurement model based on what is known as Bayesian item response theory (IRT) modeling, which “aggregates the ratings provided by multiple country experts and, taking disagreement and measurement error into account, produces a probability distribution over country-year scores on a standardized interval scale.” (V-Dem codebook 2016). The value produced and reported below is a form of weighted average for a given country in a given year. For more detail, see the V-Dem Methodology document (Pemstein et al. 2016).</p>	Varieties of Democracy dataset, v6.2
Subnational civil liberties unevenness	<p><i>Question:</i> Does government respect for civil liberties vary across different areas of the country? 0=Government officials in most or all areas of the country equally respect (or, alternatively, equally do not respect civil liberties). 1=Somewhat. Government officials in some areas of the country respect civil liberties somewhat more (or, alternatively, somewhat less) than government officials in other areas of the country. 2=Yes. Government officials in some areas of the country respect civil liberties significantly more (or, alternatively, significantly less) than government. Civil liberties in the dataset comprise (1) freedom of academic and cultural expression, (2) freedom of religion, (3) freedom from torture, (4) freedom from political killings, (5) freedom of foreign movement, (6) freedom of domestic movement, (7) freedom of discussion for men, (8) freedom from forced labor, (9) property rights, (10) private ownership of economy, (11) transparent laws with predictable enforcement, (12) rigorous and impartial public administration, and (13) secure and effective access to justice.</p> <p>The measure uses a particular measurement model based on what is known as Bayesian item response theory (IRT) modeling, which “aggregates the ratings provided by multiple country experts and, taking disagreement and measurement error into account, produces a probability distribution over country-year scores on a standardized interval scale.” (V-Dem codebook 2016). The value produced and reported below is a form of weighted average for a given country in a given year. For more detail, see the V-Dem Methodology document (Pemstein et al. 2016).</p>	Varieties of Democracy dataset, v6.2




Figure A1: Regional unevenness in election quality from 1900 to 2015, estimated proportion of each group.




Figure A2: Regional unevenness in civil liberties from 1900 to 2015, estimated proportion of each group.

5.11.2 Case study sources and source selection

For the two abbreviated case studies, I have relied primarily on newspaper sources, academic literatures and policy reports. Three search portals were used: the Lexis Nexis searchable database of newspaper articles in English from all over the world, Google Scholar (for academic research) and Google (for policy documents, news articles not listed in Lexis Nexis and other relevant information). Furthermore, additional sources listed within results from these three search portals were also pursued. For India, I also availed myself of the searchable database of articles from the peer-reviewed and highly reputed weekly academic journal *Economic and Political Weekly*. For Russia, I used Google Translate to access Russian-language news articles, policy documents and academic research.

I extensively searched for results using as keywords the names of key actors (such as Eduard Rossel, Lalu Prasad Yadav, Arkady Chernetsky, Rabri Devi, etc., using alternative spelling for names not consistently reported using the name spelling) and place names (Sverdlovsk, Bihar, Yekaterinburg, Patna, etc.), sometimes in conjunction with keywords such as “election*”, “deaths”, “booth capturing”, etc.

As such, I accessed a very large number of news articles, scholarly articles, books and reports that were read, consulted and used for the analysis. For brevity, however, I only list in the literature list documents from which I quote, or which support a specific claim made in the text. On a few occasions, I reached out to key actors repeatedly via email and other channels such as Twitter to corroborate specific incidences uncovered in the course of the analysis.

I searched broadly and used both sources that are contemporaneous to the events and later sources that have the benefit of information becoming available ex post facto, including some by actors involved in decision-making or implementation in Sverdlovsk and Bihar. The sources represent both interviews with regime elites, oppositions, bureaucrats and civil society organizations at the local level as well as at the national level. This means that the coverage of events was generally satisfactory. It is unclear what, if any, bias should be present in the availability of sources.

At all times, I sought out primarily specific information from the sources, rather than evaluations. I then used this information to personally evaluate matters such as the regime type, the sequence of events and the relative importance of earlier events for later ones. It would of course have been preferable to have conducted interviews with key actors myself over the relevant period from 1990 to 2005, but for obvious reasons this has not been possible.

Election results at the polling place level from general, state assembly and panchayat elections as well as presidential, parliamentary, gubernatorial and municipal elections would have been useful to more concretely evaluate shifts in electoral practices, fraud, and competitiveness in the two cases. Unfortunately, they are not available for the period. However, other information concerning the number of candidates, election violence, and aggregate-level election outcomes are available and have been used in making assessments concerning election quality.

6. Transitions from Subnational Authoritarian Rule: Transitology in Short Pants

Rasmus Fonnesbaek Andersen¹

Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen

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Abstract:

How do regime transitions from subnational authoritarian rule differ from the well-studied transitions from authoritarian rule in sovereign states? Beginning from the rich literature on national-level transitions, I develop a typology of eight modes of subnational transitions from authoritarian rule based on the identity of leading actors, the territorial source of the actors' political power and whether the transition creates institutional rupture with the national state. This typology links the study of subnational regime transitions to a number of established literatures in political science and to existing approaches to subnational democratization. Examples of recent and historical subnational regime transitions illustrate each mode of transition. I show that some modes of subnational transitions are very similar to national regime transitions (those led by incumbents, local oppositions, and local insurgents), while others are fairly different from them (those led by non-local actors). This has broader implications for studying the territorial politics of democratization and authoritarian rule.

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6.1 Introduction

Subnational politics are often less democratic, transparent and institutionalized than national politics. Mayors and governors who manipulate elections and violate civil liberties are widespread in new democracies like Mexico, India, Argentina, the Philippines and Brazil (Gibson 2005; 2013; Lankina & Getachew 2012; Gervasoni 2010; Sidel 1999; Hagopian 1996). Conversely, in authoritarian regimes political decentralization sometimes provides space for opposition in enclaves of democratic rule or for disparate types of subnational authoritarian rule. Transitions from authoritarian rule in sovereign states are well-studied in the social sciences, but we know much less about subnational regime transitions. How do subnational authoritarian regimes break down? And how does this process differ from authoritarian breakdown in national authoritarian regimes?

The leaders of the segregationist, one-party states of the US South attempted to secede in 1860, yet many governors in the same states oversaw relatively peaceful democratization from the 1960s onward. Opposition forces in Maranhão continued to take part in the rigged electoral game in the Brazilian state throughout the almost 50 years of Sarney family rule before finally winning the governor's mansion in 2014. The politically excluded Baganda in Uganda's Luwero Triangle instead took up arms to create a new, institutionally severed subnational regime after the election in 1980. In 1986 they even took Kampala as the National Resistance Movement (NRM) and became the officially recognized national government. In yet other subnational regime transitions, outside actors' support has been decisive: foreign military support gave Iraqi Kurds autonomy, and NGO support let the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in South Sudan successfully defend their own territory. In many cases, central states have also sought to democratize enclaves of subnational authoritarianism by replacing autocratic incumbents within constitutional rules, as in Argentina, the Philippines, India, or Peru.

Up to now, the existing literature on subnational authoritarianism has studied only regime transitions led by central governments and nationalized parties, overlooking transitions led by incumbents, insurgents, local parties and foreign actors (Gibson 2013; Mickey 2015; Behrend & Whitehead 2016).² It has conceptualized different modes of subnational transition narrowly and without building on the rich literature on national transitions and its analytically stringent conceptual framework on modes of transition.

In this article I use the term *transitology* broadly to encompass the study of regime transitions from authoritarian rule, including modes of transition, likely triggering events of transitions, the timing of transitions, and incumbents' and oppositions' strategic decision-making. In this article, we are specifically concerned with the mode of transition. This is the process by which the transition happens, distinguished in particular by the "identity of the primary agents of change" (Munck & Leff 1997: 342, see also Stepan 1986, Huntington 1991, and Karl & Schmitter 1991). Research on national regime transitions has shown that different structural conditions shape whether transitions are led by incumbents, established oppositions, peaceful mass movements or revolutionaries (Bratton & Van de

² Gibson (2013: 32) describes these two modes of subnational regime transition and then writes "There are undoubtedly a greater variety of potential transition types, but these two are general enough for us to expect that others will be subsumed by them." This article wholeheartedly disagrees with this assessment.

Walle 1994; Wood 2000; Lindberg 2009; Slater & Wong 2013). Dissimilar transition modes are also followed by different outcomes when it comes to conflict and stability (Cederman et al. 2010), subsequent authoritarian rule (Geddes et al. 2014), and democratic quality (Guo & Stradiotto 2014; Albertus & Menaldo 2014).

The pioneer of the study of subnational regimes, Edward Gibson, was right to point out that “subnational democratization is not democratization in short pants” (2013: 9). Local regimes, unlike sovereign nations, are integrated within the national government through linkages of authority, institutions and personnel. Yet for the aim of this article – providing a comprehensive way of organizing the study of subnational regime transitions – drawing inspiration from the study of national democratic transitions and authoritarian breakdowns (and the transitology literature in particular) proves highly worthwhile.

To systematize how the vast array of actors involved varies from one transition to another, I adapt the transitology literature to the subnational level and construct a conceptual typology of modes of subnational regime transition. If we want to understand regime change at the local level, we must first map out the different ways in which *local or non-local* actors who are either placed in positions *in or out of power* varyingly employ strategies of *negotiation or force* against the national state to accomplish their goals of subnational regime change. These are the three dimensions that the typology uses to characterize eight distinct modes of transition at the subnational level, which characterize regime transitions in non-sovereign polities everywhere.

Without such precise conceptual building blocks, we may get our explanations of subnational regime transitions wrong. Different types of transitions may have different causes, as do national regime transitions. Typologies provide us with “one possible basis for developing tighter theory and gathering more fine-grained data” on the phenomena with which we are concerned (Staniland 2014: 112). The resulting typology of eight modes of subnational regime transition provides an intuitive overview of modes of subnational regime transitions. In addition, it links a number of disparate literatures in political science concerning enclaves of subnational authoritarianism in new democracies (Gibson 2013), warlordism and governance by rebels during civil war (Arjona et al. 2015), multilevel governance (Hooghe & Marks 2016), democracy and autocracy promotion (Levitsky & Way 2010), and most importantly ‘transitology’ and national regime transitions (O’Donnell et al. 1986).

Finally, Gibson and others have emphasized that subnational democratization is very different from regime transitions of sovereign states. Building explicitly on the transitology literature on national regime transitions lets me identify commonalities with national transitions in addition to sharp differences from them. Accordingly, some subnational transitions are similar to one of the four canonical modes of transition found national regime transitions (those led by incumbents, local oppositions, and local insurgents). Others, by contrast, are fairly different (those led by non-local actors).

I present this conceptual typology as a starting point for further research. Instead of theorizing and testing the causes of variation between different subnational regime transitions, I focus on fleshing out the concepts, their relation to each other, and the dynamics of each mode of transition. Modes of subnational regime transition can then serve as dependent or independent variables for scholars

interested in moving beyond coarse cross-national regime differences, in territorial politics within democratic and authoritarian regimes, and in the intersection of state-building and regime formation.

Still, viewing subnational politics in this way has broader ramifications for the study of national regimes, processes of regime change and civil wars, including how we may interpret the effects of crucial variables such as state weakness, ethnic fragmentation, economic development and natural resources in explicitly *territorial* terms.

The remainder of this article is structured as follows. I start out by building a typology of eight modes of transition through which subnational polities can undergo a transition from authoritarian rule from the building blocks provided by the transitology literature. I then describe each mode of transition, give examples and relate them to the literature on national regime transitions. Finally, I show that some transitions are similar to national regime transitions, while others are particular to the subnational, hierarchical, multilevel context. Lastly, I conclude and draw implications for subnational methodology, decentralization, and the territorial politics of regime change.

6.2 Transitology in Short Pants

In the literature on subnational authoritarianism and subnational transitions from authoritarianism, a common assumption is that subnational regimes and transitions are *sui generis* phenomena. Edward Gibson's pronouncement of subnational democratization as distinctly *not* "democratization in short pants" (2013: 9) is most famous, but the sentiment is echoed by other important texts. Robert Mickey says that "dynamic interaction between and among national and subnational polities is decisive" for subnational democratization (2015: 15). Bohlken's work on the introduction of local elections is also skeptical of the view that sees local and national democratization as a "unitary phenomenon" (2016: 245). Starting from scratch theoretically in treating subnational regime change as a particular phenomenon has led to great scholarly creativity and is being fruitfully pursued.

Faced with obvious differences between national and subnational regime transitions, most prominently with regards to sovereignty, in this paper I try to avoid the path of treating subnational regime change as exceptional as well as that of treating it as identical to national regime change. Instead I systematically scrutinize the voluminous and rich literature on national regime transitions – paying particular attention to theoretically relevant scope conditions relevant to multilevel governance – because a cumulative approach to conceptualization has been neglected in studies of subnational regime transitions so far. To structure our understanding of them, I therefore build a conceptual typology of eight types of subnational regime transitions explicitly based on the insights from the study of national regime transitions.³

³ Work on subnational regimes that takes a more 'integrationist' view of the literature on national regime stability and reproduction includes McMann (2006) and Gervasoni (2010), while this view is only beginning to be represented in studies examining subnational regime *change* (Behrend & Whitehead 2016: chapter 10). However, Behrend & Whitehead still do not explicitly connect subnational democratization to the literature on regime transitions and transitology.

6.2.1 Transitology and modes of transition

A regime transition indicates “the interval between one political regime and another” (O’Donnell & Schmitter 1986: 6) and is not contingent on democratization, but only on the dissolution of the previous regime. Because regimes are the rules that govern how leaders come to power and stay in power, a transition is the process that *changes these rules* in the interval between one set of established rules and another.

Opposition actors and incumbent governmental elites have very different resources at their disposal in order to bring about regime transitions and very different interests in office. This has been the first of the two dimensions that have organized the study of national-level transitions for the last 30 years. The second has been the role of violence and coercion in a given transition, ranging peaceful transfers of powers to violent revolutions (Linz 1981; O’Donnell & Schmitter 1986; Stepan 1986; Share 1987; Huntington 1991; Karl & Schmitter 1991; Linz & Stepan 1996; Munck & Leff 1997; Guo & Stradiotto 2014; Haggard & Kaufman 2016).

Such an approach yields four modes of transition: in the terms used by Karl & Schmitter for transitions from authoritarianism (1991: 274-277), they are (i) *pacted* transitions negotiated between incumbents and organized oppositions (non-violent and elite-based) as in South Africa or Poland, (ii) incumbent-led transitions *imposed* from above (violent and elite-based) as in Taiwan or Western Europe in the late 9th and early 20th century, (iii) peaceful mass-led democratic *reform* movements (non-violent and mass-based) as in the Philippines, and (iv) insurrections led from below by *revolutionary* actors (violent and mass-based) as in Iran in 1979. In addition, *foreign-imposed* regime change has been suggested as another category (Huntington 1991; Downes & Monten 2013; Guo & Stradiotto 2014) or a version of ‘imposition’ (Karl & Schmitter 1991). This typology is reproduced in table 1 to illustrate its role as an essential building block of my own typology in table 2 in the next subsection.

Table 1: Modes of national regime transition

		Do elite transition strategies consist in “unilateral recourse to force or multilateral will to compromise”?	
		<i>Compromise</i>	<i>Force</i>
Which actors provide “the impetus for change” in the transition?	<i>Elite</i>	Pact	Imposition (+ foreign imposition)
	<i>Masses</i>	Reform	Revolution

Source: Karl & Schmitter (1991): “Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe”

There are two major scope conditions that differentiate the analysis of subnational transition processes from that of sovereign states. Firstly, the analysis must now accommodate two sets of actors: those at the local level and those at the national level. Thus, there are both subnational executives (governors) and national executives (presidents or prime ministers) who can each initiate

and potentially carry out transitions. This means that leading actors must be identified, as in national regime transitions illustrated in table 1, from a larger set of actors that are both local and non-local. This is paralleled in transitological analysis of national regime transitions that heavily feature international intervention, such as in Germany and Japan after WWII or in Iraq in 2003 (Whitehead 1986).

Secondly, elite and non-elite actors' possible actions with respect to using violence are different in a subnational polity that is embedded within a sovereign state than if they are acting with respect to a sovereign state. Essentially, national actors can use force to bring down national regimes and gain hierarchical control of the entire coercive apparatus of police and military. Of course, sometimes national regime transitions reveal or produce factional division and secessionist groups in civil wars, where hierarchical control of police and military is splintered (Quinlivan 1999). However, this is usually not the case, and the point is that national actors *can* often shift the allegiance of the coercive apparatus to a new regime. Conversely, subnational actors as a rule *cannot* gain control of the entire state's coercive apparatus by themselves. Thus, if subnational actors employ open violence against the country's armed forces – using territorially based divisions of the army, police under provincial control or paramilitary forces – then they instead rupture their relationship with the 'home' state, i.e. the national state in which they are embedded (Coggins 2011). This makes them territorially based rebel organizations engaged in civil conflict instead of subnational governments (Kasfir 2015).

In light of these two fundamental scope conditions of theories of national regime transitions, in the next section I modify the approach to modes of transition found in the transitology literature and construct a typology of transitions from subnational authoritarian rule.

6.2.2 *Modes of subnational transition*

How should we differentiate between different ways that transitions take place in *subnational* regimes instead?

I conceptualize subnational regime types procedurally, comparably to standard definitions employed in studies of national regimes, authoritarianism and democracy (Dahl 1971). Thus, subnational democratic rule is constituted by the presence of *all* of the following: reasonably free, fair and somewhat inclusive elections with multiple parties, factions or independent candidates running for offices with some decision-making power.⁴ If subnational governments are elected, then the elections in question are subnational elections. If the subnational government is instead appointed by the national government, it is considered democratic if *national* elections in that territory are reasonably free, fair and somewhat inclusive.

Subnational authoritarian rule, conversely, is constituted by the absence of *any one* of the required attributes for subnational democratic rule. Subnational authoritarian regimes can be non-electoral or electoral as long as free and fair elections or civil liberties are not sufficiently guaranteed. Following Geddes et al. (2014), I view a subnational regime as "the rules that identify the [leadership] group from

⁴ I use a dichotomous definition of subnational regime type for the explicit purpose of constructing a simple typology, but variation in the subcomponents of democracy can naturally delineate more or less democratic empirical instantiations of both authoritarian and democratic subnational rule.

which leaders can come and determine who influences leadership choice and policy.” I distinguish between subnational authoritarian regimes that are party-based (regime members are drawn from one party and rule collegially), military/rebel-based (regime members are drawn from an armed group and rule collegially), or person-based (one leader selects regime members and rules with few constraints). Thus, transitions from one subnational authoritarian regime to another regime characterized by different leadership groups, rules and *modi operandi* – such as those from subnational authoritarian regimes to insurgent regimes that fight the government – are also addressed by this article.

To organize subnational regime transitions in a typology, I firstly retain the distinction between incumbents and opposition actors. At the subnational level, this distinction also captures important differences in access to different types of financial, coercive and mobilization resources. Secondly, I modify the distinction between violent and non-violent transitions: here, instead, I separate leading actors who play within the rules of the national political system from those who seek secessionism or state overthrow by using violence or threats of it against central state power. Thirdly, I add a dimension based on the transition leaders’ territorial source of political power, distinguishing between whether local power or non-local power is used to push through the subnational regime transition.

The resulting typology of modes of subnational regime transition is illustrated in table 2.

Table 2: Organizing Subnational Transitions from Authoritarian Rule

		Does the transition bring about institutional rupture, such as secession or state overthrow, or is it undertaken in accordance with national political authority?		
			<i>No rupture</i>	<i>Rupture</i>
Who are the actors undertaking the transition, and from where do they draw their political power?	<i>Incumbent</i>	<i>Local</i>	Incumbent-led transition	Incumbent-led insurgent transition
		<i>Non-local</i>	Center-led transition	Foreign-led transition
	<i>Opposition</i>	<i>Local</i>	Opposition-led transition	Insurgent-led transition
		<i>Non-local</i>	Opposition-led assisted transition	Insurgent-led assisted transition

The first dimension of the typology concerns who leads the transition. It distinguishes between transitions undertaken by established political and military leaders (local, national or foreign) and by opposition leaders, high-level defectors and insurgents. With regards to political status, I distinguish between incumbent leaders who possess executive political and military offices and opposition actors who do not. Because of the multilevel nature of the political situation under study, incumbent actors exist at multiple levels of government. Thus, the heads of government and military in the province under study, in the sovereign state to which the province belongs and heads of government and military of foreign countries are all regarded as incumbents. Their administrations and other officials in the executive branch and military are also regarded as incumbents. Opposition actors, then, are opposition politicians and parties, insurgency movements, activists, protesters, etc.

The second dimension of the typology concerns the relationship to the national state of the actors leading the subnational regime transition. Does the transition mark an institutional rupture with the home state or not? If the actors leading the transition largely cooperate with national authorities and act within recognized hierarchies, the province thus remains institutionally integrated within the national political system. In this case, there is no rupture. However, if the actors leading the transition use coercion to break cooperation with the home state and challenge it overtly, for instance espousing goals of violent secessionism or state overthrow, I consider this evidence of institutional rupture. Insurgents' organization of rival armies and police challenge the national hierarchy such that the home state no longer has effective reach into the province concerned (or areas spanning parts of one or several provinces).⁵ When insurgents have established 'liberated territories' or other types of territorially segmented control, they also must decide how leaders are selected, establishing new subnational regimes.

The third dimension of the typology concerns the geographical allegiance of the actors leading a transition. The two groups of transitions distinguished by this dimension are those, wherein there is little external involvement, and those with crucial external involvement from national or international actors. This dimension is particular to the multi-level nature of subnational politics. When actors are local, they are characterized by commanding political resources (most importantly supporters and money) primarily in the province in question. Non-local actors instead command political resources primarily derived from outside of the province in question. Thus, living in a province does not make an actor local if she commands power primarily derived from elsewhere. As long as they mobilize local political resources for the regime transition, local actors may have lived elsewhere prior to the transition – or even potentially remain outside the province in question.

These three dimensions yield, then, the eight possible combinations and modes of transition in Table 2. The first dimension distinguishing between incumbent and opposition actors is clear-cut. However, the next two allow for more continuous evaluation on a spectrum; from fully disarmed, seamless compliance with national coercive authority to complete institutional rupture with national authorities in outright civil war and from actors with entirely local to entirely non-local political resources. Here, types are more stylized, and I will also draw on examples that fall somewhere in between the extremes on the two dimensions.

Next, I analyze each mode of transition and give examples. Along the way, I also show how my framework relates to existing “paths from subnational authoritarianism” in the literature (Gibson 2013; Mickey 2015).

6.3 Transitions from Subnational Authoritarian Rule

In this section, I go through each of the eight modes of subnational transition. In each section, I will devote most space to one example that is described in some detail and mention other examples when

⁵ Transitions marking institutional rupture may sometimes descend into all-out civil war, but more commonly insurgent-ruled areas will coexist with areas ruled by the home state with passive or even active cooperation between state forces and insurgents (Staniland 2012).

relevant. Because subnational politics in the world's most populous countries receive more attention from scholars, policy-makers and the media, subnational regimes from these countries are more likely to figure here. Table 3 displays the selected cases for more in-depth study plotted into the typology.

I also categorize the types of subnational transitions that I have discussed as either (i) "very similar to", (ii) "somewhat similar to", (iii) having "parallels to" or (iv) "not similar to" the modes of national regime transition common in the literature and discussed in the previous section.

