

Authoritarian States: Economic and Political Change

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Bachelor's level: 10 ECTS

Master's level: 7,5 ECTS

Content

After the massive democratization since 1989, formal attributed of democracy such as holding multiparty elections have become less important in distinguishing societies in which elites are held accountable to their citizens and in which this is not the case. Therefore, this course seeks to explore authoritarian states, their differing rates of survival, change to and from authoritarian states, and the relationship between economics and politics in such societies.

Both the fall of communism and the Arab Spring have exposed systematic differences in the survival of authoritarian regimes. Why do some stable authoritarian states survive international trends towards democratization, while others fall and establish new democracies, hybrid regimes or new, unstable authoritarian regimes? More broadly, how should we think about regime differences in authoritarian societies – for instance between Putin's Russia, Communist Party-ruled China, the military junta government in Burma or near-anarchy in the so-called Democratic Republic of the Congo after the fall of Mobutu Sese Seko in 1997? This course introduces students to a literature concerning variation in the institutional structure of authoritarian states that amongst other things is concerned with the implications of such differences for regime endurance and economic outcomes.

The course will be organized along four main modules:

1. Authoritarian and democratic breakdown: gradual and sudden change
2. Authoritarian institutions: repression, legislatures, parties, elections – and their consequences
3. Sub-national pockets of authoritarianism in democracies and of democracy in authoritarian states
4. Agency and leadership: how much do individual leaders matter, and how can political change be effectuated?

Learning Outcome

The aim of the course is to bring students up to date with the latest research on why some authoritarian states last and others collapse and how politics function in non-democracies. This also involves examining the consequences of differences in authoritarian institutions for economic development.

While independent empirical analysis is not required to pass the course, the student will be exposed to and gain a strong familiarity with empirical work, quantitative as well as qualitative. Thereby, the student will get a practical feel for fundamental and general problems of empirical work (such as correlation vs causation) and will be exposed to practical methods of circumventing these problems. Overall, the course will improve the student's ability to critically assess, understand and question empirical work in other academic fields or in professional applications.

The course is relevant for all students with an interest in comparative politics, political economy, international political economy (IPE), political history, economic development, as well as applied large-N/statistical analyses.

Teaching and learning methods

The course will be a mix of lectures and discussions of the day's topics – with the weight on interactive lectures.

Academic qualifications

The course can be taken with a basic grounding in comparative politics and quantitative methodology from the bachelor's degree in political science and an interest in the origins of cross-country differences in levels of democracy and development. The course, however, is also related to the course 'Democracy, The State and International Development' taught by Rasmus Fonnesbæk Andersen & Jacob Gerner Hariri in the fall of 2014, and we will make reference to literature explored therein, although this will not form part of the curriculum or be required for the exam.

Exam: 15 page written assignment on independently chosen research question relating to questions studied in this course.

1. Course Introduction, Methods and Relation to Last Semester's Course JGH

- Lieberman, E. (2005). "Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research." *American Political Science Review*, p. 435-451.
- Seawright, J. (2013). *Integrative Multimethod Research*, chap. 1, mimeo.
http://berkeleyroundtable.weebly.com/uploads/2/1/9/9/21997192/seawright_multi-method_book_chap_1.pdf
- Hariri, Jacob (2012): "The Autocratic Legacy of Early Statehood", *American Political Science Review* 106(3).

Additional reading (not required)

- Hariri, Jacob (2012): "Kausal inferens i statskundskaben", *Politica*, 44(2): 184-201
- Winship & Morgan (1999): "The Estimation of Causal Effects from Observational Data." *Annual Review of Sociology*, pp. 659-687 (note, not entire article)

2. From Representative Institutions to Modern Democracy JGH

- Przeworski, Adam (2009). "Conquered or Granted? A History of Suffrage Extensions." *British Journal of Political Science*, 39(2): 291–321.
- Aidt & Jensen: "Workers of the World Unite! Franchise Extensions and the Threat of Revolutions in Western Europe, 1820-1938."

- Przeworski (2010): *Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government*, pp. 17-43.
- Aldrich, John (1995): *Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America*. pp. 28-61.