Table 3: Subnational Transitions from Authoritarian Rule

		Does the transition bring about institutional rupture, such as secession or state overthrow, or is it undertaken in accordance with national political authority?		
			<i>No rupture</i>	<i>Rupture</i>
Who are the actors undertaking the transition, and from where do they draw their political power?	<i>Incumbent</i>	<i>Local</i>	Outer South, US (1953-65)	Adjara, Georgia (1991-1995)
		<i>Non-local</i>	Maguindanao, Philippines (2009-10)	Kurdistan, Iraq (1991-1994)
	<i>Opposition</i>	<i>Local</i>	Maranhão, Brazil (2014-15)	Luwero Triangle, Uganda (1979-83)
		<i>Non-local</i>	Oaxaca, Mexico (2006-10)	South Sudan, Sudan (1983-95)

6.3.1 *Incumbent actors: governors, presidents and foreign heads of state*

The top half of the cells in the typology concern subnational transitions led by incumbent, elite actors such as governors, presidents, foreign heads of state or high-ranking military personnel in subnational jurisdictions, at the national level or in foreign militaries. As such they all share the feature of being led by actors with access to a well-developed state apparatus and substantial resources, even in the case of transitions leading to institutional rupture with the home state.

Here I distinguish between four modes of subnational transition: Incumbent-led and center-led transitions take place with the blessing of national political elites and while maintaining integration with the home state. The former are undertaken by *local* actors with important positions in the existing provincial administrative or military machinery. In the latter, subnational electoral practices are hierarchically reorganized at the demand of the *national* government, buttressing national political authority in the territory.

Incumbent-led insurgent and foreign-led transitions are led by the same kind of institutionally entrenched incumbent elites, but instead help install new, competing subnational regimes. Because of local or non-local military support against the national state, the resulting subnational regimes are not institutionally integrated into the home states that they notionally belong to. The former rely on local

resources and regime coalitions, while in the latter, extra-provincial incumbents such as foreign leaders project outside military power into a transitioning subnational territory.

6.3.1.1 Incumbent-led transitions: The US Outer South, 1950-65

Incumbent-led transitions are led by incumbents who *reform the regime* while staying in power. Alternation in power does not make a regime change in itself, and neither is it *required* for regime change to take place. Almost by definition, they come about when regime “soft-liners” gain the upper hand against “hard-liners” and initiate electoral and civil rights reforms (O’Donnell & Schmitter 1986).

They are very similar to what Karl & Schmitter call “imposition,” i.e. incumbent-led national regime transitions. They share strong similarities to national-level actors’ considerations and the sequence of events playing out in transitions led by incumbents in Western Europe in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Taiwan in the late 1980s and early 1990s or Myanmar today. Building on arguments made by Rokkan (1970) and Huntington (1991), Slater & Wong (2013) consider such incumbent-led transitions likely when (i) regimes are strong, yet (ii) are faced with setbacks portending future challenges, and (iii) democratize to legitimate and secure the regime. Thus, subnational incumbent autocrats may also reform their regimes while in office if they want to safeguard their future performance in a context of expected long-term decline.

Incumbent-led transitions have taken place in Kerala and Tamil Nadu in the 1950s and 1960s in India (Tudor & Ziegfeld 2016), Nuevo León in Mexico in the 1990s (Correa-Cabrera 2013) and in parts of the US South after World War II. In studying democratization of the US South from the 1940s to 1970s – scarred by one party rule, property qualifications for poor whites and informal racial disenfranchisement – Robert Mickey describes the subnational regime transitions in the Outer South (such as Virginia, Florida, Tennessee and Texas) as “acquiescent democratization.” Here, “enclaves quickly submitted to pressures to democratize, or even preempted some of them through ‘indigenous’ reforms” (Mickey 2015: 5).

In the Outer South, party stakeholders chose not to employ undemocratic means to fight rising opposition from Republicans and blacks and to implement Supreme Court decisions loyally.⁶ The main reason was changes in the local authoritarian support coalition, when moderate pro-business interests within the regimes wished to avoid racial violence and its negative short- and long-term effects on the economy (ibid. 174-75, 185-88). Urbanization and suburbanization also changed the Southern electorate, and party stakeholders were keen not to alienate the newly arrived as future Democratic voters. Thus, Virginia had a competitive gubernatorial election in 1953, Florida in 1960 and Texas in 1962. Equally, the Republican candidate Dwight Eisenhower carried all three states in the 1952 presidential elections. Before this, the only other non-Democrat since 1880 to win these Southern states was Herbert Hoover in his 1928 landslide (Key 1949; Mickey 2015: chap. 2).

6.3.1.2 Center-led transitions: Maguindanao in the Philippines, 2009-10

⁶ Mickey considers these transitions a sub-type of center-led transitions. Yet they were adopted by incumbent subnational leaders in anticipation of externally imposed reforms that would leave them worse off. I instead describe these states’ democratizing reforms as closer to incumbent-led transitions.

In center-led transitions *domestic national actors use coercion* to change the regime and rules set in place by the local incumbent and reorganize subnational politics. I take the term ‘center-led transition’ from Edward Gibson (2013: 32) who views them as driven by an electoral interest in capturing votes that have hitherto been monopolized by a local autocrat or party machine.⁷ However, center-led transitions may also stem from a desire to avoid international condemnation, loss of foreign direct investment or assistance from international organizations. In the extreme, center-led transitions can also be motivated by the desire to bring rebel enclaves back under central control.

Center-led transitions are very different from national transitions and primarily have a few parallels to foreign-imposed regime change because they use force and pose a high cost to incumbent autocrats who are often arrested and prosecuted. Compared to more cooperative or voluntary transitions, students of foreign-imposed regime change have emphasized that externally sponsored transitions only sometimes intend to install democracy. Even when this is the goal, they often struggle with the absence of strong internal pro-democratic stakeholders after troops leave (Downes & Montan 2013). Similarly, at the subnational level Behrend (2016) finds that center-led transitions in Argentina do not consistently lead to democratic outcomes post-intervention.

Center-led transitions have taken place in the US Deep South in the 1960s and against authoritarian governors in provinces like Catamarca and Santiago del Estero in Argentina. Central force was used even more explicitly when the Sri Lankan government brought the territory of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam back under central control from January 2008 to May 2009 with thousands of casualties on both sides, or when the Georgian government amassed troops on the border to the autonomous republic of Adjara to force out its renegade leader in early 2004.

In the Philippines, Maguindanao province lies in the impoverished and politically unstable Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. Here, Esmel Mangudadatu was a local ex-mayor from a prominent family who had challenged incumbent governor Andal Ampatuan Sr.’s son, who was seeking to replace his father after three gubernatorial terms.⁸ The Ampatuans were known for electoral fraud and use of state resources for municipal and gubernatorial election campaigns as well as employing private militias to harass and even murder journalists, opposition politicians and independent-minded judges.

On the way to register Mangudadatu’s candidacy for the upcoming gubernatorial elections in November 2009 in Maguindanao province in the Philippines, 58 people were killed. They included Mangudadatu’s wife, three sisters, supporters, lawyers and 34 journalists who were covering the event for local media. After the massacre, the Ampatuan clan were expelled from President Gloria Arroyo’s party, and a state of emergency was imposed as 3000 infantry troops and two tanks were deployed to the province (Human Rights Watch 2010). Incumbent governor Ampatuan Sr. was forced to quit his post as governor, and his son was barred from contesting the governorship in 2010 and charged with the murders.

⁷ Mickey’s ‘harnessed’ and ‘protracted’ transitions – differing in the timing and level of conflict with federal authorities and exemplified by South Carolina and Mississippi, respectively – also each fit into the category of center-led transitions (2015: chap. 1).

⁸ Governors and other local office holders are limited to three consecutive terms in the Philippines, but as in other subnational authoritarian regimes a common maneuver is to create dynastic regimes by placing other family members in the position when term limits kick in (Querubin 2012).

Mangudadatu eventually had his candidacy registered and won the gubernatorial election in 2010. He was handsomely reelected for a third term as governor in May 2016. However, as in the territories of the former Tamil Eelam after 2009, – or in Iraq and Afghanistan today – his successor regime in Maguindanao does not appear to have fully democratized the province after the center-led transition.

6.3.1.3 Incumbent-led insurgent transitions: Adjara in Georgia, 1991-1995

When *incumbent subnational leaders use coercion* to create new regimes, I refer to these as incumbent-led insurgent transitions. Subnational executive leaders often have important formal and informal prerogatives at their disposal. Therefore, they are sometimes able to take control of a subnational jurisdiction, its institutions and personnel (both bureaucratic and coercive) and declare either independence, drastically expanded autonomy from the home state or state overthrow. If the home state does not accept a reorganization of the intergovernmental framework of the state, then institutional rupture happens.

Incumbent-led insurgent transitions are somewhat similar to “imposition” and coups because of the preeminent role of military forces in achieving institutional rupture against a resisting home state. Incumbent-led insurgent transitions also have parallels to revolutions because institutional rupture cuts off many bureaucratic, financial and military links to the central state. Often, a significant number of loyalist public servants and armed services personnel also flee the newly rebellious regime. Nonetheless, to some extent incumbent leaders are able to continue running the province as before and do not have to build systems of governance from scratch as do most insurgent movements.

Subnational regimes led by incumbent leaders of local or regional government that engaged in minor or major armed conflicts with the national government (or other subnational governments) emerged in the US South from 1860-65, Karen State in Burma in 1949 (South 2011), Biafra in Nigeria in the late 1960s (Nixon 1972), in Somalia in the 1980s and early 1990s and in a number of other African states (Menkhaus 2007; Reno 2011), and in Adjara in Georgia beginning in 1991 (Marten 2012: chap. 4).

Insurgencies often take place in weak states and, within them, in regions with particularly weak state presence. In the Autonomous Republic of Adjara, former Georgian minister in Soviet times Aslan Abashidze was appointed to govern Adjara by the first elected Georgian president Gamsakhurdia in 1991. He would go on to govern autocratically until 2004. The ensuing civil war in Georgia following the coup against Gamsakhurdia in December 1991 allowed Abashidze to quickly assert his independence of central control. He mobilized a personal militia of up to a thousand men equipped with twenty armed vehicles (including four battle tanks) as well as several helicopters and ships. He set up checkpoints with passport control to enter Adjara and replaced Georgian custom officials at the border with Turkey with his own men. This was done in contradiction of a national directive, yet allowed him to siphon off custom revenues instead of contributing to the central budget. Abashidze also prevented residents of Adjara from access to Georgian national television broadcasts by disrupting the signal (Marten 2012: 69-76).

The character of Abashidze’s regime was straightforwardly personalistic and authoritarian. Upon taking power he disbanded Adjara’s Supreme Soviet, the provincial council, and harassed opposition political forces using his paramilitary forces. He also burned down opposition party offices and the

homes of prominent politicians several times (ibid. 72). Seeking influence at the center, however, Abashidze's own party Revival received more than 90 percent of Adjara's votes in every election from 1995 to 2003. Thus, Abashidze used his incumbent position and local standing to engender *partial* institutional rupture with the Georgian national state.⁹

The historical Biafra region of Southeastern Nigeria from 1967 to 1970 provides an example of full-fledged institutional rupture that had aspects of both economic and political motivations (Gould 2013). Here, increasingly conflictual intergroup relations after the exit from Nigeria by the British and contest over considerable oil resources in the Niger Delta military governor C. Odumegwu Ojukwu of Nigeria's Igbo-dominated Eastern Region to declare secession. As is well-known, it resulted in a bloody civil war.

6.3.1.4 Foreign-led transitions: Kurdistan in Iraq, 1991-1994

Foreign-led transitions are those in which *leaders from outside the province coerce a change of a subnational regime*, rupturing the relationship with the home state.¹⁰ The most extreme version of a foreign-led transition is when military force or the credible threat of it is used to install agents of the regime in control of a foreign subnational territory. Most foreign-led transitions – wherein foreign regimes contribute direct military support and other crucial military resources such as safe haven and transit opportunities in neighboring countries (Byman et al. 2001: 84-91) – rely on domestic, insurgent partners with some independent military capabilities, however. Foreign-installed subnational regimes are not mere puppets, but their independence is severely circumscribed.

When foreign actors are directly involved in subnational regime change, this will almost always result in institutional rupture. Depending on the international recognition and recognition by the state from which it ruptured, the enclave either obtains a special status or maintains an unrecognized territorially segmented 'liberated territory', wherein rebels govern (Arjona et al. 2015). The costs of foreign-led transitions for incumbents are likely to be high, and loyalist officials are usually run off or flee themselves at the moment of the 'break' with the home state (Tolstrup 2015). Foreign powers' interests in subnational regime transitions are various: increasing regional influence and destabilizing rivals loom large in decisions to initiate or support emerging insurgencies (Byman et al. 2001). Other objectives not specifically linked to regime type such as controlling resources, minimizing refugee streams or ethnic, religious and ideological concerns may also be present. Finally, motivations may in some cases be promotion of democracy by democratic governments or a fear of democratic contagion by authoritarian governments.

Foreign-led transitions are somewhat similar to foreign-imposed regime change. Because the kind of foreign support we are concerned with here is by definition direct, military and crucial to foreign-led transitions, it can also be withheld or reversed. This gives outside patrons large influence over insurgents, their strategic alignments, policy decisions, and over what type regime is erected – just as

⁹ He also received strategic support from Russia, contributing to the reluctance of national authorities to unseat him. Its influence, though, appears to have been relatively contained until the later period *after* he had set up his insurgent regime (Marten 2012: 83-86).

¹⁰ I call these foreign-led transitions because most cases feature foreign heads of state as the actors that provide the impetus for regime change, but these incumbent actors could also be subnational incumbents in either the home state or a foreign state.

in foreign-imposed national regime change (Salehyan et al. 2011; Downes & Montan 2013). Foreign-led transitions also have parallels to revolutions because incumbents rarely have the power to impose conditions on subsequent regimes and protect their interests.

Foreign-led transitions have taken place in South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh or Eastern Ukraine and Crimea by Russia since the end of the Cold War, in the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 that led to the UN mission in Kosovo, and in the proxy war of the Soviet Union and Cuba against South Africa and the US in Angola from 1975 to 1991, when the UNITA rebel group a territorial stronghold in the country's south. In the Mekong Delta the rebel Viet Cong took orders from North Vietnam's People's Army from 1960 to 1975.

An overt example of foreign-led transitions is the no-fly zone upheld by the US, UK and France that permitted the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq to undertake self-rule from 1991 to 2003.¹¹ Because of the danger posed to Iraqi Kurdistan if Britain, France and the US stopped enforcing the no-fly zone against Saddam Hussein's forces, the autonomous region's rulers sought out legitimacy among Western powers by promoting human rights and democracy (Voller 2015). Thus, when foreign powers are friendly towards democratization or seek to prevent genocide (as in Iraqi Kurdistan and Kosovo), transitions may yield reasonably democratic outcomes. When foreign powers are not concerned with democracy, as in foreign-sponsored insurgencies before 1989 or Russia's enclaves of autocracy, foreign-led transitions may also inhibit democracy.

6.3.2 *Opposition actors: parties, non-state actors and insurgents*

The bottom half of the cells in the typology in table 2 and 3 concern subnational regime transitions led by non-incumbents such as opposition party leaders at the subnational or national level, insurgent groups, independent politicians, and civil society organizations. In contrast to transitions led by subnational, national or foreign incumbent leaders, these transitions are led by actors outside of the state apparatus whose access to resources is usually more limited and whose attachment to existing institutions are more tenuous.

I also distinguish between four modes of subnational transition within this group: opposition-led and opposition-led *assisted* transitions are usually led by political opposition groups who defeat the subnational incumbent at the polls and then take power and go on to change the formal and informal rules constituting the previous subnational regime. In a few cases, they instead negotiate with incumbents and reach a deal. In the first case, they are led by local actors, whose political resources come from local citizens, businesses and organizations. In the other they are derived in large part from outside assistance, changing transition leaders' priorities, the relevant set of actors and dynamics of

¹¹ Foreign support solicited by a weak national government to stamp out an insurgent subnational regime in a territory not under central control brings institutional rupture to an end rather than creating it. Examples are certain peacekeeping and peacemaking missions by the UN, EU or other bodies or individual countries to bring rebellious regions under central control. For this reason it is subsumed under the headline of center-led transitions as a type of elite-led transition by non-local actors (foreign and from the national capital).

regime building. In both cases, the resulting subnational regimes remain squarely within the ambit of the national institutional framework.¹²

In insurgent-led transitions and insurgent-led *assisted* transitions, territorially delimited insurgencies build systems of governance for populations living under their writ as they fight their home state militarily and prevent representatives of the home state from delivering public services in the area. When this is the case, the provision of public services, organization of taxation and enforcement of rules by insurgents also carry with them the replacement of one subnational regime with a new set of formal and informal procedures for selecting who makes such binding decisions. By definition, such subnational regimes in 'liberated areas' are institutionally ruptured from the home state. In the non-assisted insurgent-led transitions, insurgent groups gain their resources primarily from residents of the territories they control and govern. In assisted transitions rebels instead support their warfare with financial resources from foreign states, diaspora, NGOs, and wealthy individuals who in return get some de facto influence over the group.

6.3.2.1 Opposition-led transitions: Maranhão in Brazil, 2014-15

Opposition victories sometimes take place in less-than-democratic subnational regimes and under flawed, existing rules set in place by undemocratic incumbents. When *opposition actors come to power without significant outside assistance* and reform the regime, they can be characterized as pure opposition-led transitions. Almost all opposition-led transitions from subnational authoritarianism happen through existing, flawed, authoritarian elections.¹³ This can be perceived as 'failed subnational authoritarianism': despite concerted efforts at electoral manipulation, the incumbent regime still does not manage to control the electoral process enough to prevent an alternation in power.

The underlying power balance between an incumbent subnational government and opposition in these cases rests in part on local, domestic or 'internal' factors, and within-province dynamics between authoritarian incumbents, oppositions and citizens lead to an opposition victory. A dynamic inherent in opposition-led transitions is the temptation to take over the authoritarian institutions left behind by the former autocrat, as has been stressed by Wahman (2014) at the national level and Behrend (2016) for subnational center-led transitions.

Opposition-led transitions are very similar to transition by pacts and/or reform. With the rise of electoral authoritarianism, national transitions from authoritarianism by elections have become more common. Lindberg (2009) even calls them "a new mode of transition." However, transitions by

¹² Opposition-led transitions are close to what Gibson calls "party-led transitions", the other of his two "pathways from subnational authoritarianism." However, in Gibson's party-led transitions local parties are always empowered by resources stemming from outside the province, channeled through national parties. Thus, in the typology in Table 2 they correspond to opposition-led assisted transitions instead. Furthermore, I prefer the term opposition-led because it ties in more directly with the literature on national transitions and because independent candidates, factions within the same party or civil society organizations can also end subnational authoritarian regimes in this way.

¹³ In Russia's Sverdlovsk Oblast, opposition leader Eduard Rossel instead forced Boris Yeltsin to allow Sverdlovsk to hold direct gubernatorial elections by leveraging a strong fiscal position and voter popularity (Carter 2015; Andersen 2016)

election are in many ways similar to pacted transitions: both are carried out by elites tacitly accepting unfair competition under the terms set by the authoritarian incumbent.

Such transitions have taken place in Sverdlovsk Oblast and the city of Volzhskiy in Russia in the early 1990s (Carter 2015; Andersen 2016; Evans 2014), in Brazil's Rio Grande do Norte state in 2003 (Borges 2016), and in Baja California Sur in Mexico in 1989 (Rodriguez & Ward 1994). A number of Russian oblasts and republics have also experienced opposition-led transitions from one authoritarian government to another based on predominantly local dynamics (Saikkonen 2016: 271-2).

The authoritarian regime in the Brazilian state of Maranhão maintained by ex-President José Sarney's political machine for almost 50 years from 1966 until the gubernatorial election of 2014 fell through an opposition-led transition (Da Costa 1997; New York Times 2014). The new governor Flavio Dino, supported by a number of parties on his platform of anti-corruption and good governance, was elected for the nationally weak Communist Party of Brazil and without the support of national party leaders against the Sarney family's candidate. In other authoritarian enclaves in Brazil's Northeast such as Bahía, Sergipe, and Piauí, governors from the Worker's Party (PT) replaced so-called *coronels*, or strongmen, when the PT headed the national government (see section 4.2.3 on opposition-led assisted transitions). However, José Sarney and his daughter, three-term governor Roseanna Sarney, were *allies* of the PT when they controlled the presidency and national government from 2003 until 2016. In the 2014 gubernatorial election, the PT was even part of the coalition supporting the Sarney family's candidate.

Instead of national-level support from sympathetic partners, local questions of performance, corruption, public order and security were key to the unraveling of the regime in Maranhão. Murder rates had risen more than three-fold from 2002 to 2012 (Human Rights Watch 2015). Drastically, long-term underinvestment in law enforcement and prisons resulted in the Pedrinho prison crisis, where 60 inmates were killed in gang warfare in 2013. Violence spilled out of the prison through gang networks, with buses set on fire in Maranhão's capital São Luis. The chaotic scenes put the spotlight on governor Roseanna Sarney and delayed the grooming of a new gubernatorial candidate loyal to the Sarney machine, opening the way for Flavio Dino's ascent as governor.

Although Dino has only been governor for about a year and a half at the time of writing, Dino's government has sought to break clientelistic ties that maintained the Sarney machine in power. Yet the Sarney family remains powerful in media, the state legislature, municipal politics and the bureaucracy could attempt to stage a return to power with potentially adverse consequences for democracy in Maranhão.

6.3.2.2 Opposition-led assisted transitions: Oaxaca in Mexico, 2006-10

When a subnational regime transition is led by *opposition actors whose political support comes mainly from outside the province* in question, I call it an opposition-led assisted transition. I choose this terminology to highlight that the political resources that helped opposition figures defeat the subnational authoritarian regime electorally came from outside the province. Opposition-led assisted transitions correspond to what Edward Gibson calls 'party-led transitions.' When subnational actors opposing the regime succeed in nationalizing conflict, national actors form alliances with them and channel resources – money, expertise, endorsements, manpower, etc. – to opposition candidates for

electoral reasons (Gibson 2013). External resources to opposition forces may also come from national civil society organizations, internal migrants from authoritarian enclaves or from abroad through international organizations, transnational civil society organizations or diasporas.

Opposition-led assisted transitions are somewhat similar to transition by pacts and reform: Incumbent autocrats are in some control of the process that leads to their departure from office and secure favorable post-election treatment. In many cases, authoritarian successor parties provide for vehicles that can bring regime elites back to positions of power (Loxton 2016). Undemocratic practices may also persist despite party alternation (Wahman 2014; Behrend 2016). Because assisted transitions are highly dependent upon external support, they also have aspects of foreign-led transitions. Thus, the interests and preferences of outside sponsors concerning policy and regime decisions will often also be important, even if external support may also be fickle and vary in strength over time.

Examples of external assistance in opposition-led transitions include the structural changes in the welfare systems wrought by the national-level PT in Brazil and its strong efforts to expand party organization into the Northeast (Borges 2011; Van Dyck & Montero 2015; Souza 2016). This undercut long-standing clientelism on behalf of large landowners, and Bahía was captured by the PT in 2006. In Bihar in India, the election in 2005 of Nitish Kumar ended Lalu Prasad Yadav's 15-year-long political domination of the state of Bihar, when Kumar partnered with the national BJP opposition party (Andersen 2016). In Pskov Oblast in Russia, significant liberalization ensued after the EU accession in 2004 of the Baltic countries suddenly made it an external boundary of the EU and eligible for a large increase in funding from the EU's TACIS democracy assistance program (Lankina & Getachew 2006).

The most well-studied case of an opposition-led assisted transition is Oaxaca in Mexico. Here PRI hegemony persisted after the PAN's victory in the 2000 presidential elections after 80 years of uninterrupted rule by the PRI and its predecessor parties. Both the failed attempt to unseat the PRI governor in the gubernatorial election in 2004 and the successful attempt in 2010 are very well-documented (Gibson 2005; Hermann 2010; Rebolledo 2012; Gibson 2013; Giraudy 2015; Herrmann 2016). With the mayoralty in the Oaxacan state capitol won in 2001 by ex-PRI politician Gabriel Cué Monteagudo and the national presidency from 2000 onwards by PAN politicians, Oaxacan opposition parties got access to discretionary financial resources to use against incumbent autocrats.

Federal spending on media in Oaxaca increased drastically in 2004 to the advantage of the local opposition in the 2004 gubernatorial election (Rebolledo 2012: 79). External support proved inadequate in the close and fraudulent election, however. Strong links between the Oaxacan PRI and the national PRI leadership meant that the PAN president prioritized cooperative relations with the national PRI over Oaxacan democratization after the election. By the time of the 2010 gubernatorial election the PAN again made an alliance with the national PRD party to coalesce around Monteagudo as a candidate against the PRI. More external support for the opposition was provided by the US State Department and the Catholic Church's reporting on deplorable human rights violations in Oaxaca that chipped away at the PRI's local legitimacy (Gibson 2013: 142-3). PAN presidents from 2000 to 2012 also sought to withhold a number of federal subsidies, depriving incumbent autocratic governors of as much funding as possible (Giraudy 2015: 156).

Thus, in 2010 the PRI was ousted after unbroken gubernatorial rule since the early 20th century. However, Monteagudo's tenure lasted only one gubernatorial term, and many local power networks dominated by PRI loyalists. In June 2016, Alejandro Murat (son of Oaxaca's authoritarian PRI governor

José Murat in power from 1998-2004) was elected governor of Oaxaca for the PRI.

6.3.2.3 Insurgent-led transitions: The Luwero Triangle in Uganda, 1979-83

When transitions by *insurgents using coercion* take place without notable outside support, especially without support from foreign states, I call them insurgent-led transitions. Some strong territorial insurgencies choosing to maintain their autonomy rather than receive additional resources from state sponsors or other patrons that are conditional on certain strategic allegiances or policies (Salehyan et al. 2011). The end of the Cold War and superpower rivalry also led to a dwindling of state support. Byman et al. (2001) found that in only 44 out of 74 major post-Cold War insurgencies did external state support play a large role.

Insurgent-led transitions are important because many of them have turned into independent states. Both ‘center-seeking’ insurgents who seek to replace the official government and secessionist or ‘autonomy-seeking’ insurgents that struggle to control and govern a particular area, ethnic or linguistic group have come into power of independent states. Coggins finds that “95 of 259 independence movements between 1931 and 2002 became independent states.” (2014: 6).¹⁴ This is most likely when rebels are perceived to be popular, exerting territorial authority and not to pose problems to the interests of great powers in the international system.

Insurgent-led transitions are somewhat similar to revolutions. Because insurgents violently oppose existing armies and governments, rebel governance and insurgent-led transitions – subnational as well as national – are a high-stakes game. Some end in rebel victories, in peace settlements that allow former rebels important positions or in de facto territorial autonomy (Toft 2009). However, many insurgents and insurgent leaders die in battle or when rebellions fail.

The Islamic State (or ISIL) is a recent example of a strong insurgency that gained territorial control of large swaths of Syria and Iraq by its own access to resources through taxation, extortion, legal and illegal exports and more (Revkin 2016). Other examples of insurgent-led subnational regime transitions include the territories held by the Taiping rebels against the Qing Dynasty in China from 1851-1864 (Gray 1990), in Colombia’s Northeast by the self-proclaimed National Liberation Army (ELN) in the mid-1960s (Gallego 2012), and finally the National Resistance Army (NRA) of central Uganda (Kasfir 2005) in the early 1980s.

In 1979, Idi Amin’s exceptionally personalistic rule crumbled into warring factions after his annexation of a bordering region led the Tanzanian army to quickly unseat him. After the return to power of former dictator Milton Obote in the widely criticized 1980 elections, the NRA in Uganda began to establish civilian supply networks in the territories of the former Buganda Kingdom (Kasfir 2005: 282). These areas of anti-Obote sentiment became the NRA’s first liberated zones, where democratically elected village councils in 1982 were instructed to organize policing, local dispute settlement mechanisms, food supplies and other local governance tasks (ibid: 286-8). When the NRA advanced, this system travelled with it except in periods of the most intense fighting. By 1985 much of

¹⁴ Excluding colonies, Florea (2014) in addition finds 34 unrecognized ‘de facto states’ from 1945 to 2011 that controlled territory, performed basic governance, did not seek to overtake the national government and existed for more than two years – of which only four became independent states.

western Uganda was also organized with such elected councils. The NRA's and Yoweri Museveni's need for civilian support compelled them to govern rather than pillage and to do so relatively democratically. In this way, the insurgency gained support and eventually took over the Ugandan state. NRA forces entered Kampala and toppled the Ugandan national regime in 1986.

6.3.2.4 Insurgent-led assisted transitions: South Sudan, 1983-95

In some insurgent-led transitions, rebels derive a substantial portion of their resources from others than their own fighters or the civilians and territories in which they operate. I refer to these as insurgent-led assisted transitions. I distinguish these transitions from foreign-led transitions in that (i) they are not supported by direct military involvement of foreign troops, and (ii) their leading groups are usually not created from scratch by foreign states, armies or intelligence services or controlled wholesale, but have home-grown roots. Rather than foreign troops fighting alongside rebels, instead the types of external support provided in insurgent-led assisted transitions are financial support, diplomatic backing, volunteer manpower, favorable media coverage, organizational and military training, etc. Another difference is that it comes from both state supporters, diaspora, NGOs, wealthy individuals, other insurgent groups and other sources (Byman et al. 2001).¹⁵

Because of advances in telecommunications, mass migration and refugee streams, and globalization more generally, insurgent groups are increasingly linked to the rest of the world. This means they have more opportunities for outside support. Diasporas played a major role in 27 of 38 conflicts from 2008 to 2013, but were trivial players not too long ago (Byman 2013). Rebel groups have been able to recruit foreign fighters more easily and connect with each other to form alliances, share intelligence, recruits and resources using increasingly sophisticated communications infrastructure.

Insurgent-led assisted transitions are somewhat similar to revolutions for the same reasons that insurgent-led transitions without external assistance are. They also have parallels to foreign-imposed regime change because outside assistance changes the dynamics of transition processes and potential regime outcomes. External supporters condition their material, diplomatic, or media support on certain rebel behavior. Likewise, insurgents seek to account for the potential reactions of non-local patrons in how they wage war against their home state, how they govern civilians, and which ultimate goals they profess.

Most rebel groups have received significant external support. Prominent examples include territorially based communist insurgencies that received support from the Soviet Union, China, or Cuba, for instance in Greece after WWII (Kalyvas 2006; 2015) On the other hand, the US supported insurgencies against communist movements such as the Contras in Nicaragua.

In South Sudan, historically neglected by both colonial and postcolonial central governments and split from the north by both ethnic, linguistic, religious, and racial Arab-Black divides, mutinying Southern soldiers created the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) in 1983. Early on, it received financial and organizational support from the Ethiopian government as well as the opportunity to construct rear bases in Ethiopian territory. The Sudanese government supported

¹⁵ However, foreign states may also provide access to safe havens, where insurgents can operate extraterrestrial bases, and financial support will often ultimately buy arms and other military equipment.

Eritrean rebels inside Ethiopian territory, and for this reason Ethiopia sought to destabilize and distract the Sudanese government within their own territory (Mampilly 2011). The SPLA/M quickly won control over large parts of Southern Sudan in the mid- and late 1980s.

Ethiopian support deeply shaped the SPLA/M. Until it lost the support of Ethiopia following a regime change in 1991, the SPLA/M sought to replace the government in Khartoum rather than establish its own state due to its patron's opposition to secessionism (Mampilly 2011: 143). Thus, external support changed extremely fundamental policy goals. The Norwegian People's Aid NGO entered with large scale humanitarian programs in 1986 and quickly gained the local moniker 'Norwegian People's Army' for its role in helping the SPLA/M gain further territory, including providing weapons and in several occasions potentially also landmines (Reno 2010).

After the famine of 1988, the presence of NGOs became coordinated by the UN. They were ubiquitous in humanitarian work, but also in the health and education sectors. By 1995, annual expenditure from NGOs exceeded \$100 mn. per year, of which large parts went directly to the SPLA/M rather than to civilians (Mampilly 2011; Reno 2010). Early on the SPLA/M operated its own security system alongside tribal courts as well as primary schools that also served as recruiting grounds. Later on, education and health systems were operated by NGOs under strict conditions imposed by the insurgency command regarding their locations and funds provided to finance the war effort (Mampilly 2011).

6.4 Subnational and National Regime Transitions

In the following section, I use the typology and the descriptions in this section to assess how different transitions from subnational authoritarian rule are to authoritarian breakdown in national authoritarian regimes.

The preceding sections concerning different subnational transitions display a wide array of actors undertaking subnational transitions, motivations underlying their actions, subnational polity characteristics shaping the actors' capabilities and motivations, and particular relations between subnational and extra-provincial actors, institutions and organizations within transitions.

In table 5, I bring together the evaluations from section 4 of the similarity of the modes of subnational transition in my typology to (i) *pacted* transitions (non-violent and elite-based), (ii) incumbent-led transitions *imposed* from above (violent and elite-based), (iii) peaceful mass-led democratic *reform* movements (non-violent and mass-based), (iv) insurrections led from below by *revolutionary* actors (violent and mass-based), and (5) *foreign-imposed* regime change (violent and elite-based, where the elite is foreign rather than domestic).

Table 5: Subnational and National Transitions from Authoritarian Rule

		Does the transition bring about institutional rupture, such as secession or state overthrow, or is it undertaken in accordance with national political authority?		
			<i>No rupture</i>	<i>Rupture</i>
Who are the actors undertaking the transition, and from where do they draw their political power?	<i>Incumbent</i>	<i>Local</i>	Incumbent-led transitions: Very similar to 'imposition'	Incumbent-led insurgent transitions: Somewhat similar to 'imposition' and parallels to 'revolution'
		<i>Non-local</i>	Center-led transitions: Parallels to 'foreign-imposed regime change'	Foreign-led transitions: Somewhat similar to 'foreign-imposed regime change' and parallels to 'revolutions'
	<i>Opposition</i>	<i>Local</i>	Opposition-led transitions: Very similar to 'pacts' and/or 'reforms'	Insurgent-led transitions: Somewhat similar to 'revolutions'
		<i>Non-local</i>	Opposition-led assisted transitions: Somewhat similar to 'pacts' and 'reforms' and parallels to 'foreign-imposed regime change'	Insurgent-led assisted transitions: Somewhat similar to 'revolutions' and parallels to 'foreign-imposed regime change'

On the basis of this, I argue that subnational transitions evince three levels of similarity to national transitions. One group is broadly similar, one has some similarities and some notable differences, and one group of subnational transitions is fairly distinctive from most national transitions with only few similarities (see table 6).¹⁶

Two modes of subnational regime transition are *broadly similar* to one or more types of national transitions. Incumbent-led transitions are in many ways analogous to what Karl & Schmitter called “imposition”, the authoritative decision by incumbents to change aspects of a regime slowly and in a controlled manner. Opposition-led transitions with little outside assistance are a lot like both pacts and reforms, where democratic change comes about through opposition elites’ negotiations with incumbents and citizens’ mobilization and casting votes in large numbers for opposition candidates. They are especially similar to the subset of those national transitions sometimes referred to as “transition by elections” (Lindberg 2009).

¹⁶ The three groups are determined by a combination of the degree of similarity (very similar, somewhat similar, parallels to) and the dispersion of similarity (i.e. whether similarity is to one or more national transition modes).

Table 6: Similarity of subnational to national modes of transition

Broad similarity	Some similarity	Little similarity
Incumbent-led transitions	Insurgent-led transitions	Center-led transitions
Opposition-led transitions	Incumbent-led insurgent transitions	Foreign-led transitions
		Insurgent-led assisted transitions
		Opposition-led assisted transitions

Two modes have *some similarity*. Insurgent-led transitions are somewhat similar to revolutions because they often lead to fundamentally new regimes and take place violently. The presence of a competing *national* military and a lack of international recognition of sovereignty, however, also make the subnational territorial governance that these movements engage in profoundly different from that in national revolutions. Incumbent-led insurgent transitions have similarities to auto-golpes (self-coups), coup d'états and imposition. But the partial, territorially based control that they achieve means they must bring about relatively clean, territorially based splits in the military and state administrations. This is an almost impossible feat. Dealing with the fallout from imperfect splits and fighting the home state confers on these transitions a revolutionary mark as well, as aspects of rebel governance and institutional replacement come into play.

Four modes have *little similarity* to modes of national transition. Center-led transitions are very different from national regime transitions. They only have a few likenesses to foreign-imposed regime change. The intricate bargaining found between subnational non-democratic incumbents and national political actors, national actors' interests in political and electoral support from subnational polities, and the possibility of forcible regime change without institutional rupture have no parallels in national transitions.

Opposition-led assisted transitions are somewhat similar to transitions by elections that take place with international support and to foreign-imposed regime change. Still, national actors – presidents or prime ministers, party leaders, Supreme Courts, national election commissions – have the possibility to direct institutional resources to different actors. They can authoritatively and legally shape subnational autocrats' prerogatives in terms of electoral rules and block subnational autocrats' distribution of rents to coopt rising elites, for instance. International actors have none of these tools at their disposal.

Foreign-led subnational transitions are more similar to foreign-imposed national regime change than center-led transitions. Yet the diplomatic ratifications for the foreign state differ and the foreign patron's influence on the new subnational regime is much higher, both due to the continuing threat constituted by the home state and lack of sovereignty. Foreign-led transitions also almost always face major military efforts, either to fight the home state or maintain a stalemate, unlike in national foreign-imposed transitions.

Insurgent-led assisted transitions have parallels to foreign-imposed regime change and revolutions. But they face the same military effort as foreign-led transitions and lack sovereignty, making building new governance institutions difficult in a context of shifting territorial control. Rebel leadership combined with support from various outside stakeholders (like diasporas, NGOs, states or others) are also essential characteristics that differ from the classic national revolutions and foreign-imposed regime change.

In terms of the three dimensions of the typology I set up – (i) incumbent actors vs. opposition actors, (ii) local actors vs. non-local ones and (iii) institutional integration vs. rupture – it thus seems that hierarchical, non-local aspects of subnational transitions distinguish them most significantly from national transitions. Insurgent subnational transitions are also more different, especially when they incorporate non-local power projection aspects. On the other hand, both similar and dissimilar subnational transition modes are led by incumbent actors and opposition actors.

The most distinctive modes of subnational transition have received the bulk of scholarly attention. Center-led transitions are hugely important in the literature on subnational authoritarianism and subnational regime variation. Opposition-led assisted transitions have received attention as well and are also profoundly different from any transition found at the national level. In contrast, the remaining six modes of subnational transition – of which some are similar to national-level transitions and some less so – have received very little attention.

In one sense, this reflects successful advancement of political science. The literature on subnational authoritarianism identified two highly distinctive “paths from subnational authoritarianism,” or modes of subnational regime transitions, with very particular national-local dynamics. The way in which such subnational authoritarian regimes were integrated in national-level democratic politics was puzzling, but convincingly explained by the political support they could offer to leaders of democratic nations (Gibson 2005; 2013; Mickey 2015; Giraudy 2015).

On the other hand, emphasizing and studying only highly distinctive subnational regime transitions is a problem because it means that we overestimate the distinctiveness of subnational regime transitions and discard theoretical intuitions and lessons learned from national regime transitions. If locally driven incumbent-led and opposition-led transitions are common, that would mean that we underestimate the similarity of subnational and national-level regime transitions.

6.5 Conclusion

In this article I have argued that careful theorization of subnational regime change processes can benefit from the rich literature on modes of transition in national regimes. I build organically upon an extremely widespread framework of categorizing transitions by whether they are led by incumbent actors or opposition actors and whether the transition takes place using violence or not. Examining subnational transitions adds a set of actors at the local level in addition to those at the national level and transforms the relationship to violence, such that violent subnational transitions are those that create institutional rupture with the national state and take place without the support of national political authorities. I use these differences to develop a new, conceptual typology of the ways in which subnational regime transitions take place.

Different modes of subnational transition vary according to the institutional place of the actors undertaking them (incumbents vs. opposition actors), their geographical bases of support (local vs. non-local) and the approach regime-changers take to their home state (institutional integration vs. rupture). They range from gradual, local incumbent-controlled liberalization to violent revolution fought by insurgents with support from foreign states, diasporas and foreign fighters. Each results in fundamental change in the rules that govern how leaders *come to power* and *stay in power*. In discussing how these different transitions work, I illustrated them with historical and recent examples and link them to existing literatures in political science.

Finally, I showed that some modes of subnational regime transition appear very different from national transitions (center-led, foreign-led and insurgent-led assisted transitions), while others are quite similar (esp. incumbent-led and opposition-led transitions). Importantly, the existing literature has overwhelmingly centered on the transition types that are *most different* from national regime transitions. Examining *all* types of transitions, I find that the transitology literature on national regimes proves perceptive and pertinent in many respects.

As my primary purpose in this article is conceptual, I have not sought to give an exhaustive explanation of variation in modes of subnational regime transitions in comparative perspective. It is my hope that future research will tackle this question. Employing the categories that I have developed in this typology, however, has implications for three themes in comparative politics: (i) the subnational turn in political methodology, (ii) increased decentralization and multilevel governance, and (iii) the territorial organization of democratic and authoritarian rule.

First, the 'subnational turn' has played an enormous role in recent political science, especially in comparative politics. Studies of conflict, economic development, ethnic relations, public goods provision and more have utilized subnational variation to test the causal relationships often proffered in national-level studies or answer new questions (Kalyvas 2006; Tsai 2007; Tabellini 2010; Ichino & Nathan 2013). In studies of corruption, political responsiveness, electoral fraud, political competitiveness and more broadly democracy and authoritarianism, this tendency is also evident (Kotsadam et al. 2016; Wahman & Basedau 2015; Tausanovitch & Warsaw 2014; Lankina & Getachew 2012; Asher & Novosad 2016).

This body of research often neglects hierarchical and relational variables, such as the relationship between a given municipality and the incumbent governor or national government or between coalitions of municipalities or provinces. This article treats strategic, hierarchical interference and spillovers between subnational units as a *variable*. Areas of civil conflict, that border hostile foreign states, that have natural resources or that receive large inflows of central government subsidies are probably more likely to experience high influence from non-local actors than other areas, for instance. Thus, the framework expounded here suggests that studies using subnational analysis, but do not incorporate such non-local dynamics are likely to yield biased or imprecise results. Subnational politics usually see some combination of local and hierarchical dynamics.

Second, the era of the centralized, unitary nation state has been fading fast. Regional governments have increased in power, and states are less and less likely to impose common rules on their

subnational jurisdictions, giving rise to a norm of ‘differentiated governance’ (Hooghe et al. 2016). Decentralization has gone even further at the local level than at intermediary levels of government. International organizations have promoted decentralization, and the third wave of democratization further pushed forward the cause of local autonomy (ibid.). Another example is customary law and traditional governance of particular ethnic groups, which is explicitly recognized by 61 UN countries (Holzinger et al. 2016).

In addition, many states that were officially centralized have never managed to penetrate into local governments in their hinterlands and peripheries (Migdal 1988; Herbst 2000). Large landowners, strongmen and clans have often rendered government ineffective at the local level, especially in rural areas. In this way, colonial policies of administrative neglect and indirect rule were often perpetuated after independence (Slater & Kim 2015). Increased political decentralization, de facto state absence and low-capability states are all likely to lead to more heterogeneous local politics – and thus perhaps also to a higher probability of all kinds of subnational regime transitions, except those led by the central state.

Third, political regimes are also territorial regimes. They enforce a set of rules more or less successfully over the entire territory in different ways. Local regimes and local administrations are extremely important insofar as territories that are not governed satisfactorily are at risk of secession from within, invasion from without, or rebellion against and towards the center. The existing literature on subnational regime heterogeneity has viewed decentralization and federal arrangements as enabling subnational pockets of authoritarianism. One policy implication of the approach in this article is to nuance this finding: national governments face difficult trade-offs due to the potential for subnational leaders and movements to use coercion in the pursuit of secession and autonomy, potentially also leading to subnational authoritarian rule.

Further, many variables associated with an increased risk of regime change at the country-level are in fact highly territorially uneven: state weakness, ethnic fragmentation, and natural resources are a few examples. Is it possible that such variables often affect national regimes through local regimes and not just directly? While some regime changes are uniform over the territory of an entire state, others have clearly subnational aspects wherein subnational actors use institutional resources inherent in their subnational political offices to initiate national-level regime changes. In a subset of these regime transitions, the transition may even be seen as ‘spreading’ from one or more subnational political units to the entire state – as in the Party of the Regions in Ukraine in 2010.¹⁷ Thus, a fuller description of subnational regime change provides insights into the territorial politics of democracy and authoritarianism, and subnational transitions may portend broader national regime changes.

¹⁷ I thank Mark Teramae for alerting me to this example.

6.6 Literature

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7. Christian and Muslim Regions Are Similar: Religion, Political Culture and Subnational Democracy

Rasmus Fonnesbaek Andersen¹

Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen.

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Abstract: It is well-established that majority Christian countries are more democratically governed than majority Muslim countries. Does the strong cross-national relationship between religion and levels of democracy also extend to subnational jurisdictions? This is a theoretically appropriate test of political culture explanations of the democracy deficit in the Muslim world because regional governments are closer to the people and therefore more susceptible to citizen pressures than national governments. However, despite high subnational regime heterogeneity in 36 African countries studied in this paper, there is no relationship between perceived democratic quality and a region's proportion or plurality of Muslims. The result is not driven by religious differences in perceptions of democratic quality in the same territorial setting. In addition, Muslims are more politically knowledgeable and civic-minded than others living under the same local institutions and equally democratically oriented. These results suggest that an apathetic or undemocratic political culture specific to Islam is not responsible for low levels of democracy in the Muslim world.

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7.1 Introduction

Why is democracy so comparably rare in countries with Muslim majority populations? Five years after the Arab Spring protests, scholars of democratization still do not agree on the answer this question.

Political scientists are generally skeptical of culture-based explanations of the low levels of democracy found in the Islamic world. However, many political observers, intellectuals and policy-makers continue to suspect that Islam breeds a certain political culture, which is either apathetic or even inimical to democracy. They point to certain Qur'anic passages and to widespread popular support among Muslims for shari'a and for Islamist political parties hostile towards democratic institutions to support this contention (Huntington 1998; Driessen 2014; Hamid 2016).

Seeking to evaluate the role of Islam in Muslim majority countries' low levels of democracy, however, is complicated by the empirical overlap of competing explanations: Many Muslim majority countries are rich in petroleum and other natural resources, even outside the Middle East (Nigeria, Malaysia, and Kazakhstan are also large oil exporters, for instance). Such rentier states are able to coopt elites and pacify their populations with lavish resource spending rather than political concessions, whether in Muslim or in non-Muslim states like Angola, Venezuela or Russia (Ross 2001; 2012; Gassebner et al. 2013; Ahmadov 2014). In addition, many Muslim majority countries share a long history of government by Islamic empires with particularly well-organized, enduring state structures that have kept civil societies weak (Hariri 2012; 2015; Chaney 2012). Since the early 1990s especially, they have also been subject to the risk of Islamist terrorism. For that reason US and European governments have exerted weaker pressures for democratic reform, lending support to pro-Western, non-Islamist authoritarian regimes in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait and other countries (Bellin 2004; Hinnebusch 2006; Diamond 2010; Brownlee 2012).

For these reasons, I suggest in this paper that one way we can better evaluate hypotheses concerning the influence of Islam on political institutions is by employing *subnational* analysis of within-country territorial regime differences in religiously diverse societies (Snyder 2001). For instance, Nigeria is a religiously divided country, whose northern Muslim regions are generally regarded as more democratic on average than its Christian regions, especially the oil-producing Niger Delta Region (Bratton 2008; Human Rights Watch 2010; Wahman & Basedau 2015). Testing political culture explanations at the subnational level is also more theoretically appropriate because citizens interact more with government at the local level and have more opportunities to hold local political elites accountable than they do the national government.