Additional reading (not required)

- Acemoglu, D. & J. Robinson (2000). "Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality and Growth in Historical Perspective" *QJE*, pp. 1167-1199

3. Civil Liberties, Political, and Social Rights **JGH**

- Møller, J. and Skaaning, S.-E. (2010). "Marshall Revisited: The Sequence of Citizenship Rights in the Twenty-first Century." *Government and Opposition*, 45: 457-483. doi: 10.1111/j.1477-7053.2010.01326.x
- Meltzer, Allan H. and Scott F. Richards (1981): "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government", *The Journal of Political Economy*, 89(5): 914-27.
- Roehmer, John E. (1998): "Why the Poor Do Not Expropriate the Rich: An Old Argument in New Garb", *Journal of Public Economics*, 70: 399-403.

4. Conceptualizing and Measuring Varieties of Authoritarianism **RFA April 13th**

- Bech Seeberg, M. (2013). "Authoritarianism and Elections during the Third Wave." *Statsvetenskaplig Tidsskrift*, 115 (4): 313-337
- Levitsky, Steven & Lucan Way (2010). *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-20
- Gandhi, J. (2008). *Political Institutions under Dictatorship*. Cambridge University Press, pp. 7-34
- Geddes, Barbara; Joseph Wright & Erica Frantz (2014). "Autocratic Regimes and Transitions." *Perspectives on Politics*. 12(2): forthcoming. 1-34.

Additional reading (not required)

- Geddes, Barbara (1999). "What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 2 (1): 115-44.
- Svobik, Milan W. (2012). *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-18

5. Authoritarian Institutions: Repression, Legislatures and Personalist Rule **RFA**

- Gandhi, J. (2008): *Political Institutions under Dictatorship*. Cambridge University Press, pp. xv-xxiv, 34-41; 73-82
- Svobik, Milan W. (2012). *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 53-63; 75-81; 196-202
- Abramson, Scott F. & C.V. Rivera (2013). "Time is Power. Leader Duration, Elite Reproduction and Political Stability in Non-Democracies", mimeo, pp. 1-34.
- King, G.; J. Pan & M.E. Roberts (2013). "How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism But Silences Collective Expression." *American Political Science Review*, 107(2):1-18
- Frye et al. (2014). "Political Machines at Work. Voter Mobilization and Electoral Subversion in the Workplace." *World Politics*, 195-228

6. Authoritarian Institutions: Ruling Parties, Elections and Clientelism **RFA**

- Magaloni, Beatriz (2006). *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico*. Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-43.
- Jason Brownlee (2007). *Durable Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization*. Cambridge University Press, pp. 10-15, 32-43
- Lust, Ellen. 2009. "Competitive Clientelism in the Middle East." *Journal of Democracy* 20 (3): 122-135.
- Susan C. Stokes, Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno, and Valeria Brusco (2013). *Brokers, Voters and Clientelism*. Cambridge University Press, pp. 36-54; 96-129

Additional reading (not required)

- Brancati, D. (2014). "Democratic Authoritarianism. Origins and Effects." *Annual Review of Political Science*, pp. 1-14

7. Authoritarian Institutions: Consequences and Endogeneity **RFA**

- Charron, Nicholas, and Victor Lapuente. 2011. "Which Dictators Produce Quality of Government?" *Studies in Comparative International Development* 46 (4): 397-423.

- Wright, Joseph. 2008. "Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain? How Legislatures Affect Economic Growth and Investment." *American Journal of Political Science* 52 (2): 322–343.
- Pepinsky, T. (2014): "The Institutional Turn in Comparative Authoritarianism." *British Journal of Political Science*, 44 (3): 631–653.

Additional reading (not required)

- Easterly, W. (2011). "Benevolent Dictators" Mimeo.

8. Authoritarian Breakdown: Elites **RFA**

- O'Donnell, G. & P. Schmitter (1986). *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, pp. 15-48.
- Mainwaring, S. & A. Pérez-Liñán (2014). *Democracies and Dictatorships in Latin America. Emergence, Survival and Fall*. Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-28; 76-91.
- Marinov, N. & H. Goemans (2014). "Coups and Democracy", *British Journal of Political Science*, 44 (4):799-820

Additional reading (not required)

- Elisabeth Wood, "An Insurgent Path to Democracy: Popular Mobilization, Economic Interests and Regime Transition in South Africa and El Salvador." *Comparative Political Studies* (October 2001).
- Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van de Walle, "Neopatrimonial, Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa," *World Politics* 46, No. 4 (July 1994), pp. 453-489.