Using a dataset of up to 492 first-level political units in 36 African countries in the fourteen years from 2002 to 2015, I investigate whether residents perceive politics as less democratic in subnational regions with many Muslims. Contrary to the Islamic political culture hypothesis, I find that subnational regions with primarily Muslim and Christian populations are very similar in the democratic quality perceived by respondents in the Afrobarometer dataset. This result is not an artifact of differential perception of democratic quality among Muslims and non-Muslims living under the same local institutions. In accordance with the finding of little or no local regime differences along religious lines, I show that Muslims are actually more politically interested and have higher political knowledge than

Christians in the same regions. At the same time, they are equally likely to support democracy and reject authoritarian forms of rule as non-Muslims living in the same local context.

I choose the African continent as the empirical setting for this paper firstly because it provides us with a broad range of religious contexts. About 450 million Muslims live in Africa, just shy of one third of the world's Muslims and a bit less than half of all Africans. Some African Muslims live in Muslim-majority countries in North or West Africa or the Horn of Africa, whereas others comprise significant national minorities in West or East African countries. Most African Muslims live in segmented groups that form local majorities, but a few also reside as minorities in national capital cities or in areas where they are not the majority. I use the 189,000 respondents in rounds 2 to 6 of the Afrobarometer Survey to measure subnational religious demographics. The importance of religion is striking in Africa. In round 6 (collected from 2012 to 2015), the average Christian and Muslim respondent engages in religious practices like prayer, reading the Bible or Quran or going to religious ceremonies close to once a day.

An additional reason for choosing the African continent as an empirical setting is that here local political regime differences are allowed grow with only limited capabilities for central states to impose uniform institutional practices throughout their territories. If a particular Islamic political culture negatively affects democratic quality, then we should find within-country territorial differences along religious lines in Africa. In this sense, the finding that there is only a very weak negative or even positive relationship between Muslim population share and Muslim population plurality and local perceived democratic quality constitutes strong evidence against the 'Islamic political culture' thesis. The results of the paper then suggests that the direct effect of religion on democratic quality in Muslim majority societies due to political culture is likely overestimated in cross-country analysis and in the views of policy-makers.

This paper is also related to the literature on subnational authoritarianism (Gibson 2005; 2013; Giraudy 2015) and on subnational regime differences (Gervasoni 2010; McMann et al. 2016). The starting point for this literature is that national political regimes often conceal great territorial variation in electoral practices, elite co-optation, media propaganda, incumbency advantage, and repression (Behrend & Whitehead 2016).² Territorial unevenness in governance has been noted by scholars of African politics more generally: In the African context, Herbst (2000) has analyzed the difficulties many African states face when attempting to project power and enforce rules in their hinterlands, while Boone (2003; 2014) has drawn attention to the varying institutional topographies of West African states after independence. Many African countries have also undertaken political decentralization, establishing local and intermediate tiers of government with responsibilities for policy areas like infrastructure or health (Dickovick & Riedl 2010).

In this paper, I first review existing national-level literature seeking to explain the democracy deficit in the Muslim world and then adapt theories concerning the influence of political culture on democracy to subnational governments. Next, I introduce the data sources and measurement challenges before

² The new Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM) dataset confirms that the African continent is indeed characterized by high subnational regime variation in the freeness and fairness of elections and in civil liberties protection: Only six of 54 African countries have more territorial evenness in election quality than the world average, and only 14 of 54 have more territorial evenness in civil liberties protection than the world average (see appendix A).

proceeding to the subnational analysis. I start by providing baseline results of the relationship between Muslim populations and perceived democracy at the region-level. I proceed to test whether individuals' religious identity shapes, first, their perceptions of democratic quality and, second, relevant aspects of political culture. In the conclusion, I consider the limitations of the analysis and return to the question of why Muslim majority countries experience less democracy by drawing lessons from the subnational arena.

7.2 Attempts to Explain the Democracy Deficit in the Muslim World

A large quantitative literature in political science has found the low levels of democracy in Muslim majority countries and the MENA region in particular exceptional. Seeking to control for natural resource dependency (especially oil and gas), economic development, ethnic fragmentation, colonial heritage, varying levels of religious freedom, education, and differences in gender equality, Muslim majority population has continued to have a sizable and statistically significant residual negative effect on the degree of democracy (Barro 1999; Ross 2001; Borooah & Paldam 2007; Acemoglu et al. 2008; Rowley & Smith 2009; Potrafke 2011; Fish 2002; 2011; Gassebner et al. 2013).

In figure 1, I plot the country means for Muslim population share and perceived democratic quality based on the measure and sample used in the subnational analyses in this paper and described in section 4.1.




Figure 1: Muslim population proportion and perceived democratic quality in the countries of the Afrobarometer sample (round 5, 2009-2011). Circle size represents country population size.

The relationship between Muslim population proportion and perceived democratic quality is negative. The exclusion of Middle Eastern monarchies as well as European countries and European settler colonies means there is less variation within Africa than within the entire world.³ However, of the empirically observed distribution of region means (between Egypt in the bottom at 1.95 and Botswana on top at around 3.1), the predicted difference between wholly Muslim and non-Muslim countries is between a fourth and a fifth of this range. Notable Muslim democratic overachievers by these measures are Niger and Senegal.

7.2.1 Islamic Political Culture

Based on this data, does Islam stand as a “major barrier to democratization” (1992: 347), as Francis Fukuyama put it with reference to Algeria and Iran? Attributing causal importance to the contemporary form that Islam takes, whether in the form of political culture (Diamond 1994) or political theology (Philpott 2007), and its effects on popular political behavior holds a great deal of *prima facie* appeal. Within the Muslim world, the lowest levels of political competition are found in the states with the strictest regulation of religion like Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Qatar, while better protection of political liberties and higher political competition is found in more secular and/or religiously moderate societies like Turkey, Indonesia, Senegal and Lebanon (Grim & Finke 2006; 2011).

Similar arguments about religion and political culture have been made concerning the shift in Catholicism’s political theology associated the Second Vatican Council in the early 1960s. The embrace of religious liberty and human rights and sometimes liberation theology made the Catholic Church a force for democratization in Spain, Poland, Brazil and the Philippines as it ceased cooperation with and legitimation of authoritarian regimes (Huntington 1991; Philpott 2004; Driessen 2014). Sometimes The Catholic Church mobilized its adherents against regimes it had supported only a few years earlier as in Spain’s democratic transition after Franco’s death in 1975.

On the contrary, in Senegal, Mali and Niger – the few African Muslim majority countries that have liberalized politics or even democratized – the democratization and liberalization process in the early 1990s were driven by Francophone, secularized elites in the cities, such as university students, teachers, lawyers, journalists (Villalón 2010). Clerics and religious groups instead protested against the new regimes in Mali and Niger and initially argued that democracy was not appropriate to their societies and incompatible with Islam (*ibid.* 377-78). Organized religious groups in the Muslim world generally have not constituted as strong a democratizing force as did many Catholic churches, mainline Protestant churches and some Evangelical churches in the third wave of democratization, including in Malawi, South Africa and Ghana (Philpott 2004; Woodberry 2012; Freston 1999; Haynes 2004). For this reason, we may expect Muslims to be less likely to actively push for democracy than

³ I reproduce this result for a number of common democracy measures in Appendix B.

adherents of other religions. Some may even support anti-democratic Islamist movements that command significant support in many Muslim majority countries (Hamid 2016).

7.2.2 *Alternative explanations: geopolitics, natural resources and history*

Against theories highlighting Islam as a barrier to democracy, others have argued that Islam and indeed all religions are “multi-vocal” and can provide intellectual backing for democracy as well as authoritarian rule (Esposito & Voll 1996; Stepan 2000). Alternative explanations for the Islamic democracy deficit instead stress geopolitical and historical factors or natural resources for a number of reasons.

Firstly, many authoritarian regimes in Muslim majority societies are not themselves Islamist and even maintain power by playing up their anti-Islamist and pro-Western credentials (Diamond 2010; Hinnebusch 2006, Bellin 2004). Instead of pushing for free elections as elsewhere after the end of the Cold War (Levitsky & Way 2010), successive American and European governments have supported non-Islamist authoritarian regimes in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Kuwait (Brownlee 2012). Policy-makers’ fears of Islamic Revolutions as in Iran in 1979 and of Islamist terrorism have greatly reduced the external pressure for democracy in Muslim majority countries. Foreign-led depositions in Iraq and Afghanistan were rooted in concerns over sponsorship of terrorism and did not create democracy. Thus, the differential external pressure for democracy experienced by Muslim majority countries are an alternative explanation to Islamic or Arab political culture for low levels of democracy in the Muslim world.

Secondly, the vast oil and gas resources possessed by many Muslim majority countries cushion against economic shocks and allow for spending on particularly large militaries and police forces used for repressing domestic regime critics. They also allow authoritarian regimes to buy off citizens and local elites with the proceeds from fuel exports. Finally, oil and gas wealth retard economic modernization and its attendant social and cultural changes through disadvantaging other export sectors, i.e. ‘Dutch disease’ (Ross 2012).

Thirdly, some point to historical explanations for Muslim societies’ enduring authoritarianism. Some scholars focus on the specificity of the Arab world with regards to democratization (Stepan & Albertson 2003). Hariri (2012; 2015) highlights the peculiar colonial experience of most of the Islamic world. Present-day Islamic states, especially those in the Middle East and North Africa, had strong, well-organized states that inhibited European colonization and settlement until the late 19th century. Thus, most present-day Muslim majority countries did not experience the institutional shock of colonization that severely disrupted indigenous state structures in most of the rest of the world. This led to weaker, later and selective European influence in the region. Similarly, Chaney (2012) suggests that early Arab conquests led to territories’ political inclusion in particularly durable state structures created under Islamic empires – as well as to the initial spread of Islam to these areas. He suggests that these state structures have persisted through time and form a particular barrier to democratization. Other scholars have stressed differences in religious financing and in particular the institution of the *waqf* as responsible for differential long-term institutional development (Kuran 2016; Rothstein & Broms 2013).

7.2.3 *The advantage of subnational analysis*

I approach the question of democracy in Muslim majority countries by studying *within-country* territorial regime differences in religiously diverse societies. I do this both motivated by the problems of empirical overlap and degrees of freedom in cross-country studies and because political culture theories are amenable to more precise, subnational research designs (see next section). Here, I briefly present the inferential logic of this research design.

The advantage of subnational analysis in addressing this question is that certain explanations for low prevalence of democracy in the Islamic world are ‘institutionally bound’ to the national state, while others are ‘unbound’, or can at least conceivably be institutionally bound also to subnational politics and subnational political units (Harbers & Ingram 2015).⁴ Thus, this research design allows us to hold constant national-level features and some potential explanations for low levels of democracy in Muslim majority countries (because they are relevant exclusively at the national level) and to adjudicate between certain others based on within-country spatial variation (when they are not).

Thus, Western strategic support is almost exclusively tied to the national state, government and regime for its cooperation in subduing Islamist terrorism and displays no subnational variation. Rentierism explanations based on national resources can apply either nationally or sub-nationally depending on fiscal arrangements for revenue sharing, but usually divide resources between national government and the region of extraction. Furthermore, extraction of oil and gas, like mining, often has direct effects on governance (Wahman & Basedau 2015; Kotsadam et al. 2016). Political culture, finally, is clearly relevant to outcomes at levels of government and often has great within-country variation. I expand on this point in the next section by adapting theories of political culture and democracy to subnational politics.

7.3 Adapting Political Culture Theories to Subnational Democracy

In this section, I argue that following conventional arguments in the political culture literature leads to the conclusion that political culture theories should be expected to hold equally or even more strongly at the subnational level than in national politics. I then flesh out how political culture affects subnational democracy under high decentralization with subnational elections, moderate fiscal or administrative decentralization with appointed governors in lieu of subnational elections, and low decentralization without subnational elections. This adapted theory is tested in this paper in the case of the widespread perception that a specifically Islamic political culture accounts for lower levels of democracy in Muslim majority countries.

⁴ By ‘institutional boundedness’, Harber & Ingram mean whether a political phenomenon is exclusively tied a given institutional arena such as a national parliament, supreme court, hierarchical military, etc. (2015).

7.3.1 *Political culture as a micro-level theory*

Political culture is hypothesized to influence regime change and maintenance processes primarily by way of citizens' interactions with those who govern them (Almond & Verba 1963: 30-35; Putnam 1993: 86-91; Inglehart & Welzel 2005: 158-60).⁵ Because citizens differ in their political demands and preferences – for instance regarding their acceptance of clientelism (Carlin & Moseley 2015; Nichter & Peress 2016) or of repressive law and order policies (Esberg 2016) – rulers find it easier to build non-democratic regimes in some circumstances than in others. Perhaps more importantly, because citizens differ in the dedication and perseverance with which they pursue political demands and the ease with which they can solve collective action problems, some are more likely than others to succeed in forcing politicians and bureaucrats to accede to their wishes (Putnam 1993; Padro-i-Miguel et al. 2015; Nannicini et al. 2013).

The first aspect of political culture thus concerns substantive preferences for governance. This I refer to as the 'preference aspect'. It encompasses beliefs concerning what legitimate government is as well as relative weightings of the importance for citizens of representative government relative to more output-oriented policy performance. The second aspect of political culture concerns political representation viewed as a principal-agent problem. I refer to this as the 'accountability aspect.' Successfully holding agents accountable requires costly monitoring by the principal in form of information-seeking and political participation by the citizenry, which constrains politicians and bureaucrats by ultimately threatening to replace them.

Thus, through formal mechanisms of political accountability in electoral, judicial or administrative spheres or informal mechanisms of protest and non-cooperation, politicians and bureaucrats are sometimes forced to accede to citizens' varying political demands. Regional and local governments are much closer to the population than is the distant national government, and most citizen interactions with the state, in Africa as elsewhere, go through its most basic and mundane functions: health, infrastructure, education, policing, etc. These functions are almost always at least deconcentrated such that they are carried out locally with imperfect control from the national capital. For this reason, we would expect political culture to have a greater effect on subnational regime outcomes – and to be able to trace it more precisely there in empirical analyses than at the national level due to varying subnational culture and institutional outcomes (Putnam 1993).

Therefore, the higher democracy is prioritized in a region's citizens' preferences, and the more vigorously they seek to hold political officials accountable, the more democratic outcomes we would expect to see in the region according to a theory of political culture at the subnational level. Particular threats to democracy at the subnational level in Africa are the use of election violence and coercion by local or national incumbents, opposition forces, insurgents or local power-holders and more broadly political intimidation, vote-buying and clientelism, control of media as well as election fraud (Reno 2011; Burchard 2013; Boone 2014). As such, in the African context these are some of the outcomes that civic, pro-democratic, and activist political cultures would be expected to mitigate.

However, a number of institutional features differ from national politics to the subnational political arena. Do similar mechanisms as those in theories of national political culture operate at the

⁵ Most of the political culture literature concerns *mass* political culture. In this paper, I am not concerned with the smaller literature on *elite* political culture (Putnam 1971; Duffield 1999).

subnational level? In the next section, I argue that features of non-sovereignty, especially regarding hierarchical appointment of political officials, do not undermine the expectation that political culture should affect subnational governance and regime outcomes.

7.3.2 Election and appointment of subnational officials in political culture

Because subnational governments are not sovereign and embedded in systems of hierarchical authority, national actors do often have the opportunity to further territorial uniformity and exert political control over regional and local subordinates. They do this by directly appointing lower-level officials, withholding or discretionarily directing central transfers, auditing local and regional governments, setting national election commissions in charge of local and regional elections, giving Supreme Courts prerogatives to strike down local or regional laws relevant to subnational regime characteristics, etc. (Giraudy 2015).

Rulers also often seek to construct territorial minimal winning coalitions, leading them to employ different tactics towards different subnational governments which may shape local democratic quality. In addition, electorally important districts may be favored fiscally, and 'fiscal donor' districts may be allowed greater autonomy or influence in national politics due to their greater bargaining power with the central government. Regional favoritism may also shape subnational regime outcomes (Hodler & Raschky 2014). On the other hand, restive districts with secessionist or oppositionist sentiment and geopolitically important districts bordering hostile neighbors may be allowed less autonomy, and unpopular appointed governors may be shored up by national actors (Carter forthcoming).

I conceptualize democracy procedurally as a system for selecting political leaders that provides for reasonably free and fair multiparty elections and overall protection of freedom of assembly, speech and organization (Dahl 1971). I transfer these criteria for democracy to subnational territories with minor variations based on the level and type of decentralization (Gibson 2013). I distinguish between subnational governments with (i) high decentralization, (ii) moderate decentralization, and (iii) low/no decentralization: In the first cases, where elected subnational governments hold set of policy or revenue prerogatives, then subnational democracy entails free and fair subnational elections in the presence of political rights of assembly, speech and organization. In the second and third cases, where subnational governments are appointed or non-existent respectively, then it entails democratic representation of that territory's population in national elections. Thus national elections in the region should be free and fair and guarantee the right to free assembly, speech and organization. The more these conditions are met in each of the three types of subnational governance, the more democratically governed are these three types of territories.

In most African countries regional executives are appointed with responsibility for local policy outcomes. Only a few countries have directly or indirectly elected regional executives (Nigeria, South Africa, Ethiopia, Sudan until 2015, Madagascar until 2002, and Kenya from 2013), and about a third have elected regional councils that share some power with the appointed governor or advise him or her (see appendix C for an overview). However, appointment by central government still allows for territorial differences in the responsiveness of subnational executives: some appointed governors have no independent support coalition in the region to which they are appointed, while others represent strong local interests and are not beholden to central government (Buckley et al. 2014; Carter forthcoming).

Despite appointment of subnational officials, citizens still interact with government representatives and have a number of informal avenues by which they can hold them accountable (in addition, sometimes, to formal ones). Equally, administration of national elections (and their manipulation) have strong local components (Rundlett & Svolik 2016; Benton 2016). The level of coercion exercised in a region with regards to rights of assembly, speech and organization also depends on local implementation of coercion.

Importantly, theoretical accounts of how *national* political culture shapes regime change or regime reproduction do not focus particularly on elections. The presence of non-elected subnational governments, then, is parallel to present-day and historical national-level authoritarian regimes that do not hold elections, but instead are governed by monarchies, military rule, hegemonic parties or personalist dictatorships. It is also similar to authoritarian regimes without multi-party elections more generally. Political culture approaches have maintained that they are relevant to these country cases, including present-day China and Arabian Peninsula monarchies (Lewis 2000; Fish 2002; Tang 2016). In this view periods of dormant opposition in such polities reflect not only repression, but also successful regime legitimation through propaganda or successful policy performance.

For these reasons, arguments found in the political culture literature concerning the effects of civic culture on national regime types – both related to substantive regime preferences and the accountability aspect of political culture – should apply equally to subnational democracy, if not more so given that citizens interact most with local government.

7.4 Data

In order to investigate the relationship between subnational religious majorities and subnational democracy, we need data that are comparable between countries on these two variables and potential confounders. I find data on both religious identity and perceived regional institutions in the Afrobarometer survey of which I use rounds 2 to 6 (from 2002 to 2015) containing 189,000 respondents in 36 African countries. Combined with Afrobarometer's regionally stratified sampling and random sampling within regions, this is enough to obtain relatively precise estimates of religious demographics and perceived democratic quality.

I start out by identifying the level of analysis as the first-level administrative units, i.e. states, provinces, regions, etc. The number of regions analyzed ranges from 167 in round 2 (2002-2003) to 453 in round 5 (2009-2011). On average, I have 400 respondents per region and 117 per region per year.⁶ In addition to pragmatic questions of sample size, I also choose first-level administrative units because they are large enough relative to the national government that they potentially wield substantial political power.

⁶ Over the period from 1999 to 2014, Madagascar, Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya and Morocco experience a fundamental administrative reorganization that changes the first-tier administrative level. The post- or pre-reform rounds are dropped from the analysis, retaining as many rounds as possible.

7.4.1 *Dependent variable: subnational democratic quality*

Cross-national expert-coded data on subnational democratic quality for first-level administrative units are not available for the African continent. For this reason, I instead rely on perceived democratic quality aggregated to the relevant regions. There are no questions in the Afrobarometer survey asking specifically about local democracy and for this reason respondents are asked to evaluate the level of democracy in their country, rather than in their regions or local areas. However, unevenness in democratic quality often relate to national politics as it plays out locally, and national elections display immense within-country variation in fraud, violence, media freedom, etc. (McMann et al. 2016). I address measurement validity in this section through a number of validation checks.

As my preferred measure, I rely on the question “In your opinion, how much of democracy is country X today? 1. Not a democracy, 2. A democracy with major problems, 3. A democracy with minor problems, 4. A full democracy.” This question is asked of every single respondent of every round of the Afrobarometer survey. That gives the measure desirable properties as regards reducing statistical noise, i.e. random measurement error, when estimating region means. The two downsides are that it asks of national democracy and relies on respondents’ own understanding of democracy. I refer this measure as ‘perceived democratic quality’. In figure 2 the distribution of this measure is shown on a map of Africa’s first-level administrative units.




Fig. 2: Perceived democratic quality by first-level administrative regions (Afrobarometer 2002-2015). Darker shades indicate higher perceived democratic quality. Stars indicate location of capital cities.

As a second-best alternative, I use a simple index of the battery of six questions from the Electoral Integrity Project asked in Afrobarometer's round 6. The items concern the fairness of the count, the opposition's possibility to campaign for office, the fairness of media, whether voters are bribed, to what extent candidates running present a genuine choice, and whether voters are threatened with violence (Norris 2014). The two downsides to this measure are that it is only asked in round 6 (2014-2015) of the Afrobarometer (and thus suffers from a correspondingly lower number of respondents), and that it measures only electoral aspects of democracy. On the upside, it taps clear, concrete aspects of democracy perceptions. I refer to this measure as 'electoral integrity'. At the region level, this measure is highly correlated with electoral integrity ($r = 0.6$).

I also use a number of alternative dependent variables in the analysis whose wordings are less bound up with the national state (political freedoms and bribes) or that ask specifically about local outcomes (perceived local corruption). They are selected based on measurement validity, region coverage and respondent number. All dependent variables are standardized to range from 0 to 1, where 1 is the perception of full democracy, full electoral integrity, full enjoyment of political freedoms, no bribes paid or no local corruption.⁷

I perform a number of validation exercises of the survey-based measures based on (i) national measures of democracy, (ii) national measures of territorial regime unevenness, (iii) region-level measures of electoral competitiveness in South Africa and Nigeria, and (iv) individual-level vs. region-level correlations of perceived democracy measures in the Afrobarometer sample.

First, I correlate aggregated survey responses from Afrobarometer with other measures of democracy. Electoral Integrity Project researchers have found that national averages of the electoral integrity battery are highly correlated with experts' answers to the same questions and to conventional democracy indices (Norris 2014: chap. 6), as have Afrobarometer researchers using the perceived democracy question (Bratton 2007). External validation of aggregated democracy measures is also provided by three questions in round 6. Respondents are asked to evaluate democracy in the US, South Africa and Zimbabwe in 2014/15 on a scale from 0 (highly undemocratic) to 10 (highly democratic). For the sample as a whole, the US is evaluated at 8.0, South Africa at 6.6 and Zimbabwe at 3.5. Thus, both measures capture real differences in national-level democracy.

Second, I correlate within-country territorial variation with other measures of territorial unevenness in democracy aggregated to the national level. The Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM) dataset measures unevenness in subnational election quality and subnational civil liberties protection for all countries. Territorial unevenness in elections and civil liberties in 2012 are correlated with the range in region means in the survey-based measures of perceived democratic and political freedoms protection that I use in this paper at $r = -0.56$ and $r = -0.39$, respectively, for the 36 countries in the data in rounds 5

⁷ All question wordings and data sources for the paper are in appendix G.

and 6 (see appendix D).⁸ Thus, countries evaluated by experts as having more territorial regime heterogeneity show a larger dispersion of region means on the survey questions used in this paper.

Third, I correlate the competitiveness of gubernatorial elections in Nigeria in 2011 (win margins) and provincial elections in South Africa from 1999 to 2014 (Vanhanen index: the product of turnout and win margins) with the survey-based region-level data on perceived democratic quality that I use in this paper. Both win margins and the Vanhanen index are highly imperfect measures of subnational democracy (Gervasoni 2010). This shows that attitudes towards the national government are correlated with both subnational election results and perceived election integrity and democracy (see Appendix E). For this reason, in all regressions I control for the national executive's approval rating in a region or an individual's approval of the national executive to absorb this bias in measurement.

Fourth, the Afrobarometer survey does contain questions about perceived *corruption* of local government councilors, MPs, the President and national government officials. At the region-level, the correlation of corruption in local government councilors to presidential corruption is $r = 0.62$, to MP corruption is $r = 0.74$, and to government officials in the country is $r = 0.81$. Thus, asking respondents about government corruption in the *country generally* captures a great deal of *local* variation in corruption. This suggests that the same is the case for democracy.

For these reasons, it appears that potential concerns regarding (i) whether citizens perceive democracy similarly to political scientists, (ii) whether survey-based measures capture within-country territorial variation, and (iii) whether political loyalties bias evaluations of democracy are all surmountable. Based on these four disparate types of validation checks, then, I feel confident that the measure of perceived democracy contains useful information concerning the quality of democracy as experienced at the subnational level.⁹

7.4.2 Independent variable: subnational religious composition

Instead of potentially politicized census data that is hard to access at flexible levels of territorial aggregation, instead I determine the religious composition of subnational regions using the Afrobarometer dataset. Another advantage of using the Afrobarometer survey data to measure religious identity and affiliation is that it is highly disaggregated. For instance, it allows respondents to report belonging to no religion, being atheists or agnostic concerning the existence of a God or to various traditional faiths.

I categorize respondents into four major religious groups (no religion, Christian, Muslim, and other religion). For each of these categories, I generate variables for the proportion of these groups in a region and in a country. Figure 3 shows the distribution of Muslims in Africa's first-level administrative units.

⁸ Using the standard deviation across region means instead, the correlations are $r = -0.52$ and $r = -0.39$, respectively. For the electoral integrity measure, the correlations are instead $r = -0.30$ and $r = -0.13$.

⁹ A number of other analyses have also used the Afrobarometer surveys to measure local political institutions' levels of corruption and administrative capacity (Kotsadam et al. 2016; Wig & Tollefsen 2016).




Fig. 2: Muslim proportion by first-level administrative regions (Afrobarometer 2001-2015). Darker shades indicate higher proportion of Muslims. Stars indicate location of capital cities.

From the latter variables, I also generate dummy variables for regions with a plurality of adherents belong to a national minority religion. For 223 regions, I am able to triangulate the Afrobarometer data using independently collected data on the religious identities of over 460,000 women from the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) from the 1980s until today at the same level of aggregation. I find very high region correlations with the Afrobarometer data. For Muslim regional population shares the correlation $r = .99$, for Catholic regional population share $r = .90$, and for Protestants $r = 0.76$.

7.4.3 Controls: demographic, center-periphery relations, natural resources

I control for a number of potentially confounding variables at the region-level and individual-level, either from the Afrobarometer dataset itself or by relating the Afrobarometer region-level dataset to a geographic information system (GIS) that I created using data from the Global Administrative Areas Database (GADM, 2015, version 2.8).

Given the literature on Arab countries and democracy, I calculate the share of region residents speaking Arabic at home from the Afrobarometer survey. Modernization theory holds that as societies grow more economically developed they are also more likely to democratize (Lipset 1959) or prevent breakdown of existing democratic institutions (Przeworski & Limongi 1997). Therefore I control for a region's lived poverty index of material deprivation (lacking access over the last year to either food,

water, medical care, cooking fuel or a cash income) from the Afrobarometer survey aggregated to the region level.¹⁰ I also control for the proportion of urban residents in the region in the same way. Christian missionaries spread literacy, so I control for the level of educational attainment at the region and individual level (Woodberry 2012; Lankina & Getachew 2012). To address the possibility of a subnational resource curse for politics, I use the geocoded PRIO petroleum dataset of the locations of the world's oil and gas fields (Lujala et al. 2007) with the GADM GIS to calculate whether regions had oil or gas fields. In the same way, I used the PRIO diamond dataset (Gilmore et al. 2005) to calculate whether regions have diamond deposits.

I also created variables for a number of 'hierarchical' controls pertaining to the relationship between a region and the national government. First, I control for presidential approval (or in some cases prime ministerial approval) with four values running from "strongly disapprove" (1) to "strongly approve" (4) of the president's conduct. I include additional controls for the distance from the capital city to the centroid (i.e. midpoint) of the region, for the distance from a foreign land border, and for whether the capital city lies in the region or not, creating these variables using the GIS. I also control for region size calculated in ArcGIS. Lastly, I control for the relative importance (electorally and politically) of the region by calculating the proportion of the country's total respondents in the survey round residing in this region.¹¹

7.5 Empirical Analysis

To revisit the logic of this paper's research design, I argued in section 4 that if the cross-national Islamic democracy deficit stems from contemporary political culture and mass political behavior that is particular to Islam, then we should see an equally strong relationship between Muslim population in subnational territories and subnational democratic quality.

In figure 4 I plot the proportion of Muslims in a region and the region's mean perceived democratic quality. Across all regions, i.e. without including country fixed effects, the relationship is weakly negative. Going back to figure 1 containing the identical national-level analysis, then, the slope is much steeper at the national level. Figure 4 also contains dashed lines containing the within-country trend lines of the relationship (see appendix F for the scatter plot for all individual countries), of which some are negative and others positive.

¹⁰ The questions are scored as "Never" (0), "Just once or twice" (1), "Several times" (2), "Many times" (3) or "Always" (4), and the mean from 0 to 4 is given.

¹¹ Remember that the regions I use correspond to actual political or administrative regions, sometimes with a large degree of self-rule as well as influence over policies enacted by the center (shared rule). See appendix C for the legal framework governing the regions in the paper.




Figure 4: Perceived democratic quality and region proportion of Muslims (2002-2015). Solid, black line is cross-country trend line with confidence interval. Dashed lines are country-specific trend line. Circle size represents number of respondents in a region.

7.5.1 Baseline results

I first estimate region-level relationships across all countries, then within countries by including country fixed effects. In table 1, I estimate regressions of the form

$$D_{i,t} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 M + X'_{it}\beta + u_{it},$$

Where D is the perceived democratic quality in a region i observed for a given interview round t , M is a region's proportion or plurality of Muslim citizens, X is vector of control variables, and u is an error term.

I choose the panel data structure to better account for the time-varying nature of local democratic quality and especially of certain control variables (such as presidential approval). I cluster standard errors at the level of the regions. They are observed over one to six rounds, and the number and identity of regions do not change.

A region's proportion of Christians is omitted from the tables in this paper, as it is almost perfectly negatively correlated with a region's proportion of Muslims ($r = -0.95$).¹² All models include round fixed effects, presidential approval ratings (highly positively and significantly correlated) and a set of what I call 'hierarchical' controls that address the relationship between the national government and the region. All variables in the analysis are standardized to range from 0 to 1.

Table 1: Muslim proportion and perceived democratic quality in regions (Afrbrm. 2002-2015)

	(1) prop.	(2) prop.	(3) prop.	(4) prop.	(5) prop.	(6) plur.	(7) WVS	(8) AsiaBar.
Muslim prop./plur.	-0.03* (0.01)	0.04** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.03 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.09)
No religion prop.	0.23*** (0.05)	0.26*** (0.05)	0.12** (0.04)	0.13** (0.05)	0.12* (0.05)	- (0.01)	0.02 (0.03)	0.19+ (0.10)
Other religion prop./plur.	0.10** (0.04)	0.07* (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.09 (0.08)	0.04 (0.09)
Arabic language fraction	-	-0.15*** (0.01)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.07)	-	-
Lived poverty	-	-	-	-0.09** (0.03)	-0.09** (0.03)	-0.09** (0.03)	-	-
Urban prop.	-	-	-	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)	-	-
Education	-	-	-	-0.15*** (0.04)	-0.15*** (0.04)	-0.15*** (0.04)	-	-
Petroleum production	-	-	-	-	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-	-
Diamond deposits	-	-	-	-	0.01* (0.01)	0.01* (0.01)	-	-
Country FEs	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Round FEs	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Pres. approval rating	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Hierarchical controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO
R ²	0.47	0.53	0.72	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.67	0.66
N	1,563	1,563	1,563	1,563	1,563	1,555	734	205
Countries	36	36	36	36	36	36	55	21

Notes. Unstandardized OLS beta coefficients. Robust standard errors clustered at the region-level. All variables standardized to range from 0 to 1. Hierarchical controls are distance to capital city, distance to land border, region size, capital city region and region proportion of country population. Constant term not reported to save space. *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, + $p < .1$

Columns (1) and (2) in table 3 shows the relation between a region's proportion of Muslims and the perceived democratic quality across all countries. Thus, in column (1) a region with no Muslims will be three percentage points more democratic than one whose population is wholly Muslim. However, when controlling for each region's Arabic language share in column (2), the estimate switches from negative positive, and Christian-only regions are four percentage points less democratic than Muslim-only regions. Arabic speakers almost exclusively live in North Africa. In Sub-Saharan Africa, therefore, even without country fixed effects there is no perceived democracy deficit associated with Muslim populations. For this reason, observers who see the low levels of democracy in Muslim majority countries as rooted in contemporary culture have more reason to be skeptical of Arab political culture than of specifically Islamic political culture in Africa.

¹² The compositional nature of population shares in the African context means that the this interpretation is somewhat parallel to one emphasizing that Christian share or plurality is associated with less perceived democracy.

Adding country fixed effects in column (3) increases the significance of the positive estimate on a region's Muslim proportion and shows that regions with a higher proportion of Muslims are also perceived as more democratic than other regions in the same country. The strong negative coefficient on a region's share of respondents speaking Arabic at home falls to about a third and becomes insignificant. However, Arabic speakers are dominant in North African countries, and there is very little within-country territorial variation, so we cannot easily evaluate relationship between Arabic political culture and democracy using subnational analysis. When adding socioeconomic controls for the mean educational level, level of material poverty and proportion of city dwellers in the regions in column (4), however, the positive relationship between Muslim percentage and perceived democratic quality disappears. It stays insignificant and close to 0 in column (5) when adding controls for oil and diamond production.¹³ Examining regional religious pluralities rather than proportions in column (6), regions with a plurality of Muslims are also statistically indistinguishable from Christian plurality regions in the same country.

Interestingly, the proportion of respondents replying that they do not belong to any religion is strongly correlated with higher perceived democratic quality in all columns from (1) to (5). Thus, the presence of irreligion, rather than Christianity, appears to be associated with better democratic outcomes. However, it is worth noting that the regions with the highest proportions of irreligious respondents are all in Christian or other non-Muslim areas, such as Botswana, Madagascar and Cape Verde. It is not clear why this is the case: Perhaps the punishment associated with apostasy makes Muslims less likely to leave Islam, or Muslims are successful missionaries when entering a territory. Another possibility concerns sorting effects: perhaps non-Muslims are less likely to move to Muslim majority regions, or non-Muslims are more likely to leave Muslim majority regions than vice versa.

In columns (7) and (8) I briefly examine the within-country relationship between Muslim proportion at the region-level and perceived democracy in two other datasets. The World Values Survey (2010-2014) and AsiaBarometer (2003-2007) include data from a number of populous countries with large Muslim minorities like India, China, the Philippines and Thailand and from religiously diverse Muslim majority countries such as Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Malaysia. Neither sample shows evidence of a subnational democracy deficit in regions with more Muslims.

In figure 5, I show that the results in table 1 are not an artifact of the chosen dependent variable.

¹³ Oil and gas production is highly collinear with Muslim population at the national level, but at the region-level the variables are practically uncorrelated at $r = 0.06$.




Figure 5: Coefficients on Muslim proportion or plurality in a region and alternative dependent variables. Based on the full specification with country FEs, i.e. specifications 4 and 5 in table 1. Significance levels are 90 and 95 percent. Observations: [1563; 419; 1139;1334; 1549]

The first set of plotted coefficients termed ‘perceived democratic quality’ are the results from the fully specified models in table 1. In the second row are the coefficients with ‘electoral integrity’ as the dependent variable. Although the standard errors are higher due to fewer respondents, the estimates are almost identical to those of ‘perceived democratic quality’. In the third row, I examine perceived ‘political freedoms’ to join political organizations, to vote and to speak one’s mind. Here, the coefficients with country fixed effects are negative, however. Examining it closer, this result is driven by Nigeria and Tanzania. However, even this within-country difference of between two and four percentage points less perceived political freedom (between 15 and 30 pct. of the standard deviation) is relatively small compared to the magnitude of the cross-country differences between the Muslim world and other countries that motivate this paper.

The fourth and fifth rows concern perceived corruption among councilors of local government and bribes that respondents admit to paying to avoid trouble with the police or to obtain documents and permits. These items are reverse-scaled, such that higher values represent less corruption and fewer bribes paid. As for perceived democratic quality and electoral integrity, the coefficients are insignificant, but positive: regions with more Muslims show a tendency towards *less* perceived corruption and bribe-paying. Again, these results point against a specifically Islamic political culture as responsible for lower democracy in Muslim majority countries.

7.5.2 Perceptions vs. institutions: Individual-level evidence

Do the results I have presented show that regions with more Muslims have the same levels of democratic quality as other regions, or just that individuals in regions with more Muslims *perceive* their regions as equally democratic? Muslim population share is negatively correlated with perceived democratic quality at the national level, yet not at the subnational level, using the same measure from the Afrobarometer. This suggests that the subnational territorial differences seen in the previous section do not just come from Muslims perceiving democracy and electoral practices differently.

But do Muslims have lower expectations of democracy? For a given government, Muslims may look at other Muslims, for instance in the culturally significant Arab world, and think that they themselves are better off. In other words, their reference for comparison may be other Muslims in other places. In this section, I investigate in greater depth whether Muslims *in the same subnational regions* and thus exposed to the same local-level institutions have a different perception of democratic quality from non-Muslims in individual-level analyses. I again estimate regressions of the form

$$D_{i,t} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 M + X'_{it}\beta + u_{it},$$

But here D is the perceived democratic quality by an individual i observed for a given interview round t , M is the individual's religious identity, X is vector of control variables, and u is an error term.

Table 2: Religious identity and individual-level perceptions of democratic quality (Afrbrm. 2002-2015)

	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13) district	(14) WVS	(15) AsiaBar.
Muslim	0.02** (0.01)	0.01* (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01+ (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
Region Muslim Share	-	-	-	0.02 (0.03)	-	-	-
Muslim X Region Muslim share	-	-	-	0.02 (0.01)	-	-	-
No religion	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.01+ (0.01)	-0.01* (0.00)	-0.01* (0.00)	-0.01* (0.01)	-0.01** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.01)
Other religion	0.01* (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.02+ (0.01)
Arabic language	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.06+ (0.03)	-	-
Pres. approval	0.27*** (0.01)	0.26*** (0.01)	0.25*** (0.01)	0.25*** (0.01)	0.21*** (0.01)	0.19*** (0.01)	0.14*** (0.01)
Education	-	-	-0.08*** (0.01)	-0.08*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	0.01+ (0.00)	-0.01 (0.01)
Lived poverty	-	-	-0.10*** (0.01)	-0.10*** (0.01)	-0.10*** (0.01)	-	-
Urban resident	-	-	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.01)	-0.01** (0.00)	-	-
Country FEs	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Region FEs	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES
District FEs	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO
Round FEs	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
R ²	0.19	0.21	0.22	0.22	0.30	0.25	0.24
N	156,675	156,675	156,225	156,225	57,746	73,865	21,373
Regions/districts	492	492	492	492	2,937	716	140

Notes. Unstandardized OLS beta coefficients. Robust standard errors clustered at the region-level. All variables standardized to range from 0 to 1. Hierarchical controls are distance to capital city, distance to land border, region size, capital city region and region proportion of country population. Constant term not reported to save space. *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, + $p < .1$

Column (9) in table 2 shows the relation between an individual's religious identity and his or her perception of democratic quality with country fixed effects. In the 36 African countries in the sample, then, Muslims are slightly more forgiving in their evaluation of their country's level of democracy relative to the omitted category of Christians. Adding region fixed effects in column (10), Muslims still evaluate democratic quality slightly more positively than Christians in the same region. However, adding socioeconomic controls in column (11) makes the relationship disappear. The interaction term with a region's Muslim share in specification (12) tests whether Muslims perceive higher democratic quality in regions with a higher proportions of Muslims. The sign on the interaction term points in this direction, but it is also imprecisely estimated and statistically insignificant.

What if there are differences in democracy within first-level administrative units, such that local government is less democratic in Muslim villages, for instance? Column (13) shows that the results hold also within almost 3000 districts available in rounds 3, 4 and 6 of the Afrobarometer data. Muslims actually evaluate their countries as *less* democratic than Christians in the same district to a degree that is significant at the ten percent level. Columns (14) and (15) show that these results are not unique to Africa: In the World Values Survey from 2010-2014 in 53 countries and the Asian Barometer from 2003 to 2007 in 19 countries, Muslims also do not tend to perceive democratic quality as higher than adherents of other religions in their regions.

In figure 6, I again show that the results in table 2 also hold for alternative dependent variables.




Figure 6: Coefficients on Muslim religious identity and alternative dependent variables. Based on the full specification with region FEs, i.e. specification 11 in table 2. Significance levels are 90 and 95 percent. Observations: [156,225; 35,426; 120,252;127,019; 161,061]

Figure 6 plots coefficients for Muslim religious identity on alternative dependent variables as in the previous section. Muslim respondents within the same regions say they have paid slightly more bribes

than non-Muslims, while the coefficients on electoral integrity perceptions, perceived political freedoms and local corruption are statistically insignificant.

Thus, when controlling for fairly trivial, observable socioeconomic conditions, Muslims are *not* less discerning in their evaluation of democracy. They evaluate democracy as critically as Christians in the same region and even district. Differences in perceptions between Muslims and non-Muslims do not drive our results conditional on socioeconomic controls.

7.5.3 Evidence from local religious minorities

Another way of addressing the concern that differential perceptions of democracy are correlated with religious identity is to use as a dependent variable *only the perceptions of local religious minorities*. In table 4, I use only the perceptions of respondents who do not follow the same religion as a plurality of their co-residents in the subnational region in which they live. I refer to these respondents as local religious minorities. I use the simple four-fold classification of no religion, Christianity, Islam and other religions described in section 4.2. To increase the sample size, I pool all survey rounds into one and perform the analysis at the region-level rather than at the region-round level.

For 274 subnational regions in 31 countries, more than 15 respondents over all six rounds do *not* belong to the plurality religion in the region.¹⁴ This entails that the regions have a certain degree of religious heterogeneity, and almost all regions in the North African countries drop out. However, the 274 regions have a wide range of empirical coverage from regions with no Muslims to regions that are almost entirely Muslim.¹⁵ The evaluations of democratic quality of majority and minority religionists are quite similar: the simple correlation between the ‘regular’ measure of perceived democratic quality used in the previous section and that constructed using only the perceptions of local religious minorities is $r = 0.90$.

¹⁴ As the number of respondents required rises, the number of regions drops mechanically. As such, for 232 regions in 30 countries there are more than 30 respondents. The results hold across this range.

¹⁵ See appendix H for the distribution of regions on the dimensions of democratic quality as perceived by local religious minorities and region proportion of Muslims

Table 3: Local religious minorities' perceived democratic quality, (Afrbrm. 2002-2015)

	(16) only min., prop.	(17) only min., plur.	(18) all, prop.	(19) all, plur.
Muslim prop./plur.	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.04** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
No religion prop.	0.14 (0.15)	-	0.18+ (0.10)	-
Other religion prop./plur.	-0.05 (0.08)	-0.08 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.02)
Arabic language share	-0.63* (0.32)	-0.71* (0.31)	-0.11 (0.23)	-0.12 (0.23)
Country FEs	YES	YES	YES	YES
Pres. approval rating	YES	YES	YES	YES
'Hierarchical' controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Socioeconomic controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Natural resource controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
R ²	0.77	0.77	0.91	0.91
N	274	274	274	274
Countries	31	31	31	31

Notes. Unstandardized OLS beta coefficients. Robust standard errors clustered at the region-level. All variables standardized to range from 0 to 1. Hierarchical controls are distance to capital city, distance to land border, region size, capital city region and region proportion of country population. Socioeconomic controls are mean education, lived poverty and proportion of urban residents. Constant term not reported to save space. *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, + $p < .1$

Contradicting the results in table 1, table 3 shows that non-Muslims in regions with more Muslims *do* perceive democratic quality as lower than do non-Christians in regions with more Christians (columns 16 and 17). The estimates are moderately large in size at between 35 and 50 percent of the standard deviation of the dependent variable in this sample. This is not the case using the perceptions of all residents as the dependent variable for the sample (columns 18 and 19).¹⁶ It is important to remember that this analysis compares minority perceptions to other minorities' perceptions; the estimated difference is in minority perceptions under *different local religious majorities*.

Figure 8 shows the region-level results for four alternative variables with the minority-only dependent variable measures. For electoral integrity and political freedoms, there is also a negative and significant relationship between a region's Muslim plurality and perceived democratic quality by non-Muslims similar in magnitude to that for perceived democratic quality. For all three measures, the coefficients on Muslim proportion and plurality are larger in absolute terms when the dependent variable is measured only using religious minority perceptions than when using all respondents' perceptions.

¹⁶ However, the results also suggest that there is more measurement error in the analysis using minority perceptions as R² is much higher in columns (18) and (19).




Figure 8: Coefficients on a region's Muslim proportion or plurality and alternative dependent variables measured only for local religious minorities. Based on the full specification with country FEs, i.e. all specifications in table 3. Significance levels are 90 and 95 percent. Observations: [274; 118; 251; 248; 259].

For the local corruption and paid bribes measures, the point estimates are instead positive, and regional proportions and pluralities of Muslims are associated with less corruption and bribe-paying by religious minorities than in other regions in the same country. However none of the latter estimates are significant.

This suggests that while there is no general democratic deficit in Muslim majority regions, it is possible that Muslim plurality or majority regions have particular problems regarding the democratic accommodation of religious minorities. This is likely connected to the far greater religious homogeneity observed in Muslim majority regions compared with those where Christians are the majority. For instance, in Northern Nigeria and in the semi-autonomous Zanzibar islands of Tanzania, shari'a law has been implemented as pertains to family law, criminal law, inheritance, gambling, alcohol consumption, and appropriate Islamic dress, etc. (Kendhammer 2016). There have also been reports of persecution of Christians in Kenya, Mali, Senegal, The Gambia and more generally in the Horn of Africa and North Africa.

Generally, however, evaluations of democracy by minority religionists are highly correlated with those of the majority. Together with the individual-level evidence from section 5.1, this indicates that the baseline results reflect primarily region-level differences in the political institutions and practices rather than differences in perception.

7.5.4 Islamic political culture?

Why do we not see the same negative association at the subnational level between Muslim share and democracy that we do at the national level? The theory of political culture at the subnational level that I presented in section 3 stipulated that subnational levels of political responsiveness and democracy are shaped by (i) varying preferences for democratic or authoritarian rule, and (ii) varying levels of behavior designed to hold politicians and bureaucrats accountable.