9. Authoritarian Breakdown: Masses and Thresholds **JGH**

- Kuran, T. (1991): "The East European Revolutions: Is It Surprising that We Were Not Surprised?" *AER-P&P*, pp. 121-125.
- Kuran, Timur. 1991. "Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989." *World Politics*, 44(1): 7-48.
- Granovetter, M. (1978). "Threshold Models of Collective Behavior." *American Journal of Sociology*, 83 (6): 1420-1443
- Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Michael D. Ward (2006). "Diffusion and the International Context of Democratization." *International Organization*, 60 (4): 911-933.

Johan A. Elkins (2011), "The International Diffusion of Democracy", *Comparative Political Studies*, 44 (12): 1651-1674

Additional reading (not required)

- Schelling, T. (1978). *Micromotives and Macrobehavior*, New York: V.W. Norton

10. Democratic Breakdown **RFA**

- Linz, Juan J. (1978). *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration. An Introduction*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 3-86

Additional reading (not required)

- Capoccia, Giovanni (2001). "Defending Democracy: Strategies of Reaction to Political Extremism in Inter-War Europe." *European Journal of Political Research*, 39 (4): 431-460.

11. Sub-National Regime Variation in Democracies **RFA**

- Gibson, Edward L. (2013). *Boundary Control: Subnational Authoritarianism in Federal Democracies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-7; 9-34, 148-172

Additional reading (not required)

- Andersen, R.F. (2015). "Measuring Sub-National Regime Differences: Two New Measures." Mimeo
- Gibson, Edward L. (2013). *Boundary Control: Subnational Authoritarianism in Federal Democracies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chap. 3-5
- Gervasoni (2010). "A Rentier Theory of Subnational Regimes. Fiscal Federalism, Democracy, and Authoritarianism in the Argentine Provinces." *World Politics*, pp. 302-332

12. Sub-National Regime Variation under Authoritarianism **RFA**

- Gilley, B. (2010). "Democratic Enclaves in Authoritarian Regimes" *Democratization* 17:3: 389-415
- Malesky, Edmund and Paul Schuler (2010) "Nodding or Needling: Analyzing Delegate Responsiveness in an Authoritarian Parliament." *American Political Science Review*. 104(3): 482-502.

13. Agency and Leadership: How Much and How Do Individual Leaders Matter? **RFA**

- Jones, Benjamin F. & Benjamin A. Olken (2005). "Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth Since World War II." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 120 (3): 835–64.
- Landry, P. (2008). *Decentralized Authoritarianism in China. The Communist Party's Control of Local Elites in the Post-Mao Era*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-27
- Jia, R.; M. Kudamatsu & D. Seim (2014). "Political Selection in China. The Complementary Roles of Connections and Performance." Mimeo. 1-37
- Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan Way (2012). "[Beyond Patronage: Ruling Party Cohesion and Authoritarian Stability](#)." *Perspectives on Politics* 10(4) p. 869-889.

14. How Can Political Change Be Effectuated from Outside?

- Levitsky, Steven & Lucan Way (2010). *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 37-54
- Tolstrup, J. (2014). "Black Knights and Elections in Authoritarian Regimes: Why and How Russia Supports Authoritarian Incumbents in Post-Soviet States." *European Journal of Political Research*, pp. 1-18
- Jha, S. (2012). "Financial Innovations and Political Development. Evidence from Revolutionary England." Mimeo. 1-26; 39-54
- Wright, J. (2009). "How Foreign Aid Can Foster Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes." *American Journal of Political Science*, 53(3): 552–571

Additional reading (not required)

- Lankina & Getachew (2006). "A Geographic Incremental Theory of Democratization. Territory, Aid and Democracy", *World Politics*, 536-582
- Ryan Jablonski (2014). "How Aid Targets Votes: The Impact of Electoral Incentives on Foreign Aid Distribution." *World Politics*.