Do Muslims actually differ in a way that is relevant to the preference and accountability aspects of political culture? Table 4 tests this by again examining individual-level differences within the same subnational regions, where local levels of democracy and other institutional differences are held constant. The tests are divided into three headings: (i) characteristics relevant to monitoring and accountability, (ii) political knowledge and (iii) preferences for democracy and religious tolerance.

Table 4: Muslims and political culture (Afrbrm. 2002-2015)

	<i>Monitoring and accountability</i>		<i>Political knowledge (names of deputy president, finance minister, local MP and local government head)</i>				<i>Preferences for democracy and religious tolerance</i>		
	(20) pol. int	(21) voter resp.	(22) DP name	(23) FM name	(24) MP name	(25) LG name	(26) sup. dem.	(27) rej. auth.	(28) rel. tol.
Muslim	0.01** (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)	0.06** (0.02)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.04 (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.01+ (0.01)
No religion	-0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.00)	0.04 (0.02)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.01)
Other religion	0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.04** (0.00)	-0.04+ (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.01)
Pres. approval	0.06*** (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	0.05** (0.02)	-0.02+ (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03+ (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)
Education	0.24*** (0.01)	0.10*** (0.01)	0.66*** (0.03)	0.58*** (0.03)	0.31*** (0.02)	0.21*** (0.03)	0.28*** (0.01)	0.11*** (0.00)	0.06*** (0.01)
Lived poverty	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.06** (0.02)	-0.10*** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.01)
Urban resident	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.00)	-0.05** (0.02)	0.01 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)
Region FEs	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Round FEs	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
R ²	0.09	0.13	0.36	0.32	0.32	0.24	0.08	0.11	0.25
N	160,249	136,463	19,744	25,093	44,846	19,061	148,375	150,452	41,247
Regions	492	488	176	243	243	176	492	488	348

Notes. Unstandardized OLS beta coefficients. Robust standard errors clustered at the region-level. All variables standardized to range from 0 to 1. Constant term not reported to save space. *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, + $p < .1$

Column (20) shows first that Muslims are in fact *more* politically interested than others in the same region. Considering the responsibility for making sure that local government does its job, column (21) shows that Muslims are as likely as non-Muslims to say that this responsibility lies with local voters rather than with the president, parliament, or political parties. In columns (22) to (25), gathered from rounds 3 and 4 of the Afrobarometer surveys, we see that Muslims are six percent more likely to be able to provide the correct name of the deputy president and two percent more likely to know the name of the MP for their district than others in the same region. Muslims are estimated to be four

percent more likely know the name of their local government head, although the estimate falls just short of conventional statistical significance levels (the p value is 0.112).

Columns (26) and (27) show that Muslims support democracy equally strongly and are equally likely to disapprove of authoritarian alternatives such as military, one-party or strongman rule as Christians in the same region. Thus, in accordance with the theory sketched in section, if anything we would expect Muslim majority regions to be slightly *more* democratic than those with greater non-Muslim majorities based on both accountability and regime preference aspects of political culture. The reason that there are no differences in democracy levels between majority Muslim regions and other regions is simple: Muslims are not bearers of a particularly Islamic political culture with regards to regime preferences or their willingness to hold political elites accountable, including at the local level.

The lower perceptions of democracy by religious minorities in Muslim majority regions shown in the previous section are also consistent with this theory: Column (28) from round 6 of the Afrobarometer survey shows that Muslims are indeed slightly less likely than others in the same region to express tolerance of having people of different religions from themselves as their neighbors.

7.6 Conclusion

Analyzing the relationship between Islam and subnational perceptions of democracy, electoral practices and corruption in the African continent, where almost a third of the world's Muslims live, I find little evidence that Islamic political culture inhibits democracy.

When applying basic socioeconomic controls, the proportion of Muslims in a region is uncorrelated with its level of perceived democratic quality. Within-region analysis of individuals' perceptions of democratic quality shows that this result is not due to Muslims perceiving the same local governments as more democratic than others perceive them. Finally, this (non-)result is consistent with conventional models of political culture applied to subnational government: Muslims are no more likely to prefer non-democratic forms of government and indeed better equipped to hold local political elites accountable than others in the same regions. The wider implication is, perhaps, that a specifically Islamic political culture is also not responsible for the broader 'democracy deficit' found in the Muslim world. That said, African Muslims are slightly less religiously tolerant than others, and non-Muslims in Muslim majority regions perceive democratic quality as worse than do religious minorities in non-Muslim regions in the same country. This may also parallel wider trends in the Muslim world.

A limitation of this study is its empirical coverage: The Afrobarometer disproportionately carries out surveys in stable, more democratic African countries. As such, missing countries with religiously diverse populations include the war-torn Central African Republic and Chad, highly repressive Eritrea and Guinea-Bissau. All except Guinea-Bissau have experienced ethno-religious violence and civil war, but given the lack of survey data, it is difficult to estimate whether and how their inclusion would change the results. A broader concern is that enumerators avoid certain sub-regional areas that are marked by Islamist radicalism due to security concerns and thereby overstate perceived democracy in Muslim majority regions. However, Afrobarometer places high importance on simple random selection

of respondents within regional strata.¹⁷ Finally, the results ultimately depend on perceptions of democracy rather than ‘real’ institutions at the local level. Obtaining more objective, non-survey-based measures of the subnational politics and their levels of democracy would be a valuable step forward.

To what extent do these findings generalize from subnational to national regimes in the Muslim world? It is conceivable that Islam does not have an adverse democratic effect on local politics, but that it still inhibits democracy at the national level. The Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire as well as the recent territorial successes of the Islamic State each remind us that much of the Muslim world is plagued by artificial boundaries and an ambivalent affiliation with nation-states relative to the transnational Ummah of Muslims. Another possibility is that political culture does not affect local institutions, but only national regimes. Perhaps Christianity has positive effects on democratization not due to ordinary people’s interactions with politicians and bureaucrats tinged by religious values or behavior, but rather through concerted action by churches as hierarchical organizations that concentrate their efforts on *national-level* political reform (Philpott 2007).

Finally, popular Islam spread in Africa through Sufi brotherhoods organized around individual preachers that tended to blend Islamic teachings with culturally resonant pre-Islamic practices (Vikør 2000). In Europe and the US, Sufism has often been seen as a non-dogmatic, tolerant and more democratically benign version of Islam. Does this mean that results on democracy and Islam from (Sub-Saharan) Africa are not representative of the rest of the world? I have provided preliminary evidence from South and Southeast Asia that this is not the case. Furthermore, the Middle East and North Africa – where Salafism has the most sway – hold less than 20 percent of the world’s Muslims. Thus, the African Muslim experience may actually be more relevant to the rest of the world than that in the Middle East.

The results in this paper have implications for scholarship on the democracy in Muslim majority countries and the MENA region and for scholarship arguing that Islam, Christianity and political culture are causally linked to political regime outcomes. If there is a non-spurious negative effect of Islam and Muslims on democracy, it seems to operate at the country-level, for instance through historical legacies of inclusion in Islamic empires, the pernicious effects of Western strategic support of authoritarian non-Islamist governments, or via the (lacking) effect of national religious organizations. A mass political culture specific to Islam, on the other hand, does not seem to account for the low levels of democracy in Muslim majority countries.

¹⁷ Afrobarometer states that “Occasionally, we must also exclude people living in areas determined to be inaccessible due to conflict or insecurity.” (<http://www.afrobarometer.org/surveys-and-methods/sampling-principles>). However, any such departures from random sampling stratified at the first-level administrative unit is noted in Technical Information Reports for each country survey round, and it is only noted for Mali and Nigeria.

7.7 Literature

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7.8 Supplementary Information

7.8.1 Appendix A: V-DEM subnational regime heterogeneity data

Variable	Measure	Source
Subnational election quality unevenness	<p><i>Question:</i> Does the freeness and fairness of subnational elections vary across different areas of the country? 0=No, Subnational elections in most or all areas of the country are equally free and fair (or, alternatively, equally not free and not fair), 1=Somewhat. Subnational elections in some areas of the country are somewhat more free and fair (or, alternatively, somewhat less free and fair) than subnational elections in other areas of the country. 2=Yes. Subnational elections in some areas of the country are significantly more free and fair (or, alternatively, significantly less free and fair) than subnational elections in other areas of the country.</p> <p>The measure uses a particular measurement model based on what is known as Bayesian item response theory (IRT) modeling, which “aggregates the ratings provided by multiple country experts and, taking disagreement and measurement error into account, produces a probability distribution over country-year scores on a standardized interval scale.” (V-Dem codebook 2016). The value produced and reported below is a form of weighted average for a given country in a given year. For more detail, see the V-Dem Methodology document (Pemstein et al. 2016).</p>	Varieties of Democracy dataset, 2012
Subnational civil liberties unevenness	<p><i>Question:</i> Does government respect for civil liberties vary across different areas of the country? 0=Government officials in most or all areas of the country equally respect (or, alternatively, equally do not respect civil liberties). 1=Somewhat. Government officials in some areas of the country respect civil liberties somewhat more (or, alternatively, somewhat less) than government officials in other areas of the country. 2=Yes. Government officials in some areas of the country respect civil liberties significantly more (or, alternatively, significantly less) than government. Civil liberties in the dataset comprise (1) freedom of academic and cultural expression, (2) freedom of religion, (3) freedom from torture, (4) freedom from political killings, (5) freedom of foreign movement, (6) freedom of domestic movement, (7) freedom of discussion for men, (8) freedom from forced labor, (9) property rights, (10) private ownership of economy, (11) transparent laws with predictable enforcement, (12) rigorous and impartial public administration, and (13) secure and effective access to justice.</p> <p>The measure uses a particular measurement model based on what is known as Bayesian item response theory (IRT) modeling, which “aggregates the ratings provided by multiple country experts and, taking disagreement and measurement error into account, produces a probability distribution over country-year scores on a standardized interval scale.” (V-Dem codebook 2016). The value produced and reported below is a form of weighted average for a given country in a given year. For more detail, see the V-Dem Methodology document (Pemstein et al. 2016).</p>	Varieties of Democracy dataset, 2012

African countries are in **bold** in the data below.

Country name	Subnational election quality unevenness, 2012
<i>Mean of all countries</i>	-0.1262
<i>Mean of all African countries</i>	-0.76
Somaliland	-2.65543
Rep. of the Congo	-2.26391
Philippines	-2.25109
Djibouti	-2.10304
Jordan	-1.88316
Thailand	-1.8247
Panama	-1.77805
Madagascar	-1.76588
Nigeria	-1.75614
Sri Lanka	-1.75414
Colombia	-1.74257
Cameroon	-1.69399
Indonesia	-1.64727
Sudan	-1.54728
Iraq	-1.54554
Russia	-1.54525
Lebanon	-1.53678
Argentina	-1.52817
Haiti	-1.47691
Gabon	-1.46183
Burma/Myanmar	-1.43176
Mauritania	-1.4145
Guinea-Bissau	-1.37824
Bangladesh	-1.37579
Israel	-1.36821
Papua New Guinea	-1.3477
Paraguay	-1.30061
Somalia	-1.24462
Mozambique	-1.23244
Malaysia	-1.20977
Mexico	-1.20694
Seychelles	-1.18883
Ukraine	-1.17298
Central African Republic	-1.11147
Ethiopia	-1.0708
Rwanda	-1.07068
Morocco	-1.06721
Burundi	-1.05408
Pakistan	-1.03371
Angola	-1.01953
Ecuador	-1.00539
Tanzania	-0.99415
Guinea	-0.9933
Macedonia	-0.99
Guyana	-0.97173
South Sudan	-0.92299
Guatemala	-0.91667
Bolivia	-0.90943
Niger	-0.90836
Togo	-0.90531
Zambia	-0.8846

Country Name	Subnational civil liberties unevenness, 2012
<i>Mean of all countries</i>	0.527921
<i>Mean of all African countries</i>	0.00
Sudan	-2.06028
Colombia	-1.94218
Mexico	-1.81314
Thailand	-1.70273
Guatemala	-1.63094
Burma/Myanmar	-1.49031
Nepal	-1.29082
Morocco	-1.24814
Iraq	-1.18623
Pakistan	-1.17525
Gabon	-1.15541
Egypt	-1.13568
Mauritius	-1.04387
Panama	-0.97571
Comoros	-0.94585
Uganda	-0.92778
Somaliland	-0.92583
China	-0.92393
Ethiopia	-0.91054
Honduras	-0.87484
Bangladesh	-0.81134
Philippines	-0.80124
Mauritania	-0.76173
India	-0.75484
Cyprus	-0.73385
Rep. of the Congo	-0.72983
Argentina	-0.71327
South Sudan	-0.69569
Swaziland	-0.68455
Djibouti	-0.6599
Chad	-0.60451
Syria	-0.59968
Sri Lanka	-0.55918
Indonesia	-0.53585
Kyrgyzstan	-0.44266
Iran	-0.43637
Afghanistan	-0.41603
Yemen	-0.39698
Liberia	-0.3784
Somalia	-0.35317
Lebanon	-0.33371
Angola	-0.3312
Madagascar	-0.31165
Peru	-0.27541
Uzbekistan	-0.21865
Algeria	-0.21294
Paraguay	-0.21087
Kenya	-0.20799
Dem. Rep. of Congo	-0.19314
Sierra Leone	-0.18864
Malaysia	-0.18438

Nepal	-0.87857
Georgia	-0.86871
Yemen	-0.84651
Dem. Rep. of Congo	-0.83841
Nicaragua	-0.83646
Brazil	-0.82997
Ivory Coast	-0.80328
Uganda	-0.80172
Sierra Leone	-0.79401
Kosovo	-0.78855
Tunisia	-0.78425
Venezuela	-0.77234
Albania	-0.7664
India	-0.75929
Chad	-0.75572
Maldives	-0.734
South Africa	-0.71446
Algeria	-0.68046
Cambodia	-0.67595
Zimbabwe	-0.65468
Senegal	-0.65176
Italy	-0.6463
Egypt	-0.64606
Liberia	-0.64042
Afghanistan	-0.60829
Kyrgyzstan	-0.60777
Libya	-0.60464
Kenya	-0.59786
Malawi	-0.59365
El Salvador	-0.58751
Benin	-0.56889
Montenegro	-0.56664
Peru	-0.5614
Burkina Faso	-0.53269
Palestine (West Bank)	-0.50393
Turkey	-0.49015
Namibia	-0.46776
Comoros	-0.45878
Gambia	-0.30553
Mongolia	-0.30428
Mali	-0.29361
Bulgaria	-0.29251
Ghana	-0.29106
Moldova	-0.25797
Chile	-0.24577
Tajikistan	-0.21434
Spain	-0.19714
Vietnam	-0.1885
Honduras	-0.18358
Botswana	-0.1667
Armenia	-0.14302
Bhutan	-0.13803
Bosnia and Herzegovina	-0.12997
Cyprus	-0.11778
Dominican Republic	-0.07616
Taiwan	-0.04114

Russia	-0.15455
Vietnam	-0.14854
Central African Republic	-0.13321
Tanzania	-0.12825
Guyana	-0.12222
Turkey	-0.08906
Brazil	-0.08242
Bolivia	-0.07926
Botswana	-0.06528
Niger	-0.0596
Bhutan	-0.05594
Cameroon	-0.04479
Ukraine	-0.00789
Ecuador	-0.00108
Laos	0.027057
Eritrea	0.030012
Rwanda	0.058409
Guinea-Bissau	0.06279
Armenia	0.093898
Ivory Coast	0.148731
Georgia	0.160563
Venezuela	0.161238
Kosovo	0.189771
Tunisia	0.198276
Mozambique	0.212463
Israel	0.227061
Azerbaijan	0.227782
Libya	0.227796
Guinea	0.231885
Moldova	0.233599
Gambia	0.240287
Mali	0.280456
Togo	0.369122
Jordan	0.415122
Korea, North	0.418639
Canada	0.447906
Cambodia	0.454336
Papua New Guinea	0.467428
Kazakhstan	0.525405
Nicaragua	0.564192
Nigeria	0.59616
Australia	0.62105
Palestine (Gaza)	0.630963
Cuba	0.720452
South Africa	0.820076
Sao Tome and Principe	0.82182
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.822477
Palestine (West_Bank)	0.837078
Saudi Arabia	0.846447
Albania	0.859398
Maldives	0.86522
Lesotho	0.888722
Haiti	0.891727
Malawi	0.925031
Burkina Faso	0.966051
Senegal	0.97266

Cape Verde	0.013732
Syria	0.017572
Croatia	0.058888
Solomon Islands	0.192407
France	0.204913
Romania	0.223212
Fiji	0.234919
United States	0.236821
Jamaica	0.321134
Lesotho	0.405932
Azerbaijan	0.636122
Palestine (Gaza)	0.671922
Serbia	0.690547
Iran	0.702979
Saudi Arabia	0.818342
China	0.821596
Korea, South	0.836057
Sao Tome and Principe	0.857162
Japan	0.937066
Korea, North	1.073926
Trinidad and Tobago	1.08676
Laos	1.113232
Greece	1.118203
Mauritius	1.129885
Kazakhstan	1.164112
Portugal	1.194447
Belarus	1.236459
Belgium	1.279718
Norway	1.316542
Finland	1.365567
Uzbekistan	1.45769
Swaziland	1.502083
Uruguay	1.513322
Poland	1.525928
Turkmenistan	1.581201
Lithuania	1.592209
Canada	1.640382
Barbados	1.677731
Czech Republic	1.705897
Vanuatu	1.706323
East Timor	1.749308
Estonia	1.765968
Switzerland	1.812152
Germany	1.82856
Suriname	1.83498
Australia	1.841734
Iceland	1.858003
United Kingdom	1.86147
Slovakia	1.897026
Denmark	1.909622
New Zealand	1.915076
Austria	1.937808
Cuba	1.968653
Netherlands	2.000579
Eritrea	2.009116
Hungary	2.05392


Ghana	1.021046
Zimbabwe	1.023351
Zambia	1.047668
Trinidad and Tobago	1.061701
Macedonia	1.090741
Namibia	1.107053
Benin	1.114207
Dominican Republic	1.117557
Seychelles	1.131497
United States	1.151006
Suriname	1.179758
Croatia	1.26217
El Salvador	1.268249
Solomon Islands	1.329991
Montenegro	1.332886
Iceland	1.342134
Fiji	1.355394
Burundi	1.395995
Korea, South	1.449879
Ireland	1.451229
Jamaica	1.470968
Chile	1.483825
Greece	1.493325
Serbia	1.514988
Spain	1.526093
Belarus	1.67565
Italy	1.707552
Turkmenistan	1.720619
Cape Verde	1.727619
Qatar	1.73537
East Timor	1.793203
United Kingdom	1.793779
Slovakia	1.859885
Tajikistan	1.870816
Belgium	1.874152
Barbados	1.951898
Denmark	1.998266
France	2.02483
Romania	2.030096
Slovenia	2.033514
Switzerland	2.038327
Austria	2.039166
Mongolia	2.070909
Poland	2.075135
Netherlands	2.109499
Taiwan	2.115339
Finland	2.177626
Sweden	2.240325
Vanuatu	2.263578
Costa Rica	2.26394
Uruguay	2.279064
Latvia	2.32236
Czech Republic	2.388807
Bulgaria	2.412511
Germany	2.425708
New Zealand	2.427259

Ireland	2.067198
Latvia	2.096572
Slovenia	2.117353
Sweden	2.162867
Costa Rica	2.216044

Hungary	2.4553
Portugal	2.459665
Lithuania	2.48105
Japan	2.614517
Estonia	2.691741
Norway	2.856513

7.8.2 Appendix B: Muslim population and democracy globally

Figures A1-A3 plot the relationship between Muslim population percentages and three common measures of democracy: Polity IV's polity 2 score, Freedom House's combined Freedom in the World score (inverted, so high scores denote more democracy) and the V-DEM Polyarchy index in the year 2012.



Figures A1, A2 and A3: Muslim population proportion and national democracy (Sources: Polity IV dataset, Freedom House: Freedom in the World dataset, Varieties of Democracy dataset, data for 2012)

The relationship is strongly negative, with predicted differences between wholly non-Muslim and wholly Muslim countries of around 25-30 percent of the total distribution of the variables. Indonesia and Turkey represent populous 'democratic overachievers' scoring relatively highly on democratic outcomes, but most Muslim majority countries lie relatively close to the regression line in the Freedom House and V-DEM datasets.

7.8.3 Appendix C: Governing arrangements for first-level administrative units in Africa, 2000-2016

Country	First-level administrative division	Executive	Elected council	Afrobarometer rounds
Algeria	48 wilaya'at	Appointed governors	Assemblées populaires wilayales	5

Benin	12 départements	Appointed prefects	No	3, 4, 5, 6
Botswana	16 districts	Appointed district commissioners	District councils	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Burkina Faso	13 régions	Appointed governors	No	4, 5, 6
Burundi	17 provinces	Appointed governors	No	5, 6
Cameroon	10 régions	Appointed governors	<i>De jure</i> indirectly elected regional councils, <i>de facto</i> no due to non-establishment	5, 6
Cabo Verde	22 concelhos	Elected mayor	Municipal assemblies	2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Cote d'Ivoire (until 2011)	19 régions	Appointed prefects	Regional councils	5
Cote d'Ivoire (2011-present)	<i>De jure</i> 14 districts, <i>de facto</i> 31 régions	Appointed prefects	Regional councils	6
Egypt	27 muhāfazāt	Appointed governor	Governorate popular councils (vacant since 2011)	5, 6
Ethiopia	9 kililoch, 2 chartered cities	Elected presidents (indirect election by regional councils)	Regional councils	5
Ghana	10 regions	Appointed regional ministers	Regional coordinating councils (indirectly elected)	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Guinea	8 régions	Appointed governors	No (appointed regional councils)	5, 6
Kenya (until 2013)	8 provinces	Appointed provincial commissioners	No	2, 3, 4, 5
Kenya (2013-present)	47 counties	Elected governors	Elected county councils	6
Lesotho	10 districts	Appointed district administrators	District councils (since 2005, indirectly elected)	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Liberia	15 counties	Appointed superintendents	No	4, 5, 6
Madagascar (until 2008)	6 provinces	<i>De jure</i> elected governors, <i>de facto</i> appointed governors from 2002 onwards after political crisis and	<i>De jure</i> elected provincial councils, <i>de facto</i> suspended from 2002 onwards after political crisis and subsequent coup	3, 4

		subsequent coup		
Madagascar (2008- present)	22 faritra	Appointed regional chiefs	Elected councils (but regional elections due in 2014 have not yet been held)	5, 6
Malawi	3 regions	Appointed regional administrators	No	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Mali	8 régions and City of Bamako	Appointed governors	Conseils de region (indirectly elected)	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Mauritius	9 districts (disregarding division into four islands)	Elected mayors	District councils	6
Morocco (until 2015)	16 régions	Appointed governors (but also indirectly elected president of regional council)	Regional councils (indirectly elected)	5
Morocco (2015-present)	12 régions	Appointed governors (but also indirectly elected president of region)	Regional councils	N/A
Mozambique	10 provincias and city of Maputo	Appointed governors	Provincial assemblies (since 2009)	2, 3, 5
Namibia	14 regions	Appointed regional governors	Regional councils	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Niger	7 régions and city of Niamey	Appointed governors	No	5, 6
Nigeria	36 states and Federal Capital Territory (Abuja)	Elected state governors	State legislatures	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Sao Tome and Principe	2 concelhos	N/A	N/A	6
Senegal	14 régions	Appointed governor (but also indirectly elected president of the regional assembly)	Regional assemblies	2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Sierra Leone	3 provinces and 1 area	Appointed resident ministers	No	5, 6
South Africa	9 provinces	Elected premiers (indirect election by provincial legislatures)	Provincial legislatures	1, 2, 3, 4, 5
Sudan	18 wilaya'at (25 until 2011)	Elected governors (but pre-selection	State legislatures	5, 6

		by president of candidates), after 2015 direct appointment		
Swaziland	4 tifundza	Appointed regional administrators	No	4, 5, 6
Tanzania	30 mkoa (26 until 2012)	Appointed regional commissioners	No	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Togo	5 regions	Appointed governors	<i>De jure</i> conseils regionals, <i>de facto</i> no (due to no elections since 1987)	6
Tunisia	24 wilaya'at	Appointed governors	No (but regional councils will be elected from 2016 or 2017)	5, 6
Uganda	111 districts and City of Kampala (56 in 2000)	Elected chairpersons	Local councils	1, 2, 3, 4, 4.51, 4.52
Zambia	10 provinces (9 until 2011)	Appointed governors	No	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Zimbabwe	8 provinces, City of Bulawayo and City of Harare	Appointed governors (to be elected according to 2013 constitution)	No (provincials councils to be elected according to 2013 constitution)	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6

7.8.4 Appendix D: V-DEM data and survey data on subnational regime heterogeneity




Figure A4: 2012 Subnational unevenness in freedom and fairness of elections (V-DEM) and within-country range of means (i.e. minimum to maximum) of perceived democratic quality in first-level administrative units (Afrobarometer rounds 5 and 6). Pearson's $r = -0.56$.





Figure A5: 2012 Subnational unevenness in civil liberties protection (V-DEM) and within-country range of means (i.e. minimum to maximum) of perceived democratic quality in first-level administrative units (Afrobarometer rounds 5 and 6). Pearson's $r = -0.39$.

7.8.5 Appendix E: Election contestation and participation and survey data






Figure A6, A7, A8, A9: win margins in the 2011 Nigerian governorship elections and perceived quality of the governorship elections (A6), perceived quality of the national elections (A7), perceived political freedoms (A8) and perceived democratic quality (A9).




Figure A10, A11, A12, A13: Vanhanen index in the 1999 (A10), 2004 (A11), 2009 (A12) and 2014 (A13) South African provincial assembly elections and perceived democratic quality.




Figure A14, A15, and A16: Vanhanen index in the 2004 (A14), 2009 (A15) and 2014 (A16) South African provincial assembly elections and perceived quality of last national election.




Figure A17 and A18: Vanhanen index in the 2009 (A17) and 2014 (A18) South African provincial assembly elections and perceived political freedoms.




Figure A19: Vanhanen index in the 2014 South African provincial assembly elections and perceived electoral integrity.

7.8.6 Appendix F: Scatter plots of region Muslim share and region perceived democratic quality by country



Figure A20: Perceived democratic quality and region proportion Muslims by country (Afrobarometer 2002-2015). Circle sizes correspond to number of respondents in a region.

7.8.7 Appendix G: Question wordings

Variable	Measure	Source
Perceived democratic quality	<p><i>Question:</i> In your opinion how much of a democracy is the country today? 1=Not a democracy, 2=A democracy, with major problems, 3=A democracy, but with minor problems, 4=A full democracy. The question is then standardized to range from 0 to 1.</p> <p>At the individual level, this is the measure. At the region and national level, the measure is calculated as the average of the responses in the region or country or for the region in a given round or country in a given round.</p>	Afrobarometer Survey, rounds 2-6 (2002-2015)

Electoral integrity	<p>The electoral integrity index is composed of six questions:</p> <p><i>Question:</i> In your opinion, how often do the following things occur in this country's elections: Votes are counted fairly? Opposition candidates are prevented from running for office? The media provides fair coverage of all candidates? Voters are bribed? Voters are offered a genuine choice in the elections? Voters are threatened with violence at the polls? 0=Never, 1=Sometimes, 2=Often, 3=Always. The six questions are then summed (media and choice questions reversed) and standardized to range from 0 to 1.</p> <p>At the individual level, this is the measure. At the region and national level, the measure is calculated as the average of the responses in the region or country or for the region in a given round or country in a given round.</p>	Afro-barometer, round 6 (2014-2015)
Political freedoms	<p>The political freedoms index is composed of three questions:</p> <p><i>Question:</i> In this country, how free are you: To join any political organization you want? To say what you think? To choose who to vote for without feeling pressured? 1=Not at all free, 2=Not very free, 3=Somewhat free, 4=Completely free. The three questions are then summed and standardized to range from 0 to 1.</p> <p>At the individual level, this is the measure. At the region and national level, the measure is calculated as the average of the responses in the region or country or for the region in a given round or country in a given round.</p>	Afro-barometer, rounds 4-6 (2008-2015)
Bribe index	<p>The bribe index is composed of two questions:</p> <p><i>Question:</i> In the past year, how often (if ever), have you had to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a favor to government officials in order to: Get a document or a permit? Avoid a problem with the police? 0=Never, 1=Once or twice, 2=A few times, 3=Often. The two questions are then summed and reversed such that higher values represent paying bribes less frequently, and standardized to range from 0 to 1.</p> <p>At the individual level, this is the measure. At the region and national level, the measure is calculated as the average of the responses in the region or country or for the region in a given round or country in a given round.</p>	Afro-barometer, rounds 2-6 (2002-2015)
Local councilor corruption	<p><i>Question:</i> How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Local government councilors? 0=None, 1=Some of them, 2=Most of them, 3=All of them. The question is then reversed, so that higher values represent a lower perception of corruption, and standardized to range from 0 to 1.</p> <p>At the individual level, this is the measure. At the region and national level, the measure is calculated as the average of the responses in the region or country or for the region in a given round or country in a given round.</p>	Afro-barometer, rounds 3-6 (2005-2015)
Religion	<p>I construct simple measures of religion based on four different categories (no religion, Christian, Muslim, Other) and disaggregated measures based on eight different categories (no religion, Catholic, Mainline Protestant, Evangelical/Pentecostal Protestant, other Christian, Muslim, Traditional/Animist, other religion).</p> <p><i>Question:</i> What is your religion, if any?</p> <p>At the individual level, this is the measure. At the region and national level, the measure is calculated both as the proportion of the responses in the region or country or for the region in a given round or country in a given round and as the plurality of the responses in the region or country or for</p>	Afro-barometer, rounds 2-6 (2002-2015)

the region in a given round or country in a given round.

Arabic language	<p><i>Question:</i> Which language is your home language? 0=Other, 1=Arabic.</p> <p>At the individual level, this is the measure. At the region and national level, the measure is calculated as the proportion of Arabic speakers of the respondents in the region or country or for the region in a given round or country in a given round.</p>	Afro-barometer, rounds 2-6 (2002-2015)
Lived poverty	<p>The lived poverty index is composed of five questions:</p> <p><i>Question:</i> Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family gone without: Enough food to eat? Enough clean water for home use? Medicines or medical treatment? Enough fuel to cook your food? A cash income? 0=Never, 1=Just once or twice, 2=Several times, 3=Many times, 4=Always. The five question are then summed and standardized to range from 0 to 1.</p> <p>At the individual level, this is the measure. At the region and national level, the measure is calculated as the average of the responses in the region or country or for the region in a given round or country in a given round.</p>	Afro-barometer, rounds 2-6 (2002-2015)
Education	<p><i>Question:</i> What is the highest level of education you have completed? 0=No formal schooling, 1=Informal schooling only (including Koranic schooling), 2=Some primary schooling, 3=Primary school completed, 4=Some secondary school/ high school, 5=Secondary school completed/high school completed, 6=Post-secondary qualifications, other than university e.g. a diploma or degree from polytechnic or college, 7=Some university, 8=University completed, 9=Post-graduate. The question is then standardized to range from 0 to 1.</p> <p>At the individual level, this is the measure. At the region and national level, the measure is calculated as the average of the responses in the region or country or for the region in a given round or country in a given round.</p>	Afro-barometer, rounds 2-6 (2002-2015)
Proportion urban residents	<p><i>Question:</i> Is the primary sampling unit urban or rural. Answered by interviewer.</p> <p>At the individual level, this is the measure. At the region and national level, the measure is calculated as the proportion of the respondents in the region or country who live in urban areas or for the region in a given round or country in a given round.</p>	Afro-barometer, rounds 2-6 (2002-2015)
Presidential approval rating	<p><i>Question:</i> Do you approve or disapprove of the way the following people have performed their jobs over the past twelve months: President (Prime Minister in Lesotho, Mauritius, Morocco, Swaziland, Tunisia)? 1=Strongly disapprove, 2=disapprove, 3=Approve, 4=Strongly approve. The question is then standardized to range from 0 to 1.</p> <p>At the individual level, this is the measure. At the region and national level, the measure is calculated as the average of the responses in the region or country or for the region in a given round or country in a given round.</p>	Afro-barometer, rounds 2-6 (2002-2015)
Political interest	<p><i>Question:</i> How interested would you say you are in public affairs? 0=Not at all interested, 1=Not very interested, 2=Somewhat interested, 3=Very interested, The question is then standardized to range from 0 to 1.</p>	Afro-barometer, rounds 2-6 (2002-2015)

Voter respon- sibility	<i>Question:</i> Who should be responsible for: Making sure that, once elected, local government councilors do their jobs? 0=The President/Executive, 1=The Parliament/Local Council, 2=Their political party, 3=The voters, 4=No one. The question is then recoded such that (1) is 'the voters' and (0) are all other responses not missing or 'don't know' responses.	Afro- barometer, rounds 3-6 (2004- 2015)
Political knowledge	<i>Question:</i> Can you tell me the name of: Your Local Government Councillor? Your Member of Parliament/National Assembly Representative? Your country's Minister of Finance and Economic Planning? The Deputy President/Vice President? 1=Know but can't remember, 2=Incorrect guess, 3=Correct name, 9=Don't Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data. The question is then recoded such that (1) is 'correct name' and (0) are all other non- missing responses (including 'don't know' and 'know but can't remember').	Afro- barometer, rounds 3-4 (2004- 2008)
Support for democracy	<i>Question:</i> Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion? 1=Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government. 2=In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable. 3=For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we have. The question is then recoded such that (1) is '1' and (0) are all other non-missing responses (including 'don't know').	Afro- barometer, rounds 2-6 (2002- 2015)
Reject authoritaria n alternatives	<i>Question:</i> There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives: Only one political party is allowed to stand for election and hold office? The army comes in to govern the country? Elections and Parliament/National Assembly are abolished so that the President/Prime Minister can decide everything? 1=Strongly disapprove, 2=Disapprove, 3=Neither approve nor disapprove, 4=Approve, 5=Strongly approve. The question is then standardized to range from 0 to 1 and reversed, such that higher values represent stronger disapproval of authoritarian rule.	Afro- barometer, rounds 2-6 (2002- 2015)
Religious tolerance	<i>Question:</i> For each of the following types of people, please tell me whether you would like having people from this group as neighbors, dislike it, or not care: People of different religion? 1=Strongly dislike 2=Somewhat dislike, 3=Would not care, 4=Somewhat like, 5=Strongly like. The question is then standardized to range from 0 to 1.	Afro- barometer, round 6 (2014- 2015)
Petroleum production	I create a dummy variable for whether or not there is petroleum production in a region. I do this using ArcGIS software by joining the geo-coded PRIO Petroleum dataset to a shapefile of all first-level administrative units as described in Appendix C constructed from the GADM database of Global Administrative Areas shapefiles. I count the number of oil fields within a region, as production data is not available for all oil fields, and if a region has more than one oil field, it receives a value of 1. If it has none, it receives a value of 0.	PRIO Petroleum Dataset v1.2 (2009), GADM shapefile
Diamond production	I create a dummy variable for whether or not there is diamond production in a region. I do this using ArcGIS software by joining the geo-coded PRIO Diamond dataset to a shapefile of all first-level administrative units as described in Appendix C constructed from the GADM database of Global Administrative Areas shapefiles. I count the number of diamond production sites within a region, and if a region has more than one site of diamond production, it receives a value of 1. If it has none, it receives a value of 0.	PRIO Diamond dataset (2005), GADM shapefile

Distance to capital city	I obtain a shapefile of capital cities from the 'Populated Places' layer in the Natural Earth public domain map dataset. In South Africa and Cote d'Ivoire I use all capitals (Pretoria, Cape Town and Bloemfontein in South Africa, Yamassoukro and Abidjan). I then compute the centroid of all regions in the shapefile of all first-level administrative units as described in Appendix C constructed from the GADM database of Global Administrative Areas shapefiles. Then I compute the distance between each region's centroid and its country's capital city (or nearest capital city in South Africa and Cote d'Ivoire) in meters.	Natural Earth (Populated Places layer), GADM shapefile
Distance to land border	I obtain a shapefile of land boundaries from the 'Land Lines' layer in the Natural Earth public domain map dataset. I then compute the centroid of all regions in the shapefile of all first-level administrative units as described in Appendix C constructed from the GADM database of Global Administrative Areas shapefiles. Then I compute the distance between each region's centroid and its closest land border in meters.	Natural Earth (Land Lines layer), GADM shapefile
Region size	I calculate the region size in square meters from the shapefile of all first-level administrative units as described in Appendix C constructed from the GADM database of Global Administrative Areas shapefiles.	GADM shapefile
Capital city region	I create a dummy variable for whether or not there region holds the capital city. I obtain a shapefile of capital cities from the 'Populated Places' layer in the Natural Earth public domain map dataset. In South Africa and Cote d'Ivoire I use all capitals (Pretoria, Cape Town and Bloemfontein in South Africa, Yamassoukro and Abidjan). I do this using ArcGIS software by joining the geo-coded capital cities to a shapefile of all first-level administrative units as described in Appendix C constructed from the GADM database of Global Administrative Areas shapefiles. If a region hosts the capital city region, it receives a value of 1. If it does not, it receives a value of 0.	Natural Earth (Populated Places layer), GADM
Region proportion of country population	I construct an approximation of each region's proportion of the country's population. I do this by exploiting the stratified sampling undertaken by Afrobarometer on the basis of national census population numbers for first-level administrative units. Thus, by country-round or by country I calculate the proportion of respondents from each first-level administrative unit (see appendix C) relative to the total sampled in the country.	Afro-barometer, rounds 2-6 (2002-2015)
Perceived democratic quality, World Values Survey	<i>Question:</i> How democratically is this country being governed today? Using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means that it is "not at all democratic" and 10 means that it is "completely democratic," what position would you choose? The measure is standardized to range from 0 to 1. At the individual level, this is the measure. At the region, the measure is calculated as the average of the responses in the region or country or for the region in a given round or country in a given round.	World Values Survey, round 6 (2010-2014)
Religion, World Values Survey	I construct simple measures of religion based on four different categories (no religion, Christian, Muslim, Other) and disaggregated measures based on eight different categories (no religion, Catholic, Mainline Protestant, Evangelical/Pentecostal Protestant, other Christian, Muslim, Traditional/Animist, other religion). <i>Question:</i> Do you belong to a religion or religious denomination? If yes, which one?	World Values Survey, round 6 (2010-2014)

	At the individual level, this is the measure. At the region level, the measure is calculated both as the proportion of the responses in the region or for the region in a given round and as the plurality of the responses in the region or for the region in a given round in a given round.	
Presidential approval rating, World Values Survey	<p><i>Question:</i> I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in: The government (in your nation's capital)? 4=a great deal of confidence, 3=quite a lot of confidence, 2=not very much confidence, or 1=none at all? The measure is standardized to range from 0 1.</p> <p>At the individual level, this is the measure. At the region level, the measure is calculated as the average of the responses in the region or for the region in a given round.</p>	World Values Survey, round 6 (2010-2014)
Education, World Values Survey	<p><i>Question:</i> What is the highest educational level that you have attained? 0=No formal education, 1=Incomplete primary school, 2=Complete primary school, 3=Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type, 4=Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type, 5=Incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type, 6=Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type, 7=Some university-level education, without degree, 8=University-level education, with degree. The measure is standardized to range from 0 to 1.</p> <p>At the individual level, this is the measure. At the region level, the measure is calculated as the average of the responses in the region or for the region in a given round.</p>	World Values Survey, round 6 (2010-2014)
Perceived democratic quality, Asia-Barometer	<p>The perceived democratic quality measure in the AsiaBarometer survey is an index is composed of six questions:</p> <p><i>Question:</i> How satisfied are you with the current scope of the following rights in [your country]: The right to vote? The right to participate in any kind of organization? The right to gather and demonstrate? The right to be informed about the work and functions of government? Freedom of speech? The right to criticize the government? 1=Very satisfied, 2=Somewhat satisfied, 3=Somewhat dissatisfied, 4=Very dissatisfied. The six questions are then summed, reversed such that higher values represent more perceived democratic quality, and standardized to range from 0 to 1.</p> <p>At the individual level, this is the measure. At the region level, the measure is calculated as the average of the responses in the region or for the region in a given round.</p>	Asia-Barometer, rounds 1-5 (2003-2007)
Religion, Asia-Barometer	<p>I construct simple measures of religion based on four different categories (no religion, Christian, Muslim, Other) and disaggregated measures based on eight different categories (no religion, Catholic, Mainline Protestant, Evangelical/Pentecostal Protestant, other Christian, Muslim, Traditional/Animist, other religion).</p> <p><i>Question:</i> Do you regard yourself as belonging to any particular religion? If yes, which?</p> <p>At the individual level, this is the measure. At the region level, the measure is calculated both as the proportion of the responses in the region or for the region in a given round and as the plurality of the responses in the region or for the region in a given round in a given round.</p>	Asia-Barometer, rounds 1-5 (2003-2007)

Presidential approval rating, Asia-Barometer	<i>Question:</i> Please indicate to what extent you trust the following institutions to operate in the best interests of society: the central government? 1=Trust a lot, 2=Trust to a degree, 3=Don't really trust, 4=Don't trust at all. The measure is then reversed such that higher values represent more trust of the central government and standardized to range from 0 to 1.	Asia-Barometer, rounds 1-5 (2003-2007)
Education, Asia-Barometer	<i>Question:</i> What is the highest level of education you have completed? 1=No formal education, 2=Elementary school/junior high school/middle school, 3=High school, 4=Professional school/technical school, 5=University/graduate school. The measure is standardized to range from 0 to 1. At the individual level, this is the measure. At the region level, the measure is calculated as the average of the responses in the region or for the region in a given round.	Asia-Barometer, rounds 1-5 (2003-2007)

7.8.8 Appendix H: Democratic quality perceived by local religious minorities




Figure A21: Democratic quality as perceived by local religious minorities and region proportion of Muslims (2002-2015). Solid, black line is cross-country trend line with confidence interval. Dashed lines are country-specific trend line. Circle size represents number of respondents in a region.




Figure A22: Democratic quality as perceived by local religious minorities and all respondents (2002-2015). If an observation is above the 45 degree dashed line, then local religious minorities perceive democratic quality as higher than do all respondents. If it is below, then minorities perceive democratic quality as lower.

8. It's the Geography, Stupid! An Introduction to Geographical Information Systems in Political Science

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Rasmus Fonnesbaek Andersen*

Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen

Abstract: Much research in political science examines either countries or individuals. However, technological advances in geographic information systems (GIS) software and the ubiquity of geo-coded data in recent years have opened up the possibility of political science research that is attentive to (1) spatial aspects of political phenomena and (2) potential biases resulting from the dominance of country- and individual-based analysis in the discipline. In this article, I first present GIS and its possibilities for researchers (including existing, user-friendly GIS databases), and then show how GIS and spatial data have been used to examine the effects of artificial borders in Africa on civil war and development. Finally, I will offer my thoughts on how GIS can move forward political science in each of the traditional subfields of comparative politics, international relations and public administration.

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8.1 Introduction

Modern political science has generally taken the sovereign state as well as individuals within one sovereign state as its natural units of analysis.¹⁹ Does economic development lead to democracy? To find out, study correlations between income per capita and levels of democracy in as many of the world's countries as possible, preferentially over time. Does education lead to political tolerance? Study as many individuals as possible in a given country or across countries, and you will know. The field of international relations is basically founded on the premise that relations between sovereign states hold the only key to understanding patterns of peace and war.

Students of supranational organizations like the EU or scholars of postcolonial societies have voiced concerns over this preoccupation, noting that policy authority is increasingly devolved upwards and downwards from the sovereign state (Hooghe & Marks 2003) or that many national governments outside Western Europe and North America do not project their power over their entire territories (Herbst 2000; Scott 2009). Likewise, recent research in political behavior has drawn attention to the local contexts and social networks in which individuals are embedded and which shape their political attitudes and participation (Gerber et al. 2008; Bond et al. 2010). More broadly, students of subnational politics and political methodologists have questioned both methodological individualism and methodological nationalism in urging conceptual attention to appropriate levels of analysis (Agnew 1996; Snyder 2001; Hilgers 2011; Harbers & Ingram 2014). But how can we avoid the pitfall of abandoning the goal of analysis and generalization and contenting ourselves with proclaiming immense complexity? I propose that one way to do so is to cultivate 'spatial awareness' – always trying to locate politics in space – and complement it with the tools furnished by Geographic Information Systems (or GIS).

By space, I mean geographic linkages between objects, units and actors of interest. The starting premise of linking data to space is that almost every type of information has a geographical referent. A country has borders existing in definite places, individuals move around in space, wars take place (also) in delimited spaces that troops, tanks or drones physically inhabit, and even rocket missiles have ranges that are limited in space. With regards to the challenges raised above, spatial awareness and GIS can help political scientists analyze subnational governments, peripheral territories that are only under partial central government control and the impact of local contexts and spatially proximate networks on individuals. As such, I will emphasize the potential for spatial awareness and GIS to advance political science in terms of theory-testing and to some extent also theory-building.

In this article I will first present GIS and its possibilities for researchers, including existing user-friendly GIS databases that allow for spatial representation of data without the need for technical savvy. Secondly, I will use the example of the Scramble for Africa and the artificial borders drawn at the Berlin Conference in 1885 to show how studies utilizing GIS have investigated large, otherwise intractable problems in social science. I will also use this example throughout the paper to illustrate the challenges and opportunities for research that spatial awareness grants us. I then offer my

¹⁹ Notable early postwar exceptions are V.O. Key's *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (1949) and Robert Dahl's *Who Governs* (1961), while a later exception is Robert Putnam's *Making Democracy Work* (1993).

thoughts on how GIS can move forward the traditional political science subfields of comparative politics, international relations and public administration. Finally, I conclude that geography in political science is not only about using GIS to test existing theories, and that spatial awareness may also help our theory-building by making us more aware of geographical linkages in politics.

8.2 Everything is Spatial: GIS in Practice

Why should you care about Geographic Information Systems (GIS)? At the most basic level, what the technological advances in software and spatial data make possible is the combination of otherwise incongruous types of data. This is not only relevant to the quantitative study of political phenomena: historians have been at the forefront of applying GIS methods to their work, constructing maps and visual representations to track networks, interactions and ways of seeing the world of elite actors, migrants, and social movements (Hillier & Knowles 2008; Gordon 2008; Dear et al. 2011; Bol 2013).

Simply visualizing data in the form of maps and examining spatial patterns (and their dynamics and changes over time) in my own experience yields a greater understanding of any topic and allows for a quick and intuitive overview of many types of data. As Gary King put it, “Displaying data geographically helps because it connects a variable we wish to explain with numerous others coded on the same level of geography. Moreover, because most observers know the values of many of these variables without having to look them up, geographical displays are instantly recognizable and interpretable.” (1996: 161). While specific GIS software – most prominently ArcGIS – is essential for conducting independent and substantial research using spatial data, there exists a wealth of resources freely available, which allow for more informal spatial reasoning. The Center for Geographical Analysis at Harvard University has developed the open-source WorldMap platform in order to “lower barriers for scholars who wish to explore, visualize, edit, collaborate with, and publish geospatial information.”

AfricaMap: http://worldmap.harvard.edu/africamap/ ChinaMap: http://worldmap.harvard.edu/chinamap/ Map of the Russian Empire: http://worldmap.harvard.edu/maps/russianempire ChicagoMap: http://worldmap.harvard.edu/chicago/
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Table 1: Selected digital, interactive maps from WorldMap

Each of the digital maps in Table 1 contains spatially referenced information for different historical periods – such as the distribution of ethnic groups, languages, locations of armed conflict, slave ports (including the number of slaves exported), individual slave trade expeditions (including number of slaves, destination port, nationality of traders, year and date and more), and emitted light as recorded by satellite imagery (a strong proxy for income in Africa, see Henderson 2012) for the AfricaMap. The maps are easily constructed using point-and-click to show various layers of information alongside each other. Below, I will use the AfricaMap to illustrate the different forms that data can take in GIS because of the simplicity and richness of this particular map.

What GIS can help us do is categorize the political objects that we deem to be of importance into types of spatial data that we can then relate to each other thanks to their common spatial referent of GPS coordinates. The four basic types of spatial data are (1) points (for instance landmarks such as churches, the location of a battle or residence of an individual that we know something about from a survey or registry), (2) lines (such as infrastructure networks like roads, railroads or gas pipelines), (3) polygons (i.e. connected lines that enclose an area such as administrative units or countries) and (4) so-called ‘rasters’ (meaning continuously varying information that is available for each point in a large area at a certain resolution, i.e. topography, emission of nighttime lights, etc.).²⁰

These datasets are each geocoded (using GPS coordinates) and packaged in so-called ‘shapefiles’ that can be accessed in GIS software. Such shapefiles of various types of data are available online from various administrative agencies, international organizations and other scholars (for a partial overview, see the Wikipedia page “List of GIS data sources”).

- | |
|--|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Points: a GPS coordinate (city, building, site of battle, etc.) 2. Lines: the sum of points directly between two GPS coordinates (river, road, gas pipeline, etc.) 3. Polygons: the area enclosed by lines that connect each other (administrative units, lakes, etc.) 4. Rasters: information available for each point in a given area at a certain granularity (light density, topography, temperature, etc.). |
|--|

Table 2: types of spatial data

Figure 1 shows the AfricaMap with three data sources overlaid on a simple terrain from Google: points, i.e. green bubbles that represent slave ports scaled in size by how many slaves were exported from them (Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database 2010), blue lines showing major rivers (Natural Earth Project 2013), and colored polygons showing religious composition across first-level administrative units in African countries in 2005 (World Religion Database 2008). For the latter, darker green areas have a higher percentage of Muslims, darker blue more Christians and darker red more tribalists. The slave trade data have been used in a number of studies to examine the effects of the slave trade on present-day economic development and social characteristics such as trust (Nunn 2008; Nunn & Wantchekon 2011), distance to major rivers could provide a relevant control variable in many different types of studies, and research using GIS has also tried to explain why certain parts of Africa are predominantly Muslim, while in others Protestant and Catholic missionaries succeeded in spreading the gospel (Michalopoulos et al. 2012; Nunn 2010). Figure 2 shows instead the Landsat raster dataset which uses census data and satellite images of light density at night (detecting light from human settlements) to obtain fine-grained and precise information on population density across Africa (Landsat 2010). As such, darker areas on the map are more densely populated. In section 3.1, I will review research of the effect of ethnic partition by country boundaries in Africa using some of these data.

²⁰ Using GIS in 3D adds a third dimension to X-Y coordinates, which will not be covered here (see for instance Dell 2010). Geometrical GIS objects (points, lines and polygons) are sometimes called vectors and contrasted to the pixel-based raster data.




Figure 1 and 2: AfricaMap with polygons (country borders and World religion database), points (slave ports) and lines (major rivers) and AfricaMap with polygons (country borders) and raster (population density)

Geocoding data of these four types (i.e. adding spatial information to them) then allows the computation of relations between them. This usually means joining information from other 'layers' than the one representing the unit of analysis with which one is concerned.

If the unit of analysis is polygons such as administrative units, then points (measuring number of battles in a civil war for instance) may be counted within the territory of a given polygon, a variable may be constructed coding for whether or not a line (such as a road or river) traverses the polygon, and the average of a raster (such as topography or altitude) may be calculated for all polygons. We may also calculate which other polygons overlap with the administrative unit we are interested in, such as parliamentary constituencies. If the unit of analysis is points, like surveyed individuals based on residence, then the soil type (polygon) in the place in which the individual lives may be joined to the individual, as goes for the distance from the individual to a country border (line of a polygon) or highway (line), or the average density of light emitted at nighttime in a 25 kilometer radius from the individual (raster). Joining information from other points to a point can be done in a number of ways: the distance from the individual's residence to the closest school, for instance, or the number of schools in a certain radius from the surveyed individual. Likewise, lines or rasters may be related to other data of its own type or the three other forms of data.

These are the fundamental building blocks of GIS and spatial analysis. Knowing these types of data allows one to make sense of the vast majority of studies in social science utilizing GIS, including the ones presented above, and the example I turn to in the following section.

8.3 Geography in Political Science: Then and Now

The focus of political science on individuals and countries at the exclusion of geography and space is a postwar phenomenon. The founders of academic American political science at Johns Hopkins University in the late 19th century were schooled in 'Old Institutionalism' focused on the geographical transmission of ideas and institutions, which produced for instance the well-known Turner Thesis (Turner 1893) of the American frontier (see Ethington & McDaniel 2007: 135-7). With the behavioral revolution and the systematic collection of survey data and national-level data, however, geography slid out of the political science mainstream. While engaging and theoretically fruitful, these works of 'old institutionalism' and other literatures such as comparative historical sociology ultimately were weaker in conclusively and systematically establishing their findings and eliminating alternative hypotheses than most the quantitative work that became possible (see for instance critiques of comparative historical sociology by Geddes [1990] and King et al. [1994]). Yet today, newer studies utilizing the tools of GIS enumerated above can help social science provide systematic and triangulating tests of the accounts of the vital questions asked by 'old institutionalism' and comparative historical sociology and geography in politics, more broadly.

I will now show how – using GIS and these four types of geocoded data – new research has tested the effect of African borders on the wellbeing of the continent's citizens, as the borders have been argued to be artificial and poor for stability and development. I will take care to highlight the role played by spatial data in answering this otherwise difficult research question.

8.3.1 *The Scramble for Africa and artificial borders*

In addition to colonial rule (Acemoglu et al. 2001) and the slave trade (Nunn 2008), one of the causes of Africa's poverty and proneness to war, civil war and violence highlighted by Africanist historians is the imposition of unsuitable borders by European powers (Thomson 2010). Beginning at the Berlin Conference in 1884-5 arbitrary borders were drawn, and many have proven remarkably persistent up until today. Historians have argued that this has hindered the development of cohesive nation-states and led to ethnic strife (Horowitz 1985): if an ethnic group is partitioned, then its members may agitate for reunion with their ethnic brethren across the border, and in a conflict its members may be able to retreat and regroup on the other side of the national border, which may make them more of a threat to other ethnic groups or the national government. However, historians and political scientists have not been able systematically and conclusively to establish this finding. In an age of secessionism and new states such as South Sudan springing up, the effects of location of borders are therefore a question of very high substantive academic and policy interest.

In order to study the effects of ethnic partition and implicitly the effect of this particular pernicious European influence on Africa, Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaoiannou (forthcoming) examine conflict in the areas traditionally inhabited by split ethnic groups, the involvement of partitioned ethnic groups in ethnic conflict as well as the living standards and educational attainment of individuals belonging to partitioned ethnic groups. To do this, they combine a large number of data sources using the GIS toolbox described in section 2.

To first find out which ethnic groups were partitioned and which were not, they first use spatial data on the locations and borders of mid-19th century 'homelands' of ethnic groups collected by ethnographers and missionaries [polygons] and present-day country borders [polygons] to determine that 229 of these ethnic homelands are partitioned by one or more present-day country borders, while 596 are not (see figure 3). They are also able to show that ethnic and precolonial characteristics pertaining to the ethnic groups in question (such as precolonial kingdoms, major cities, sites of major battles, family structure, etc.) do not predict whether an ethnic homeland is split by a border or not. This makes sense insofar as European border-drawers were making these decisions *without* local knowledge far away from the African areas concerned. The only things that predict split are size of an ethnic homeland and presence of major lakes in the territory of an ethnic homeland.




Figure 3: Partitioned and non-partitioned ethnic homelands (from Michalopoulos & Papaioannou forthcoming)

However, because Michalopoulos & Papaioannou want to conduct within-country comparison, they use as their unit of analysis not the ethnic homelands, but rather the 'country-ethnic area' (i.e. the part of a given ethnic homeland in a given country). Of these there are 1212 in 49 countries [polygon]. Using spatially disaggregated data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) on violent events from 1997 to 2013 measured at the specific location of the violent event [point], Michalopoulos & Papaioannou can assign these to the country-ethnic area in which they take place. As such, they show that ethnically partitioned country-ethnic areas experience more battles between armed actors (state or non-state) and one-sided violence against civilians than other country-ethnic areas *in the same country* – also when examining only country-ethnic areas close to borders. The differences are strikingly large: the prevalence of conflicts with one or more deaths is estimated to be between 40 and 60 percent higher in the homelands of partitioned ethnicities (2015: 18). Equally,

there is a (generally smaller) spill-over effect to country-ethnic areas adjacent to split ethnicities. Michalopoulos & Papaioannou also use data from the ACLED on the conflict actors to show that government forces, rebels and militias and especially external government forces are more likely to engage in violence in partitioned country-ethnic areas. This backs up qualitative research indicating that foreign governments are especially likely to invade areas with large populations belonging to an ethnic group on the other side of the country border. Michalopoulos & Papaioannou also link the split ethnic groups to the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset (Wimmer et al. 2009) to show that groups that are partitioned by country borders are more likely to be victims of government discrimination and implicated in ethnically based civil wars.

Finally, Michalopoulos & Papaioannou examine individual outcomes using household data [points] from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) containing location of residence and reported ethnicity. Matching this data to the split groups allows them to show that individuals identifying with partitioned ethnic groups have lower living standards, less access to public goods such as running water and electricity, and lower levels of education. Because they know where these respondents live, Michalopoulos & Papaioannou can also show that this is the case both for those living inside split homelands and outside of them. Crucially, no matter where members of partitioned groups live, they appear to be disadvantaged, while members of non-partitioned groups who live in partitioned country-ethnic areas are not disadvantaged by it. In this way, their findings partly challenge Africanists suggesting that ethnic partitioning is responsible for poverty in general in Africa: country-ethnic areas of partitioned groups do *not* have lower income per capita measured by emitted night lights recorded by satellite imagery [raster].

As such, it seems that traditional Africanist historiography overwhelmingly had it right in emphasizing borders splitting ethnic groups in explaining civil wars and violence episodes in Africa, and further that the economic effects of this European heritage appears present *only* for citizens who belong to partitioned groups. In beginning to answer this question, Michalopoulos & Papaioannou have also provided us with a creative, new research design that will likely lead to more research that will make us understand ethnic partitioning, conflict, and African history even better. But many possibilities remain to test even *the same* question by leveraging spatial thinking and data: Michalopoulos & Papaioannou look at contemporary borders, but do not in fact trace the development of African borders from 1884 until today (see also section 4.1 for the problems this poses for the results in the paper). Which ones changed, and which did not? Were early borders that partitioned groups more likely to change later than those which did not? While answers to these questions are unlikely to substantially change the findings in this research project, there is still much we do not know.

8.4 Advancing Political Science: Spatial Awareness and GIS

After outlining the concrete tools of GIS and showing an example of its innovative use to address one of political science's great questions, here I offer my thoughts on how spatial awareness and GIS can further political science as a discipline. I then give a number of specific examples of questions and topics in each of the three traditional subfields of comparative politics, international relations and public administration that I believe spatial thinking and GIS could help address.

8.4.1 *Theory Testing, Data and Research Designs*

Political scientists' preoccupation with the sovereign state and atomic individuals does not just increase the risk that we miss out on interesting political phenomena in between them, but also may carry implications for the validity of the results we find. By allowing for new tests of existing theories GIS can help improve the quality of our analysis and inference and thus hold the potential for political science to progress.

Firstly, it can do this by allowing the integration of data sources. As emphasized in section two of this article, space is a common denominator of almost all types of data and thus allows for integrating otherwise incongruent datasets by common spatial referents. If the units of analysis of different datasets are not compatible, they can often be made so by the addition of geocodes. In the example of the Scramble for Africa, the existing, non-geocoded Ethnic Power Relations dataset (Wimmer et al. 2009) was linked with the dataset of partitioned ethnicities constructed by Michalopoulos & Papaioannou using GIS. Furthermore, many of the new data sources referred to as 'Big Data' are recorded with spatial information such that for instance google searches and some social network activity may be linked to a specific place (see Stephens-Davidowitz [2013] and Jamal et al. [2015]). Historical sources – such as information at the city-level, census records or historical borders – are often also possible to geocode at relatively low cost or effort. In this way, more data may be brought to bear on our theories to adjudicate between competing theories.

Secondly, GIS and spatial thinking can help political science advance by making new research designs possible to test our theories. Conducting subnational analysis is much more straightforward with GIS, and complementing or moving beyond the cross-country and cross-country time-series research design can help improve the validity of our causal inference on macro-political phenomena for a number of reasons: Countries are inherently very difficult to compare in a manner that is sufficiently attentive to their particularities. Comparing subnational political units holds a great many potentially unobserved factors constant across the units of analysis, lessening the risk of omitted variable bias (Snyder 2001; Pande & Udry 2005). By using geocoded datasets or geocoding existing datasets ourselves, we add spatial information that can be used for new research designs both within and between countries (such as natural experiments based on geographical discontinuities or precise instrumental variables, etc.). Using again the example of the Scramble for Africa, Michalopoulos & Papaioannou create a new unit of analysis for their study by combining two shapefiles containing polygon data: the country-ethnic area, i.e. the part of an ethnic homeland contained in a given country. This then allows them to compare areas within the same country that were historically inhabited by a split and a non-split group, something that would have otherwise been impossible.

Such new research designs enabled by GIS can help ameliorate the threats to inference originating from what geographers call the 'Modifiable Areal Unit Problem' (or MAUP): the challenge posed by the aggregation of local data into higher-order units for statistical analysis (Openshaw 1983). The basic intuition of the problem is that summary values for a given variable of higher-order units are highly influenced by the specific choice of boundaries if there is local variation in the variable. This holds because the areal units (countries, provinces, municipalities) are modifiable; political scientists who work with gerrymandering of political districts are acutely aware of this phenomenon. As Alesina &

Spolaore put it, in social science “[...] borders themselves are treated as part of the geographical landscape, like coasts or mountains. However, national borders are not a natural phenomenon; they are human-made institutions [...]” (2005: 2). This introduces yet another disadvantage of country-level analysis: for any factor that has substantial, territorial within-country variation, MAUP potentially biases results – and when countries split up or amalgamate, MAUP is also one of the reasons that this may change our findings. Thus, MAUP may confound any potential causal relationship analyzed across sovereign states if the causal processes that produce the specific number of sovereign states and the territorial extent of these states at a given time are also correlated with the independent or dependent variable. What this means, essentially, is that conclusions about causal relationships reached by comparing countries may be misleading or outright wrong whenever we study variables that are plausibly also related to breakdown, amalgamation or emergence of sovereign states – most obviously colonialization, state capacity, federalism, secessionist sentiment, etc. at the domestic level and peace, war, free trade regimes, etc. at the international level.²¹ Even in the (primarily subnational) study by Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, MAUP could pose a problem: if ethnic partitioning (their independent variable) or civil war (one of their dependent variables) mattered for how many sovereign states emerged in Africa and where their borders came to lie, then their results may be biased. This would in fact appear very likely. South Sudan and Eritrea are Africa’s two newest states which both came into being following particularly vicious civil wars with ethnic components. If borders have been moved to *less* conflict-prone areas and towards aligning with ethnic boundaries since 1884, then the partitioned ethnicities analyzed by Michalopoulos & Papaioannou given current boundaries may experience less conflict than would have been case without endogenous border displacement, and their estimate of the effect of ethnic partitioning on conflict may be biased downwards (i.e. *smaller* than the true causal estimate).

In addition to helping us solve these problems with much existing (primarily cross-country) research by facilitating subnational analysis, natural experiments and geographical regression discontinuity designs, using GIS software with certain types of geocoded data also allows us to perform cross-country analysis holding political units constant over time, instead of allowing them to change endogenously. As such, GIS would also allow Michalopoulos & Papaioannou to run their analyses on ethnic partitioning using only the borders that have not changed since 1885, since 1914, and since 1960, and see whether their results are the same. For many types of research, GIS can even help us construct ‘virtual countries’ to use as complementary units of analysis, i.e. dividing the world into a number of squares, calculating values for relevant variables for them and performing analyses at this level of analysis (Michalopoulos 2012; Abramson 2014; Alesina et al. forthcoming).

However, GIS obviously cannot solve every problem of causal inference. Furthermore, certain types of GIS-assisted analysis contain risks of their own: in subnational analysis, for instance, processes of diffusion between subnational political units with relatively permeable borders make the assumption of the independence of causal processes taking place internally in units without outside influence even less tenable than in cross-national studies (see Imke & Harbers 2014 for ways to address this problem

²¹ Studying the processes of state formation and recognition, both eminently territorial, in history and today can help us determine which variables to worry about in relation this type of confounding. An example is Coggins’s book-length study of which secessionist movements are elevated to the status of states and admitted into the international community of states after World War II, finding that support from great powers in the international system is crucial (Coggins 2014).

statistically). Additionally, it is not always warranted to conduct analysis at the lowest level of aggregation possible (such as the municipality) if the phenomenon studied is intimately tied to or takes place at a higher level of aggregation (such as at the provincial level or in the capital city). The spatial projection of power and linkages between different places can also be difficult to analyze using GIS. Edward Gibson distinguishes between the *site* (territorial arena) and *scale* (territorial reach) of political action because “goals pursued in one geographic location are often means toward objectives in other locations.” (2013: 16). When site and scale are the same location, meaning that political action is directed at an outcome in the same location as that political action takes place, a variable or causal relationship is easily ‘geo-operationalized’, i.e. tied to a single geographical referent. But when this is not the case, ‘geo-operationalizing’ a variable or a causal relationship requires more reflection, and often in these cases they often should not be solely reduced to a single geographical referent. In the case of ethnic partitioning and conflict, for instance, much relevant conflict caused by this division could take place *outside* of the historical homelands of the ethnic group in question, for instance if separatists motivated by grievances related to the partitioning of their ethnic group undertake terrorist attacks in the capitol city [site] to pressure influential national policymakers to change policy in the area where the partitioned group lives [scale].²²

Despite these limitations, the new research designs made possible by GIS thus allow us to test political science theories in a way that is less vulnerable to omitted variable bias and MAUP biases rooted in how our units of analysis come about. This in turn should make political science more accurate in its explanations. For these two reasons, I believe that almost every branch of political science concerned with empirical analysis can benefit from GIS and spatial awareness.

8.4.2 *GIS and Comparative Politics, International Relations and Public Administration*

The example of Michalopoulos & Papaioannou’s work on the Scramble for Africa is easily translated to much of comparative politics at the micro- and macro-levels. Just to give a few examples, in comparative politics geographically informed studies of party systems, ethnic relations, public goods provision, multilevel governance, and election fraud all present great potential and are beginning to be published (for recent examples, see Ichino & Nathan 2013 and Dinesen & Sønderskov 2015).

In the field of international relations, questions such as the relationship of supra-national organizations to sub-national regions desiring autonomy, the use of strategic maps by diplomats and policy-makers, of national minorities in border regions and the risk of war and many others are equally amenable to the use of GIS. Here as well, disciplinary trends such as the publication of a special issue entitled “Bridging Micro and Macro Approaches on Civil Wars and Political Violence: Issues, Challenges, and the Way Forward” using GIS by the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* in December 2014 indicate that a ‘spatial turn’ is taking place.

²² Including this type of conflict is another advantage to Michalopoulos & Papaioannou of linking their data to the EPR dataset, which records ethnic conflict involving a given group no matter where it takes place (2015: 29).

In contrast, the research done in the sub-discipline of public administration so far has perhaps been touched the least by the possibilities unleashed by GIS. This near-absence of research in public administration using GIS is somewhat paradoxical: in real-life administration at municipal, provincial and national levels GIS tools are ubiquitous and used in planning to determine the locations of new schools, hospitals, roads and other types of infrastructure. Equally, they are used to manage existing infrastructure and improve local public service provision.²³ Furthermore, a large literature in public administration is concerned with analyzing governance and policy networks of bureaucrats and agencies (O'Toole 1997; 2014), which are highly conditioned by geographical distance. Taken together, this implies that there is a large potential for such studies, that there quite possibly 'low-hanging fruit' to be picked in the field of public administration, and that scholars could benefit from embracing a spatial mindset and the tools of GIS.

8.5 Conclusion

In this article, I have argued that all political actors and political action are ultimately grounded in geographical space. For this reason, political science can progress further if we as its practitioners adopt a spatial mindset and avail ourselves of the possibilities inherent in geographic information systems for testing existing theories in new ways. While comparative politics and international relations are beginning to incorporate space in their analyses, however, its potential is still underexplored, and research public administration is notably lagging behind. Therefore, I have highlighted an example of geographically informed research that I believe advances political science and given examples of where we still have work to do that can be helped along by GIS.

In furthering political science, I have laid my emphasis on the possibilities furnished by GIS to test existing theories through new data and new research designs. However, I believe spatial awareness may also help us as political scientists in theory-building: firstly, in theoretically incorporating political phenomena that our focus on countries and individuals have concealed, and secondly in theoretically integrating hierarchical linkages between actors at local, intermediate, national and international levels as well as horizontal linkages between actors at the same levels. This would make our theories more complete and likely also more accurate.

Taking this task to the example of the Scramble for Africa for the last time, thinking about a number of questions may make our theory of the long-run effects of European-imposed borders more complete: local conflict and inequality is likely shaped by subnational political contexts, so how do subnational civil servants and political officials (elected or appointed) seek to prevent or stoke the flames of conflict? How does local government mitigate or exacerbate ethnic inequality? And what interests do national governments have in shaping these local governance outcomes? Another question concerns the drawing of *subnational* boundaries. Do these follow ethnic boundaries, and when they do, does this make conflictual outcomes in partitioned ethnicities more or less likely? In Ethiopia since 1994, the introduction of ethno-federalism meant the redrawing of subnational first-level administrative boundaries in accordance with the locations of large ethnic groups (including the Eastern-most Somali

²³ See for instance "The Mayor's Geek Squad", *The New York Times*, March 23rd 2013, on the use of GIS data in New York City's Office of Policy and Strategic Planning under previous mayor Michael Bloomberg.

regional state), providing subnational political leaders with institutional resources that may in part be used in conflicts. This happened after a destructive civil war, but from 1998-2003 and again from 2006-2009 Ethiopian-Somali conflict in and outside of Ethiopian territory has fulminated (Kefale 2013).

Although the Ethiopian boundaries are likely more 'natural' in having been negotiated gradually between the indigenous Abyssinian kingdom and various European powers, thinking spatially about political action in between the individual and the national level and linkages between national and local political officials as well as between local political officials and individual citizens may help us in locating some of causal mechanisms that connect ethnic partitioning and conflict.

Contemporary politics are inextricably linked with space and geography, as has been explored by historians, area specialists and qualitative scholars directly and indirectly since the infancy of political science. Yet, the possibilities unlocked by GIS allow quantitative scholars to enrich such detailed, narrative research with systematic testing and let qualitative scholars add yet another source of information to their in-depth accounts of complex political phenomena. In addition to empirical and theoretical advances, an increased appreciation of geography may then also further better integration between quantitative and qualitative research in political science.

8.6 Literature

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